Friday, April 12, 2013
Garrett Epps writes in the Atlantic that if originalism's aim was to keep judges from writing their personal views into the law, it has been "an abject failure." His evidence? Chief Judge David Sentelle's ruling in Noel Canning v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit's January ruling striking President Obama's recess appointments to the NLRB.
Epps criticizes Judge Sentelle's ruling as putting a 1755 definition over the consistent executive practice based on a practical concern, getting the government's business done, and judicial precedent:
For at least a century, presidents--with congressional acquiescence--have interpreted [the Appointments Clause] as giving them the ability to make appointments any time when the Senate is not in session. But Chief Judge David Sentelle looked up the six-word entry for "the" in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1755, and found that its "original public meaning" was "noting a particular thing," meaning that there can be one and only one "recess" of the Senate.
Epps notes that the Noel Canning rule would have voided 232 appointments under President Reagan, 78 under President G.H.W. Bush, 139 under President Clinton, and 171 under G.W. Bush. Appointees include Alan Greenspan and Lawrence Eagleburger.
Epps points to a recent Congressional Research Service report, The Recess Appointment Power After Noel Canning v. NLRB: Constitutional Implications. The CRS issued a companion report, Practical Implications of Noel Canning on the NLRB and CFPB.
Tuesday, April 9, 2013
President Obama today sent three nominations for full terms at the NLRB to the Senate--a renomination of Board chair Mark Pearce, a Democrat, and nominations of two Republicans. The President nominated two Democrats to full terms in February.
The nominations come just months after the D.C. Circuit ruled in Canning v. NLRB that the President's recess appointments to the Board were invalid. According to TPM, the administration plans to appeal that decision, but in the meantime it "has prompted more than 100 businesses to claim the board lacks authority to take action against them becuase two of its members are not there legitimately."
Friday, March 22, 2013
The Obama Administration has given us just a glimpse of its legal analysis authorizing its use of drone attacks on U.S. citizens in a foreign country outside the zone of active hostilities. And that mere glimpse contains a telling, and deeply troubling, reference to an earlier episode, Nixon's bombing of Cambodia, writes Professor Mary Dudziak (Emory), author of War Time: An Idea, Its History, Its Consequences, in the NYT.
Dudziak points to a citation to a 1970 speech by Department of State Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson in the recently released "white paper" setting out the administration's legal justification for drone attacks. In that speech, Stevenson argued that the U.S. had authority to take military action in Cambodia in self-defense against North Vietnamese attacks from that country. Dudziak explains:
Since 1965, "the territory of Cambodia has been used by North Vietnam as a base of military operations," [Stevenson] told the New York City Bar Association. "It long ago reached a level that would have justified us in taking appropriate measures of self-defense on the territory of Cambodia. However, except for scattered instances of returning fire across the border, we refrained until April from taking such action in Cambodia."
But there was a problem:
In fact, Nixon had begun his secret bombing of Cambodia more than a year earlier. (It is not clear whether Mr. Stevenson knew this.) So the Obama administration's lawyers have cited a statement that was patently false.
Here's the full paragraph from page 4 of the white paper:
The Department has not found any authority for the proposition that when one of the parties to an armed conflict plans and executes operations from a base in a new nation, an operation to engage the enemy in that location cannot be part of the original armed conflict, and thus subject to the laws of war governing that conflict, unless the hostilities become sufficiently intense and protracted in the new location. That does not appear to be the rule of the historical practice, for example, even in a traditional international conflict [i.e., a conflict between nations]. See John R. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State, United States Military Action in Cambodia: Questions of International Law, Address before the Hammarskjold Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (May 28, 1970), in 3 The Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context 23, 28-30 (Richard A. Falk, ed. 1972) (arguing that in an international armed conflict, if a neutral state has been unable for any reason to prevent violations of its neutrality by the troops of one belligerent using its territory as a base of operations, the other belligerent has historically been justified in attacking those enemy forces in that state). Particularly in a non-international armed conflict, where terrorist organizations may move their base of operations from one country to another, the determination of whether a particular operation would be part of an ongoing armed conflict would require consideration of the particular facts and circumstances in each case, including the fact that transnational non-state organizations such as al-Qa'ida have no single site serving as their base of operations. [Citation omitted.]
Dudziak argues that the citation to Nixon's bombing of Cambodia illustrates a problem, instead of providing a precedent:
The Cambodia bombing, far from providing a valuable precedent for today's counterterrorism campaign, illustrates the trouble with secrecy: It doesn't work. If Nixon had gone to Congress or announced the plan publicly, the historian Jeffrey P. Kimball has written, "there would have been an uproad." But disclosure was ultimately forced upon him when he decided to send ground troops into Cambodia. A new wave of giant antiwar protests erupted, and Nixon's ability to take further aggressive action became infeasible.
She writes that we expect more, and deserve more, of President Obama.
Friday, March 15, 2013
Portions of the show examine "the ‘aiding the enemy’ charge the government has brought against Bradley Manning, the man who gave hundreds of thousands of classified documents to WikiLeaks," including an interview with Yocahi Benkler, whose New Republic article we profiled here. More of our discussions on Bradley Manning here, here, and here.
"On the Media" is broadcast on public radio throughout the nation; this week's show is worth a listen for anyone interested in the First Amendment.
Monday, March 11, 2013
The constitutional issues in the challenge to NYC Health Code §81.53 - - - the New York City Department of Health regulation prohibiting sugary drinks in restaurants, movie theaters and arenas to exceed 16 ounces - - - largely involve the power of a city agency to promulgate such a rule. Today, a state trial judge, Milton Tingling, issued an decision in New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. NYC Department of Health and Mental Hygiene enjoining §81.53 for violating the state separation of powers doctrine.
After a lengthy discussion of New York City Charters - - - beginning with the first charter in 1686 - - - Judge Tingling wrote:
To accept the respondents' interpretation of the authoriy granted to the Board [of Health] by the New York City Charter would leave its authority to define, create, mandate and enforce limited only by its own imagination. . . . The Portion Cap Rule, if upheld, would create an administrative Levianthan and violate the separation of powers doctrine. The Rule would not only violate the separation of powers doctrine, it would eviscerate it. Such an evisceration has the potential to be more troubling that sugar sweetened beverages.
The judge's conclusion that the regulation was therefor "arbitrary and capricious" followed from the lack of agency power.
The ruling is sure to be appealed from the supreme court - - - which in New York is the lowest and trial court - - - to an appellate court.
Thursday, March 7, 2013
It turns out that the administration won't use drones to kill Americans on U.S. soil after all, according to White House Press Secretary Jay Carney earlier today. This seems a very strange thing to be relieved about, but this is the level of discussion after AG Eric Holder earlier this week suggested in a letter to Senator Rand Paul that there might be extraordinary circumstances when the White House could order such a strike. Senator Paul then engaged in a 13-hour talking filibuster, holding up a vote on John Brennan to head the CIA, in protest.
In response to a question whether "the president has authority to use a weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat on American soil," Carney simply said "No." "The president has not and would not use drone strikes against American citizens on American soil," according to Carney.
Josh Gerstein at Politico posted the story here.
[Picture: Air Force]
Wednesday, March 6, 2013
Senator Rand Paul started a talking filibuster today on the Senate floor, holding up John Brennan's nomination to head the CIA. His problem? The administration's use of drones. In particular, a reply he received earlier this week from AG Holder in response to his question whether the government could use drones to target and kill U.S. citizens within the United States. Here's Holder's answer:
The question you have posed is therefore entirely hypothetical, unlikely to occur, and one we hope no President will ever have to confront. It is possible, I suppose, to imagine an extraordinary circumstance in which it would be necessary and appropriate under the Constitution and applicable laws of the United States for the President to authorize the military to use lethal force within the territory of the United States. For example, the President could conceivably have no choice but to authorize the military to use such force if necessary to protect the homeland in the circumstances of a catastrophic attack like the ones suffered on December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001.
Were such an emergency to arise, I would examine the particular facts and circumstances before advising the President on the scope of his authority.
Monday, February 25, 2013
Peter Dimock's just published book, George Anderson: Notes for a Love Song in Imperial Time, is a novelistic intervention in contemporary anguish about the legality of torture.
In a starred review, Publishers Weekly explains,
The novel takes the form of a letter from Theo Fales, editor and memoir ghostwriter for former CIA operatives, to David Kallen, a government official who directed Special Forces trainers to torture him before signing a document that led to the legalization of torture by the George W. Bush administration. Fales attempts to teach Kallen a method he devised as a, "means by which every person rids the self of its inordinate attachment to empire and creates reciprocity."
It's a brief but challenging book, interweaving music and literature to interrogate the roles of lawyers and journalists regarding the use of torture. It is worth a read by anyone exploring how the constitutionality of "enhanced interrogation" should be decided.
Monday, February 18, 2013
Today we celebrate "Presidents' Day" and ConLawProfs contemplating executive power might do well to consider the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) as a formative experience.
In his new article, Slavery, Executive Power and International Law: The Haitian Revolution and American Constitutionalism, available in draft on ssrn, ConLawProf Robert Reinstein argues that the "six administrations from George Washington through John Quincy Adams responded to the slave revolt and establishment of Haitian independence in ways that greatly expanded executive power."
Indeed, as Reinstein reminds us, the first sole executive agreements were made by Adams with regard to Haiti (predating the seizure of the schooner The Wilmington Packet by six months). Reinstein contends that the Haitian history is important because
Many of the most controversial questions presidents face in the modern era—whether to support regime change, use military force to protect American interests abroad, intervene in civil wars, arm foreign rebellions, form secret agreements with governments or belligerents, comply with obligations of international law—were first faced in the American reactions to the Haitian slave revolt.
Yet as Reinstein observes, the history also reveals conflicting executive interests, at times favoring domestic fear of a similar slave-revolt and at other times favoring geopolitical (and capitalist) interests. At the center - - - not surprisingly - - - is Thomas Jefferson, who vowed to reduce Haiti's charismatic leader Toussaint L'ouverture to "starvation."
But Reinsten also centers the Supreme Court's hostility to the establishment of the second independent nation in the Western Hemisphere. Reinstein writes that as "Congress debated the first Haitian embargo bill, a Representative asked: “Have these Haytians no rights?”" Reinstein concludes that the "answer ultimately given by the United States government was unequivocal: “No.”"
An important - - - and oft-neglected - - - history of executive power as well as judicial power worth a read on Presidents' Day.
[image of Toussaint L'ouverture from a French engraving circa 1802 via]
Saturday, February 9, 2013
The idea to create a judicial check on the administration's use of targeted killings seems to be gaining some momentum, according to several sources, including WaPo and NYT. According to the reports, the idea is to create a secret court, like the FISA court, to provide a measure of process before the government kills a person by drone attack. There is some concern that a court could act quickly enough, however. Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Senator Diane Feinstein said she and others may explore the idea of a special court.
Thursday, February 7, 2013
The Justice Department today released a series of legal memos outlining the case for the administration's use of drone attacks to the Senate Intelligence Committee, according to WaPo. But the memos are (inexplicably) not for public consumption.
The release came just days after the leak of a DOJ white paper outlining the legal case for drone attacks on Americans overseas, and just hours before John Brennan's confirmation hearing before the Committee to be CIA director. Brennan defended the attacks in his testimony.
Tuesday, February 5, 2013
A Department of Justice white paper leaked to NBC gives the more detailed version of the administration's legal case for drone attacks against overseas Americans associated with al-Qa'ida. (Note that the white paper is unsigned and undated; it is not an OLC memo. It is titled simply "Department of Justice White Paper.") Michael Isikoff wrote on the white paper here. The leak is significant, because the administration has steadfastly refused to release a formal legal justification for the program. Just last month, the administration successfully defended against a FOIA claim in federal court seeking legal justification for the program.)
According to the white paper, the president has constitutional authority to order drone attacks and is not prohibited by due process. The paper says that the president has authority to respond to order strikes as part of his authority to defend the country against the imminent threat posed by al Qa'ida and associated forces, including U.S. citizens associated with al Qa'ida, under "the inherent right of the United States to national self defense under international law, Congress's authorization of the use of all necessary and appropriate military force against this enemy, and the existence of an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida under international law."
According to the paper, due process does not prohibit this:
Were the target of a lethal operation a U.S. citizen who may have rights under the Due Process Clasue and the Fourth Amendment, that individual's citizenship would not immunize him from a lethal operation. Under the traditional due process balancing analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge, we recognize that there is no private interest more weighty than a person's interest in his life. But that interest must be balanced against the United States' interest in forestalling the threat of violence and death to other Americans that arise from an individual who is a senior operational leader of al-Q'aida or an associated of al-Q'aida and who is engaged in plotting against the United States.
Instead, the white paper sets out a three-part test for targeted killing of a U.S. citizen who is outside the United States and who is "an operational leader continually planning attacks against U.S. persons and interests":
(1) where an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States;
(2) where a capture operation would be infeasible--and where those conducting the operation continue to monitor whether capture becomes infeasible; and
(3) where such an operation would be conducted consistent with applicable law of war principles.
The paper says that "[i]n these circumstances, the 'realities' of the conflict and the weight of the government's interest in protecting its citizens from an imminent atack are such that the Constitution would not require the government to provide further process to such a U.S. citizen before using lethal force."
The paper, however, goes on to define "imminent" quite broadly (and surprisingly): "the condition that an operational leader present an 'imminent' threat of violent attack against the United States does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in the immediate future." The paper also goes on at length as to why this isn't unlawful murder.
It mentions as part of the justification that "under the circumstances described in this paper, there exists no appropriate judicial forum to evaluate these constitutional considerations."
Sunday, January 27, 2013
The D.C. Circuit on Friday vacated a military commission conviction of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul for material support, conspiracy, and solicitation, according to Lawfare and others. (Thanks to Lawfare for the links.) The ruling came after the government filed a supplemental brief a couple weeks ago arguing that the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Hamdan ("Hamdan II") compelled the court to vacate the ruling, but also disagreeing with the court's reasoning in Hamdan II. (The government made the latter point in order to preserve the argument for appeal.)
Recall that the D.C. Circuit vacated Hamdan's military commission conviction for "material support for terrorism" in October 2012. The court ruled that the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which criminalized material support, did not apply to acts before 2006, and that the government's other authority, 10 U.S.C. Sec. 821, which authorizes the government to try persons by military commission for violations of the "law of war" didn't apply, because material support wasn't a violation of international law of war.
The government argued that Hamdan II compelled the court to vacate al Bahlul's conviction, too. But it also went on to argue that the D.C. Circuit was wrong in Hamdan II, preserving that argument for appeal.
The D.C. Circuit agreed and, referencing the government's supplemental brief, on Friday issued a one-page per curiam ruling vacating al Bahlul's conviction.
Friday, January 25, 2013
The D.C. Circuit ruled today in Noel Canning v. NLRB that President Obama's three recess appointments to the NLRB last year, on January 4, 2012, were invalid under the Recess Appointments Clause, and that the NLRB therefore lacked a quorum to issue its decision finding that the petitioner violated the NLRA. The ruling tees the issue up for likely Supreme Court review.
We've previously posted on President Obama's recess appointments and court challenges here, here, and here. Here's our post on the OLC memo concluding that President Obama had authority to make the appointments.
The case arose after President Obama appointed three people to the NLRB on January 4, 2012, when the Senate was operating under a unanimous consent agreement that provided that it would meet in pro forma sessions every three business days from December 20, 2011, through January 23, 2012. The pro forma sessions are designed to keep the body in business so that it's not "in recess" for Recess Appointment Clause purposes, thus thwarting the President's ability to make unilateral recess appointments. (During these sessions, the Senate actually engaged in some business, including passing a temporary extension to the payroll tax and convening the second session of the 112th Congress.) The Senate did not adjourn sine die before the end of the first session of the 112th Congress, and thus according to the court the Senate did not have an intersession recess between the first and second sessions of the 112th Congress. Instead, "the First Session of the 112th Congress expired simultaneously with the beginning of the Second Session." Op. at 42.
The petitioner challenged the appointments after the NLRB, with President Obama's appointees, issued a decision concluding that he violated the NLRA. The petitioner claimed that the appointments were invalid under the Recess Appointments Clause, that the NLRB wouldn't have had a quorum without those appointees, and without a quorum it didn't have any authority to issue its decision against him.
The D.C. Circuit agreed. It ruled that the Recess Appointments Clause only authorizes intersession appointments, not intrasession appointments, and that it only authorizes appointments for vacancies that happened during the intersession recess (and not that merely existed during the intersession recess).
As to the intersession requirement, the Court relied principally on the plain text of the Clause:
[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
The court explained that the phrase "the Recess" must refer to the intersession recess, because of the use of the definite article "the." If the Clause were to cover intrasession recesses, in contrast, the text would have used the phrase "a recess" or "recesses." The word "the" here identifies "recess" only as the intersession recess. The court also looked to history, structure, other text, state constitutionalism, and other sources to buttress its textual analysis. It said that the OLC's position would allow the executive to define the scope of his or her own recess appointment power and to make a recess appointment anytime the Senate broke for lunch. "This cannot be the law." Op. at 26.
This part of the ruling puts the D.C. Circuit at odds with the Eleventh Circuit and its ruling in Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004).
As to when the vacancy happens, the D.C. Circuit also relied principally on text, but looked to other sources, too. The court said that "happen" must mean that the vacancy arises during the recess, not that it merely exists during the recess.
This part of the ruling puts the D.C. Circuit at odds with the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. It was also unnecessary: as Judge Griffith points out in concurrence, the court's ruling on the intrasession appointment was sufficient to vacate the NLRB's decision, without considering when the vacancies happened.
Because of the importance of the issues and the circuit splits, look for this case to go to the Supreme Court.
There's just one potential hiccup: It's not obvious that the courts have jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claims. The NLRA says that courts can consider appeals from NLRB judgments only when parties raised the issues at the NLRB, unless there are "extraordinary circumstances." The parties didn't raise the appointments challenges at the NLRB, but the court said that there were "extraordinary circumstances": the appointments objections "go to the very power of the Board to act and implicate fundamental separation of powers concerns." Op. at 11.
Thursday, January 24, 2013
President Obama will re-nominate former Ohio AG Richard Cordray to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, according to WaPo. Cordray is currently serving in that role as a recess appointee.
Recall that President Obama recess-appointed Cordray just over a year ago after Republicans made clear that they wouldn't confirm him. Republicans objected to both the CFPB and to Cordray. We posted on substantive objections here; we posted on procedural and constitutional objections here.
Cordray's nomination and another nomination expected today, former federal prosecutor Mary Jo White to head the SEC, are seen as part of the administration's drive to more tightly regulate financial markets. They promise to (again) create a stir in Congress.
Wednesday, January 23, 2013
Representative Steve Stockman (R-TX) and Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) today introduced companion bills that would overturn President Obama's series of recent orders on gun control. Politico reports here; The Hill here; and Stockman's press release is here. (Rep. Stockman, you may recall, earlier called for President Obama's impeachment over the orders.)
According to Stockman's press release, his objection is more about separation of powers than infringement on the Second Amendment, though he mentions both. As to powers, he argues that "the Constitution flatly prohibits the President from making up his own laws." Stockman's legislation, the Restore The Constitution Act, would
declare any past, present or future executive action that infringes on the powers and duties of Congress in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, or the Second Amendment to the Constitution or that would require the expenditure of federal funds not specifically appropriated for the purpose of executive action, is advisory only and has no force or effect unless enacted by law.
Friday, January 4, 2013
President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2013 this week and, just as he did on last year's NDAA, issued a signing statement objecting to several provisions on separation-of-powers grounds. In characteristic language, the President said that he will implement those provisions "to avoid a constitutional conflict." This means, largely, that the administration will ignore them. But it's unlikely that the administration will act contrary to all of them.
Perhaps the most notable provisions restrict the President's use of funds to transfer detainees out of Guantanamo Bay--either to the U.S. for criminal trials in regular Article III courts, or to other countries--or to house detainees in the U.S. Last year's NDAA also contained similar restrictions. These provisions--Sections 1022, 1027, and 1028--are designed to prevent the President from closing Guantanamo and detaining suspected terrorists in the United States; they effectively foiled the President's plans last year to close Guantanamo.
But another provision, Section 1025, new this year, similarly restricts the President's use of funds to transfer detainees out of the detention facility in Parwan, Afghanistan. The President wrote,
That facility is located within the territory of a foreign sovereign in the midst of an armed conflict. Decisions regarding the disposition of detainees captured on foreign battlefields have traditionally been based upon the judgment of experienced military commanders and national security professionals without unwarranted interference by Members of Congress. Section 1025 threatens to upend that tradition, and could interfere with my ability as Commander in Chief to make time-sensitive determinations about the appropriate disposition of detainees in an active area of hostilities.
The President also objected to provisions interfering with his authority to conduct foreign relations and supervise the executive branch. As to the latter, Sections 827 and 828 enhance whistleblower protection for executive branch contractors. The President wrote, "I will interpret those sections consistent with my authority to direct the heads of executive departments to supervise, control, and correct employees' communications with Congress in cases where such communications would be unlawful or would reveal information that is properly privileged or otherwise confidential."
Section 1034 requires the President to "transmit to the congressional defense committees a report by the Commander of the United States Strategic Command, without change, detailing whether the recommended reduction would create a strategic imbalance or degrade deterrence and extended deterrence between the total number of nuclear weapons of the United States and the total number of nuclear weapons of the Russian Federation." President Obama wrote, "section 1034 would require a subordinate to submit materials directly to the Congress without change, and thereby obstructs the traditional chain of command."
Wednesday, January 2, 2013
Judge McMahon (SDNY) ruled Wednesday in New York Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice that the government need not disclose its legal justification for targeted killings in response to the plaintiffs' FOIA requests. The ruling means that any OLC memo providing a legal justification for targeted killings (or any other government-issued legal justification) will remain under wraps unless and until the ruling is successfully appealed.
The case involves FOIA requests by the New York Times and Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, and the ACLU, for the government's legal justification for its targeted killing program--in particular, any OLC memos outlining the legal justification. We covered the Times's complaint here; we covered the ACLU's complaint here.
The court held that FOIA did not compel the disclosure of any government legal analysis of the program, but not before outlining in some detail why "there are indeed legitimate reasons, historical and legal, to question the legality of killings unilaterally authorized by the Executive . . . ." Op. at 17. The court also noted the troublesome nature of its holding:
However, this Court is constrained by law, and under the law, I can only conclude that the Government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents sought in the FOIA requests, and so cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules--a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with out Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for their conclusions a secret.
Op. at 3.
In this lengthy opinion, Judge McMahon also surveys the several statements by Administration officials on the legality of targeted killing, in order to address (and reject) the plaintiffs' waiver arguments.
The court declined in camera review of withheld documents (in order to evaluate the government's claims under Exemptions 1 and 3), concluding that it didn't need in camera review to fully evaluate Exemptions 1 and 3, because Exemption 5 applied. (Exemption 5 exempts disclosure of inter- or intra-agency documents that wouldn't be available to a party in litigation. The government argued, and the court agreed, that the requested documents were covered by attorney-client and deliberative process privileges.)
The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment in full, "except to the extent of permitting the DoD to submit a supplemental and more fulsome justification for why the deliberative process privilege applies to two Unclassified Memos on its Vaugh Index." Op. at 68.
Tuesday, January 1, 2013
Here's the transcription from the National Archives:
The Emancipation ProclamationWhereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States, containing, among other things, the following, to wit:
"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.
"That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the States and parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the people thereof, shall on that day be, in good faith, represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States."
Now, therefore I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as Commander-in-Chief, of the Army and Navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days, from the day first above mentioned, order and designate as the States and parts of States wherein the people thereof respectively, are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:
Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, (except the Parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James Ascension, Assumption, Terrebonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including the City of New Orleans) Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia, (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth[)], and which excepted parts, are for the present, left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.
And by virtue of the power, and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated States, and parts of States, are, and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.
And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.
And I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.
And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington, this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty three, and of the Independence of the United States of America the eighty-seventh.
By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.
[pages of proclamation via]
Monday, December 31, 2012
The Seventh Circuit ruled last week in Richards v. NLRB that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge President Obama's 2012 recess appointments to the NLRB. The ruling means that this challenge to the recess appointments is dismissed. We posted on another challenge, in the D.C. District, with links to other posts on those recess appointments, here.
The Seventh Circuit case arose out of a dispute over unions' rule that required non-union employees to file an annual objection to opt out of paying dues for the unions' non-collective-bargaining activities. (Non-union members that are part of a union's collective bargaining unit can be charged dues for a union's collective bargaining, but they cannot be required to pay dues for non-collective-bargaining activities, like political activities.) Non-members filed unfair labor practice charges against the unions, arguing that the annual renewal requirement violated the unions' duty of fair representation by placing an undue burden on objectors. They sought an order striking the policies and a refund for non-members who at one time objected but failed to renew their objections. The petitioners did not seek a refund for themselves, because they renewed their objections every year.
The NLRB granted the order striking the annual renewal requirement, but denied the refund for other non-members.
While the case was pending at the NLRB (on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration), on January 4, 2012, President Obama made three recess appointments to the Board, without which the Board would have lacked a quorum. The NLRB later denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners argued that President Obama's appointments were invalid, and therefore that the NLRB's action on reconsideration was invalid. They said that the Recess Appointments Clause allowed the President to make recess appointments only during intersessions of Congress (any recess between the two annual sessions of Congress, generally starting in December and ending on January 3, when the next session starts), not intrasessions of Congress (any recess during an annual session of Congress). They also said that the Senate didn't consider itself in recess when President Obama made the appointments. (It was in pro forma sessions.)
The Seventh Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing and didn't reach the merits. The court ruled that the plaintiffs already got all the relief they asked for and all they qualified for--that they suffered no injuries from NLRB decisions that could be remedied on appeal. In particular, the court said that the NLRB already struck the annual renewal requirement, and that the petitioners didn't qualify for a refund because they renewed their objections annually and didn't pay the non-collective-bargaining assessment.
The court also ruled that the plaintiffs didn't have standing to seek postage fees they paid for their annual objection renewals, because they didn't raise this claim at the NLRB.
December 31, 2012 in Appointment and Removal Powers, Cases and Case Materials, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)