Monday, August 15, 2016

Texas Attorney General Opinion: Prayer to Start Court Is Constitutional

Controversial Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton has issued an opinion today that the First Amendment's Establishment Clause is not violated if court were opened with a prayer.  He stated:

A court would likely conclude that a Justice of the Peace's practice of opening daily court proceedings with a prayer by a volunteer chaplain as you describe is sufficiently similar to the facts in Galloway such that the practice does not violate the Establishment Clause.

Galloway is the United States Supreme Court's sharply divided 2014 opinion in Town of Greece v. Galloway which involved a town board meeting. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Galloway repeated referred to the issue as whether the "legislative prayer" approved by the Court in Marsh v. Chambers (1983) as part of a historical practice extended to a local legislature, despite the fact that some non-legislative functions occurred at the town board.  In the dissent for four Justices, Justice Kagan essentially argued that a prayer at the beginning of a trial was clearly unconstitutional.  Indeed, in his separate concurring opinion, Justice Alito seemingly agreed:

I am troubled by the message that some readers may take from the principal dissent’s rhetoric and its highly imaginative hypotheticals. For example, the principal dissent conjures up the image of a litigant awaiting trial who is asked by the presiding judge to rise for a Christian prayer, of an official at a polling place who conveys the expectation that citizens wishing to vote make the sign of the cross before casting their ballots, and of an immigrant seeking naturalization who is asked to bow her head and recite a Christian prayer. Although I do not suggest that the implication is intentional, I am concerned that at least some readers will take these hypotheticals as a warning that this is where today’s decision leads—to a country in which religious minorities are denied the equal benefits of citizenship.

Nothing could be further from the truth. All that the Court does today is to allow a town to follow a practice that we have previously held is permissible for Congress and state legislatures. In seeming to suggest otherwise, the principal dissent goes far astray.

At least for Attorney General Ken Paxton,  Justice Kagan's hypothetical was not as "highly imaginative" as Justice Alito averred.  Paxton's opinion recognizes that the only United States Circuit court opinion to directly consider the issue, North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy (4th Cir. 1991), found opening court with prayers unconstitutional, but Paxton opines "other courts deciding the issue may disagree with Constangy that prayer in judicial settings lacks historical foundation."  Thus, Paxton states that "a Justice of the Peace's practice of opening daily court proceedings with a prayer by a volunteer chaplain," would  not violate the Establishment Clause.

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[image: Henry VIII at prayer with Black Book of the Garter via ]

 

August 15, 2016 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Interpretation, Religion, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 14, 2016

Agency Power, Executive Power, and Gender Equality in School Bathrooms

While the constitutional issues are not front and center in the controversies and litigation over gender identity and school bathroom access, the disputes certainly implicate constitutional issues of equal protection, federalism, unconstitutional conditions, and executive/agency as well as judicial powers.

A Virginia school board has filed a stay application in the United States Supreme Court pending a petition for writ of certiorari to the Fourth Circuit's opinion in G.G. v. Glouster County School Board.  In G.G., a divided panel, reversing the senior district judge, concluded that Title IX's ban on sex discrimination,  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a), requires schools to provide transgender students access to restrooms congruent with their gender identity. (The senior district judge had not reached the Equal Protection claim, so it was not before the Fourth Circuit.)  In construing Title IX, the Fourth Circuit relied upon a January 7, 2015 opinion letter from the United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, with a similar conclusion.  The Fourth Circuit accorded deference to the agency interpretation of Title IX under Auer v. Robbins (1997), because the relevant regulation was ambiguous - - - perhaps not in the plain meaning, but in its application:

Although the regulation may refer unambiguously to males and females, it is silent as to how a school should determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms. We conclude that the regulation is susceptible to more than one plausible reading because it permits both the Board’s reading— determining maleness or femaleness with reference exclusively to genitalia—and the Department’s interpretation—determining maleness or femaleness with reference to gender identity. [citation omitted].  It is not clear to us how the regulation would apply in a number of situations—even under the Board’s own “biological gender” formulation. For example, which restroom would a transgender individual who had undergone sex-reassignment surgery use? What about an intersex individual? What about an individual born with X-X-Y sex chromosomes? What about an individual who lost external genitalia in an accident? The Department’s interpretation resolves ambiguity by providing that in the case of a transgender individual using a sex-segregated facility, the individual’s sex as male or female is to be generally determined by reference to the student’s gender identity.

The Fourth Circuit panel rejected G.G.'s request to have the case reassigned to another district judge, but did reverse, vacate, and remand the district court's order dismissing the complaint.  The Fourth Circuit panel, in an unpublished opinion on July 12, denied the school board's motion for a stay pending appeal, again with one dissent. 

The stay application in the United States Supreme Court pending a petition for writ of certiorari argues that the Fourth Circuit's opinion in an "extreme example" of judicial deference to an administrative agency and is the "perfect vehicle" for the Court's reconsideration of Auer v. Robbins (1997).  The motion notes that several Justices have signaled such a reconsideration might be warranted, notably the late Justice Scalia, as well as Alito and Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts.  The application also argues that the DOE and DOJ have "seized momentum" and issued further instructions (citing a May 13 DOE  "Dear Colleagues" Letter) which would further solidify Auer deference, making action by the Court necessary.

Meanwhile, thirteen states have filed a complaint and application for preliminary injunction in Texas, based on the same letter:

On May 13, 2016, following years of incremental preambles (“guidances,” “interpretations,” and the like), Defendants informed the nation’s schools that they must immediately allow students to use the bathrooms, locker rooms and showers of the student’s choosing, or risk losing Title IX-linked funding. And employers that refuse to permit employees to utilize the intimate areas of their choice face legal liability under Title VII. These new mandates, putting the federal government in the unprecedented position of policing public school property and facilities, inter alia, run roughshod over clear lines of authority, local policies, and unambiguous federal law.

The central challenge is failure to conform with the Administrative Procedure Act, including notice and comment for rule-making.  However, the complaint also alleges that the federal government defendants "violated the Spending Clause" by engaging in "unconstitutional coercion" by "economic dragooning."  The complaint relies on that portion of the "Obamacare" case, NFIB v. Sebelius, in which a plurality found constitutional issues with the medicaid expansion program.
This portion of the complaint is less than 2 pages (in a 39 page document) and is cursory at best, although perhaps these arguments have the potential to be developed.
 
In short, it seems issues of gender-identity will be the subject of much litigation, perhaps even at the United States Supreme Court, in the next few years.
 
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[image via]

July 14, 2016 in Cases and Case Materials, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Executive Authority, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Gender, Interpretation, Sexuality, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 11, 2016

Daily Read: Black Lives Matter, Respectability Politics, and News Reporting

In a just-published article, Black Lives Matter and Respectability Politics in Local News Accounts of Officer-Involved Civilian Deaths: An Early Empirical Assessment, 2016 Wisconsin Law Review 541, ConLawProf Osagie K. Obasogie (pictured below) and UC Hastings law student Zachary Newman present a compelling discussion of how news media - - - and by extension the general public - - - engage in the politics of respectability with regard to allegations of police misconduct, focusing on the conduct or character of the victim. 

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The authors argue that although " sustained media attention to Black Lives Matter may lead some to conclude that journalists have become more sensitive to how respectability politics can lead to inaccurate reporting and encourage more balanced descriptions of these events, our qualitative assessment of the selected data suggests that journalists’ reporting of these incidents continues to reflect a troubling respectability politics that minimizes the lives lost and overstates the legitimacy of police use of deadly force."

In looking at news reports from 2013 until July 2015, the authors conclude that

overall, as a qualitative matter, there is a notable discursive consistency across pre– and post–Black Lives Matter reporting on officer-involved killings, suggesting that the movement’s concerns over race and respectability are not reflected in journalists’ accounts. This overall finding is empirically supported by three persistent themes throughout the data: (1) a strong commitment to colorblindness in discussing the race of the parties involved, (2) the dominance of the police perspective in reporting these incidents, and (3) continued use of criminalizing language unrelated to the incident itself to characterize the victim’s respectability.

The authors insights could be extended to more recent events, including those of this past week, which will be sure to still be on the minds of law students in our classes and  this article could be a great introductory reading for 1L students.

Additionally, more must-read discussions of respectability politics including the events of the last week is over at Race and the Law Prof Blog, including Atiba Ellis's, On Respectability, the Dallas Shootings, #BlackLivesMatter, and Reasoned Discourse which links to that blog's online symposium on Respectability Politics.

July 11, 2016 in Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, Interpretation, News, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, May 7, 2016

Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore Charged with Judicial Misconduct Based on Same-Sex Marriage Rulings

The continuing saga of the controversial Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Justice Roy S. Moore, has taken another turn with a complaint against him filed by the Judicial Inquiry Commission of the State of Alabama, in the special Court of the Judiciary. [While the entire complaint is almost 300 pages, more than 250 pages are devoted to the 17 appendixes of supporting documents including opinions and letters].

As the complaint notes, this is not the first time that Justice Roy Moore has been before the Court of the Judiciary: the court removed him from office in 2003 for violation of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics for failure to obey an injunction from a federal district court.  (He was re-elected in 2013.) While that earlier controversy revolved around the placement of the Ten Commandments in the courthouse, the present one concerns Justice Moore's actions on same-sex marriage.  As the complaint summarizes it, Chief Justice Moore's pertinent conduct "involves the interplay of four cases":

 The complaint gives a good chronology of the various events which have been contentious.  As we previously noted, the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a judicial ethics complaint after Chief Justice Moore penned a letter to the Governor arguing that the state should not - - - and need not - - - comply with the federal order on same-sex marriage.

One of the more interesting aspects of the ethics charges is this:

On January 6, 2016—despite the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Obergefell, despite the United States District Court's injunction against all Alabama probate judges that specifically enjoined them from obeying any contrary order of the Alabama Supreme Court, and despite the Eleventh Circuit's October 20, 2015 order recognizing the abrogation of API by Obergefell—Chief Justice Moore, under the guise of his administrative authority as Chief Justice, unilaterally issued an Administrative Order to all probate judges that they continue to have a ministerial duty under API to enforce the Alabama marriage laws against same-sex couples.   His Administrative Order states in part:

IT IS ORDERED AND DIRECTED THAT: Until further decision by the Alabama Supreme Court, the existing orders of the Alabama Supreme Court that Alabama probate judges have a ministerial duty not to issue any marriage license contrary to the Alabama sanctity of Marriage Amendment or the Alabama Marriage Protection Act remain in full force and effect.

[paragraph 38].  In paragraph 3, the complaint stated "Significant to the context of this matter is that the vast majority of probate judges in this state are not licensed to practice law."  However, the probate judges would be bound by the Canons of Judicial Ethics; the complaint alleges that Moore "flagrantly disregarded and abused his authority as chief administrative officer of Alabama's judicial branch by "ordering or appearing to order" the probate judges not to obey the federal district court's injunction and thus ordering the probate judges to commit violations of the Canons of Judicial Ethics "knowingly subjecting them to potential prosecution and removal from office."

Thus, it is not only Moore's own refusal to abide by federal interpretations of the United States Constitution, but his ordering of subordinates to do so that are included in the six specific charges against him, all of which involve alleged violations of Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, which, broadly stated are:

  • Canon 1.     A judge should uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.
  • Canon 2.     A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.
  • Canon 3.     A judge should perform the duties of his office impartially and diligently.

Chief Justice Moore has reportedly been suspended, pending the decision of the Alabama Court of the Judiciary, which is composed of judges, lawyers, and lay persons, and has the power to remove the Justice.  Interestingly, appeal from the Alabama Court of the Judiciary is to Supreme Court of Alabama.

 

 

video via

May 7, 2016 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Interpretation, Recent Cases, Sexual Orientation, State Constitutional Law, Supremacy Clause, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Congressional Research Service on Supreme Court Nominee Merrick Garland

Congressional Research Service Reports are almost always a terrific resource and this new one - - - Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court  by Andrew Nolan, Kate M. Manuel, and Brandon J. Murrill - - - is no exception.  At almost 80 pages, with numerous footnotes, as well as two tables and an appendix, it is a wealth of information and analysis.

For example, here's an excerpt regarding Garland's views on campaign finance and the First Amendment:

While serving on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Garland has ruled in a number of major free speech cases. In particular, because the D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over certain election law appeals,454 the bulk of these matters have involved free speech issues arising in the context of campaign finance regulations and rules governing political parties.455 Perhaps most significantly, Judge Garland wrote the opinion for a unanimous en banc court in Wagner v. FEC,456 upholding the prohibition on campaign contributions by certain federal government contractors457 against a challenge under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment.. . . Perhaps revealing aspects of Judge Garland’s views on the constitutionality of campaign finance regulation more broadly, the opinion deferred to Congress’s judgment on how best to serve the government’s interests. . . . .  In contrast, judicial deference to congressional determinations has arguably not been as evident in the Supreme Court’s more recent campaign finance jurisprudence.463 At the same time, because of the unanimity of the Wagner decision and the decision’s relatively narrow scope, it may be difficult to draw any firm conclusions regarding Judge Garland’s views on judicial deference toward congressional determinations respecting campaign restrictions from the Wagner decision, in and of itself.

Nonetheless, in another context, Judge Garland generally took a favorable view of the regulation of federal lobbyists. Specifically, in National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) v. Taylor,464 he authored a unanimous opinion rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a federal lobbying disclosure law. The court found no evidence of harassment connected to lobbying disclosures465 that might justify more skepticism with regard to the disclosure requirements, and, in a display of deference to Congress arguably like that in Wagner, ultimately concluded that there was “no reason why Congress cannot enact a scheme that plausibly yields a significant portion of the information it seeks.”466

On the other hand, during Judge Garland’s tenure on the D.C. Circuit, the appellate court issued a well-known campaign finance ruling that resulted in the establishment of super PACs, political committees that spend independently of any candidate or party and are permitted to receive unlimited contributions.467 In SpeechNow.org v. FEC,468 Judge Garland joined, but did not author, a unanimous en banc opinion holding that limits on contributions to groups that make only independent expenditures are unconstitutional.469

 [footnote text omitted].

Other sections relating to the constitution include the Religion Clauses, Second Amendment, Separation of Powers, Federalism, Substantive Due Process, and Criminal Law and Procedure.

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While the Report cautions "that, at least as a historical matter, attempting to predict how particular Supreme Court nominees may approach their work on the High Court based on their previous experience is a task fraught with uncertainty," since Garland's nomination there has been reference to his opinions on the DC Circuit. 

This CRS Report provides a wealth of information should Garland's nomination be subject to Senate hearings.

 

 

May 3, 2016 in Interpretation, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Supreme Court Decides First Amendment Protects "Mistaken" Perception of Political Activity by Public Employee

In its relatively brief opinion in Heffernan v. City of Paterson, NJ, the Court decides that the First Amendment is applicable when a government employer takes an adverse employment action against an employee for perceived (but not actual) political activity.  Heffernan, a police officer, was demoted for his perceived political activity: he had decided to stay neutral but was seen picking up a mayoral campaign sign at the request of his "bedridden mother" to "replace a smaller one that had been stolen from her lawn" and was therefore demoted.

The majority opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, began by noting that the First Amendment "generally prohibits"government officials from "dismissing or demoting an employee because of the employee’s engagement in constitutionally protected political activity" and posing the question of whether "the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal difference." 

In determining that the factual mistake is not a critical legal difference, Breyer's 8 page opinion for the Court concludes that it is the "government's reason" that "counts."  Supporting this conclusion is the language of the First Amendment itself: 

Unlike, say, the Fourth Amendment, which begins by speaking of the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects . . . ,” the First Amendment begins by focusing upon the activity of the Government. It says that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”

(This point was made by Justice Ginsburg in oral argument). Additionally, the conclusion focusing on the government's rationale supports the underlying rationale of the rule:

The constitutional harm at issue in the ordinary case consists in large part of discouraging employees—both the employee discharged (or demoted) and his or her colleagues—from engaging in protected activities . . . . The upshot is that a discharge or demotion based upon an employer’s belief that the employee has engaged in protected activity can cause the same kind, and degree, of constitutional harm whether that belief does or does not rest upon a factual mistake.

Finally, Breyer's opinion for the Court noted that the recognition of mistaken employer beliefs will not open the floodgates (or as the Court phrases it "impose significant costs on the employer"), because "the employee will, if anything, find it more difficult to prove that motive, for the employee will have to point to more than his own conduct to show an employer’s intent to discharge or to demote him for engaging in what the employer (mistakenly) believes to have been different (and protected) activities."

In remanding the case, the Court did recognize that Heffernan may have been dismissed under a "different and neutral policy," but did not express its views on that issue.

Dissenting, Justice Thomas joined by Justice Alito - - - in an opinion as long as the one for the Court - - - stressed that Heffernan did not have a constitutional right that had been violated: "The mere fact that the government has acted unconstitutionally does not necessarily result in the violation of an individual’s constitutional rights, even when that individual has been injured." 

In oral argument, Justice Alito had described the issue as being "like a law school hypothetical."  The Court, however, has decisively answered the question in favor of construing the First Amendment to prohibit government "wrongs" rather than requiring the actual exercise of  individual "rights."

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 image via

April 26, 2016 in First Amendment, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, April 8, 2016

First Circuit: Same-Sex Marriage Ruling in Obergefell Applies to Puerto Rico

In a brief per curiam opinion, a panel of the First Circuit essentially reversed the ruling of Senior United States District Judge for the District of Puerto Rico Juan Perez-Gimenez that denied the joint motion for summary judgment in Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla regarding a challenge to Puerto Rico's same-sex marriage ban.

The panel stated:

The district court's ruling errs in so many respects that it is hard to know where to begin. The constitutional rights at issue here are the rights to due process and equal protection, as protected by both the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Obergefell v. Hodges; United States v. Windsor. Those rights have already been incorporated as to Puerto Rico. Examining Bd. Of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero (1976). And even if they had not, then the district court would have been able to decide whether they should be. See Flores de Otero.

In any event, for present purposes we need not gild the lily.  Our prior mandate was clear . . . 

[citations and footnote omitted].

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After quoting its previous opinion, the panel then addressed the procedural posture of the case, noting that the district court "compounded its error (and signaled a lack of confidence in its actions), by failing to enter a final judgment to enable an appeal in ordinary course."  Both parties therefore sought a writ of mandamus, which the court granted and additionally "remitted" the case to the district court "to be assigned randomly by the clerk to a different judge to enter judgment in favor of the Petitioners promptly, and to conduct any further proceedings necessary in this action."

The First Circuit did not explicitly discuss the district judge's conclusions regarding Puerto Rico's status and his argument that under The Insular Cases (1901), territorial incorporation of specific rights is questionable.  But  the First Circuit did cite contrary authority and made clear its disagreement.  The intensity of the disagreement is also made evident by the First Circuit's somewhat unusual instruction that Senior United States District Judge for the District of Puerto Rico Juan Perez-Gimenez be removed from the case.

 

April 8, 2016 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Sexual Orientation, Supremacy Clause, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 7, 2016

United States Supreme Court Reverses Alabama Supreme Court's Denial of Full Faith and Credit to Lesbian "Second-Parent" Adoption

In a brief and straightforward per curiam opinion today in V.L. v. E.L.,  the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Alabama Supreme Court's denial of full faith and credit to a Georgia adoption involving a lesbian couple. 

As we discussed last September when the Alabama Supreme Court's opinion was rendered, it relied in large part on the dissenting opinion of a Georgia Supreme Court in a different case to support its conclusion that the Georgia courts did not have proper "jurisdiction" over the adoption. 

The United States Supreme Court stated that the Alabama Supreme Court's "analysis is not consistent with this Court's controlling precedent." It continued:

Indeed, the Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning would give jurisdictional status to every requirement of the Georgia statutes, since Georgia law indicates those requirements are all mandatory and must be strictly construed. That result would comport neither with Georgia law nor with common sense.

As Justice Holmes observed more than a century ago, “it sometimes may be difficult to decide whether certain words in a statute are directed to jurisdiction or to merits.” Fauntleroyv. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 234–235 (1908). In such cases, especially where the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, a court must be “slow to read ambiguous words, as meaning to leave the judgment open to dispute, or as intended to do more than fix the rule by which the court should decide.” Id., at 235. That time-honored rule controls here. The Georgia judgment appears on its face to have been issued by a court with jurisdiction, and there is no established Georgia law to the contrary. It follows that the Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant that judgment full faith and credit.

That the parties to the case are lesbians - - - "two women who were in a relationship" - - - is made apparent by the United States Supreme Court.  This fact most likely figured largely in the Alabama Supreme Court's original majority ruling given the well-known hostility of its controversial chief justice to sexual minority rights.  However, given Friday's odd dismissal of the same-sex marriage litigation by the Alabama Supreme Court and today's United States Supreme Court definitive and unanimous reversal, it seems as if the opinions of Alabama Supreme Court Justice Greg Shaw (pictured below),  who dissented in E.L. as well as the earlier same-sex marriage opinions, has been vindicated.

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Alabama Supreme Court Justice Greg Shaw

 

March 7, 2016 in Courts and Judging, Family, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Recent Cases, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

Federal Judge Finds No Constitutional Violation in Denying Permit to "Wandering Dago" Food Truck

In her extensive opinion in Wandering Dago, Inc.  v. Desito, United States District Judge for the Northern District of New York Judge Mae D'Agostino granted summary judgment for the government against the First Amendment and Equal Protection claims of "Wandering Dago" resulting from the denial of a permit to operate a food truck at the Empire State Plaza in Albany (pictured below), a facility owned by the state of New York and operated by the state Office of General Services (OGS) under Commissioner RoAnn Desito.

 In the summers of 2013 and 2014, OGS administered "The Empire State Plaza Summer Outdoor Lunch Program," permitting vendors to operate food trucks for limited hours on the plaza, intended to provide "lunch options to the approximately 11,000 State employees who work at Empire State Plaza, as well as for visitors to the Capitol, State Museum, performing arts center" - - - known as The Egg - - - and various monuments and memorials in New York's capital city.  As the list of applicants was being processed, the name "Wandering Dago" attracted attention of OGS employees, one who "recognized the term 'dago' as 'a highly offensive term for Italians,'" and after conducting a "computer search" to determine whether this was true, his conclusion was not only "confirmed" but it was "revealed" that the term has been "used to refer to people of Spanish and Portuguese descent, as well as Italians."  OGS denied the application "on the grounds that its name contains an offensive ethnic slur and does not fit with OGS' policy of providing family-friendly policy."  Wandering Dago's application the next year was similarly rejected.

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The First Amendment claims were primary; the Equal Protection Clause claims having been previously dismissed and warranting little more analysis when re-plead.  On the First Amendment, Judge D'Agostino identified the problem common to so much free speech litigation: this case does not fit neatly into any particular First Amendment "framework."  Thus, Judge D'Agostino engaged in several strands of analysis, most prominently being "forum" analysis, but also government speech, employee (contractor) speech, and commercial speech.

As to forum doctrine, Judge D'Agostino rehearses the well-know different types of forum, ultimately deciding that the forum is a "nonpublic forum."  Key to this conclusion, as is so often true, is the definition of the forum.  For Judge D'Agostino, the forum is not Empire State Plaza, but the lunch program - - - "which happens to take place within the grounds that comprise the Empire State Plaza."  That OGS required permits and controlled the "forum" contributes to this view.

Yet even under a nonpublic forum, the government must be "reasonable" and content/viewpoint neutral.  As to the reasonableness, Judge D'Agostino discounted the fact that the policy was not written or even previously articulated.  Somewhat confusingly, the judge decided that the owners of Dago did not intend to express anything particular by the name, and therefore there could be no viewpoint/content discrimination and similarly found that there was no problem with unbridled discretion.  The judge rejected the applicability of  In Re Simon Shiao Tam, in which the en banc Federal Circuit held that the disparagement provision in Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), barring the the Patent and Trademark Office from registering scandalous, immoral, or disparaging marks, is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment because  it did not involve a forum, but an application of strict scrutiny.  Judge D'Agostino also distinguished cases in which the proprietor was denied the entire opportunity to sell the goods rather than simply not allowed to participate in a particular program.

The particular program aspect supports the judge's conclusion that "government speech" was at issue, relying on Walker v. Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans in which the Court found that Texas's program of specialty license plates was government speech.

While Judge D'Agostino's opinion is well-structured and comprehensive, the analysis regarding content/viewpoint discrimination, no matter the forum type, will most likely be fertile ground for appeal.  On government speech, the case may provide the Second Circuit with an opportunity to clarify the limits of Walker.

March 2, 2016 in Equal Protection, First Amendment, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, February 29, 2016

Supreme Court's Oral Argument in Voisine: Does Justice Thomas believe there is a Second Amendment issue?

Today's oral argument in Voisine v. United States centers on  the statutory construction of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A) which defines a "“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” as an offense that is a misdemeanor AND 

has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.

The relevance of this definitional section is its application to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(9) which makes is a federal crime for anyone "who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence," to "ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce."

At issue in Voisine is whether the misdemeanor crimes involving family offenses that can be satisfied with a reckless mens rea are included the definition.  Virginia Villa, arguing for the petitioners Voisine and Armstrong, stressed statutory definitions but the arguments delved into common law definitions as well.  Arguing for the United States, Assistant Solicitor General Ilana Eisenstein stressed Congressional intent, with Justice Ginsburg surfacing the "rule of lenity." 

But the argument then took a constitutional turn.

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This was prompted by questioning from Justice Thomas (seemingly just as Eisenstadt believed her argument had concluded):

 This Court should continue to interpret Section 922(g)(9) in light of that compelling purpose.

If there are no further questions.

JUSTICE THOMAS: Ms. Eisenstein, one question.

Can you give me ­­ this is a misdemeanor violation. It suspends a constitutional right. Can you give me another area where a misdemeanor violation suspends a constitutional right?

Justice Thomas thereafter made a First Amendment analogy, asked whether the Second Amendment was indefinitely suspended, and pointed out that the underlying misdemeanor need not have involved a firearm.   In considering possible analogies, Justice Kennedy pointed to SORNA which curtails the interstate travel of registered sex offenders.  (Justice Kennedy could have analogized to sex offender cases involving the restrictions on First Amendment rights as well).  Justice Breyer asked whether the Congressional statute was a "reasonable regulation of guns under the Second Amendment given Heller and the other cases with which I disagreed?"  This provoked laughter but was also a poignant reminder that Heller's author was not on the bench given his unanticipated death.  Justice Breyer, however, continued and attempted to make clear that the constitutional question was not clearly before the Court.  It may be before the Court as a matter of constitutional avoidance (the statute should be construed to avoid the constitutional question), but, as Justice Breyer stated:

 So one answer would be, well, maybe so. We aren't facing the constitutional question. We are simply facing the question of what Congress intended. And if this does raise a constitutional question, so be it. And then there will, in a future case, come up with that question. So we ­­ or our point is, we don't have to decide that here.

EISENSTEIN: That's correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE BREYER: Thank you.

EISENSTEIN: If there are no further questions.

 Ilana Eisenstein was then excused by Chief Justice Roberts.

Justice Thomas broke his own well-remarked upon habit of not asking questions during oral argument; it's been a decade since he has.  But as some Court observers has noticed, he did write notes which were passed to Justice Scalia.  It is difficult to not to make a causal connection in this regard.  Moreover, Justice Thomas assumed a more active role in a case seemingly involving Second Amendment rights, an issue which a future Court might reconsider. 

However, as the Court did in another domestic violence case last term,  Elonis v. United States, look for a decision that engages in statutory construction and avoid the constitutional issue.

 

February 29, 2016 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Interpretation, Oral Argument Analysis, Second Amendment, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 24, 2016

Sixth Circuit Finds Ohio's False Campaign Speech Law Violates First Amendment

In a relatively brief opinion in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, a panel of the Sixth Circuit found that Ohio's false campaign statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 3517.21(B)(9),  violates the First Amendment.

Recall that the Sixth Circuit had previously decided that the constitutional challenge was not ripe for review, but that the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed in June 2014.  On remand, District Judge Timothy Black concluded that the statute violated the First Amendment.

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Hannah Trapnel, a Quaker and a pretended prophet. Line engraving after R. Gaywood, 1823, via

The Sixth Circuit panel reasoned that any Sixth Circuit precedent supporting the view that falsehoods were categorically excluded from the First Amendment had been abrogated by United States v. Alvarez,  (the "stolen valor" case).  Instead, the panel found that the Ohio law both targeted core speech and was a content-based regulation, and thus strict scrutiny was applicable.  The Sixth Circuit reasoned that

Ohio’s interests in preserving the integrity of its elections, protecting “voters from confusion and undue influence,” and “ensuring that an individual’s right to vote is not undermined by fraud in the election process” are compelling.

However, the means chosen were not narrowly tailored:

in their (1) timing, (2) lack of a screening process for frivolous complaints, (3) application to non-material statements, (4) application to commercial intermediaries, and (5) over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness.

Additionally, the Sixth Circuit noted:

Ohio’s political false-statements laws have similar features to another Ohio election law that the Supreme Court found unconstitutional. In McIntyre [v. Ohio Elections Committee (1995)] , the Supreme Court struck down Ohio’s election law prohibiting anonymous leafleting because its prohibitions included non-material statements that were “not even arguably false or misleading,” made by candidates, campaign supporters, and “individuals acting independently and using only their own modest resources,” whether made “on the eve of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited,” or months in advance. Ohio’s political false-statements laws have all of the same flaws. Such glaring oversteps are not narrowly tailored to preserve fair elections.

The use of McIntyre is an interesting one because the "right to be anonymous" recognized in McIntyre seemed to rest in part on the government interest in ensuring truthfulness and cited the Ohio campaign falsehoods law in support.

Given that the court did recognize as compelling the government's interests in addressing lies in campaigns, is there any possibility that a government could craft a narrowly tailored regulation?  It seems doubtful.

February 24, 2016 in Campaign Finance, First Amendment, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Ripeness | Permalink | Comments (0)

Daily Read: Justice Scalia on Judicial Appointments as Political Prerogative

On this anniversary of Marbury v. Madison (decided February 24, 1803), and given the current controversies regarding the appointment of Justice Scalia's successor after his unexpected death, Justice Scalia's views on the political nature of judicial appointments, including those to the United States Supreme Court, is worth a read. 

Dissenting in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois (1990), Scalia wrote:

Today the Court establishes the constitutional principle that party membership is not a permissible factor in the dispensation of government jobs, except those jobs for the performance of which party affiliation is an "appropriate requirement." Ante, at 1. It is hard to say precisely (or even generally) what that exception means, but if there is any category of jobs for whose performance party affiliation is not an appropriate requirement, it is the job of being a judge, where partisanship is not only unneeded but positively undesirable. It is, however, rare that a federal administration of one party will appoint a judge from another party. And it has always been rare. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, the new principle that the Court today announces will be enforced by a corps of judges (the Members of this Court included) who overwhelmingly owe their office to its violation. Something must be wrong here, and I suggest it is the Court.

The Court's majority opinion - - - authored by Justice William Brennan, a Democrat appointed to the United States Supreme Court by the Republican President Dwight Eisenhower - - - held that the Illinois governor's practice of implementing certain austerity measures in state government in accordance with political affiliation violated the First Amendment rights of government employees.  Brennan's opinion for the Court notably began:

To the victor belong only those spoils that may be constitutionally obtained. Elrod v. Burns (1976), and Branti v. Finkel (1980), decided that the  First Amendment forbids government officials to discharge or threaten to discharge public employees solely for not being supporters of the political party in power, unless party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the position involved. Today we are asked to decide the constitutionality of several related political patronage practices — whether promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level public employees may be constitutionally based on party affiliation and support. We hold that they may not.

What the Constitution does - - - or does not - - - provide regarding the "spoils" of judicial appointment is being hotly contested.  And in this, Marbury v. Madison may be relevant as more than illustration should the controversy become subject to judicial review.

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John Marshall Statute Outside United States Supreme Court Building via

 

February 24, 2016 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, First Amendment, History, Interpretation, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, February 5, 2016

Justice Souter Upholds Statute Authorizing Public Employee Union by Child Care Workers Against First Amendment Challenge

Justice Souter - - - retired from the United States Supreme Court but sitting by designation on a First Circuit panel - - - declined to extend the Court's decision in Harris v. Quinn to the context of home child care workers in the opinion in D'Agostino v. Baker. 

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Justice David Souter, who served on the United States Supreme Court 1990- 1999

At issue was Massachusetts Gen. Laws ch. 15D, § 17(b), providing that family child care providers "shall be considered public employees . . . solely for the purposes of . . . chapter 150E," the statute authorizing employees in public service to organize for collective bargaining. The majority of the family child care providers chose Service Employees International Union (SEIU) as their exclusive agent for bargaining collectively with the state.  And while the statute did not mandate that any child care provider join the union or contribute any money to the union, the plaintiffs challenged the statute as violating their First Amendment rights, especially free association.

Writing for the unanimous panel, Souter opined that the "disposition of the constitutional claims turns on precedent, and the appellants' principal arguments probe the vitality of that precedent in light of recent developments."  For Souter, the precedents of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977)  and Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight (1984) remain controlling, despite Harris v. Quinn:

But the Harris distinction does not decide this case. While we can agree with the appellants in assuming the comparability of Harris's personal assistants and the child care providers here, the issues at stake in the two cases are different. Unlike the Harris litigants, the appellants are not challenging a mandatory fee; indeed, an agency fee previously enforced against the providers here was eliminated after Harris came down. What Harris did not speak to, however, was the premise assumed and extended in Knight: that exclusive bargaining representation by a democratically selected union does not, without more, violate the right of free association on the part of dissenting non-union members of the bargaining unit. Harris did not hold or say that this rule was inapplicable to "partial" employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement. Harris, in fact, did not so much as mention Knight, and precedent supports applying its rule here.

Souter was not on the Court when it decided Abood, Knight, or Harris.  And of course he is not on the Court as it deliberates Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass'n, which may be the "demise" of public fair share union dues and the rejection of the  precedent on which Souter is relying here.

February 5, 2016 in Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Interpretation, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, January 31, 2016

Daily Read: Kermit Roosevelt on Posner's Latest Book

In the Sunday New York Times Book Review, ConLawProf Kermit Roosevelt reviews Richard Posner's new book, Divergent Paths: The Academy and the Judiciary.    

Roosevelt begins by provocatively asking whether we could dare to even "invent" a character like Richard Posner if he did not exist, flatteringly describing Posner as "arguably America’s greatest living judge."   (A judgment that many might find more than a bit arguable.) 

9780674286030As to the book, Roosevelt has a few criticisms.  Although it is "a valuable contribution to debates over the future of federal courts and law schools alike," its "list of judicial problems and possible academic solutions is long enough to be overwhelming: It includes 55 problems and 48 solutions."  Moreover, some of the criticisms are "overstated."  As to legal scholarship, Roosevelt takes Posner to task for his judgment about the correctness of the now-reviled decision in Korematsu v. United States, upholding a Japanese internment conviction during World War II, and notes that legal scholarship has shown that the government not only over-reacted but was less than candid with the Court.

While Roosevelt has high praise for the book, it does not seem like a must-read. Instead, read Roosevelt's review.

January 31, 2016 in Books, Courts and Judging, History, Interpretation, Race, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

Federal Judge Applies Intermediate Scrutiny in Transgender Equal Protection Claim

Considering a complaint regarding an arrest during the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests, United States District Judge Jed Rakoff has allowed the Equal Protection Clause claim to proceed in his opinion  in Adkins v. City of New York.

 The judge based his opinion on the Second Circuit's 2012 decision in United States v. Windsor (affirmed on other grounds by the United States Supreme Court):

[The Second Circuit in] Windsor held that gay people were a quasi-suspect class on the basis of four factors: gay people have suffered a history of persecution; sexual orientation has no relation to ability to contribute to society; gay people are a discernible group; and gay people remain politically weakened. While transgender people and gay people are not identical, they are similarly situated with respect to each of Windsor’s four factors.

OccupyJudge Rakoff then applied each of the factors (derived from Carolene Products' footnote four) to hold that transgender people are a quasi-suspect class.  Indeed, Judge Rakoff decides that in each of the factors, transgender people more easily meet the factor than "gay people" did at the time of the Second Circuit's decision in Windsor.  For example, on the political weakness factor, Judge Rakoff reasoned:

Fourth, transgender people are a politically powerless minority. “The question is whether they have the strength to politically protect themselves from wrongful discrimination.” Windsor, 699 F.3d at 184. Particularly in comparison to gay people at the time of Windsor, transgender people lack the political strength to protect themselves. For example, transgender people cannot serve openly in the military, see Department of Defense Instruction 6130.03 at 48 (incorporating changes as of September 13, 2011), as gay people could when Windsor was decided. See Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub.L. No. 111–321, 124 Stat. 3515. Moreover, like gay people, it is difficult to assess the degree of underrepresentation of transgender people in positions of authority without knowing their number relative to the cisgender population. However, in at least one way this underrepresentation inquiry is easier with respect to transgender people: for, although there are and were gay members of the United States Congress (since Windsor, in both houses), as well as gay federal judges, there is no indication that there have ever been any transgender members of the United States Congress or the federal judiciary.

In applying intermediate scrutiny, the judge rejected the government's argument that there was an important safety interest by concluding that there were no actual safety concerns according to the allegations of the complaint (taken as true in the procedural posture of the motion to dismiss).  Judge Rakoff continued:

Moreover, defendants cannot argue their actions were substantially related to ensuring plaintiff’s safety when they removed him from an allegedly safe place and caused him injury, albeit minimal injury, by handcuffing him to a wall next to the sole bathroom in the precinct.

The judge found that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, especially given that the Second Circuit's decision in Windsor occurred after the October 2011 Occupy Wall Street protest.  However, the judge found that the City of New York could be held liable under a specific pattern on conduct in the unequal treatment of transgender persons.

Thus, the case moves to settlement as so many of the Occupy arrest cases have done - - - unless New York City chooses to appeal the decision that transgendered individuals merit intermediate scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

[image via]

November 17, 2015 in Equal Protection, Fourteenth Amendment, Gender, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

Second Circuit Upholds New York's Credit Card Surcharge Prohibition

Reversing United States District Judge Jed Rakoff who had declared unconstitutional New York General Business Law § 518 prohibiting sellers from imposing a surcharge on customers who use credit cards, the Second Circuit's opinion in Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman held that the law does not violate either the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause. [UPDATE: The Second Circuit issued an  AMENDED OPINION on December 11, 2015].

The expressive element in the challenge to pricing regulation is not immediately obvious.  But as Judge Debra Ann Livingston's opinion for the unanimous panel explains:

Section 518 does not prohibit all differentials  between the price ultimately charged to cash customers and the price ultimately charged to credit‐card customers; it forbids charging credit‐card customers an additional amount above the regular price that is not also charged to cash customers, but it permits offering cash customers a discount below the regular price that is not also offered to credit‐card customers. (That is, it allows what we have termed “cash discounts.”) To illustrate, if a seller’s regular price is $100, it may not charge credit‐card customers $103 and cash customers $100, but if the seller’s regular price is $103, it may charge credit‐card customers $103 and cash customers $100.

Plaintiffs’ submissions reveal that they are claiming First Amendment protection for two distinct kinds of pricing schemes. First, Plaintiffs aver that they would like to post only a single price for their goods and services and charge more than that price to credit‐card customers, but are prohibited from doing so by Section 518.  (Five Points Academy: “It is not our intention to display two separate prices for each good and service that we offer, but rather to display—with roughly equal prominence—a single set of prices and the credit card surcharge amount.”); (Expressions Hair Design: “We would like to . . . characterize the price difference as  a 3% credit‐card surcharge on top of the listed cash price.”). In other words, Plaintiffs are seeking First Amendment protection for the kind of straightforward single‐sticker‐price scheme that Section 518 clearly prohibits. Second, Expressions Hair Design (the only Plaintiff to do so) currently posts two different prices for its services—one for credit‐card customers and one for cash customers—and fears being prosecuted for characterizing this price differential as a “surcharge,” or for telling its customers that credit costs “more.”

The court is clear that prices are not expressive.  It also rejects the argument that the statute actually bans an expressive label it disfavors ("credit-card discount") while permitting one a label it approves ("cash discount").  As the court explains,

Plaintiffs’ chief error—or, perhaps more accurately, the central flaw in their argument—is their bewildering persistence in equating the actual imposition of a credit‐card surcharge (i.e., a seller’s choice to charge an additional amount above the sticker price to its credit‐card customers) with the words that speakers of English have chosen to describe that pricing scheme (i.e., the term “credit‐card surcharge”).

Yet this was also the error of the district judge who applied the test from Central Hudson and concluded the NY law failed it.

The court also rejected the arguments that the NY statute is unconstitutional as applied to Expressions Hair Design's "dual price" scheme and an overbreadth challenge to other "hypothetical" pricing schemes.  The court found that the New York courts had not ruled on such questions and that Section 518 was "readily susceptible" to a narrowing construction that would eliminate the constitutional issues.  The court declined to certify the question to the New York Court of Appeals.

Finally, the court very succinctly resolved the due process vagueness challenge by finding that the statute had a "core meaning that can reasonably be understood."

Thus, sellers doing business in New York are again constitutionally prohibited from imposing credit card surcharges.  Cash discounts, however, remain permissible.

Prices

September 29, 2015 in Due Process (Substantive), First Amendment, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

Kentucky Court Clerk's "No Marriage License Policy" Going to Sixth Circuit

A few months after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, reversing the Sixth Circuit's opinion, and declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the issue of same-sex marriage is again reaching the Sixth Circuit. 

This time, however, the issue is whether a government employee, a court clerk in Kentucky, can refuse to issue same-sex marriage licenses - - - or any marriage licenses - - - based upon a claim of free exercise of religion.  The claim of religious exemptions from state clerks is not new (consider events in New York in 2011); neither are objections to implementing the Court's decision in Obergefell (consider events in Alabama this summer).  Nevertheless, this controversy has become particularly focused.

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United States District Judge David Bunning's Opinion and Order last week in Miller v. Davis issued a preliminary injunction in favor of April Miller and Karen Roberts, enjoining Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis from applying the "no marriage licenses" policy.  The Judge rejected Davis' First Amendment claims.  First, Judge Bunning found that Governor Beshear's directive to county clerks to issue same-sex marriage licenses was a general law of neutral applicability that "likely does not infringe on Davis' free exercise rights."  Second, Judge Bunning further found that the issuance of the marriage license did not implicate Davis' free speech rights: the issuance of the license, even with the clerk's certification, is not an endorsement and furthermore is quite possibly government rather than individual speech, citing the Court's decision in Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans from last Term.  Judge Bunning also rejected Davis' third  - and perhaps the most interesting - claim based upon Article VI §3 prohibiting a "religious Test" as a qualification for public office.  Davis argued that this prohibition meant that her religious beliefs must be accommodated.  Even as he rejected this interpretation, Judge Bunning drew attention to the "first half" of Article VI §3 requiring state officials to take an oath to defend the United States Constitution. 

Davis predictably sought a stay of the preliminary injunction.  In an Order late yesterday, Judge Bunning denied the stay, including in his 7 page opinion an extensive quote from Obergefell regarding the relationship of religious freedom to same-sex marriage.  Yet Judge Bunning did stay the order denying the stay:

in recognition of the constitutional issues involved, and realizing that emotions are running high on both sides of the debate, the Court finds it appropriate to temporarily stay this Order pending review of Defendant Davis’ Motion to Stay (Doc. # 45) by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.

While decisions to stay and to issue preliminary injunctions involve equitable and other factors, of central prominence is the probable outcome on the merits.  Thus, the Sixth Circuit is again poised to consider, albeit less directly, the issue of same-sex marriage. 

August 18, 2015 in Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Religion, Sexual Orientation, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 1, 2015

Anti-Masking Laws, the Ku Klux Klan, and the First Amendment

 

Reports that Ku Klux Klan (KKK) members are considering a rally in Columbia, South Carolina to support the controversial display of the confederate battle flag evokes images of hooded persons in traditional KKK garb.

However, South Carolina, like many states, has an anti-masking statute,  S.C. 16-7-110, which provides:

No person over sixteen years of age shall appear or enter upon any lane, walk, alley, street, road, public way or highway of this State or upon the public property of the State or of any municipality or county in this State while wearing a mask or other device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such person demand entrance or admission to or enter upon the premises or into the enclosure or house of any other person while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity. Nor shall any such person, while wearing a mask or device which conceals his identity, participate in any meeting or demonstration upon the private property of another unless he shall have first obtained the written permission of the owner and the occupant of such property.

As I've discussed in Dressing Constitutionally, such statutes, sometimes known as anti-KKK statutes, have been upheld against First Amendment challenges.

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"Children with Dr. Samuel Green, Ku Klux Klan Grand Dragon" 1948 via

For example, the similar Georgia statute, passed in 1951 and still in force, makes it a misdemeanor for any person who “wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden, concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer” and is either on public property or private property without permission.  In 1990, the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 674, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (1990) upheld the statute against a First Amendment challenge by Shade Miller, who was arrested for appearing in KKK regalia alone near the courthouse in Gwinnet County, purportedly to protest the anti-mask statute itself.  In addressing Miller’s argument that the statute was overbroad, the court interpreted the statute narrowly, but not so narrowly as to exclude the KKK.  Instead, the court required the mask-wearer to have intent to conceal his identity and further that the statute would  “apply only to mask-wearing conduct when the mask-wearer knows or reasonably should know that the conduct provokes a reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats or violence.”

New York's anti-masking statute, which was not originally prompted by KKK activities but by land revolts before the Civil War, was also upheld against a challenge by the KKK.  In 2004, the Second Circuit panel - - - including now United States Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor - - -decided Church of American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 201 (2d Cir. 2004).  The KKK group had sought an injunction against the statute to allow a demonstration while wearing masks. Rejecting the First Amendment claim, the court agreed that the KKK regalia - - - the robe, hood, and mask - - - met the threshold requirement for expressive speech, but nevertheless separated the mask in its analysis.  In the court’s view, the mask was “redundant” and did “not convey a message independently of the robe and hood.” Moreover, the court opined that mask-wearing was not integral to the expression, but optional even amongst KKK members.  Thus, while the KKK members had a First Amendment right to march, they did not have a First Amendment right to do so wearing their masks.

Should KKK members attempt to demonstrate while wearing their "regalia" that includes hoods that obscures their faces,  the South Carolina masking statute - - - and its constitutionality - - - are sure to be in play. 

 

July 1, 2015 in Association, Criminal Procedure, Current Affairs, Federalism, First Amendment, Fundamental Rights, History, Interpretation, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Speech, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 15, 2015

Daily Reads: On the 800th Anniversary of Magna Carta

According to the usual history, "On June 15, 1215, in a field at Runnymede, King John affixed his seal to Magna Carta. Confronted by 40 rebellious barons, he consented to their demands in order to avert civil war."  The civil war was not successfully averted, but the document has come to symbolize principles of liberties and rights, including as a precursor to the United States Constitution. 

After-restoration-lImportant daily reads to celebrate the anniversary include:

    The document itself, with its specific items regarding freemen, property, writs, and the memorable "No-one is to be taken or imprisoned on the appeal of woman for the death of anyone save for the death of that woman’s husband."

    A good overview is from the BBC magazine, which points outs that most of its provisions applied only to ""Free men" who in 1215 accounted for less than half the population; the rest were serfs, to whom the charter did not apply, as well as women and children.

    ConLawProf Tom Ginsburg's Op-Ed in the New York Times entitled "Stop Revering Magna Carta," in which he argues that the Magna Carta's current status rests on a series of misunderstandings.

    The current celebrations and controversies in "England" including not only commemoration by Queen Elizabeth, but statements by Prime Minister Cameron that Great Britain must "restore" its dedication to "human rights" as evinced in Magna Carta by secession from the European Court of Human Rights and Human Rights Act.

 

June 15, 2015 in Comparative Constitutionalism, History, International, Interpretation | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, June 1, 2015

Should the Supreme Court Grant Certiorari to Federal Courts Declaring State Laws Unconstitutional?

Dissenting in a denial of certiorari today in County of Maricopa, Arizona v. Lopez-Valenzuela, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the Supreme Court should review decisions by lower federal courts invalidating state "constitutional provisions."  At issue in Lopez-Valenzuela is Arizona's "Proposition 100" a ballot measure passed by Arizona voters that amended the state constitution to preclude bail for certain serious felony offenses if the person charged has entered or remained in the United States illegally and if the proof is evident or the presumption great as to the charge. 

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"A magician raising a ghost" circa 1825 via

The Ninth Circuit en banc held the measure unconstitutional as violative of due process, over dissents by Judges Tallman and O'Scannlain.

Justice Thomas notes that

Congress historically required this Court to review any decision of a federal court of appeals holding that a state statute violated the Federal Constitution. 28 U. S. C. §1254(2) (1982 ed.). It was not until 1988 that Congress eliminated that mandatory jurisdiction and gave this Court discretion to review such cases by writ of certiorari. See Pub. Law 100-352, §2, 102 Stat. 662.

More provocatively, Justice Thomas implicitly evokes the "Ghost of Lochner" by pointing out that the Ninth Circuit's decision rested on substantive due process grounds and quoting from West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379, 391 (1937) and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 537–538 (1934), which specifically disapproved Lochner v. New York (1905). 

For Justice Thomas, the Court's refusal to grant certiorari is "disheartening," : "there are not four Members of this Court who would even review the decision below."  (Note that Justice Alito also dissented, although he did not join Justice Thomas's opinion, for a total of three Justices who would have granted certiorari). 

For Justice Thomas, the Court's "indifference to cases such as this one will only embolden the lower courts to reject state laws on questionable constitutional grounds."

June 1, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Criminal Procedure, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Federalism, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1)