Thursday, August 16, 2018

Daily Read: United States Senate Supports Free Press

Senate Resolution 607 , introduced by Senators Brian Schatz and Chuck Schumer, and affirmed unanimously, provides:

Whereas the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects the press from government control and suppression;

340px-The_General_Magazine_and_Historical_Chronicle_Vol_1 _January _1741Whereas the freedom of the press—

(1) has been recognized as integral to the democratic foundations of the United States since the beginning of the United States; and

(2) has endured and been reaffirmed repeatedly throughout the history of the United States;

Whereas Benjamin Franklin in 1722 wrote, ‘‘Whoever would overthrow the Liberty of a Nation, must begin by subduing the Freeness of Speech.’’;

Whereas Thomas Jefferson in 1786 wrote, ‘‘Our liberty de- pends on the freedom of the press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.’’;

Whereas James Madison in 1789 introduced the freedom of the press in the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of the United States;

Whereas James Madison based the freedom of the press on the Declaration of Rights of the Commonwealth of Virginia, which in 1776 declared, ‘‘The freedom of the Press is one of the greatest bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotic Governments.’’;

Whereas President Ronald Reagan proclaimed August 4, 1985, as Freedom of the Press Day, stating that ‘‘Freedom of the press is one of our most important freedoms and also one of our oldest.’’;

Whereas President Reagan also said, ‘‘Today, our tradition of a free press as a vital part of our democracy is as important as ever. The news media are now using modern techniques to bring our citizens information not only on a daily basis but instantaneously as important events occur. This flow of information helps make possible an informed electorate and so contributes to our national system of self-government.’’;

Whereas Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992), ‘‘The First Amendment is often inconvenient. But that is beside the point. Inconvenience does not absolve the government of its obligation to tolerate speech.’’;

Whereas the United States Supreme Court also affirmed the history and intent of the freedom of the press in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), stating, ‘‘In the First Amendment, the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government’s power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.’’;

Whereas tyrannical and authoritarian governments and leaders throughout history have sought to undermine, censor, suppress, and control the press to advance their undemocratic goals and actions; and

Whereas the United States, including the long-held commitment to and constitutional protection of the free press in the United States, has stood as a shining example of democracy, self-government, and freedom for the world to emulate: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That—

(1) the Senate—

(A) affirms that the press is not the enemy of the people;

(B) reaffirms the vital and indispensable role that the free press serves to inform the electorate, uncover the truth, act as a check on the inherent power of the government, further national discourse and debate, and otherwise advance the most basic and cherished democratic norms and freedoms of the United States; and

(C) condemns the attacks on the institution of the free press and views efforts to systematically undermine the credibility of the press as an attack on the democratic institutions of the United States; and

(2) it is the sense of the Senate that it is the sworn responsibility of all who serve the United States by taking the oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States to uphold, cherish, and protect the entire Constitution, including the freedom of the press.

This Resolution can be seen as a rebuke to presidential statements describing the press as an "enemy of the people." 

 

Additionally, about 350 media outlets have also published pieces today affirming the importance of a free press and rejecting the "enemy of the people" appellation.

August 16, 2018 in Current Affairs, Executive Authority, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 15, 2018

Eighth Circuit Upholds Public Union Exclusive Representation Designation Against First Amendment Challenge

The Eighth Circuit this week held that a Minnesota law that authorizes public employees to organize and to designate an exclusive representative to negotiate employment terms with the state did not violate the First Amendment.

The case, Bierman v. Dayton, may represent a next front, after Janus, in First Amendment challenges to public-sector unions. The Eighth Circuit quoted the time-bomb in Janus (see below) that could well foretell the end of exclusive representation, even without a fair-share requirement.

The case tested Minnesota's Public Employee Labor Relations Act, as applied to in-home care providers for disabled Medicaid recipients. The Act permits those employees to organize and designate an exclusive bargaining representative, but it doesn't require fair-share fees for non-union members. Still, dissenting home-health-care workers challenged the Act, arguing that it compelled them to associate with a union that they want no part of. (Again: They were not charged an agency fee or fair-share fee. Their claim was that the state, merely by allowing their union colleagues to designate an exclusive bargaining representative, violated their First Amendment rights.)

The court flatly rejected this claim, pointing to Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, which, the court said, squarely answered the question.

As to Janus's impact on this kind of case, the court wrote,

Recent holdings in [Janus] and [Harris] do not supersede Knight. Under those decisions, a State cannot compel public employees and homecare providers, respectively, to pay fees to a union of which they are not members, but the providers here do not challenge a mandatory fee. Janus did characterize a State's requirement that a union serve as an exclusive bargaining agent for its employees as "a significant impingement on associational freedoms that would not be tolerated in other contexts," but the decision never mentioned Knight, and the constitutionality of exclusive representation standing alone was not at issue. Of course, where a precedent like Knight has direct application in a case, we should follow it, even if a later decision arguably undermines some of its reasoning.

August 15, 2018 in Association, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 14, 2018

Ninth Circuit: Complaint Challenging Destruction of Photographs at Border Can Proceed

In its opinion in Askins v. United States Department of Homeland Security, a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated a district judge's dismissal of a complaint alleging the confiscation and destruction of photographs by United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) violated the First Amendment

One issue on appeal was whether the district judge incorrectly applied the "law of the case" doctrine to the amended complaint. The Ninth Circuit held the trial judge was wrong and should have evaluated the amended complaint on its own merits.

The First Amendment issue was whether the complaint stated a claim that the CBP's policies prohibiting photography even in public places was a First Amendment violation. Writing for the court, Judge Jay Bybee noted that the trial judge assumed that the areas adjacent to the ports of entry at these specific southern borders — Calexico West and San Ysidiro — were public fora and the CBP's restrictions were content based. The trial judge found that the CBP policies survived strict scrutiny because of the compelling interest of border security and in a "conclusory fashion" determined that the policies were the least restrictive means of serving the interests. The Ninth Circuit's opinion disagreed:

These conclusions are too thin to justify judgment for the government on a motion to dismiss. * * * * Without question, protecting our territorial integrity is a compelling interest that could justify reasonable restrictions on speech activities at ports of entry. * * * * But the devil lies in the details: “Even at the border, we have rejected an ‘anything goes’ approach.” United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). It is the government’s burden to prove that these specific restrictions are the least restrictive means available to further its compelling interest. They cannot do so through general assertions of national security, particularly where plaintiffs have alleged that CBP is restricting First Amendment activities in traditional public fora such as streets and sidewalks.

Large_format_camera_lensThe Ninth Circuit did, however, stress that it was not deciding that the places at issue were in fact public fora. This should be a fact-based analysis.  Yet the court in a footnote also noted that it was unclear why the CBP applied its guidelines for the press to these plaintiffs:

We are puzzled as to how these guidelines apply to members of the public, whether media or not, who take photographs outside of port of entry facilities from streets and sidewalks accessible to the general public, whether those streets and sidewalks are on or off the port of entry. On their face, the policies would not appear to apply to plaintiffs at all, much less sanction the detention of plaintiffs and the destruction of their photographs under the circumstances alleged.

As the case returns to the district judge, questions of specific geography regarding public places near border entries is sure to figure prominently.

 

August 14, 2018 in Executive Authority, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, August 5, 2018

Fifth Circuit Strikes State "Threat" Law

The Fifth Circuit ruled in Seals v. McBee that Louisiana's statute that criminalizes "threats" is unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. The ruling strikes the state law.

The case arose when officers arrested Travis Seals for an unspecified reason and claimed that Seals resisted arrest and threatened them (with physical harm and legal action). The DA declined to prosecute. Seals then filed a civil action against officers for malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and a First Amendment violation. In particular, Seals said that the Louisiana statute that criminalizes "threats" was unconstitutionally overbroad. (The statute criminalizes "public intimidation," defined as "the use of violence, force, or threats upon [specified persons, including public officers and public employees] with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty.)

The court first ruled that Seals had standing to sue, even though the DA disavowed bringing charges (but also that the government could bring charges as late as December 2019):

Seals's position mirrors that of the plaintiffs in United Farm Workers. He already bet the farm. And when he violated Section 14:122, he was arrested. Louisiana has disavowed prosecution but concedes that Seals actually violated the statute and is legally subject to prosecution. Moreover, Louisiana has introduced evidence of other enforcement actions that are currently being pursued. Viewed alongside a review of Louisiana's caselaw, that evidence shows that Section 14:122 is not a mere paper tiger but has a real history of enforcement. Because the scales are at least as balanced as in United Farm Workers, Seals, too, has standing to challenge Section 14:122.

The court ruled next that the statute was substantially overbroad in violation of free speech:

"[H]ere the statute sweeps so broadly, encompassing any number of constitutionally protected threats, such as to boycott communities, to run against incumbents, and to sue police officers. Hence it is overbroad."

August 5, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Court Closes Campaign Finance Disclosure Loophole

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell (D.D.C.) ruled on Friday in CREW v. FEC that an FEC regulatory loophole that allows 501(c)(4) organizations and cooperating super-PACs to avoid statutory disclosure requirements was invalid. The ruling strikes the FEC regulation, invalidates the FEC's dismissal of CREW's administrative complaint against Crossroads GPS, and means that the FEC has to reconsider the complaint for failure to disclose contributors. Judge Howell stayed the ruling to give the FEC time to issue valid interim regulations.

The ball's now in the FEC's court. Depending on what the FEC does, this ruling could strike a serious blow to 501(c)(4)s and cooperating super-PACs that use the regulatory loophole to fly under the radar and evade disclosure of contributors.

The case tests the FEC disclosure reg at 11 C.F.R. Sec. 109.10(e)(1)(vi) against the authorizing federal law at 52 U.S.C. Secs. 30104(c)(1) and (c)(2)(C). The reg requires a non-political committee (like a 501(c)(4) organization) to report "[t]he identification of each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing such report, which contribution was made for the purpose of furthering the reported independent expenditure." The statute requires a non-political committee "who makes independent expenditures in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a calendar year" to report "the identification of each person who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person filing such statement which was made for the purpose of furthering an independent expenditure."

The court explained how the reg falls short:

First, the challenged regulation wholly fails to implement another disclosure requirement, mandated in 52 U.S.C. Sec. 30104(c)(1), requiring reporting not-political committees to identify non-trivial donors, as well as the date and amounts of their contributions, when the contributions were made for political purposes to influence any election for federal office, or at the request or authorization of a candidate or the candidate's agent. Such contributions may, in fact, be intended to fund the not-political committee's own contributions and be routed to candidates, political parties, or political committees, such as super PACs. Second, the challenged regulation impermissibly narrows the mandated disclosure in 52 U.S.C. Sec. 30104(c)(2)(C), which requires the identification of such donors contributing for the purpose of furthering the not-political committee's own express advocacy for or against the election of a federal candidate, even when the donor has not expressly directed that the funds be used in the precise manner reported.

These disjunctions between the reg and the statute allow non-political committees and cooperating super-PACs to evade disclosure requirements. The court explains how this works:

Reading subsection (c)(1) out of the statute makes a difference. By contrast to the donors covered in subsection (c)(2)(C), who contributed to support the not-political committee's independent expenditures . . . the donors covered in subsection (c)(1) contributed to not-political committees to support political efforts in connection with federal elections, which contributions may be used by the not-political committee, in some cases, to contribute directly to candidates or political committees, including to fund super PACs. For example, super PACs set up only to make independent expenditures, may receive unlimited contributions from donors, including not-political committees, to fund their independent expenditure activity. While super PACs, as political committees, must disclose their contributors, those disclosed contributors may serve merely as pass-through entities to route the funds to the super PAC.

Indeed, super PACs are often affiliated with not-political committees, such as 501(c)(4) organizations, because, as a political committee and not-political committee, respectively, each entity "abides by a particular set of rules, enjoys distinct opportunities, and is subject to different restraints." Allowing not-political committees to mask donors, who otherwise are subject to disclosure under subsection (c)(1), facilitates the role of these organizations as pass-throughs, enabling donors to contribute to super PACs without being identified by routing their contributions through affiliated 501(c)(4) organizations or other types of not-political committees. Absent enforcement of subjection (c)(1), super PACs disclose the identities of contributing not-political committees, but the latter do not disclose the original contributors, subverting the FECA's broad disclosure regime.

The ruling strikes the FEC reg, but gives the Commission another bite at the apple--45 days to issue interim regs that comply with the statute.

 

August 5, 2018 in Campaign Finance, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, August 1, 2018

D.C. Circuit Denies Injunction Against Transit Rule Banning Religious Content

The D.C. Circuit ruled yesterday in Archdiocese of Washington v. WMATA that the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority rule that bans religious content advertising on buses did not likely violate free speech. The court denied the Archdiocese's motion for a preliminary injunction.

Judge Kavanaugh was an original member of the panel, but recused himself from the ruling.

The ruling sides with the government on a key free-speech question: Is religious content necessarily a viewpoint? The court said no.

The case involves WMATA's Guideline 12, which closes the public-transit authority's advertising space to issue-oriented ads, including political, religious, and advocacy ads. (Importantly, the Guideline banned by pro- and con- ads on each topic.) When WMATA, acting pursuant to the Guideline, rejected the Archdiocese's request to place religious ads on buses, the Archdiocese sued, arguing that the denial violated free speech, the Free Exercise Clause, and RFRA, among others. The Archdiocese moved for a preliminary injunction, but yesterday the D.C. Circuit rejected that request.

The court ruled that the Archdiocese was unlikely to succeed on its free speech claim, because buses are a non-public forum, and Guideline 12 permissibly discriminates based on the content, not viewpoint, of the message.

The court rejected the Archdiocese's argument that any content restriction on religious speech was necessarily a viewpoint based restriction on speech because there's a religious viewpoint on any matter. "Notably, there is no principled limit to the Archdiocese's conflation of subject-matter restrictions with viewpoint-based restrictions as concerns religion. Were the Archdiocese to prevail, WMATA (and other transit systems) would have to accept all types of advertisements to maintain viewpoint neutrality, including ads criticizing and disparaging religion and religious tenets or practices."

The court distinguished Rosenberger, Lamb's Chapel, and Good News Club--all of which struck government bans on religious speech as viewpoint-based discrimination. The court said that those cases involved religious-viewpoint discrimination within a defined content of speech. But here, the government simply banned the content of all religious speech, again, both pro- and con- (or otherwise). 

[F]ar from being an abrogation of the distinction between permissible subject matter rules and impermissible viewpoint discrimination, each of these cases represents an application of the Supreme Court's viewpoint discrimination analysis, of which Guideline 12 does not run afoul. In each, the Court held that the government had engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination because the challenged regulation operated to exclude religious viewpoints on otherwise includable topics. An examination of each case demonstrates the contrast between the breadth of subjects encompassed by the forums at issue and WMATA's in which, unlike the restrictions struck down by the Court, Guideline 12 does not function to exclude religious viewpoints but rather proscribes advertisements on the entire subject matter of religion.

The court also said that the Archdiocese didn't demonstrate a likelihood of success on its other claims. As to Free Exercise, the court said that Guideline 12 was merely a religiously-neutral rule of general applicability, with no evidence of religious animus, and therefore valid under rational basis review.

August 1, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, News, Opinion Analysis, Religion, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 25, 2018

Federal Judge Enjoins Florida's Ban on Early Voting at College Facilities

In his opinion in League of Women Voters v. Detzner, Chief Judge Mark Walker of the Northern District of Florida found that the Florida Secretary of State's Opinion barring early voting on any university or college campus most likely violates the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, and issued a preliminary injunction.

The issue involves an interpretation of the Florida's Division of Elections, under the Secretary of State, that Florida Statute §101.657(1)(a), passed in 2013, that permits supervisors of elections to “designate any city hall, permanent public library facility, fairground, civic center, courthouse, county commission building, stadium, convention center, government-owned senior center, or government-owned community center as early voting sites.”  A question arose as to whether a particular hall on the University of Florida campus qualified and in response the state official issued an Opinion banning all university and college facilities for use in early voting.

University-of-florida-editorial

Judge Walker found that the state's interpretation of the early voting statute was constitutionally faulty. While early voting is not required and may be classified as a convenience, Judge Walker quoted Bush v. Gore (2000) — “Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another" — to reason that constitutional problems emerge  "when conveniences are available for some people and affirmatively blocked for others."  Judge Walker began the opinion by noting that the number of people effected was substantial: more than 1.1 million "young men and women were enrolled in institutions of higher learning" in Florida in 2016, nearly 830,000 in public institutions, as well as there being another 107,000 staff members at the public institutions. To stress the number of people involved, Judge Walker wrote:

Put another way, the number of people who live and work on Florida’s public college and university campuses is greater than the population of Jacksonville, Florida—or the populations of North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Vermont, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia.

Judge Walker first applied the the Anderson-Burdick  balancing test  for less than "severe restrictions." (Recall in Burdick v. Takushi (1992) the Court upheld Hawai'i 's ban on write-in voting).  Judge Walker stated that even assuming the state's opinion could be construed as a reasonable nondiscriminatory restriction, it imposed significant burdens on the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to vote, categorically prohibiting the use of on-campus early voting and thus "lopsidedly impacts Florida's youngest voters," a class of voters "particularly invested in early voting" with approximately 43 percent of Florida's college students voting early in 2016.  These burdens were not justified by the state's interests — which the Judge stated "one must squint hard to identify"— in following state law, preventing parking issues, and avoiding on-campus disruption.

As to the Twenty-Sixth Amendment issue, Judge Walker found that while there was a "dearth of guidance on what test applies" when the claimed infringement is not a facial denial of voting for any citizen 18 years or older, the standard of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. (1997) was generally accepted. Judge Walker found that the state's approach revealed a stark pattern of discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age. Judge Walker also compared the state's policy to earlier seemingly neutral attempts to effect African-American voters, noting that

This Court does not lightly compare contemporary laws and policies to more shameful eras of American history. But addressing intentional discrimination does not require kid gloves.

Having found that there was a likelihood that plaintiffs would prevail on the merits, Judge Walker also found the other requirements for a preliminary injunction were met. The judge instructed the Defendant Secretary of State to issue a directive to supervisors of elections that they retain discretion to implement the Florida statute including any sites that may be on university or college campuses.

July 25, 2018 in Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis, Reconstruction Era Amendments | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 17, 2018

Check it Out: Tang on How to Undo Janus

Check out Aaron Tang's piece on SSRN, How to Undo Janus: A User-Friendly Guide. In response to Janus, where the Court ruled that fair-share violated the First Amendment, Tang argues that "lawmakers can amend state law to permit government employers to reimburse unions for their bargaining-related expenses directly."

July 17, 2018 in First Amendment, News | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 6, 2018

District Judge Enjoins FDA Health Warnings for Cigars on First Amendment Appeal

In a brief opinion in Cigar Association of America v. United States Food and Drug Administration, Judge Amit Mehta has enjoined the FDA's warning requirements regarding cigars under 21 CFR 1143.5, such as the statement "Cigar smoking can cause lung cancer and heart disease" pending appeal.

In a previous opinion in May, Judge Mehta had sustained the FDA rule against a First Amendment challenge (as well as other challenges), finding that "Because the warning statements are factual and uncontroversial disclosures aimed at informing the public about the risks of cigar and pipe tobacco use and at correcting the public’s misperceptions about such products’ use, and because the [FDA] Rule does not impose these requirements in an “unjustified or unduly burdensome” manner, the Rule is constitutional" under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio (1985).

Nevertheless, Judge Mehta's conclusion regarding the "likelihood of success on the merits" prong of the preliminary injunction analysis was that the Cigar Association raised "serious legal questions going to the merits, such as

whether Defendants’ asserted governmental interest in imposing the health warnings regime is a substantial one; the precise burden the government bears under Zaudererto compel purely factual and uncontroversial government speech; and whether a disclosure of the size and appearance mandated by the warnings requirements is so “unduly burdensome” as to chill protected speech. These are difficult legal questions, and the D.C. Circuit might well disagree with this court’s resolution of them.

Most interestingly, however, Judge Mehta relies on the Supreme Court's June decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra holding California's FACT Act requiring of disclosures by "pregnancy crisis centers" violated the First Amendment. Judge Mehta states that Becerra "only adds to the substantiality of the issues Plaintiffs intend to raise on appeal," even as Judge Mehta writes

This court does not concur that Becerra requires an outcome different than the one the court reached— Becerradiffers from this case in multiple, material ways—but that disagreement does not diminish the merits of Plaintiffs’ motion. Becerra makes clear that Plaintiffs’ appeal raises serious legal questions.

Yet while an important aspect of the Court's opinion in Becerra as we discussed was that abortion was not "uncontroversial," it does seem as if the cigar association cannot make the same claim as to the links between tobacco and cancer. Or can they?

A case to watch as it goes to the D.C. Court of Appeals in the continuing saga of First Amendment challenges to government mandated warnings and disclosures by industries as in the 2014 DC Circuit en banc  American Meat Institute v. U.S. Department of Agriculture and panel opinions in National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC (conflict minerals) and  R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA (cigarette labeling). 

Four_cigars

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July 6, 2018 in Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 5, 2018

Check it Out: The Deregulatory First Amendment

Check out the conversation at Take Care on the deregulatory First Amendment. Charlotte Garden and Nikolas Bowie have posted so far. Posts to come from Caroline Mala Corbin and Catherine Fisk.

July 5, 2018 in First Amendment, News, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 2, 2018

Fifth Circuit Clarifies: Nonfinal Decisionmaker Can Be Liable for Retaliation for Free Speech

The Fifth Circuit ruled last week in Sims v. City of Madisonville, that a nonfinal decisionmaker can be liable for a retaliatory discharge against an employee in violation of the First Amendment.

The ruling clarifies the law in the Fifth Circuit and aligns the court with all the other circuits to have addressed the issue. It also means that future nonfinal decisionmakers in the Fifth Circuit are now on notice (and the law is clear, for qualified immunity purposes): You may be liable for actions you take against employees in retaliation for their protected First Amendment speech.

The case involved a police officer's lawsuit against the city and another officer (but not the final decisionmaker) for retaliatory discharge in reprisal for his speech about the defendant-officer's official conduct. The defendant-officer sought qualified immunity.

In a somewhat unusual move, the court took up the first prong of the two-part qualified immunity test in order to get to its holding on the plaintiff's right. Qualified immunity shields an official from a constitutional tort unless (1) the official violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights and (2) the right was clearly established at the time. Because courts can address either prong  first, they often (or almost always) address the second prong first, and grant qualified immunity because a right wasn't clearly established. But this means that they don't get to the first prong--whether there was a constitutional violation in the first place. That leaves the law unsettled, which then invites qualified immunity on the second prong in future like cases. Or as the court said: "Continuing to resolve the question at the clearly established step means the law will never get established."

That's exactly what happened here. Fifth Circuit law took a detour on the issue after courts misread an earlier ruling. That led to confusion in the circuit about what the law was. And that, in turn, led to a string of dismissals on qualified immunity grounds because, well, the right wasn't clearly established.

So the court joined all the other circuits to have addressed the issue and ruled that nonfinal (mid-level) decisionmakers can be liable for retaliatory action, so long as their actions were a "causal link" in the retaliatory action.

As numerous courts of appeals have recognized, individual liability for a government official who violates constitutional rights, including First Amendment ones, turns on traditional tort principles of "but-for" causation. If an individual defendant's animus against a coworker's exercise of First Amendment rights is a link in the causal chain that leads to a plaintiff's firing, the individual may be liable even if she is not the final decisionmaker.

The ruling did nothing for the plaintiff in this case, though. That's because at the time of the action (before the court ruled in this case), the law was still unsettled in the circuit--there was no clearly established right--and so the court granted qualified immunity to the defendant under the second prong.

The court also rejected the plaintiff's due process claims.

July 2, 2018 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 1, 2018

Check it Out: Liptak on Free Speech's Right Turn

Check out Adam Liptak's piece in The NYT, How Conservatives Weaponized the First Amendment.

The Roberts court does more than hear a larger proportion of cases concerning conservative expression. It is also far more likely than earlier courts to rule for conservative speech than for liberal speech.

The piece draws on Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, and Kevin Quinn's 6+ Decades of Freedom of Expression in the U.S. Supreme Court.

July 1, 2018 in First Amendment, News, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 27, 2018

Court Strikes Fair Share

The Supreme Court today ruled that Illinois's fair-share, agency-fee requirement for non-members of public sector unions violated the First Amendment. The ruling deals a significant blow to public sector unions.

The 5-4 ruling wasn't entirely a surprise: The Court has sent several signals in recent years that fair-share was on the chopping block. The big question for the Court in today's ruling, Janus v. AFSCME, was how Justice Gorsuch would vote. He voted with the other conservatives against fair-share.

We last posted on the case here.

As part of the ruling, the Court overturned Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., the 1977 case upholding a fair-share requirement against a First Amendment challenge. The Abood Court held that the state's interests in avoiding free-riders and maintaining labor peace justice any intrusion into First Amendment rights of non-members. Today the Court said that "Abood was poorly reasoned," that it "has led to practical problems and abuse," and that it "is inconsistent with other First Amendment cases . . . ."

The ruling means that states can no longer allow public sector unions to require non-members in a public-sector union shop to pay "agency fees" or "fair share" fees that go to the union's collective bargaining activities (but not to its political activities).

The ruling could have a devastating effect on public sector unions, or it could energize them. Time will tell.

It's unclear at this point whether the ruling could be used to challenge fair-share in the private sector.

Justice Kagan wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Sotomayor dissented separately.

June 27, 2018 in Association, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

Closely Divided SCOTUS Finds Trump "Travel Ban" Constitutional

In its opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, a closely divided United States Supreme Court found that the so-called "travel ban" or "Muslim ban" did not violate the Establishment Clause. 

Recall that the Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hawai'i v. Trump regarding Presidential Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”of  September 24, 2017, also known as E.O 3, or Travel Ban 3.0, or Muslim Ban 3.0. The Ninth Circuit, affirming a district judge, found Travel Ban 3.0 unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act.  The Court also took certiorari on the Establishment Clause issue. There were also constitutional issues involving standing.

The Court's majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, spends substantial space on the statutory issue, ultimately concluding that the Proclamation is within the President's authority under 8 U.S.C. §1182, a provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

On the constitutional issues, Chief Justice Roberts writing for the majority finds there is standing, but concludes that the Proclamation does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court rehearses some of the President's statements regarding a "Muslim ban," but — in a passage which will be oft-quoted — states that

the issue before us is not whether to denounce the statements. It is instead the significance of those statements in reviewing a Presidential directive, neutral on its face, addressing a matter within the core of executive responsibility. In doing so, we must consider not only the statements of a particular President, but also the authority of the Presidency itself.

In making this assessment, the majority, finds the statements essentially insignificant. The Court applies the rational basis standard derived from Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972) which the majority stated applies "across different contexts and constitutional claims" when considering Executive authority. Thus, according to the majority, as long as the Executive act "can reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds" it will be upheld. The majority briefly considered its equal protection cases involving animus (interestingly, the majority does not discuss McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky (2005), an Establishment Clause case involving intent),  but rejected the equal protection cases' applicability:

The Proclamation does not fit this pattern. It cannot be said that it is impossible to “discern a relationship to legitimate state interests” or that the policy is “inexplicable by anything but animus.”

Instead, the majority states that the Proclamation results from a worldwide review process (echoing the opening words of the Solicitor General at oral argument), and three "additional features" including removal of three nations since the first ban, significant exceptions, and a waiver process. 

Noteworthy in the majority is also its disavowal and essential overruling of Korematsu v. United States (1944), one of the so-called Japanese internment cases, and states that it is "wholly inapt to liken that morally repugnant order [in Korematsu] to a facially neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the privilege of admission."

Four Justices dissented.  The dissenting opinion by Breyer, joined by Kagan, argues that the Proclamation's "elaborate system of exemptions and waivers" points to the conclusion that "religious animus" played a significant role in the Proclamation. Breyer recommended that the issue be remanded for further factfinding, but on balance, the evidence of antireligious bias was now sufficient to find the Proclamation unconstitutional.

The dissenting opinion by Sotomayor, joined by Ginsburg, devotes itself entirely to the Establishment Clause issue and concludes that the Proclamation, which "masquerades behind a facade of national-security concerns," is nevertheless motivated by anti-Muslim bias and "runs afoul of the Establishment Clause's guarantee of religious neutrality." Sotomyor's opinion critiques the majority for providing a "highly abridged account" of the President's public statements regarding Muslims that does not "tell even half the story," and provides almost seven pages of statements, tweets, and retweets, and also notes that "despite several opportunities to do so, President Trump has never disavowed any of his prior statements about Islam."

In addition to comparing this situation with Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah (1993, in which the Court found unconstitutional the city's prohibition of animal sacrifice as motivated by bias against the Santeria religion, and Korematsu v. United States (1944), as discussed above,  Sotomayor's dissenting opinion stated:

Just weeks ago, the Court rendered its decision in Mas­terpiece Cakeshop,  which applied the bed­ rock principles of religious neutrality and tolerance in considering a First Amendment challenge to government action.  (“The Constitution ‘commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state inter­ vention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures’” (quoting Lukumi); Masterpiece(KAGAN, J., concurring) (“[S]tate actors cannot show hostility to religious views; rather, they must give those views ‘neutral and respectful consideration’ ”). Those principles should apply equally here. In both instances, the question is whether a gov­ernment actor exhibited tolerance and neutrality in reach­ing a decision that affects individuals’ fundamental reli­gious freedom. But unlike in Masterpiece, where a state civil rights commission was found to have acted without “the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires,”  the government actors in this case will not be held accountable for breaching the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious neutrality and toler­ance. Unlike in Masterpiece, where the majority consid­ered the state commissioners’ statements about religion to be persuasive evidence of unconstitutional government action, the majority here completely sets aside the President’s charged statements about Muslims as irrelevant. That holding erodes the foundational principles of religious tolerance that the Court elsewhere has so emphatically protected, and it tells members of minority religions in our country “‘that they are outsiders, not full members of the political commu­nity.’ ”

[citations omitted].

The majority did not cite Masterpiece. Neither did Kennedy's brief concurring opinion which closed with what seemed to an  attempt at an admonition:

An anxious world must know that our Government remains committed always to the liberties the Constitution seeks to preserve and protect, so that freedom extends outward, and lasts.

 

June 26, 2018 in Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Executive Authority, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Religion, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS Finds California's FACT Act Violates First Amendment

In its closely divided opinion in  National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, Justice Thomas writing for the Court found California's FACT Act regulating "crisis pregnancy centers" violates the First Amendment. 

Recall that the Ninth Circuit upheld the California Reproductive Freedom, Accountability, Comprehensive Care, and Transparency Act (FACT Act), which requires that licensed pregnancy-related clinics, also known as crisis pregnancy centers, or CPCs, must disseminate a notice stating the existence of publicly- funded family-planning services, including contraception and abortion, and requires that unlicensed clinics disseminate a notice stating that they are not licensed by the State of California.  The California legislature had found that the approximately 200 CPCs in California employ “intentionally deceptive advertising and counseling practices [that] often confuse, misinform, and even intimidate women from making fully-informed, time-sensitive decisions about critical health care.” The California law is not unique, but as we previously discussed when certiorari was granted, other courts have consider similar provisions with mixed conclusions.

The majority's opinion found the regulations as to both the licensed and unlicensed pregnancy centers violated the First Amendment.

As to the required notice for licensed pregnancy centers, the majority found it was a content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny under Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015). The Court rejected the category of "professional speech," relied on by the Ninth Circuit, stating the "Court’s precedents do not recognize such a tradition for a category called “professional speech.”" However, the majority opinion recognized that the Court had  "afforded less protection for professional speech in two circumstances," but stated that neither "turned on the fact that professionals were speaking." First, citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio (1985), the majority discussed the more deferential review accorded to laws that require professionals to disclose factual, noncontroversial information in their “commercial speech.”  However, the majority found Zauderer inapplicable because "the licensed notice is not limited to 'purely factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which . . . services will be available."  "Instead, it requires these clinics to disclose information about state-sponsored services— including abortion, anything but an “uncontroversial” topic."  Second, citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, the majority acknowledged that the Court had rejected a First Amendment challenge to a law requiring physicians to obtain informed consent before they could perform an abortion.The majority distinguished Casey, however stating that:

The licensed notice at issue here is not an informed- consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct. The notice does not facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied to a procedure at all. It applies to all interactions between a covered facility and its clients, regardless of whether a medical procedure is ever sought, offered, or performed.

The majority's opinion states that regulating medical speech is especially problematical given that "Throughout history, governments have “manipulat[ed] the content of doctor-patient discourse” to increase state power and suppress minorities, quoting language regarding the Chinese Cultural Revolution and Nazi Germany. 

Even if strict scrutiny did not apply, the majority stated that "the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny. California asserts a single interest to justify the licensed notice: providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored services. Assuming that this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to achieve it."

As to the unlicensed notice, the majority found that it did not survive even under Zauderer, because it was “unjustified or unduly burdensome.”

Even if California had presented a nonhypothetical justification for the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech. The unlicensed notice imposes a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that is wholly disconnected from California’s informational interest. It requires covered facilities to post California’s precise notice, no matter what the facilities say on site or in their advertisements.

In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Alito, and Gorsuch, argued that the California law was viewpoint discrimination.

 

June 26, 2018 in Abortion, First Amendment, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 25, 2018

SCOTUS Remands Arlene's Flowers on Same-Sex Wedding Refusal

The Court, without opinion, in Arlene's Flowers v. Washington, granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court, and remanded the case for consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n.

Recall that in 2017 the Washington Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Washington Law Against Discrimination including sexual orientation as applied to a business that refused to provide wedding flowers for a same-sex wedding. Artlene's Flowers had several First Amendment claims and on the Free Exercise claim, the court rejected Arlene's Flowers' argument that the Washington ant-discrimination law was not a neutral one of general applicability and should therefore warrant strict scrutiny.  Instead, the court applied the rational basis standard of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, which the Washington anti-discrimination easily passed. 

Philippe_de_Marlier_Nelkenstrauss_in_GlasvaseShortly after the Court's decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, in which the Court found that the Colorado  Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of the case had "some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his [the cakemaker's] objection," the florist in Arlene's Flowers, Baronnelle Stutzman, filed a Supplemental Brief seeking "at least" remand and alleging:

in ruling against Barronelle, the state trial court—at the urging of Washington’s attorney general—compared Barronelle to a racist “owner of a 7-Eleven store” who had “a policy” of refusing “to serve any black[]” customers. Pet. App. 107a–109a & 108a n.16 (emphasis added). The state, in short, has treated Barronelle with neither tolerance nor respect.

Thus the Washington Supreme Court is now tasked with determining whether there was hostility towards the Arlene's Flowers woner's religion, and if so, applying strict scrutiny.

Relatedly, in a challenge to Arizona's non-discrimination statute by a company, Brush & Nib, that sells "pre-fabricated and design artwork for home décor, weddings, and special events," an Arizona Court of Appeals found that there would be no Free Exercise claim in its opinion in Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix. Yet because Brush & Nib was a pre-enforcement challenge, the emphasis was on the statute rather than on Brush & Nib's actions.

 

 

June 25, 2018 in Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis, Recent Cases, Religion, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 18, 2018

SCOTUS Dodges Partisan Gerrymandering Challenges in Gill and Benisek

In its opinion in Gill v. Whitford involving a challenge to Wisconsin's alleged partisan gerrymandering the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, with a concurring opinion by Justice Kagan (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor), found that the plaintiffs did not prove sufficient Article III standing to sustain the relief granted in the divided decision by the three judge court.  Additionally, in a per curiam opinion in Benisek v. Lamone, involving a challenge to alleged political gerrymandering in Maryland, the Court declined to disturb the three judge court's decision not to grant to a preliminary injunction.

Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the Court in Gill admits that

Over the past five decades this Court has been repeat­edly asked to decide what judicially enforceable limits, if any, the Constitution sets on the gerrymandering of voters along partisan lines. Our previous attempts at an answer have left few clear landmarks for addressing the question.

The  Chief Justice's Gill opinion does little, if anything, to remedy this lack of "landmarks" in the doctrine. However, the Chief Justice's opinion continues that the Court's "efforts to sort through those considerations have generated conflict­ing views both of how to conceive of the injury arising from partisan gerrymandering and of the appropriate role for the Federal Judiciary in remedying that injury" and it is this set of "conflicting views" that the Chief Justice's opinion sets out to resolve. The 1024px-The_Gerry-Mander_Editresolution seems simple: to the extent that plaintiffs' "alleged harm is the dilution of their votes" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, "that injury is district specific." In sum, the injury must be an individual one that arises from an individual's vote being diluted by the voter's placement in a "cracked" or "packed" district.  The Chief Justice's opinion concludes that while the individual plaintiffs had "pleaded a particularized burden along such lines," they failed to prove those facts at trial.

Yet this simplicity is less straightforward when combined with Justice Kagan's concurring opinion, which correctly notes that in addition to the Equal Protection Clause claim of vote dilution, "at some points in this litigation, the plaintiffs complained of a different injury — an infringement of their First Amendment right of association." [Indeed, the opinion for the three judge court seems to combine the equal protection and First Amendment claims.] On the First Amendment claim, Kagan writes:

when the harm alleged is not district specific, the proof needed for standing should not be district specific either. And the associational injury flowing from a statewide partisan gerrymander, whether alleged by a party member or the party itself, has nothing to do with the packing or cracking of any single district’s lines. The complaint in such a case is instead that the gerrymander has burdened the ability of like-minded people across the State to affiliate in a political party and carry out that organization’s activities and objects. Because a plaintiff can have that complaint without living in a packed or cracked district, she need not show what the Court demands today for a vote dilution claim. Or said otherwise: Because on this alternative theory, the valued association and the injury to it are statewide, so too is the relevant standing requirement.

Moreover, even on the equal protection vote dilution claim, Kagan's opinion instructs that the Court's determination of remand rather than dismissal means that

the plaintiffs—both the four who initially made those assertions and any others (current or newly joined)—now can introduce evidence that their individual districts were packed or cracked. And if the plaintiffs’ more general charges have a basis in fact, that evidence may well be at hand. Recall that the plaintiffs here al­leged—and the District Court found —that a unified Republican government set out to ensure that Republicans would control as many State Assembly seats as possible over a decade (five consecutive election cycles). To that end, the gov­ernment allegedly packed and cracked Democrats throughout the State, not just in a particular district (see, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone) or region. Assuming that is true, the plaintiffs should have a mass of packing and cracking proof, which they can now also present in district-by-district form to support their standing. In other words, a plaintiff residing in each affected district can show, through an alternative map or other evidence, that packing or cracking indeed occurred there.

 [emphasis added].  The Court remanded and declined to "direct dismissal" given that this "is not the usual case" because the it "concerns an unsettled kind of claim," the "contours and justiciability of which are unresolved." Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote separately to disagree with the remand, arguing there is "nothing unusual" about the case and that the matter should be dismissed.

In the five page per curiam opinion in Benisek v. Lamone, the Court declined to disturb the three judge court's denial of a motion for preliminary injunction. Seemingly without irony, the Court noted that one rationale for the three judge court's denial of a preliminary injunction was its concern about assessing the merits of the partisan gerrymandering claim and its prediction it would be "better equipped to make that legal determination and to chart a wise course" after the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Gill. However, the per curiam opinion of the Court also reasoned that even if the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits, the  other factors in a preliminary injunction decision including the balance of equities and the public interest "tilted against" the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

In sum, the decisions in Gill and Benisek leave the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering as unsettled as before.

[image: "the gerrymander" via]

 

June 18, 2018 in Association, Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Standing, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 14, 2018

Zervos v. Trump: New York's Highest Court Refuses Appeal

On its own motion, the New York Court of Appeals (NY's highest court) dismissed the appeal by Donald Trump in Trump v. Zervos.

From its decision list, the court's entire "opinion" reads:

On the Court's own motion, appeal dismissed,without costs, upon the ground that the order appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.

Motion for leave to appeal dismissed upon the ground that the order sought to be appealed from does not finally determine the action within the meaning of the Constitution.

Motion for a stay dismissed as academic.

Recall that in May, the appellate division in New York denied President Trump's motion for a stay, in a summary decision.  Recall that in March, the state trial judge ruled the lawsuit for defamation by Summer Zervos against now-President Trump could proceed, denying a motion to dismiss or to stay by Trump based on his presidential status. The trial judge decided that the holding of  the United States Supreme Court in its unanimous 1997 decision of Clinton v. Jones that then-President Clinton was subject to suit in federal court extended to state court.

Petitioning the United States Supreme Court for a stay would be the next step if the president wants to halt the defamation lawsuit against him for as long as he is president. Otherwise, the case will proceed including presumably discovery which would mean a deposition of the president.

1000px-Seal_of_the_New_York_Court_of_Appeals.svg

 

 

June 14, 2018 in Executive Authority, Executive Privilege, First Amendment, State Constitutional Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS Rules Minnesota's Restriction on Voters' Political Apparel Violates First Amendment

In its opinion in Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, the Court held that a provision of a Minnesota law regulating voters' political attire violates the First Amendment. Recall from our preview that  Minn. Stat. §211B.11, entitled "Soliciting near polling places," includes among its petty misdemeanor violations a prohibition of political attire: "A political badge, political button, or other political insignia may not be worn at or about the polling place on primary or election day." 

The Court's majority opinion, by Chief Justice Roberts, finds that the "polling place" on election day constitutes a nonpublic forum under the First Amendment; it is "government- controlled property set aside for the sole purpose of voting" and is a "special enclave, subject to greater restriction." The question as phrased by the Court was therefore whether "Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is 'reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum': voting."  As in the oral argument, the Court considered the relevance of Burson v. Freeman (1992), in which the Court upheld a Tennessee statute which prohibited the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to a polling place.

Analogizing to Burson, the Court upheld Minnesota's objective in prohibiting voters from wearing particular kinds of expressive apparel or accessories while inside the polling place.

[W]e see no basis for rejecting Minnesota’s determination that some forms of advocacy should be excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as “an island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their choices.” Brief for Respondents 43. Casting a vote is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not campaigning. The State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect that distinction.

However, the Court found that the Minnesota statute failed to satisfy the reasonable standard in the means chosen to achieve its goal: "the unmoored use of the term 'political' in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail even this forgiving test." The Court found "political" far too broad (citing dictionary definitions) and likewise found that "issue oriented material" was also too broad (" A rule whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and positions of every candidate and party on the ballot is not reason- able. Candidates for statewide and federal office and major political parties can be expected to take positions on a wide array of subjects of local and national import.") 

However, the Court gestured toward acceptable means chosen:

That is not to say that Minnesota has set upon an impossible task. Other States have laws proscribing displays (including apparel) in more lucid terms. See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §319.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2018) (prohibiting “the visible display . . . of information that advocates for or against any candidate or measure,” including the “display of a candidate’s name, likeness, or logo,” the “display of a ballot measure’s number, title, subject, or logo,” and “[b]uttons, hats,” or “shirts” containing such information); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §61.010(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting the wearing of “a badge, insignia, emblem, or other similar communicative device relating to a candidate, measure, or political party appearing on the ballot, or to the conduct of the election”). We do not suggest that such provisions set the outer limit of what a State may proscribe, and do not pass on the constitutionality of laws that are not before us. But we do hold that if a State wishes to set its polling places apart as areas free of partisan discord, it must employ a more discernible approach.

The appendix lists thirty-four states prohibiting accessories or apparel in the polling place.

Dissenting, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, would have certified the issue of the interpretation of the statute to the Minnesota Supreme Court. The Court, in footnote 7, explained its decision not to certify, including that the request came "late in the day," but Sotomayor argued that "certification is not an argument subject to forfeiture by the parties" and is instead a matter of comity. Moreover, she contended that having an interpretation of the statute, including the term "political" (which she noted the Court had "little difficulty discerning its meaning in the context of [other] statutes subject to First Amendment challenges, citing cases), would "obviate the hypothetical line-drawing problems that form the basis of the Court’s decision today."

Thus, the import of Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky is that states can prohibit certain expressive apparel and accessories at the polling place on election day, but the courts must find the statutory definitions sufficiently defined as to be "reasonable." 

US_presidential_election_badges

June 14, 2018 in Elections and Voting, Federalism, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)

Check it Out: NYT on Campus Free Speech

Check out Jeremy Peters's piece in today's NYT, In the Name of Free Speech, States Crack Down on Campus Protests.

June 14, 2018 in First Amendment, News, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0)