Thursday, February 15, 2018
In its 285 page opinions in IRAP v. Trump, the Fourth Circuit en banc majority has found that the so-called Travel Ban 3.0, Presidential Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”of September 24, 2017, is essentially intended as a Muslim Ban and thus there is a likelihood of success on the merits of the First Amendment Establishment Clause challenge meriting a preliminary injunction.
The majority is composed of nine judges, with four judges (including a Senior Judge) dissenting. Some judges in the majority also wrote concurring opinions that would also grant relief on the statutory claims.
Recall that in October, Maryland District Judge Theodore Chuang has issued a nationwide injunction against the so-called "Muslim Ban 3.0" in an almost 100 page opinion, shortly after Hawai'i District Judge Derrick Watson had issued a nationwide injunction based largely on statutory grounds, which the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
Recall also that SCOTUS granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, adding the Establishment Clause issue to the questions to be considered. Most likely this case will be added to the SCOTUS docket.
The majority opinion by Chief Judge Gregory, after setting out the litigation history and preliminary injunction standard, delves into the Establishment Clause issue. Chief Judge Gregory begins by finding both that there is standing and that the case is ripe.
On the merits, Chief Judge Gregory's opinion first considers whether the proffered reason for the government act is "facially legitimate and bona fide" under Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972). The court assumes without deciding that the reason is facially legitimate, but holds that it is not bona fide:
here the Government’s proffered rationale for the Proclamation lies at odds with the statements of the President himself. Plaintiffs here do not just plausibly allege with particularity that the Proclamation’s purpose is driven by anti-Muslim bias, they offer undisputed evidence of such bias: the words of the President. This evidence includes President Trump’s disparaging comments and tweets regarding Muslims; his repeated proposals to ban Muslims from entering the United States; his subsequent explanation that he would effectuate this “Muslim” ban by targeting “territories” instead of Muslims directly; the issuance of EO-1 and EO-2, addressed only to majority-Muslim nations; and finally the issuance of the Proclamation, which not only closely tracks EO-1 and EO-2, but which President Trump and his advisors described as having the same goal as EO-1 and EO-2.
The President’s own words—publicly stating a constitutionally impermissible reason for the Proclamation—distinguish this case from those in which courts have found that the Government had satisfied Mandel’s “bona fide” prong.
Chief Judge Gregory then found that the Travel Ban 3.0 failed the Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) test which requires the government to show that its challenged action has a primary secular legislative purpose, and then, even if it does that its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion and which does not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion. Chief Judge Gregory's majority opinion concludes that Travel Ban 3.0 did not have a primary secular purpose but, like its previous incarnations, was motivated by anti-Muslim bias. Chief Judge Gregory noted the government's argument to disregard the President's pre-election statements was a difficult one to make, but stated it did not need to rely on any campaign statements "because the President’s inauguration did not herald a new day."
Among the incidents Chief Judge Gregory recounts is this one from November 28, 2017 (after the Travel Ban 3.0 September 24, 2017 Proclamation):
President Trump retweeted three disturbing anti-Muslim videos entitled: “Muslim Destroys a Statue of Virgin Mary!” “Islamist mob pushes teenage boy off roof and beats him to death!” and “Muslim migrant beats up Dutch boy on crutches!” The three videos were originally tweeted by an extremist political party whose mission is to oppose “all alien and destructive politic or religious doctrines, including . . . Islam.” When asked about the three videos, President Trump’s deputy press secretary Raj Shah responded by saying that the “President has been talking about these security issues for years now, from the campaign trail to the White House” and “the President has addressed these issues with the travel order that he issued earlier this year and the companion proclamation.” The Government does not—and, indeed, cannot—dispute that the President made these statements.
chose not to make the review publicly available and so provided a reasonable observer no basis to rely on the review. Perhaps in recognition of this, at oral argument before us the Government expressly disavowed any claim that the review could save the Proclamation. Instead, the Government conceded that the Proclamation rises and falls on its own four corners.
For the majority, then,
The contradiction between what the Proclamation says—that it merely reflects the results of a religion-neutral review—and what it does “raises serious doubts” about the Proclamation’s proffered purpose, and undermines the Government’s argument that its multi-agency review cured any earlier impermissible religious purpose.
Chief Judge Gregory's majority opinion summed up its reasoning:
Finally, on the scope of the injunction, the majority opinion arguably broadened it:
Our constitutional system creates a strong presumption of legitimacy for presidential action and we often defer to the political branches on issues related to immigration and national security. But the disposition in this case is compelled by the highly unusual facts here. Plaintiffs offer undisputed evidence that the President of the United States has openly and often expressed his desire to ban those of Islamic faith from entering the United States. The Proclamation is thus not only a likely Establishment Clause violation, but also strikes at the basic notion that the government may not act based on “religious animosity.”
To the extent that the district court held that IRAP, HIAS, and similar organizations categorically lack a qualifying bona fide relationship with their clients, we conclude that this would be an abuse of discretion. We see no need to read more into the Supreme Court’s grant of a stay than what it held: that refugees with formal assurances do not categorically enjoy a bona fide relationship with a U.S. entity. Instead, IRAP, HIAS, and other organizations that work with refugees or take on clients are subject to the same requirements as all other entities under the Supreme Court’s bona fide relationship standard: a relationship that is “formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose” of evading the travel restrictions imposed by the Proclamation.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit stayed its decision, in light of the Supreme Court’s order staying the district judge's injunction pending “disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought."
Tuesday, February 13, 2018
In a 55 page opinion in the consolidated cases of Vidal v. Nielsen and New York v. Trump, United States District Judge Nicholas Garaufis granted a preliminary injunction against the rescission of DACA, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, covering 800,000 people in the United States who are not citizens but who have been residents since childhood.
Recall that New York, joined by 15 other states and D.C. filed a complaint last September alleging the DACA rescission violated the constitution as well as being unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Judge Garaufis's Order is based on a violation of the APA finding the rescission arbitrary and capricious based in part on the Attorney General Jefferson Sessions's memo finding the DACA program unconstitutional.
After an extended analysis of Sessions's Letter, Judge Garaufis writes
To the extent the decision to end the DAGA program was based on the Attorney General's determination that the program is unconstitutional, that determination was legally erroneous, and the decision was therefore arbitrary and capricious. The court does not address whether the DACA program might be unconstitutional on grounds other than those identified by the Attorney General, as any such grounds are not fairly before the court.
Judge Garaufis also made clear the limited scope of the preliminary injunction:
This order does not hold that the rescission of DACA was unlawful. That question is for summary judgment, not motions for a preliminary injunction. Cf. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1953) (“[A] preliminaiy injunction . . . is, by its very nature, interlocutory, tentative, provisional, ad interim, impermanent, mutable, not ﬁxed or ﬁnal or conclusive, characterized by its for-the-time-beingness.”).
This order does not hold that Defendants may not rescind the DACA program. Even if the court ultimately ﬁnds that Defendants’ stated rationale for ending the DACA program was legally deﬁcient, the ordinary remedy is for the court to remand the decision to DHS for reconsideration. On remand, DHS “might later, in the exercise of its lawful discretion, reach the same result for a different reason.
This order does not require Defendants to grant any particular DACA applications or renewal requests. Restoring the DACA program to the status quo as of September 4, 2017, does not mean that every DACA recipient who requests renewal of his or her deferred action and work authorization will receive it. The DACA program identiﬁed “criteria [that] should be satisﬁed before an individual is considered for an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.” (2012 DACA Memo at 1.) It did not require immigration ofﬁcials to defer action against any individuals who met these criteria; to the contrary, the 2012 DACA Memo stated that DHS would exercise prosecutorial discretion “on an individual basis” and would not “provide any assurance that relief will be granted in all cases.” Preserving the status quo means only that Defendants must continue considering DACA applications and renewal requests, not that they must grant all such applications and requests. This order does not prevent Defendants’ from revoking individual DACA recipients’ deferred action or work authorization. Under the 2012 DACA Memo, DHS may terminate a DACA recipient’s deferred action “at any time, with or without a Notice of Intent to Terminate, at [its] discretion.” Maintaining the status quo does nothing to alter that.
Thursday, February 1, 2018
The President's Proclamation of February as National African American History Month for 2018 provides that:
This annual observance is an opportunity to remember the challenges of our past, but also to honor countless African-American heroes who inspire us to shape our country’s future. This year’s theme, “African Americans in Times of War,” calls our attention to the heroic contributions of African Americans during our Nation’s military conflicts, from the Revolutionary War to present-day operations.
This focus on war-time includes a reference to President Harry S. Truman in 1948 who "ordered desegregation of the military providing 'equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Forces without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.'" It mentions the "obligation to the self-evident truth of equality written into the Declaration of Independence," but interestingly does not mention the Constitution. It specifically mentions three members of the military.
It ends thusly:
These and countless other African Americans triumphed over ignorance, oppression, and injustice to make indelible contributions, not only to our military history, but even more importantly to our American history. They are an integral part of our Nation’s story. We are indebted to the individual and collective perseverance and patriotism of these outstanding men and women, as we are to all African Americans who have served, and continue to serve in the Armed Forces of this great Nation.
Wednesday, January 31, 2018
A sharply fractured and divided en banc D.C. Circuit today rejected a challenge to the independent single director at the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau. The ruling deals a blow to opponents of the CFPB's power structure. But this ruling almost certainly doesn't end the matter; instead, it likely only tees the case up for the Supreme Court, giving this Court a chance to put its gloss on independence within the Executive Branch.
We previously posted on the case here. (This case is not directly related to the litigation over who is the true acting head of the Bureau.)
Opponents of the CFPB power structure argued that Congress violated the Take Care Clause in creating the CFPB with an independent single director. They said that while the Supreme Court has approved independent agencies in the Executive Branch, these have all been boards, not single directors. And creating an independent single director put too much power in the hands of the CFPB director--and took too much power away from the President.
The court today rejected those claims. The multiple opinions run 250 pages, but the majority's approach came down to this:
The Supreme Court eighty years ago sustained the constitutionality of the independent Federal Trade Commission, a consumer-protection financial regulator with powers analogous to those of the CFPB. Humphrey's Executor v. United States. In doing so, the Court approved the very means of independence Congress used here: protection of agency leadership from at-will removal by the President. The Court has since reaffirmed and built on that precedent, and Congress has embraced and relief on it in designing independent agencies. We follow that precedent here to hold that the parallel provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act shielding the Director of the CFPB from removal without cause is consistent with Article II.
Congress's decision to provide the CFPB Director a degree of insulation reflects it permissible judgment that civil regulation of consumer financial protection should be kept one step removed from political winds and presidential will. We have no warrant here to invalidate such a time-tested course. No relevant consideration gives us reason to doubt the constitutionality of the independent CFPB's single-member structure. Congress made constitutionally permissible institutional design choices for the CFPB with which courts should hesitate to interfere. "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
Wednesday, January 24, 2018
The Justice Department today sent letters to 23 sanctuary jurisdictions, requesting certain additional documents to show that they are not preventing their officers from sharing immigration information with the feds, in violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1373.
The letters say that Justice will subpoena the documents if a jurisdiction declines to share. The letter outlines other consequences, too:
Should the Department determine your jurisdiction is out of compliance with section 1373, the Department may, as detailed in your award documents, seek return of your FY 2016 grant funds, require additional conditions for receipt of any FY 2017 Byrne JAG funding for which you have applied, and/or deem you ineligible for FY 2017 Byrne JAG funds.
Justice's moves to clamp down on sanctuary jurisdictions have drawn lawsuits by many of those jurisdictions. They argue, among other things, that Section 1373 amounts to unconstitutional commandeering of local officers, that Justice's conditions on their grants fail the conditioned-spending test under South Dakota v. Dole, and that Justice has no authority to impose conditions on federal grants without Congress's say so. We last posted on the suits here.
Friday, January 19, 2018
The United States Supreme Court has granted the Trump Administration's petition for certiorari to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hawai'i v. Trump regarding Presidential Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”of September 24, 2017, also known as Travel Ban 3.0, or Muslim Ban 3.0. The Ninth Circuit, affirming a district judge, found Travel Ban 3.0 unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The United States Supreme Court will also be considering the Establishment Clause issue. Recall that the Ninth Circuit did not reach the Establishment Clause issue. However, the United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari states that the parties are directed to brief and argue Question 3 presented by the opposition brief of Hawai'i. That question presented is simply phrased: "Whether Proclamation 9645 violates the Establishment Clause."
Recall that the United States Supreme Court previously granted certiorari in Hawai'i v. Trump, as well as IRAP v. Trump from the Fourth Circuit regarding Travel Ban 2.0, but then remanded the cases to be dismissed as moot when that Executive Order was replaced by the current incarnation.
One important issue in the Establishment Clause litigation is whether the travel ban "targets" a particular religion. Somewhat similarly, an important issue under the Immigration and Nationality Act is whether the travel ban constitutes "nationality discrimination."
These issues have involved consideration of whether the "taint" of statements from candidate Trump and President Trump during the earliest days of the Administration would continue to be viable to this third iteration of the travel ban. It is also likely that much more recent statements allegedly made by the President regarding immigration will be raised.
Wednesday, January 17, 2018
The Center for Constitutional Rights filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court last week on behalf of eleven detainees challenging their continued, and, under President Trump, apparently indefinite, detention at Guantanamo Bay.
The petitioners have all been detained at Guantanamo without charge or trial, between ten and sixteen years. Two have been cleared for release.
The petitioners argue that their claim is different than prior Guantanamo habeas petitions--"as it has to be," given President Trump's position on Guantanamo:
The two prior presidential administrations released a total of nearly 750 men. They did so by making case-by-case determinations based on an individual detainee's circumstances in a manner that was purportedly tailored to the executive branch's interest in national security. President Trump, in contrast to his predecessors, has declared and is carrying out his intention to keep all remaining detainees in Guantanamo, regardless of their individual circumstances--presumably even those the executive branch previously determined need no longer be detained.
The petitioners argue that their detention violates due process and exceeds authority under the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.
As to due process, they argue that the Due Process Clause applies at Guantanamo for the same functional reason why the Suspension Clause applies there under Boumediene: "The Boumediene Court's functional analysis led to recognition of the applicability of the Suspension Clause in Guantanamo. Therefore, at least some measure of the Due Process Clause must also reach Guantanamo because there are no practical barriers that would apply to one provision but not the other." On the merits, they argue that their lengthy detention, without charge or trial, violates the Due Process Clause's durational limits on detention; that indefinite detention cannot be justified based on a loose and dated standard; and that two of them have already been cleared for release.
As to the AUMF, petitioners claim that it doesn't authorize indefinite, unreviewable detention; that the laws of war don't authorize this kind of detention; and that the AUMF itself has become stale.
Former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon invoked a breathtakingly broad version of executive privilege on behalf of the President at yesterday's closed-door House Intelligence Committee hearing. But at the same time, he reportedly maintains (apparently along with the White House) that the same executive privilege won't prevent him from sharing information with Special Counsel Robert Mueller, who has subpoenaed Bannon.
What gives? Neither Bannon nor the White House has said. But let's try to sort some of this out.
Start here: The Supreme Court, in its seminal case United States v. Nixon, said that certain communications between the President and his or her advisors may be privileged. While this "executive privilege" is nowhere in the Constitution, the Court said that it derives from the President's Article II powers and separation-of-powers principles.
But the privilege extends only to communications with the President. So any communications that Bannon had with Candidate Trump or President-Elect Trump are not covered under Nixon. Under Nixon, executive privilege simply does not apply.
Moreover, the privilege works against particular requests for information. It doesn't provide a broad shield against testifying generally. (As the courts have recognized, if it worked as a broad shield, the President could use it to frustrate the functions of the coordinate branches, in violation of the separation of powers.) Bannon can only assert the privilege on behalf of the President in response to a particular request, and not as a shield against testifying generally.
As to Bannon's communications with President Trump: Nixon says that the privilege is qualified (that is, not absolute) and subject to a balancing of interests. In particular, in determining whether executive privilege protects communications, the Court balances the need for the information against the need for confidentiality of the particular Presidential communication at issues.
[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. The President's need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protections that a district court will be obliged to provide.
In Nixon, the Court held that the countervailing interests in the "fair administration of criminal justice"--in particular, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of defendants and the basic functions of the courts--outweighed the President's "broad interest in confidentiality of communications."
So the question in the Bannon case is whether the balancing works the same way with a congressional inquiry. There's good reason to think that it does. As Judge Bates (D.D.C.) explained in the Harriet Miers case, Committee on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, Congress's "power of inquiry" is every bit as important as the judiciary's power to administer justice:
[T]he Executive insists that this case is distinguishable because it does not involve a core function of another constituent branch but rather a peripheral exercise of Congress's power. That is mistaken. As discussed above, Congress's power of inquiry is as broad as its power to legislate and lies at the very heart of Congress's constitutional role. Indeed, the former is necessary to the proper exercise of the latter: according to the Supreme Court, the ability to compel testimony is "necessary to the effective functioning of courts and legislatures." Thus, Congress's use of (and need for vindication of) its subpoena power in this case is no less legitimate or important than was the grand jury's in United States v. Nixon. Both involve core functions of a co-equal branch of the federal government, and for the reasons identified in Nixon, the President may only be entitled to a presumptive, rather than an absolute, privilege here.
The Miers case was a little different--it involved an assertion of absolute privilege against congressional testimony on a slightly different theory than executive privilege--and the court used the quoted passage merely to support its conclusion that no such absolute privilege existed. Moreover, the passage glosses over the fact that the Nixon balancing considered important competing Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, absent or diminished in a congressional inquiry. Still, Congress's interests in fact-finding and oversight count for something important, even if slightly less than the judiciary's interests in Nixon, and they may well outweigh a "broad and undifferentiated" claim of privilege.
By claiming executive privilege before the House, but not before Mueller, Bannon and the White House are probably relying on a different balancing of interests under Nixon. In particular, the White House is probably claiming that the House's interests in the communications are less than Mueller's interests, and that the President's interest in confidential communications with Bannon outweigh the House's interests, but not Mueller's. Moreover, it's probably claiming that the communications are more secure if released to Mueller (like the in camera review in Nixon) and less secure if released to Congress (even if a closed-door hearing).
But we don't know for sure, because the White House hasn't said. And we don't know how the courts would rule on these theories, even if the President asserted them.
These disputes between the White House and Congress usually work themselves out informally, without involvement of the courts. But now that the Committee has issued a subpoena, if Bannon continues to decline to provide certain information, the case could go to the courts, and we could get the President's legal reasoning--and a court ruling on whether and how executive privilege applies.
UPDATE: It turns out that U.S. Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara ruled last spring that executive privilege doesn't apply to communications with the President-Elect. (H/t to my co-blogger Ruthann Robson.) The case involved Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach's attempt to invoke the privilege to protect a communication that he had with President-Elect Trump on the National Voter Registration Act. Judge O'Hara rejected Kobach's claim:
Secretary Kobach's communication was made to a president-elect, not to a sitting president. Although a president-elect by statute and policy may be accorded security briefings and other transitional prerogatives, he or she has no constitutional power to make any decisions on behalf of the Executive Branch. No court has recognized the applicability of the executive privilege to communications made before a president takes office. If that were the law, it would mean that potentially almost everything communicated to a president-elect by the hundreds of persons seeking appointments in the new administration would be shielded by privilege.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Supreme Court did recognize that former presidents may assert privilege over certain communications made during their terms in office. But the reasoning given by the Court for its decision doesn't directly translate to communications with president-elects.
Tuesday, January 16, 2018
The Justice Department announced today that it intends to petition for immediate Supreme Court review of Judge Alsup's ruling last week that put a temporary halt to the administration's DACA-repeal effort.
From the press release:
"It defies both law and common sense for DACA--an entirely discretionary non-enforcement policy that was implemented unilaterally by the last administration after Congress rejected similar legislative proposals and courts invalidated the similar DAPA policy--to somehow be mandated nationwide by a single district court in San Francisco," said Attorney General Jeff Sessions.
Thursday, January 11, 2018
Recall the lawsuit by Summer Zervos against Donald Trump for defamation. It's filed in New York state court and Trump has argued that Clinton v. Jones, the 1997 case in which the United States Supreme Court held that President Clinton was not immune from being sued, should not apply to state court proceedings.
In an amicus brief filed in Zervos v. Trump, and available on ssrn, three law professors who submitted an amicus brief in Clinton v. Jones in support of a plaintiffs' right to sue the sitting President in federal court,now argue that the rule should apply to state court as well. The professors - - - Stephen Burbank, Richard Parker, and Lucas Powe, Jr. - - - argue that a President should be amenable to suit in state as well as federal court, with appropriate docket-management accommodations made in light of the demands on a President's time and attention.
At issue is footnote 13 of Clinton v. Jones which might be read to distinguish state court proceedings from the federal one involved in Clinton:
Because the Supremacy Clause makes federal law “the supreme Law of the Land,” Art. VI, cl. 2, any direct control by a state court over the President, who has principal responsibility to ensure that those laws are “faithfully executed,” Art. II, §3, may implicate concerns that are quite different from the interbranch separation of powers questions addressed here. Cf ., e.g. , Hancock v. Train , 426 U.S. 167, 178 -179 (1976); Mayo v. United States , 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943). See L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 513 (2d ed. 1988) (“[A]bsent explicit congressional consent no state may command federal officials . . . to take action in derogation of their . . . federal responsibilities”).
The amicus brief contends that the footnote is best read as limited to the problem of direct control of presidential activities by a state court. That, they argue, is not the Zervos suit, since Zervos' lawsuit has nothing to do with the president's duties. They conclude that the best reading of the Constitution, the requirements of federalism and the rule of law, and the Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones direct that state courts be permitted to entertain suits against sitting Presidents for conduct arising from their pre-Presidential conduct, just as federal courts can.
Judge Jennifer Schecter has yet to issue a ruling.
Judge Timothy J. Kelly (D.D.C.) yesterday denied Leandra English's motion for a preliminary injunction against President Trump in the dispute over the acting directorship of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
Recall that outgoing director Richard Cordray appointed English as deputy in late November. Under Dodd-Frank, this meant that English would become acting director upon Cordray's resignation. But at the same time, President Trump appointed OMB Director John Michael Mulvaney as acting director pursuant to his authority under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. As a result, both English and Mulvaney claimed title to acting director. English sued to get the courts to recognize her as the actual acting director.
Judge Kelly ruled that English was unlikely to succeed on the merits of her claim. According to the court, that's because Dodd-Frank and the FVRA can be read in harmony--in favor of the President's authority to appoint an acting director over Dodd-Frank's provision automatically assigning the post to the deputy:
The best reading of the two statutes is that Dodd-Frank requires that the Deputy Director "shall" serve as acting Director, but that under the FVRA the President "may" override that default rule. This reading is compelled by several considerations: the text of the FVRA, including its exclusivity provision, the text of Dodd-Frank, including its express-statement requirement and Deputy Director provision, and traditional principles of statutory construction.
The court said that constitutional avoidance principles confirmed this result. In particular,
English's interpretation of Dodd-Frank potentially impairs the President's ability to fulfill his obligations under the Take Care Clause. Under English's theory, because Cordray installed her as Deputy Director, she must remain acting Director--no matter whom the President would prefer in that role--until a new permanent Director is appointed. . . .
Under English's interpretation, however, Cordray could have named anyone the CFPB's Deputy Director, and the President would be virtually powerless to replace that person upon ascension to acting Director--no matter how unqualified that person might be. That alone threatens to undermine the President's ability to fulfill his Take Care Clause obligations. And this problem is compounded by another unique feature of the directorship of the CFPB: it is vested with unilateral, unchecked control over the CFPB's substantial regulatory and enforcement power.
The court said that nothing in Dodd-Frank prevented the President from appointing the acting OMB chief to simultaneously serve as CFPB Director.
The ruling is only on English's motion for a preliminary injunction--and doesn't finally settle the directorship dispute--but it foretells the ultimate result in this court.
Wednesday, January 10, 2018
Judge William Alsup (N.D. Cal.) yesterday issued a preliminary injunction requiring the Trump Administration "to maintain the DACA program on a nationwide basis on the same terms and conditions as were in effect before the rescission on September 5, 2017."
The order requires the government to continue to administer DACA, including allowing DACA enrollees to renew their enrollments, despite the Administration's announcement last year that it would halt the program. The order also potentially complicates negotiations over a congressional fix.
The court ruled that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to President Trump's repeal of the DACA program. In short, the court ruled that DACA was legal when adopted; that the government's stated reason for repealing it (that DHS lacked authority to implement it) was wrong as a matter of law; and that the government's post-hoc rationalization for repeal (the "litigation risk" it faced in defending DACA) didn't count, and, in any event, was arbitrary and capricious.
This order holds that, in light of our own court of appeals' reasoning . . . and in light of the analysis of the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice, and the reasoning set forth above, our court of appeals will likely hold that DACA was and remains a lawful exercise of authority by DHS. Plaintiffs are therefore likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the rescission was based on a flawed legal premise and must be set aside as "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."
Along the way, the court distinguished the DAPA program, ruled illegal by the Fifth Circuit and affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, and said that the reasons why DAPA exceeded DHS authority don't apply to DACA:
While at least some of the majority's reasons for holding DAPA illegal would apply to DACA, fairness requires saying that DACA and DAPA were different, as the panel opinion stated. An important criticism against DAPA would not apply against DACA, namely the fact that Congress had already established a pathway to lawful presence for alien parents of citizens (so that DAPA simply constituted a more lenient substitute route). DACA, by contrast, has no such analogue in the INA. And, there is a difference between 4.3 million [covered by DAPA] and 689,800 [covered by DACA]. Finally, the criticism that DACA has been mechanically administered without the exercise of discretion in individual cases, if true, could be fixed by simply insisting on exercise of discretion. In sum, the DAPA litigation was not a death knell for DACA.
The ruling will surely be appealed.
Thursday, January 4, 2018
Today brings the news that the President is contemplating litigation to halt the publication of Fire and Fury:Inside the Trump White House by Michael Wolff. This followed a reported cease and desist letter to former White House "chief strategist" and insider Steve Bannon for talking with Wolff in alleged violation of a nondisclosure agreement.
The letter to the book's publisher is reportedly based on a claim of defamation:
“Actual malice (reckless disregard for the truth) can be proven by the fact that the Book admits in the Introduction that it contains untrue statements. Moreover, the Book appears to cite to no sources for many of its most damaging statements about Mr. Trump. Also, many of your so-called ‘sources’ have stated publicly that they never spoke to Mr. Wolff and/or never made the statements that are being attributed to them. Other alleged ‘sources’ of statements about Mr. Trump are believed to have no personal knowledge of the facts upon which they are making statements or are known to be unreliable and/or strongly biased against Mr. Trump.”
But behind the obvious relevance of New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) which set the doctrine of actual malice for defamation under the First Amendment, lurks another case involving the New York Times: New York Times v. United States (1971), often called the "Pentagon Papers Case."
It is the Pentagon Papers Case that solidified the disfavor for prior restraint.
The brief per curiam opinion in the 6-3 decision stated that there is "a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity," and the government "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint." While it is certainly the United States government that is a party to the Pentagon Papers Case, most commentators and scholars believe that it was President Nixon who was at the forefront of the attempt to stop publication of the papers. Arguably, the Pentagon Papers involved "state secrets," but President Trump, like Nixon, has been criticized as conflating his own interests with that of the government.
It's thus a good time to reconsider the continuing relevance of the case and its litigation. One perspective is available in the movie The Post involving the Pentagon Papers and starring Meryl Streep as Katharine Graham, the publisher of The Washington Post.
Another good perspective is a recent conversation between James C. Goodale, author of Fighting for the Press: the Inside Story of the Pentagon Papers and Other Battles and Jeremy Scahill, one of the founders of The Intercept and author of Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield, which I moderated at CUNY School of Law.
Here's the video:
January 4, 2018 in Books, Campaign Finance, Conferences, Current Affairs, Executive Authority, First Amendment, News, Separation of Powers, State Secrets, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, January 3, 2018
With the termination by Executive Order of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, also known as the "voter fraud commission," it's a good time to (re)read Atiba Ellis's article from 2014, The Meme of Voter Fraud.
Professor Ellis argues that "meme theory" offers a useful methodology to analyze the origins, evolution, and persistence of voter fraud rhetoric. For Ellis, a "meme" is not only a cute internet cat photo with changing words, but an "idea that spreads from person to person within a culture and replicates along with other ideas to form an ideology or worldview." The meme of "voter fraud" on his account is the latest iteration of the ideology that some people are deemed “unworthy” of the vote.
Ellis addressed the relevancy of the meme of voter fraud as it was being deployed by Trump shortly after the 2016 election (and which led to the creation of the commission). Ellis wrote that the problem with Trump's use of the voter fraud meme is that
It seeks to rig our thinking about democracy. Because a meme persuades through appeal and not logic, makes facts completely irrelevant when the story is too good. This doesn’t matter much with cat videos, but Mr. Trump’s rigged election meme are dangerous because they detach us from facts as our basis for making real-world decisions.
To believe that millions of certain voters are illegitimate simply because someone says so is to trade in an ideology of exclusion. America did this for the majority of its history with the effect of excluding women, African Americans, and naturalized immigrants in favor of property-holding white men.
While the termination of the presidential commission might be seen as a rejection of the voter fraud meme, the official Statement of the Press Secretary is less than a disavowal:
Despite substantial evidence of voter fraud, many states have refused to provide the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity with basic information relevant to its inquiry. Rather than engage in endless legal battles at taxpayer expense, today President Donald J. Trump signed an executive order to dissolve the Commission, and he has asked the Department of Homeland Security to review its initial findings and determine next courses of action.
This claim of "substantial evidence" seems to indicate that meme persists.
UPDATE: The President's tweets, which arguably have the status of official statements, confirm that the meme of voter fraud has not been abandoned:
Many mostly Democrat States refused to hand over data from the 2016 Election to the Commission On Voter Fraud. They fought hard that the Commission not see their records or methods because they know that many people are voting illegally. System is rigged, must go to Voter I.D.— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 4, 2018
As Americans, you need identification, sometimes in a very strong and accurate form, for almost everything you do.....except when it comes to the most important thing, VOTING for the people that run your country. Push hard for Voter Identification!— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) January 4, 2018
Friday, December 22, 2017
In the latest installment in the continuing saga of President Trump's various efforts to promulgate a travel ban, often called a Muslim Ban, the Ninth Circuit opinion in Hawai'i v. Trump has largely affirmed the preliminary injunction issued by District Judge Derrick Watson enjoining the Presidential Proclamation 9645, entitled “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats”of September 24, 2017.
Recall that the United States Supreme Court, over the stated disagreement of Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, issued a stay of the district judge's opinion earlier this month, as well as a stay in the related proceedings in the Fourth Circuit in IRAP v. Trump.
The unanimous Ninth Circuit panel does not disturb the status quo: "In light of the Supreme Court’s order staying this injunction pending 'disposition of the Government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is sought,' we stay our decision today pending Supreme Court review." The Ninth Circuit does, however, narrow the district judge's injunction, to "give relief only to those with a credible bona fide relationship with the United States."
On the merits, the Ninth Circuit does not reach the constitutional claims including the Establishment Clause, unlike the Fourth Circuit in IRAP v. Trump, because it finds that the plaintiffs' statutory claims are sufficient to grant relief.
Yet the complex statutory framework of the Immigration and Nationality Act, INA, does implicitly invoke the scope of executive powers. In short, the Ninth Circuit finds that the Presidential Proclamation’s indefinite entry suspensions constitute nationality discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas and therefore (in likelihood sufficient for the preliminary injunction) run afoul of 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A)’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination. As the Ninth Circuit opinion observes:
the Proclamation functions as an executive override of broad swaths of immigration laws that Congress has used its considered judgment to enact. If the Proclamation is—as the Government contends—authorized under [8 U.S.C.] § 1182(f), then § 1182(f) upends the normal functioning of separation of powers. Even Congress is prohibited from enabling “unilateral Presidential action that either repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.” Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998). This is true even when the executive actions respond to issues of “first importance,” issues that potentially place the country’s “Constitution and its survival in peril.” Id. at 449 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In addressing such critical issues, the political branches still do not “have a somewhat free hand to reallocate their own authority,” as the “Constitution’s structure requires a stability which transcends the convenience of the moment” and was crafted in recognition that “[c]oncentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty.” Id. at 449–50.
And the Proclamation’s sweeping assertion of authority is fundamentally legislative in nature. . . .
Recall that a few months ago, after granting certiorari in Hawai'i v. Trump, the United States Supreme Court instructed the Ninth Circuit to dismiss as moot the challenge to Travel Ban 2.0. It looks as if the Court will now have its chance to consider version 3.o.
December 22, 2017 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Establishment Clause, Executive Authority, First Amendment, International, Opinion Analysis, Race, Recent Cases, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, December 21, 2017
The ruling ends the case, unless and until it's appealed.
The case arose when CREW and other plaintiffs (including hotel- and restaurant-owners who compete with Trump properties) sued the President for accepting gifts and emoluments from foreign and domestic sources without congressional approval, in violation of the Emoluments Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief.
The government argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the case should be dismissed. Today Judge George B. Daniels (S.D.N.Y.) agreed.
The court said the "hospitality plaintiffs" lacked competitive standing, because they didn't sufficiently allege that President Trump's Emoluments Clause violations caused their injuries (lack of business due to competition with Trump properties) and that a successful suit would redress those injuries. The court explained:
Here, the Hospitality Plaintiffs argue that Defendant has adopted "policies and practices that powerfully incentivize government officials to patronize his properties in hopes of winning his affection." Yet . . . it is wholly speculative whether the Hospitality Plaintiffs' loss of business is fairly traceable to Defendant's "incentives" or instead results from government officials' independent desire to patronize Defendant's businesses. Even before Defendant took office, he had amassed wealth and fame and was competing against the Hospitality Plaintiffs in the restaurant and hotel business. It is only natural that interest in his properties has generally increased since he became President. As such, despite any alleged violation on Defendant's part, the Hospitality Plaintiffs may face a tougher competitive market overall. Aside from Defendant's public profile, there are a number of reasons why patrons may choose to visit Defendant's hotels and restaurants including service, quality, location, price and other factors related to individual preference. Therefore, the connection between the Hospitality Plaintiffs' alleged injury and Defendant's actions is too tenuous to satisfy Article III's causation requirement.
[Moreover,] Plaintiffs are likely facing an increase in competition in their respective markets for business from all types of customers--government and non-government customers alike--and there is no remedy this Court can fashion to level the playing field for Plaintiffs as it relates to overall competition. . . . [T]he Emoluments Clauses prohibit Defendant from receiving gifts and emoluments. They do not prohibit Defendant's businesses from competing directly with the Hospitality Plaintiffs.
The court went on to hold that the Hospitality Plaintiffs weren't within the zone of interests protected by the Emoluments Clause.
The court also held that CREW lacked standing, because its alleged harm (diversion of resources to monitor and respond to the President's Emoluments Clause violations) wasn't sufficient. "Here, CREW fails to allege either that Defendant's actions have impeded its ability to perform a particular mission-related activity, or that it was forced to expend resources to counteract and remedy the adverse consequences or harmful effects of Defendant's conduct. CREW . . . may have diverted some of its resources to address conduct it may consider unconstitutional, but which has caused no legally cognizable adverse consequences, tangible or otherwise, necessitating the expenditure of organizational resources."
Finally, the court ruled that the case raised a nonjusticiable political question (because of the Emolument Clause's textual commitment to a coordinate branch of government, Congress) and that the case wasn't ripe (because "a conflict between two coordinate branches of government . . . has yet to mature").
Friday, December 15, 2017
Judge Wendy Beetlestone (E.D. Pa.) ruled today that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was likely to succeed on the merits of its challenge to the Trump Administration's interim final rules rolling back Obamacare's contraception mandate. Judge Beetlestone issued a temporary injunction, halting enforcement of the rules.
The case, Pennsylvania v. Trump, arose when the administration issued two interim final rules that all but undid the Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate for any organization that didn't want to enforce it. One rule, the Religious Exemption Rule, said that any organization could claim an exemption based on a sincerely held religious belief; the other, the Moral Exemption Rule, said the same thing for any organization that claimed a sincere moral objection. Under the rules, objecting organizations didn't have to seek an accommodation; they could simply drop coverage (with ERISA notice to their employees).
Pennsylvania sued, arguing that the IRFs violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act , equal protection, and the Establishment Clause.
Judge Beetlestone first ruled that the Commonwealth had standing--for exactly the same reasons why Texas had standing to challenge President Obama's DAPA program in Texas v. United States:
There is no daylight between the 2015 Texas suit against the federal government and the current Commonwealth suit against the federal government. Like Texas, the Commonwealth challenges agency action in issuing regulations--here, the New IRFs. It is all the more significant that the Commonwealth, like Texas before it, sues to halt affirmative conduct made by a federal agency. . . . Furthermore, like Texas and Massachusetts [in Massachusetts v. EPA], the Commonwealth seeks to protect a quasi-sovereign interest--the health of its women residents. . . . According to the Commonwealth . . . the Agencies' New IRFs will allow more employers to exempt themselves from the ACA's Contraceptive Mandate. Consequently, the Commonwealth contends that Pennsylvania women will seek state-funded sources of contraceptive care. Such a course of action will likely cause the Commonwealth to expend more funds to protect its quasi-sovereign interest in ensuring that women residents receive adequate contraceptive care.
She went on to rule that the IRFs likely violated the APA, for two reasons. First, the administration violated notice-and-comment rules in issuing the IRFs. The court rejected the government's argument that it had statutory authority to bypass notice-and-comment procedures, and that special circumstances justified bypassing those procedures. Next, the IRFs violated federal law, the ACA. In particular, the ACA mandates coverage for women's preventative care, and doesn't provide an exception for religious or moral beliefs. Moreover, the accommodation process doesn't violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (as the government maintained), and so there's no RFRA reason for the Religious Exemption Rule. (The government didn't even try to argue that the RFRA mandated the Moral Exemption Rule.)
Because the court held that the Commonwealth would likely succeed on its APA claims, it didn't rule on the constitutional claims.
The court went on to conclude that the Commonwealth demonstrated the other elements of a preliminary injunction, too.
Thursday, December 14, 2017
The Ninth Circuit this week ruled that the Secretary of the Interior could withdraw, for up to twenty years, over one million acres of land near Grand Canyon National Park from new uranium mining claims. The ruling deals a blow to mining companies and local governments who brought the lawsuit. But the blow may be temporary, if the current administration reverses course and allows mining.
The case, National Mining Association v. Zinke, arose when then-Secretary Salazar exercised his authority under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and moved to withdraw the land from mining claims. Under the Act, the Interior Secretary has authority to withdraw large tracts of federal land from mining, so long as the Secretary publishes a notice in the Federal Register, affords an opportunity for public hearing and comment, and obtains consent to the withdrawal from any other department or agency involved in the administration of the relevant lands. Moreover, the Secretary can only withdraw land for 20 years, max, and has to report to Congress.
The Act also contains a legislative veto, allowing Congress, by concurrent resolution only (and not with a presidential signature), to veto the Secretary's withdrawal.
As soon as Salazar filed his Notice of Intent in the Federal Register, mining companies and local governments sued, arguing, among other things, that the Secretary lacked authority under the Act. Their theory went like this: The Act's legislative veto provision is unconstitutional under Chadha; the legislative veto is not severable from the rest of the Act (including the Secretary's authority to withdraw federal land); and therefore the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto provision dooms the entire withdrawal provision of the Act, including the Secretary's authority.
The Ninth Circuit rejected this theory. The court ruled that the legislative veto provision was severable, and didn't affect the Secretary's authority. Therefore, the Secretary could go ahead and initiate the withdrawal, pursuant to requirements under the Act, irrespective of the legislative-veto's invalidity.
The court went on to reject the several merits arguments against the Secretary's exercise of authority.
Monday, December 11, 2017
A third district judge has issued a preliminary injunction against the President's ban on transgender troops in the military. In her opinion in Karnoski v. Trump, United States District Judge Marsha Pechman of the Western District of Washington issued a preliminary injunction on the basis of the plaintiffs' likelihood to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection, Due Process, and First Amendment claims.
Recall that after several tweets this past July, embedded President Trump issued a Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Homeland Security through the Office of the Press Secretary directing the halt of accession of transgender individuals into the military and the halt of all resources "to fund sex-reassignment surgical procedures for military personnel, except to the extent necessary to protect the health of an individual who has already begun a course of treatment to reassign his or her sex." Recall that in October, United States District Judge for the District of Columbia Colleen Kollar-Kotelly in Doe v. Trump partially enjoined the president's actions denying the motion for preliminary injunction regarding the Sex Reassignment Directive based on a lack of standing and granting the motion for preliminary injunction regarding the Accession and Retention Directives. Recall that in November, United States District Judge Marvin Garvis of the District of Maryland in Stone v. Trump issued a preliminary injunction against the United States military's ban on transgender troops and resources for "sex-reassignment" medical procedures.
In Karnoski, Judge Pechman finds that the individual plaintiffs, the organizational plaintiffs, and the State of Washington all have standing to challenge the Presidential Memorandum and that the claims are ripe. She does grant the motion to dismiss as to the procedural due process claim.
On the merits, Judge Karnoski's analysis is succinct. She concludes that the policy "distinguishes on the basis of transgender status, a quasi-suspect classification, and is therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny." She then states that while the government defendants "identify important governmental interest including military effectiveness, unit cohesion, and preservation of military resources, they failed to show that the policy prohibiting transgender individuals from serving openly is related to the achievements of those interests." Indeed, she concludes, the reasons proffered by the President are actually contradicted by the studies, conclusions, and judgment of the military itself," quoting and citing Doe v. Trump.
Departing from the earlier cases, Judge Pechman also finds the plaintiffs have a likelihood of success on a substantive due process claim based on a fundamental liberty interest:
The policy directly interferes with Plaintiffs' ability to define and express their gender identity, and penalizes plaintiffs for exercising their fundamental right to do so openly by depriving them of employment and career opportunities.
On the First Amendment claim, Judge Pechman concludes that the "policy penalizes transgender service members but not others for disclosing their gender identity, and is therefore a content based restriction."
She then quickly finds that on balance, the equities weigh in favor of the preliminary injunction.
With this third court finding the Presidential Memorandum has constitutional deficiencies, the transgender ban is unlikely to go into effect by January 1. Additionally, the Pentagon has reportedly announced that the ban will not take effect.
Friday, December 8, 2017
WaPo's Can He Do That? podcast takes on this question, in light of John Dowd's statement earlier this week that the "president cannot obstruct justice because he is the chief law enforcement officer . . . and has every right to express his view of any case." Check it out.