Friday, April 24, 2015
Before 2011, Arizona law required that voter registration forms include a blank space for the registrant’s party preference. But a 2011 law required the voter registration form distributed by the Arizona Secretary of State to list the two largest parties (as measured by number of registered voters) on the form, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-152(A)(5).
In response to the amendment, the Arizona Secretary of State revised box 14 on the Registration Form, and the opinion includes this illustration:
Minority parties Arizona Green Party and the Arizona Libertarian Party challenged the new law as violative of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In its opinion in Arizona Libertarian Party v. Bennett, the Ninth Circuit upheld the statute as constitutional.
The panel majority opinion by Judge Tashima noted the intertwining of the equality and First Amendment claims:
“Restrictions on voting can burden equal protection rights as well as ‘interwoven strands of liberty’ protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments—namely, the ‘right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.’”
It stated that the party challenging the law bears “the initial burden of showing that [the state’s] ballot access requirements seriously restrict the availability of political opportunity" and that here any burden was de minimis. The panel thus applied rational basis scrutiny which the new form easily passed.
Concurring, Judge McKeown argued that the rational basis review burden-shifting standards derived from Ninth Circuit precedent and which the majority applied were "inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to analyzing voting rights challenges." Instead, the court should apply the balancing tests articulated in Burdick v. Takushi (1992) and reiterated in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008), although Judge McKeown acknowledged that the "semantic distinction between the balancing test and the rational basis standard" may make little difference in most cases. Indeed, here Judge McKeown recognized that Arizona's asserted interests in reducing printing costs and easing administrative efficiency are “sufficiently weighty to justify” the speculative burden on the plaintiff minority parties' rights.
Wednesday, April 22, 2015
In a 28 page opinion district judge John Koeltl has granted a preliminary injunction - - - stayed for 30 days - - - requiring New York's transit authority to accept anti-Muslim advertisements on its buses.
The case, American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority (AFDI v. MTA) should be read as part of a series of cases involving often but not always successful attempts to place anti-Muslim adverts in public places. Previously in NYC, a federal judge found the Metropolitan Transit Authority's initial rejection of the advertisements under its (since amended) "civilty standard" to be unconstitutional and the advertisements appeared, causing some NYC residents to engage in "more speech" in reaction to the advertisements. On the contrary, the Sixth Circuit found the rejection of similar advertisements in southern Michigan buses by the governmental authority SMART to be constitutional under its policy prohibiting several categories of advertising including "political or political campaign advertising." Last month, a Philadelphia district judge granted a preliminary injunction in favor of AFDI and found SEPTA's anti-disparagement standard for advertising on its buses, and its rejection of the proffered AFDI advertisement, violates the First Amendment. On the other hand, also last month, the Ninth Circuit upheld the rejection of advertisements proposed by Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign applying a limited public forum doctrine.
Judge Koeltl described the advert, known as the "Killing Jews" ad, as portraying
a menacing-looking man whose head and face are mostly covered by a head scarf. The ad includes a quote from “Hamas MTV”: “Killing Jews is Worship that draws us close to Allah.” Underneath the quote, the ad stated: “That’s His Jihad. What’s yours?”
The MTA determined that the ad violated MTA Standard § (a)(x), prohibiting material “the display of which the MTA reasonably foresees would imminently incite or provoke violence or other immediate breach of the peace.” Thus, the MTA argued that it excluded the Killing Jews ad because it falls into two separate categories of unprotected speech: “fighting words,” under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), and incitement of violence or lawlessness under Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).
Judge Koeltl held that "this case plainly does not present the rare occurrence where one of these seldom-applied categories is met."
Koeltl's reasoning rested on the MTA's failure to show that this particular ad would immediately provoke violence. The judge discounted the MTA's argument that NYC is a preferred "terrorism target" in favor of a view of a multicultural urbanity:
Indeed, the defendants [MTA] underestimate the tolerant quality of New Yorkers and overestimate the potential impact of these fleeting advertisements. It strains credulity to believe that New Yorkers would be incited to violence by ads that did not incite residents of Chicago and San Francisco to similar acts. This is not to minimize the terror threats to New York City, but those threats do not arise from these fleeting advertisements.
Subjecting the advertisement's rejection to strict scrutiny, the judge further held that the exclusion of the Killing Jews ad is not narrowly tailored to achieve any security interests. "Rather than banning an advertisement outright, the transit authorities could run the disputed advertisement with adjacent disclaimers, or counter-advertisements, expressing disagreement with the ad and/or explaining its context," including its parodying of another ad campaign regarding the positive aspects of the word "jihad."
While these "more speech" suggestions are directed to the MTA, New Yorkers have also been known to resort to individualized attempts at "more speech," raising the problem of the MTA's efforts to combat "vandalism."
Thursday, April 16, 2015
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on April 28 in the same-sex marriage cases, now styled as Obergefell v. Hodges, a consolidated appeal from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DeBoer v. Snyder, reversing the district court decisions in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee that had held the same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional, and creating a circuit split.
Recall that the Court certified two questions:
1)Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?
2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?
The case has attracted what seems to be a record number of amicus briefs. As we discussed last year, previous top amicus brief attractors were the same-sex marriage cases of Windsor and Perry, which garnered 96 and 80 amicus briefs respectively, and the 2013 affirmative action case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, which attracted 92. [Note that the "Obamacare" Affordable Care Act cases including 2012's consolidated cases of NFIB v. Sebelius attracted 136 amicus briefs.]
The count for Obergefell v. Hodges stands at 139. 147 [updated: 17 April 2015]
76 amicus briefs support the Petitioners, who contend that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional.
58 66 amicus briefs support the Respondents, who contend that same-sex marriage bans are constitutional.
05 amicus briefs support neither party (but as described below, generally support Respondents).
According to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 37, an amicus curiae brief’s purpose is to bring to the attention of the Court “relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties.” While such a brief “may be of considerable help to the Court,” an “amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.”
An impressive number of the Amicus Briefs are authored or signed by law professors. Other Amici include academics in other fields, academic institutions or programs, governmental entities or persons, organizations, and individuals, often in combination. Some of these have been previously involved in same-sex marriage or sexuality issues and others less obviously so, with a number being religious organizations. Several of these briefs have been profiled in the press; all are linked on the Supreme Court’s website and on SCOTUSBlog.
Here is a quick - - - if lengthy - - - summary of the Amici and their arguments, organized by party being supported and within that, by identity of Amici, beginning with briefs having substantial law professor involvement, then government parties or persons, then non-legal academics, followed by organizations including religious groups, and finally by those offering individual perspectives. [Late additions appear below]Special thanks to City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law Class of 2016 students, Aliya Shain & AnnaJames Wipfler, for excellent research.
April 16, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Establishment Clause, Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Foreign Affairs, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Fundamental Rights, Gender, History, Interpretation, Privacy, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Race, Recent Cases, Reproductive Rights, Scholarship, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Standing, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
In a case with similarities to Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway decided by the United States Supreme Court last year, the Supreme Court of Canada today rendered its judgment in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) finding that a prayer at a municipal council meeting violated the constitution.
S regularly attended the public meetings of the municipal council of the City of Saguenay [Quebec]. At the start of each meeting, the mayor would recite a prayer after making the sign of the cross while saying [translation] “in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit”. The prayer also ended with the sign of the cross and the same words. Other councillors and City officials would cross themselves at the beginning and end of the prayer as well. In one of the council chambers, there was a Sacred Heart statue fitted with a red electric votive light. In another, there was a crucifix hanging on the wall. S, who considers himself an atheist, felt uncomfortable with this display, which he considered religious, and asked the mayor to stop the practice. When the mayor refused, S complained to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. He argued that his freedom of conscience and religion was being infringed, contrary to ss. 3 and 10 of the Quebec Charter, and asked that the recitation of the prayer cease and that all religious symbols be removed from council chambers.
The original Tribunal found the practice unconstitutional, but the Court of Appeal held that the prayer "expressed universal values" and "could not be identified with any particular religion." It also reasoned that the "religious symbols were works of art that were devoid of religious connotation and did not affect the state’s neutrality." According to the Court of Appeal, S had not been discriminated against on the ground of freedom of conscience and religion; any interference with S's beliefs was "trivial or insubstantial."
While some of the issues before the Supreme Court of Canada involved procedural ones regarding the appeal, the Court was clear that the municipality's practice was unconstitutional. Similar to an analysis under the US Constitution's First Amendment, the Supreme Court of Canada grappled with issues such as hostility to religion and the "slippery slope" of other religious practices:
The prayer recited by the municipal council in breach of the state’s duty of neutrality resulted in a distinction, exclusion and preference based on religion — that is, based on S’s sincere atheism — which, in combination with the circumstances in which the prayer was recited, turned the meetings into a preferential space for people with theistic beliefs. The latter could participate in municipal democracy in an environment favourable to the expression of their beliefs. Although non‑believers could also participate, the price for doing so was isolation, exclusion and stigmatization. This impaired S’s right to exercise his freedom of conscience and religion. The attempt at accommodation provided for in the by‑law, namely giving those who preferred not to attend the recitation of the prayer the time they needed to re‑enter the council chamber, had the effect of exacerbating the discrimination. The Tribunal’s findings to the effect that the interference with S’s freedom of conscience and religion was more than trivial or insubstantial were supported by solid evidence, and deference is owed to the Tribunal’s assessment of the effect of the prayer on S’s freedom of conscience and religion.
Barring the municipal council from reciting the prayer would not amount to giving atheism and agnosticism prevalence over religious beliefs. There is a distinction between unbelief and true neutrality. True neutrality presupposes abstention, but it does not amount to a stand favouring one view over another. Moreover, it has not been established in this case that the prayer is non‑denominational. The Tribunal’s findings of fact instead tend toward the opposite result. Be that as it may, the respondents themselves conceded at the hearing that the prayer is nonetheless a religious practice. Even if it is said to be inclusive, it may nevertheless exclude non-believers. As for the proposed analogy to the prayer recited by the Speaker of the House of Commons, in the absence of evidence concerning that prayer, it would be inappropriate to use it to support a finding that the City’s prayer is valid. Finally, the reference to the supremacy of God in the preamble to the Canadian Charter cannot lead to an interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion that authorizes the state to consciously profess a theistic faith. The preamble articulates the political theory on which the Charter’s protections are based. The express provisions of the Canadian Charter and of the Quebec Charter, such as those regarding freedom of conscience and religion, must be given a generous and expansive interpretation. This is necessary to ensure that those to whom these charters apply enjoy the full benefit of the rights and freedoms, and that the purpose of the charters is attained.
The Court explicitly linked the state's duty of neutrality - - - akin to the First Amendment's (anti-)Establishment Clause - - - to the maintenance of a free and democratic society. "This pursuit requires the state to encourage everyone to participate freely in public life regardless of their beliefs." This principle may have special resonance when one considers the largely French (and Catholic) Quebec as compared to the other largely English (and Protestant) other provinces.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Town of Greece, the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment is not closely divided; only one Justice writes separately to discuss some of the procedural issues, but otherwise concurs. For US ConLawProfs, City of Saguenay is well worth a comparative read.
Friday, April 3, 2015
The en banc Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris rejected First Amendment challenges to two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure:
that the official proponent of a ballot measure be an elector, thereby disqualifying corporations and associations from holding that position; and
that the official proponent’s name appear on each section of the initiative petition that is circulated to voters for their signature.
Writing for the unanimous en banc court and affirming the district judge, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the provisions were "plainly constitutional."
On the first provision, the court held that the requirement that an official proponent—a person seeking a unique position in a quintessentially legislative process—be an elector satisfied the First Amendment. It concluded that
The plaintiffs seek a legislative power and, as they conceded at oral argument, many legislative and official political acts are properly reserved to members of the electorate. For example, corporations cannot vote. Nor can they run for political office or be appointed to fill vacancies. Under California law, they cannot sign initiative petitions, sign candidate nominating papers, or introduce legislation, The plaintiffs fail to provide any reason—and we find none—that the state and city may not similarly limit the exercise of the initiative power to members of the relevant political community: electors.
[citations omitted]. The Ninth Circuit rejected the challengers' appeal to Citizens United v. FEC (2010) as mandating strict scrutiny. The challengers argued strict scrutiny was warranted because the California requirement is a direct ban on core political speech; bans disfavored speakers’ speech; and requires speech by proxy. The Ninth Circuit opinion flatly stated that the challengers "are wrong." While the initiative process involves core political speech, the ban is only directed at corporations being the "official proponent—a unique legislative position that may properly be reserved to members of the political community" and corporations can otherwise speak as much as they'd like. As to corporations specifically, the court returned to the notion that corporations are distinct from natural persons, they do not have "the right to vote or to hold public office (or even to sit on the bench)" as the plaintiffs seemingly conceded. "We accordingly refuse to extend Citizens United to grant to corporations and associations the right to hold a distinct, official role in the process of legislating, by initiative or otherwise." Finally, the court summarily rejected the speech by proxy argument:
Under the plaintiffs’ view of Citizens United, the government could not exclude corporations or associations from any position available to human beings because to do so would impermissibly require speech by proxy—an assertion that is clearly untenable.
The second requirement - - - mandating disclosure - - - was subject to "exacting scrutiny" rather than the higher standard of "strict scrutiny," in accordance with Citizens United. The Ninth Circuit also relied heavily on Doe v. Reed (2010) in which the Court upheld disclosure and rejected a "right to be anonymous" when signing a ballot initiative petition. Here, the Ninth Circuit likewise upheld an interest in the integrity of the electoral process, citing Doe v. Reed, and also analyzed the informational interest. The Ninth Circuit also took a swipe at the sincerity of the anonymity argument:
It also bears noting, although we do not base our decision on it in any respect, that the interest of the proponents in anonymity is especially weak given the facts of the instant case. Both Kneebone and Breitfelder engaged in public activities advocating passage of Proposition G beyond the activities required of them as its official proponents, speaking at televised public meetings and having their names used in campaign materials provided to voters. Moreover, they explained in depositions that they did not really desire anonymity, but rather “wanted voters to know that the ‘correct’ sponsor of the ballot initiative was the Association of Builders and Contractors, Inc. and the Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition.”
More doctrinally, the court concluded that the required "disclosure poses at the most a minimal burden on First Amendment rights."
The decision is a clear rejection of an extension of Citizens United to any type of "corporate speech" and a clear adherence to the constitutionality of disclosure mandates in both Citizens United and Doe v. Reed. And it should be clear that this unanimous opinion is not a good candidate for certiorari.
Monday, March 30, 2015
In a summary order today, the United States Supreme Court listed among the cases denied certiorari the controversial "Cinco de Mayo" case, Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District.
The original controversy began with a claim by students that their constitutional rights were violated when school officials banned their American flag clothing during a Cinco de Mayo celebration. The school officials regulated American flag clothing "in [the] context of ongoing racial tension and gang violence within the school, and after a near-violent altercation had erupted during the prior Cinco de Mayo over the display of an American flag.” The district judge rejected the students' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and later denied en banc review, over a dissent, and issued an amended panel opinion which added several paragraphs of analysis.
The application of the classic Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) was predictable, but the amended opinion also discussed the “heckler’s veto,” a concept that is in some senses embedded in Tinker's "disruption" standard.
However, with the denial of certiorari, this particular controversy - - - which had often been expressed as allowing a school district to ban the American flag - - - has apparently been decided, at least in the context of this particular school for a particular holiday on a particular year.
However, as the opinion of the Ninth Circuit as amended noted, situations involving displays of the Confederate flag in the school context have been frequently litigated. And this Term, the Court is considering a Confederate flag outside the school context in the "license plate" case just argued last week, Walker v. Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans.
Monday, March 23, 2015
The Court heard oral arguments today in Walker v. Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans involving a First Amendment challenge to the denial of a specialty license plate requested by the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans.
As we noted when certiorari was granted, the Fifth Circuit's divided opinion, reversing the district judge, found that the denial violated the First Amendment as impermissible viewpoint and content discrimination. License plate schemes have been well-litigated: The Fourth Circuit recently held that North Carolina's provision of a "Choose Life" specialty license plate violated the First Amendment; the New Hampshire Supreme Court invalidated a vanity license plate regulation requiring "good taste"; a Michigan federal district judge similarly invalidated a refusal of specific letters on a vanity plate; and on remand from the Tenth Circuit, the design of the Oklahoma standard license plate was upheld.
First, there is the issue of whether the specialty license plate had become a traditional public forum. Justice Kennedy seemingly tended toward this view, noting - - - twice - - - that no one goes to parks anymore and so these license plates may be a new public forum for a new era.
Less specifically articulated was whether if there was a limited public forum in the license plates this could have any meaning at all because there were no real standards. Justice Ginsburg quickly asked the Texas Solicitor General, defending the constitutionality of the state scheme, whether it wasn't "nebulous." The number of specialty license plates approved and the very few disapproved was noted several times, again making it seem as if any designation was not at all clear.
The notion of government speech was raised at numerous points, echoing the opinion of Fifth Circuit Judge Jerry Smith who had dissented and contended that the doctrine of government speech articulated in the Court's unanimous Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009) controls: there is no meaningful distinction between the privately placed monuments in Summum and the license plates in Texas.
Yet Justice Sotomayor suggested that this might be "hybrid speech," asking counsel for the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans whether this might not be the "reverse" of Wooley v. Maynard (1977): why should the State be compelled to put something on its license plates that it disapproves?
That the state might be seen as endorsing problematical messages surfaced repeatedly, including this discussion with counsel for the Texas Sons of Confederate Veterans:
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Suppose suppose the message the the applicant said, we want this design, and the design is a swastika. Is that speech that does does the the whoever is in charge of it of the license plate, do they have to accept - - -
MR. GEORGE: I don't believe the State can discriminate against the people who want to have that design - - -
JUSTICE GINSBURG: So they could have the swastika. And suppose somebody else says, I want to have "Jihad" on my license plate. That's okay, too?
MR. GEORGE: Vegan?
JUSTICE GINSBURG: Jihad.
MR. GEORGE: Jihad. Jihad on the license plate? Can be there is obviously a court of appeal a district court from Ohio in which "Infidels" was held to be the State
JUSTICE KENNEDY: What is your answer in this case as to Justice Ginsburg's hypothetical? Yes or no, must the State put those symbols or messages on the plates at the request of the citizen? Yes or no?
MR. GEORGE: Yes.
This prospect seemed worrisome. But seemingly equally worrisome was the prospect of absolute government discretion manifested by the recurring hypothetical of a government allowing "Vote Republican" but not "Vote Democratic" on the specialty plates, a situation that is arguably consistent with Summum's interpretation of government speech. Perhaps Sotomayor's suggested "hybrid speech" may be a compromise. Or less likely, the Court could further clarify public forum and limited (designated) public forum doctrine.
Thursday, March 19, 2015
The Ninth Circuit this week upheld a county's decision to reject an ad critical of Israel (and U.S. support for Israel) on the side of a Metro bus against a First Amendment challenge. The ruling says that the bus side is a limited public forum, subject to a lower level of scrutiny--a holding at odds with holdings in other circuits in similar cases--and concluded that the county's rejection of the ad met that lower standard.
We posted just last week on SEPTA's (Southeastern Pennsylvania) rejection of an anti-Muslim ad--and a district judge's ruling that the rejection violated the First Amendment. Here's our post on a federal case out of New York going the same way; and here's our post on the Sixth Circuit, moving in the opposite direction.
King County, Washington, which runs Metro's bus advertising program through a contract with a private company, has a policy that prohibits ads with certain content (ads for alcohol and tobacco, adult movies, video games for mature audiences, and the like). The policy also has two catch-all "civility clauses" that prohibit material that would foreseebly result in disruption of the transportation system or incite a response that threatens public safety.
SeaMAC, a non-profit opposed to U.S. support for Israel, proposed a Metro ad that read:
ISRAELI WAR CRIMES
YOUR TAX DOLLARS AT WORK
The county initially approved the ad. But a local television report on the ad provoked a massive hostile, even threatening, response, which overwhelmed the Metro call center and employees' e-mails and caused many customers to express safety concerns.
Soon after the story ran, but before Metro ran SeaMAC's ad, two pro-Israeli groups submitted their own ads:
PALESTINIAN WAR CRIMES
YOUR TAX DOLLARS AT WORK
And (with a picture of Hitler):
IN ANY WAR BETWEEN THE CIVILIZED MAN AND THE SAVAGE,
SUPPORT THE CIVILIZED MAN
Given the hostile reaction to SeaMAC's ad, the county rejected both groups' ads under one of the civility clauses, and SeaMAC sued.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the side of Metro buses was a limited public forum (not a public forum or designated public forum), based on the pre-screening process for ads, the county's prior implementation (it had not categorically accepted ads, and it had rejected some), and the nature of the side of a bus (the purpose of which was to raise revenue through ad sales).
The court recognized that this put it at odds with other circuits that have held that bus sides were a designated public forum (subject to strict scrutiny). But it said that those courts made a mistake:
Some of those courts, in our view, mistakenly concluded that if the government opens a forum and is willing to accept political speech, it has necessarily signaled an intent to create a designated public forum. Neither the First Amendment nor the Supreme Court's public forum precedent impose that categorical rule.
The court went on to rule that the county's decision was reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and therefore valid.
The dissent argued that the sides of Metro's buses were a designated public forum, subject to strict scrutiny, that the civility clause gave the county too much discretion, and that the county's decision (in light of the hostile reaction to SeaMAC's ad) raised heckler veto problems. The dissent would have remanded the case for determination whether the county's decision satisfied strict scrutiny.
Wednesday, March 18, 2015
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has found a section of the state's "bias intimidation" statute, NJ 2C:16-1, unconstitutional in its opinion in State v. Pomianeck. Subsection a (3) of the statute provides that bias intimidation includes an offense committed:
under circumstances that caused any victim of the underlying offense to be intimidated and the victim, considering the manner in which the offense was committed, reasonably believed either that (a) the offense was committed with a purpose to intimidate the victim or any person or entity in whose welfare the victim is interested because of race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity, or (b) the victim or the victim's property was selected to be the target of the offense because of the victim's race, color, religion, gender, disability, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, national origin, or ethnicity.
The defendant was convicted of violating subsection 3. He and another public employee, both white, tricked another employee, who was black, into going into a wide steel storage cage, then locked the door, made a "banana" remark and laughed, and after a few minutes opened the cage door. The defendant was convicted of official misconduct as well as petty disorderly persons’ offenses of harassment by alarming conduct and harassment by communication, in addition to subsection (a)(3) of the bias intimidation statute.
On appeal challenging the constitutionality of subsection (a)(3) , the New Jersey appellate court found that the subsection's focus on the victim's reasonable belief - - - rather than the defendant's actual state of mind - - - was a violation of the First Amendment, relying on cases such as Virginia v. Black and R.A.V. v. St. Paul. The appellate court therefore found the statute should be construed to include a mens rea and remanded the case.
New Jersey's highest court unanimously found that the appellate court exceeded its bounds by interpreting the statute to include a mens rea. It then proceeded to the constitutional issues, noting that the first inquiry was "whether the line separating lawful from criminal conduct in subsection (a)(3) is so vague that a reasonable person would not have fair notice when that line is crossed," and thus would not meet the "due process demands of the Fourteenth Amendment.":
The answer raises interrelated First Amendment concerns. Nevertheless, only if subsection (a)(3) can survive due process scrutiny is it necessary to engage in a First Amendment analysis.
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that subsection (a)(3) could not survive due process because it hinged on the victim's reasonable belief:
Of course, a victim’s reasonable belief about whether he has been subjected to bias may well depend on the victim’s personal experiences, cultural or religious upbringing and heritage, and reaction to language that is a flashpoint to persons of his race, religion, or nationality. A tone-deaf defendant may intend no bias in the use of crude or insensitive language, and yet a victim may reasonably perceive animus. The defendant may be wholly unaware of the victim’s perspective, due to a lack of understanding of the emotional triggers to which a reasonable person of that race, religion, or nationality would react. Nothing in the history of the bias-intimidation statute suggests that the Legislature intended to criminalize conduct through the imposition of an amorphous code of civility or criminalize speech that was not intended to intimidate on the basis of bias. It bears repeating that no other bias-intimidation statute in the nation imposes criminal liability based on the victim’s reasonable perceptions.
The court thus found subsection (a)(3) unconstitutional under due process doctrine requiring adequate notice and lack of vagueness: the defendant "was convicted not based on what he was thinking but rather on his failure to appreciate what the victim was thinking" The court therefore did not reach the First Amendment issue. The court emphasized that the "twin pillars of the bias- intimidation statute -- subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of N.J.S.A. 2C:16-1 -- still stand."
The ruling could also be relevant to a more famous New Jersey bias intimidation conviction of Dharun Ravi of the victim, his Rutgers roommate Tyler Clementi, as the NYT reports.
The Fourth Circuit ruled in Greenville County Republican Party v. Greenville County Election Commission that various challenges to South Carolina's municipal election procedures lacked justiciability and dismissed the case.
South Carolina law required municipalities to adopt by ordinance either a partisan or nonpartisan way of nominating candidates for public office in municipal elections. If a municipality selected the partisan method, South Carolina law allowed a certified political party to select one of three procedures: a party primary, a party convention, or a petition. Nomination by party primary required an open primary. Nomination by convention required a 3/4 super-majority vote of the party membership.
The Greenville County Republican Party Executive Committee, an affiliate of the state Republican party but not itself a certified political party, challenged these procedures under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Committee sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages for having to implement the procedures in prior elections.
As the case worked its way up and down, Greenville changed its ordinance to nominate candidates using a nonpartisan procedure.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that this mooted the Committee's claims for prospective relief. In particular, the court said that the County's decision was not capable of repetition but evading review, because the Committee didn't satisfy its burden of establishing "a reasonable expectation" that it wouldn't go back to the partisan method of nominating candidates for future elections.
As to the surviving claims, the court held that the Committee lacked standing. The court said that the Committee didn't suffer any harm from the super-majority requirement for convention-nominated candidates; instead, the state party suffered that harm--making the Committee's claim a nonjusticiable third-party claim. The court also held that the Committee couldn't satisfy the traceability prong of standing, because it was the state party, not Greenville, that elected to use the open primary system. (The state Republican Party was at one time party to the suit, but withdrew.)
The ruling ends this suit, and, in the wake of Greenville's decision to use a nonpartisan nominating process, almost certainly ends any challenges to Greenville's old partisan process.
March 18, 2015 in Association, Cases and Case Materials, Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, Fifth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Monday, March 16, 2015
Over at Jotwell, First Amendment scholar Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky discusses Amy Gajda's just-published book The First Amendment Bubble: How Privacy and Paparazzi Threaten a Free Press.
Professor Lidsky provides the provocative thesis of Gajda's book: it's the fault of quasi-journalists and paparazzi that the First Amendment is losing its luster, or at least its ability to protect what might be called "real journalists."
Lidsky's last paragraph provides a terrific insight - - - as we wait for the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Williams-Yulee v. The Forida Bar - - - linking how elected state judges might feel about the press given their own experiences.
Although she never makes the point explicitly, Gajda’s book is fundamentally an exercise in legal realism. Even though the scope of constitutional rights is not supposed to vary with the winds of public opinion, The First Amendment Bubble documents that the scope of press rights has changed as judges have perceived changes in the press. As she amply and comprehensively demonstrates, trial court judges seem more hostile to the media and more favorable to privacy claimants than their appellate brethren. This hostility may reflect the fact that trial judges, especially state judges, are more likely to have been elected to their positions than their appellate brethren and are thus more likely to be alert to shifts in public opinion. Perhaps the starting point, then, for changing judicial opinions is changing public opinion. To do this, journalists must change their slipshod and sensationalist practices. Let’s hope they can.
Looks like a terrific read, especially for those who might not agree that journalists have lost their integrity any more than lawyers (or judges) may have.
Friday, March 13, 2015
The ACLU filed suit this week on behalf of several media and human rights organizations challenging the NSA's "upstream surveillance" program. The plaintiffs argue that the program violates the First and Fourth Amendments, and that NSA has implemented upstream surveillance in violation of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. (H/t reader Darren Elliot.)
Through upstream surveillance, a program disclosed by Edward Snowden after the Court handed down Clapper v. Amnesty International (more on that below), the NSA intercepts, collects, and searches all of Americans' international communications (e-mails, web-browsing, search engine queries, and the like). The NSA intercepts communications through devices directly on the internet backbone (with the help of providers like Verizon and AT&T), and it searches that material using keywords associated with NSA targets--that is, anyone outside the United States believed likely to communicate "foreign intelligence information."
The Supreme Court dismissed the last major suit of this type. The Court said that the plaintiffs in Clapper v. Amnesty International lacked standing to challenge NSA surveillance under the FISA Amendments Act (50 USC Sec. 1881a), because they didn't allege that they'd actually be targets of surveillance (only that they'd likely be targets).
This suit addresses the standing problem by alleging that upstream surveillance has already targeted them--because upstream surveillance is up and running and collects, in a drag-net kind of way, the kinds of communications that they engage in. And by including Wikimedia (with all its international internet connections), the ACLU ensures that at least one plaintiff has certainly been a target of this program.
In his decision in American Freedom Defense Initiative (“AFDI”) v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (“SEPTA”), federal district judge Mitchell Goldberg has granted a preliminary injunction in favor of AFDI and found SEPTA's anti-disparagement standard for advertising on its buses, and its rejection of the proffered AFDI advertisement, violates the First Amendment.
AFDI is a controversial organization that seeks to place anti-Islamic advertisements in a variety of public venues. In New York City, a federal judge found the Metropolitan Transit Authority's initial rejection of the advertisements under its (since amended) "civilty standard" to be unconstitutional and the advertisements appeared, causing some NYC residents to engage in "more speech" in reaction to the advertisements. On the contrary, the Sixth Circuit found the rejection of similar advertisements in southern Michigan buses by the governmental authority SMART to be constitutional under its policy prohibiting several categories of advertising including "political or political campaign advertising."
In Philadelphia, SEPTA's policy prohibited "Advertising that tends to disparage or ridicule any person or group of persons on the basis of race, religious belief, age, sex, alienage, national origin, sickness or disability." The rejected advertisement read “Islamic Jew-Hatred: It’s in the Quran. Two Thirds of All US Aid Goes to Islamic Countries. Stop the Hate. End All Aid to Islamic Countries” and contained a relevant image captioned "Adolf Hitler and his staunch ally, the leader of the Muslim world, Haj Amin al-Husseini.” (The opinion also contains an image of the advertisement).
Importantly, the parties stipulated that "over the past four years, SEPTA has accepted a number of concededly public issue advertisements on such topics as teacher seniority, fracking and contraceptive use."
Judge Goldberg found that the advertising space on the buses constituted a designated public forum, rejecting SEPTA's rather weak argument that it was a nonpublic forum. The central issue, however, was whether the rejection of the advertisement was content (and perhaps viewpoint) based. The judge found that it was, analogizing predictably to R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992):
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in R.A.V., I find that SEPTA’s anti- disparagement standard is a content-based restriction. Like the ordinance in R.A.V., the anti- disparagement standard permits disparaging advertisements so long as they are not addressed to one of the disfavored topics which are specifically enumerated. In fact, outside of these specified topics, SEPTA’s standards could permit advertisements which disparage, for example, political affiliation or union membership. Thus, in selectively prohibiting speech based upon the subject addressed, SEPTA’s anti-disparagement standard constitutes a content-based restriction.
The judge then easily found that SEPTA's policy and its application could not survive strict scrutiny.
Whether or not SEPTA will appeal - - - or chose to revise its policy as NYC's MTA did - - - remains to be seen.
Wednesday, March 11, 2015
In its relatively brief opinion in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, the Sixth Circuit seemingly brought an end to the extensive litigation that arose from Stephen Dreihaus's 2010 campaign during which the Susan B. Anthony list, an anti-abortion organization wanted to put up a billboard criticizing Driehaus's vote in favor of "Obamacare," reading "Shame on Steve Driehaus! Driehaus voted FOR taxpayer-funded abortion." But the billboard never went up because the advertising company that owned the billboard space refused to put up the advertisement after Driehaus's counsel threatened legal action against it. Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission against SBA List claiming that the advertisement violated two sections of Ohio's false-statement in elections statute. SBA List then sued, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, based on a First Amendment challenge to the statute. Recall that the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Sixth Circuit's finding that federal courts had no Article III power to hear the case.
The First Amendment issues, including Dreihaus' counterclaim for defamation, were thus remanded. The federal district judge found the Ohio election provision violated the First Amendment. In considering the defamation claim, which the judge also foreclosed on the basis of the First Amendment, the Sixth Circuit found that although the district judge's "categorical proclamation" that “[A]s a matter of law, associating a political candidate with a mainstream political position, even if false, cannot constitute defamation" was "a misstatement of First Amendment defamation law." However, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district judge's grant of summary judgment on the basis that Driehaus could not satisfy the elements of the state law defamation tort. Specifically, Driehaus could not prove that the statements by SBA were false: "it is enough that the statements had some truth, were substantially true, or were subject to differing interpretations" and Driehaus could not show any basis for a finding that the statements were made with actual malice.
Thus after extended litigation it now seems that there remain few, if any, bars to "falsehoods" in campaigns.
Monday, March 9, 2015
In its opinion today in Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, Inc. v. Joyce, the Eighth Circuit found that Missouri's "House of Worship Protection Act," Mo. Rev. Stat. § 574.035, violates the First Amendment.
The statute provides that a person commits the crime of disrupting a house of worship if he or she "[i]ntentionally and unreasonably disturbs, interrupts, or disquiets any house of worship by using profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior, or making noise either within the house of worship or so near it as to disturb the order and solemnity of the worship services."
The panel's unanimous and relatively brief opinion, reversing the district judge, found fault with the statute as a content-based regulation, focusing as it does on "profane discourse, rude or indecent behavior." The panel rejected the state's argument that it was a mere time, place, or manner regulation subject to a lower level of scrutiny. Instead, the Eighth Circuit quoted the Court's decision in McCullen v. Coakley last Term that a statute "would not be content neutral if it were concerned with undesirable effects that arise from 'the direct impact of speech on its audience' or '[l]isteners' reactions to speech.'"
The Eighth Circuit then easily found that the content based statute did not survive strict scrutiny: "Even if the government interest in protecting the free exercise of religion were viewed as compelling, however, the content based prohibitions the Act places on profane or rude speech are not necessary to protect that freedom." There were content neutral alternatives to protect houses of worship from disruption, such as noise regulations and there was nothing in the record showing that any worship services have been disrupted in Missouri.
Thus, the facial challenge to the statute, brought by SNAP - - - a non profit organization which advocates for victims of sexual abuse by clergy and members who "regularly communicate their messages outside of a Catholic friary in St. Louis where a priest accused of child molestation resides" - - - was successful.
It does seem as if Missouri could amend the statute to pass constitutional scrutiny by excising the content-based language and leaving the noise related language.
Sunday, March 8, 2015
Over at the Los Angeles Times in an Op-Ed, ConLawProf Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr. argues that present First Amendment doctrine would preclude the famous Selma march being commemorated on its 50th anniversary today.
Krotoszynski contends that it would now be "impossible to obtain a federal court order permitting a five-day protest march on a 52-mile stretch of a major U.S. highway" and that under "contemporary legal doctrine, the Selma protests would have ended March 8, 1965."
He faults the reshaping of public forum doctrine and time, place or manner restrictions so that "protests" are now relegated to "designated speech zones." He highlights the recent litigation regarding the First Amendment rights of protestors in Ferguson, which, although successful on behalf of the protestors, was a success that was both delayed and partial.
Krotoszynski's op-ed is an important reminder that while voting rights and equality are integral to the remembrance of Selma as President Obama elucidated in his speech, "Selma's main lesson" might also be that "taking to the streets and other public spaces in protest is central to our democracy."
Saturday, February 28, 2015
In its opinion in Matthews v. City of New York, the Second Circuit upheld the First Amendment rights of a police officer in a unanimous panel opinion, authored by Judge Walker.
The court reversed the district judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City that had concluded that the police officer, Craig Matthews spoke as a public employee, not as a citizen, and that his speech was thus not protected by the First Amendment.
At issue is the application of the closely divided Garcetti v. Ceballos and its "clarification" in the United States Supreme Court's 2014 decision in Lane v. Franks ,regarding the "scope of employment" exclusion for First Amendment protection. Matthews alleged that he was retaliated against for speaking about an alleged quota system mandating the number of arrests, summons, and stop‐and‐frisks that police officers must conduct. These are the same policies that have been so controversial in NYC and have been considered by the Second Circuit.
In February 2009, Matthews, believing that the quota system was damaging to the NYPD’s core mission, reported its existence to then‐Captain Timothy Bugge, the Precinct’s commanding officer at that time. In March and April of 2009, Matthews again reported the quota system’s existence to Captain Bugge, and, in May 2009, Matthews reported the same to an unnamed Precinct executive officer.
In January 2011, Matthews met with then‐Captain Jon Bloch, the Precinct’s new commanding officer, and two other officers in Captain Bloch’s office. Matthews told them about the quota system and stated that it was “causing unjustified stops, arrests, and summonses because police officers felt forced to abandon their discretion in order to meet their numbers,” and that it “was having an adverse effect on the precinct’s relationship with the community.”
The Second Circuit panel held that "Matthews’s speech to the Precinct’s leadership in this case was not what he was “employed to do,” unlike the prosecutor’s speech in Garcetti." Importantly, "Matthews’s speech addressed a precinct‐wide policy. Such policy‐oriented speech was neither part of his job description nor part of the practical reality of his everyday work."
The court also considered whether the speech had a "civilian analogue," discussing its previous opinion in Jackler v. Byrne, a 2011 opinion in which the panel had also found the speech of a police officer protected by the First Amendment. In part, the panel's conclusion rested on the fact that "Matthews reported his concerns about the arrest quota system to the same officers who regularly heard civilian complaints about Precinct policing issues."
In holding that Matthews' speech is protected by the First Amendment, the opinion may be further indication that the grip of Garcetti on employee speech is loosening. It is not only Lane v. Franks, in which the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Eleventh Circuit's summary opinion and the Second Circuit's previous opinion in Jackler, but cases such as the Third Circuit's Flora v. Luzerne County decided last month. This is not to say that Garcetti does not remain a formidable obstacle to any First Amendment claim by a public employee, but only that the obstacle is becoming less insurmountable.
Tuesday, February 24, 2015
A panel of the Second Circuit issued its amended opinion in Garcia v. Does now holding that the New York City police officers do have qualified immunity in the First Amendment suit arising from plaintiffs' arrests for participating in a demonstration in support of the Occupy Wall Street movement.
Recall that in December, the full Second Circuit granted review of the case. In today's opinion, the court noted that it had withdrawn the panel opinion, was granting the petition for rehearing, and now reversing the district judge and remanding the case with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
Thus, the panel now finds that qualified immunity can be - - - and is here - - - established at the pleading stage, citing Wood v. Moss (2014), noting that "qualified immunity protects officials not merely from liability but from litigation, that the issue should be resolved when possible on a motion to dismiss, before the commencement of discovery, to avoid subjecting public officials to time consuming and expensive discovery procedures." This echoes Judge Livingston's dissent in the original panel opinion.
The underlying First Amendment issue was whether defendant police officers "implicitly invited the demonstrators to walk onto the roadway of the Brooklyn Bridge, which would otherwise have been prohibited by New York law" and then arrested them without "fair warning." Today's panel opinion now explains:
On the face of the Complaint, the officers were confronted with ambiguities of fact and law. As a matter of fact, the most that is plausibly alleged by the Complaint and the supporting materials is that the police, having already permitted some minor traffic violations along the marchers’ route, and after first attempting to block the protesters from obstructing the vehicular roadway, retreated before the demonstrators in a way that some of the demonstrators may have interpreted as affirmatively permitting their advance. Whether or not such an interpretation was reasonable on their part, it cannot be said that the police’s behavior was anything more than – at best for plaintiffs – ambiguous, or that a reasonable officer would necessarily have understood that the demonstrators would reasonably interpret the retreat as permission to use the roadway.
This "all doubts resolved in favor of the defendants" stance on a motion to dismiss for qualified immunity illustrates how very high the bar has become for protestors raising a First Amendment claim.
[image of Brooklyn Bridge via]
Monday, February 23, 2015
The Fifth Circuit last week granted a school district's petition for rehearing en banc in a case involving off-campus student speech. The grant means that the full Fifth Circuit will get a crack at the issue whether and how off-school student speech critical of a school employee, but not otherwise disrupting the school, is protected under the First Amendment.
The case, Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, arose when a high school student was suspended for recording and posting on his Facebook page a rap song criticizing, with vulgar and violent lyrics, two named male athletic coaches for sexually harassing female students at the school. The student, Taylor Bell, wrote the song, recorded it, and posted it off campus, at facilities unrelated to the school. While students heard the song, they shouldn't have heard it at school--no cell phones, no Facebook on campus--and it didn't cause any disruption or interference with school activities. So the majority on the three-judge panel reversed the district court and ruled for Bell:
[T]he Supreme Court's "student-speech" cases, including Tinker, do not address students' speech that occurs off campus and not at a school-approved event. The Court has not decided whether, or, if so, under what circumstances, a public school may regulate students' online, off-campus speech, and it is not necessary or appropriate for us to anticipate such a decision here. Even if Tinker were applicable to the instant case, the evidence does not support the conclusion, as required by Tinker, that Bell's Internet-posted song substantially disrupted the school's work and discipline or that school officials reasonably could have forecasted that it would do so.
Given that the Court hasn't ruled on the issue, this may be one to watch.
Tuesday, February 10, 2015
Newly elected Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner (R) late yesterday issued an executive order that halted enforcement of the fair share provisions in state union contracts with state employees. At the same time, he filed a preemptive federal lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that his EO was constitutional.
The pair of moves (especially the unusual lawsuit) can only be understood as a full frontal assault on whatever is left of public sector fair share under the First Amendment after last Term's ruling in Harris v. Quinn. (And there's not much left.) Indeed, the lawsuit seems specifically engineered only to put Abood, the 1977 case upholding public sector fair share requirements, before the Court again and to topple it once and for all.
"Fair share" fees are those fees charged to nonunion members in a union shop. They're designed to cover union expenses that benefit all employees (union or not), like collective bargaining. The Supreme Court ruled in Abood in 1977 that fair share fee requirements do not violate the First Amendment (as compelled speech and association), because they are justified in order to avoid free-riding by nonunion members (that is, nonunion members who benefit from the union's activities, but fail to pay union dues) and to promote labor peace. Without fair share fee requirements, public sector unions could be hard-pressed to gain membership or collect any fees. That's because without fair share requirements every individual employee might rationally think that he or she could duck out of union membership and fees and free-ride on the union's bargaining. If enough employees think this, the unions could disappear.
The Supreme Court in recent years has chipped away at Abood, first in Knox v. Service Employees (2012) and then in Harris v. Quinn (2013). Abood's definitely holding on by just a string, but the Court hasn't specifically overruled it.
Governor Rauner's actions seem designed to do just that. Rauner's EO, halting fair share enforcement, is based on his worry that "the collective bargaining agreements force some employees to subsidize and enable union activities that they do not support," and "Illinois state employee unions are using compelled "fair share" fees to fund inherently political activities to influence the outcome of core public sector issues."
But Illinois law permits the collection of fair share fees only for nonunion members' "proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and other conditions of employment . . . ." 5 ILCS 315/6. It does not permit collection of fair share fees for other activities, like political advocacy. Thus, Illinois law is fully constitutional and comports with Abood. (Again, even if Abood is on its way out, it's still the law of the land.) Still, Governor Rauner's EO takes it head-on.
To punctuate the EO, Governor Rauner then filed a preemptive suit against the unions in federal court seeking declaratory relief that his EO is constitutional. This sounds like a nonjusticiable political question, or like Rauner lacks standing, or like the whole thing isn't yet ripe. (Shouldn't the unions be suing?) But Rauner has an answer for this (strange as it sounds): The EO renders null and void the fair share provisions in the state's collective bargaining agreements, thus creating a controversy between the Governor and unions.
The aggressive EO and the strangeness of the suit can only mean that Governor Rauner is taking on public sector fair share and Abood full force--that he's doing it because he wants his name on the case overturning Abood.