Tuesday, July 14, 2015
The Tenth Circuit today rejected statutory and First Amendment challenges to HHS's religious accommodation to its contraception mandate under the Affordable Care Act. We most recently posted on the issue, in the Notre Dame case in the Seventh Circuit, here.
The plaintiffs in the case--Little Sisters of the Poor, Southern Nazarene, and Reaching Souls--argued that the HHS requirement that they notify their health insurance providers, third party insurers, or HHS (with a simple letter) in order to get out from under the contraception mandate violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, free exercise and establishment of religion, and free speech.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the claims. In a lengthy opinion that comes with its own glossary and table of contents, the court ruled that it wasn't the plaintiffs' accommodation (the notification of their objection) that triggered the provision of contraceptions; it was the law. (Judge Posner arrived at the same conclusion with more colorful language in the Notre Dame case.) Given this, there was no substantial burden on religion under RFRA. Moreover, the court said that the accommodation met rational basis review under the Free Exercise Clause, that it didn't discriminate between religions and religious organizations in violation of the Establishment Clause, and that the accommodation didn't amount to compelled speech under the First Amendment.
Tuesday, June 30, 2015
Oklahoma Supreme Court Declares Ten Commandments Monument at State Capitol Unconstitutional Under State Constitution
In a relatively brief opinion today in Prescott v. Oklahoma Capitol Preservation Commission, Oklahoma's highest court found that a Ten Commandments monument on the Oklahoma Capitol grounds violated the state constitution, Article 2, Section 5, which provides:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary, or sectarian institution as such.
While the monument was a gift and no public funds were expended to acquire the monument, the court agreed that its placement on the Capitol grounds constituted the use of public property for the benefit of religion, emphasizing that the constitutional provision included the words “directly or indirectly.”
The court noted that the Legislature and Governor authorized the monument relying on the United States Supreme Court’s decision Van Orden v. Perry (2005), but noted that Van Orden was decided under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Here, the Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted the broader and more precise language of the Oklahoma state constitution. The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion contained the requisite language insulating it from United States Supreme Court review under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine so important to federalism:
“Our opinion rests solely on the Oklahoma Constitution with no regard for federal jurisprudence. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).”
Two justices dissented, without opinion.
Sunday, June 14, 2015
Reversing the district judge, a panel opinion of the Sixth Circuit in Smith v. Jefferson County Board of School Commissioners found that there was no Establishment Clause violation when a Tennessee public school board contracted with a "religious institution," Kingswood Schools, Inc., to provide "alternative-school" services for students suspended or expelled from their "ordinary schools." The county school board entered into the contract because of a funding shortfall and over seven years paid Kingswood, 1.7 million dollars; the arrangement ended when the county resumed providing alternative-school services.
The majority's opinion by Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, coupled with a separate concurring opinion by Judge Alice Batchelder, illustrates the disarray of Establishment Clause doctrine. Yet both the majority and concurring opinion settle on the "endorsement test" and find it is not satisfied. Specifically, the majority considered the "voluntary assemblies" as well as whether the "Biblical quotes on the report cards, family-feedback forms and—for those who sought them out—the annual report and school- improvement plan" constituted endorsement. As the majority described:
Students were required to submit a weekly family-feedback form—signed by their parents—in order to advance within the day program. That form contained the following quote from the Gospel of Luke: “Jesus . . . said, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God.” Parents were also required to sign report cards, which contained the same Biblical text. Kingswood’s director testified that the scripture—from the Gospel of Luke—could be interpreted as an invitation into the kingdom of God. The same passage appeared, accompanied by crosses, on the school’s Easter 2006 letter. The letter claimed: “Kingswood School is unique because we offer children a Christian environment of love and encouragement. . . . Kingswood remains one of the few places where children in need can get help in a Christian environment. We are a non-profit faith based ministry . . . .”
Those who sought out the 2005 Annual Report saw that it contains a picture of the chapel and says that each child will receive Christian religious training, and that emphasis is placed upon “instilling in each child a personal faith in God, and the assurance of the saving grace of Jesus Christ.” The “school improvement plan,” completed before the Jefferson County contract and still in effect afterward, stated the belief that schools must provide for “spiritual growth” in order to serve the “‘whole’ student.”
The Kingswood website also contained some religious references. It claimed, for example, that “Kingswood has survived independently by remaining true in faith to the principles of a Christian education without being bound to the doctrine of a particular denomination or sect’s control.” It states that the school will take care of a child’s “spiritual and religious life,” although it will not compel a student to adopt any particular religious doctrine. The website refers to Kingswood as a “Christian charity,” and explains its “Methodist-rooted beginnings.” It says that the school “has observed a Christian approach that has remained inter- faithed and unaffiliated with a particular Christian denomination.”
In its analysis, the court characterizes the Christian language as "de minimus" and concludes that a "reasonable observer would view all of these in the specific context of the arrangement that Kingswood had with Jefferson County." The arrangement saved taxpayer money and the court found it noteworthy that no parents or students complained. Instead, it reiterates that the complaint was by teachers of the public school who were terminated. The complaint was originally dismissed for lack of standing; the Sixth Circuit reversed en banc in 2011. The concurring opinion goes further and calls the case an "employment-contract dispute masquerading as an Establishment Clause case."
Yet the Establishment Clause disarray is not attributable to the procedural posture or the application of the so-called "endorsement test," but to questions about the test to be applied. According to the majority, there are "three main jurisprudential threads": the Lemon test; the endorsement test as a refinement of Lemon; and the "historical practice" test as articulated in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the closely-divided 2014 decision by the United States Supreme Court upholding a town council's prayer. The majority finds the historical practice test inapposite, but the concurrence argues for its application.
Interestingly, the court majority distinguishes Doe v. Elmbrook School District, in which the Seventh Circuit en banc found that an Establishment Clause violation existed when the school held graduation ceremonies in a church. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Elmbrook, over a dissent by Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas), arguing that the lower court's opinion is "fundamentally inconsistent" with a "number of points" "made clear" by Town of Greece v. Galloway. In her concurrence, Judge Batchelder essentially agrees with Justice Scalia. Judge Batchelder asks whether the school board's "contract would be historically acceptable to the Framers," seemingly assumes that it would be, and then would engage in a "fact-sensitive" inquiry regarding coercion. Judge Batchelder characterizes the biblical references as "innocuous," so presumably she would not find them coercive.
Yet bible verses on mandatory student correspondence that must be signed by parents on a weekly basis does seem to raise the specter of coercion - - - even if no parents or students of the "alternative-school" complained.
Thursday, April 16, 2015
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on April 28 in the same-sex marriage cases, now styled as Obergefell v. Hodges, a consolidated appeal from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DeBoer v. Snyder, reversing the district court decisions in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee that had held the same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional, and creating a circuit split.
Recall that the Court certified two questions:
1)Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?
2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?
The case has attracted what seems to be a record number of amicus briefs. As we discussed last year, previous top amicus brief attractors were the same-sex marriage cases of Windsor and Perry, which garnered 96 and 80 amicus briefs respectively, and the 2013 affirmative action case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, which attracted 92. [Note that the "Obamacare" Affordable Care Act cases including 2012's consolidated cases of NFIB v. Sebelius attracted 136 amicus briefs.]
The count for Obergefell v. Hodges stands at 139. 147 [updated: 17 April 2015] 149 [updated] LINKS TO ALL THE BRIEFS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE ABA WEBSITE HERE.
76 77 amicus briefs support the Petitioners, who contend that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional.
58 66 67 amicus briefs support the Respondents, who contend that same-sex marriage bans are constitutional.
05 amicus briefs support neither party (but as described below, generally support Respondents).
According to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 37, an amicus curiae brief’s purpose is to bring to the attention of the Court “relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties.” While such a brief “may be of considerable help to the Court,” an “amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.”
An impressive number of the Amicus Briefs are authored or signed by law professors. Other Amici include academics in other fields, academic institutions or programs, governmental entities or persons, organizations, and individuals, often in combination. Some of these have been previously involved in same-sex marriage or sexuality issues and others less obviously so, with a number being religious organizations. Several of these briefs have been profiled in the press; all are linked on the Supreme Court’s website and on SCOTUSBlog.
Here is a quick - - - if lengthy - - - summary of the Amici and their arguments, organized by party being supported and within that, by identity of Amici, beginning with briefs having substantial law professor involvement, then government parties or persons, then non-legal academics, followed by organizations including religious groups, and finally by those offering individual perspectives. [Late additions appear below]Special thanks to City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law Class of 2016 students, Aliya Shain & AnnaJames Wipfler, for excellent research.
April 16, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Establishment Clause, Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Foreign Affairs, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Fundamental Rights, Gender, History, Interpretation, Privacy, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Race, Recent Cases, Reproductive Rights, Scholarship, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Standing, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (3)
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
In a case with similarities to Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway decided by the United States Supreme Court last year, the Supreme Court of Canada today rendered its judgment in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) finding that a prayer at a municipal council meeting violated the constitution.
S regularly attended the public meetings of the municipal council of the City of Saguenay [Quebec]. At the start of each meeting, the mayor would recite a prayer after making the sign of the cross while saying [translation] “in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit”. The prayer also ended with the sign of the cross and the same words. Other councillors and City officials would cross themselves at the beginning and end of the prayer as well. In one of the council chambers, there was a Sacred Heart statue fitted with a red electric votive light. In another, there was a crucifix hanging on the wall. S, who considers himself an atheist, felt uncomfortable with this display, which he considered religious, and asked the mayor to stop the practice. When the mayor refused, S complained to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. He argued that his freedom of conscience and religion was being infringed, contrary to ss. 3 and 10 of the Quebec Charter, and asked that the recitation of the prayer cease and that all religious symbols be removed from council chambers.
The original Tribunal found the practice unconstitutional, but the Court of Appeal held that the prayer "expressed universal values" and "could not be identified with any particular religion." It also reasoned that the "religious symbols were works of art that were devoid of religious connotation and did not affect the state’s neutrality." According to the Court of Appeal, S had not been discriminated against on the ground of freedom of conscience and religion; any interference with S's beliefs was "trivial or insubstantial."
While some of the issues before the Supreme Court of Canada involved procedural ones regarding the appeal, the Court was clear that the municipality's practice was unconstitutional. Similar to an analysis under the US Constitution's First Amendment, the Supreme Court of Canada grappled with issues such as hostility to religion and the "slippery slope" of other religious practices:
The prayer recited by the municipal council in breach of the state’s duty of neutrality resulted in a distinction, exclusion and preference based on religion — that is, based on S’s sincere atheism — which, in combination with the circumstances in which the prayer was recited, turned the meetings into a preferential space for people with theistic beliefs. The latter could participate in municipal democracy in an environment favourable to the expression of their beliefs. Although non‑believers could also participate, the price for doing so was isolation, exclusion and stigmatization. This impaired S’s right to exercise his freedom of conscience and religion. The attempt at accommodation provided for in the by‑law, namely giving those who preferred not to attend the recitation of the prayer the time they needed to re‑enter the council chamber, had the effect of exacerbating the discrimination. The Tribunal’s findings to the effect that the interference with S’s freedom of conscience and religion was more than trivial or insubstantial were supported by solid evidence, and deference is owed to the Tribunal’s assessment of the effect of the prayer on S’s freedom of conscience and religion.
Barring the municipal council from reciting the prayer would not amount to giving atheism and agnosticism prevalence over religious beliefs. There is a distinction between unbelief and true neutrality. True neutrality presupposes abstention, but it does not amount to a stand favouring one view over another. Moreover, it has not been established in this case that the prayer is non‑denominational. The Tribunal’s findings of fact instead tend toward the opposite result. Be that as it may, the respondents themselves conceded at the hearing that the prayer is nonetheless a religious practice. Even if it is said to be inclusive, it may nevertheless exclude non-believers. As for the proposed analogy to the prayer recited by the Speaker of the House of Commons, in the absence of evidence concerning that prayer, it would be inappropriate to use it to support a finding that the City’s prayer is valid. Finally, the reference to the supremacy of God in the preamble to the Canadian Charter cannot lead to an interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion that authorizes the state to consciously profess a theistic faith. The preamble articulates the political theory on which the Charter’s protections are based. The express provisions of the Canadian Charter and of the Quebec Charter, such as those regarding freedom of conscience and religion, must be given a generous and expansive interpretation. This is necessary to ensure that those to whom these charters apply enjoy the full benefit of the rights and freedoms, and that the purpose of the charters is attained.
The Court explicitly linked the state's duty of neutrality - - - akin to the First Amendment's (anti-)Establishment Clause - - - to the maintenance of a free and democratic society. "This pursuit requires the state to encourage everyone to participate freely in public life regardless of their beliefs." This principle may have special resonance when one considers the largely French (and Catholic) Quebec as compared to the other largely English (and Protestant) other provinces.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Town of Greece, the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment is not closely divided; only one Justice writes separately to discuss some of the procedural issues, but otherwise concurs. For US ConLawProfs, City of Saguenay is well worth a comparative read.
Wednesday, December 17, 2014
Check out ConLawProfBlog's own Prof. Ruthann Robson's (CUNY) piece about her innovative and engaging approach to teaching the Religion Clauses in the Fall 2014 Law Teacher. (Robson's piece begins on page 49.) In it, Robson gives a step-by-step for a replicable, pervasive method that promises huge pedagogical payoffs--exactly the kind of thing we need more of in the Con Law world.
Robson, a leader in innovative and effective teaching who was featured in What the Best Law Teachers Do (Harvard), starts her First Amendment class by requiring students to develop and adopt a role in one of three categories: a recognized religion, a quasi-religion, and a non-religion. Robson then conducts her Religion Clause classes with her students in role, for example: "What do you think of this outcome, Student X, as a Rastafarian?"
The approach comes with distinct benefits and allows the class better to critically assess and analyze Religion Clause cases. Robson: "This role pervasiveness often illuminates the subjectivity of the Court's recitation of facts, as well as the reasoning, doctrine, theoretical perspectives, and the invocations of history."
Robson uses role pervasiveness for problems, too, assigning students to traditional legal roles (attorneys, judges, clerks, and the like) while still maintaining their assigned religion.
For example, Student Y, as a Sikh, now also takes on the role of a law clerk to a judge considering the constitutionality of the seventeen foot "Latin cross" at the National September 11 museum. Or Student Z, as a Secular Humanist, is writing an opinion as an administrative law judge in a sexual orientation discrimination case against a baker who refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.
This not only enhances students' understanding of the Religion Clauses, but it also allows Robson to explore issues of professional identity.
Check it out; give it a try; tell us how it works for you.
Sunday, August 24, 2014
The Ninth Circuit ruled last week in Williams v. State of California that a state law requiring residential community care service providers to accompany developmentally disabled clients to religious services did not violate the First Amendment. The very brief per curiam ruling simply incorporated the district court's order granting the state's motion to dismiss.
The plaintiffs in the case, residential community care facilities and employees, sued the state after the state cited the plaintiffs for violating their obligations to a client--in particular, for failing to accompany a client to Jehovah's Witness services in violation of the state's Lanterman Developmental Disabilities Services Act. Several of the service providers' employees objected to accompanying the client to services, because, they argued, to do so would violate their own religious freedom.
The district court's opinion, adopted in whole by the Ninth Circuit, took the plaintiffs to task for sloppy pleading and argument, and went on to reject their Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims. As to the Free Exercise claim, the district court held that the Lanterman Act was a law of general applicability, and had a rational basis--"to allow developmentally disabled persons to approximate the lives of nondisabled persons." As to the Establishment Clause claim, the court said that the Act had a secular purpose (same as above), a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion (because it applies to all manner of community activities, religious or not, and to all religions equally), and no excessive government entanglement with religion.
The plaintiffs' claims were weak, even non-starters, from the get-go, but they didn't help themselves with sloppy pleading, undeveloped arguments, and an apparent complete lack of response to certain court requests. All this made it easy for the Ninth Circuit simply to adopt the district court's ruling as its own and to affirm the dismissal of the case.
Friday, August 1, 2014
Affirming the opinion of United States District Judge Deborah Batts, the Second Circuit's opinion in American Atheists v. Port of Authority of NY and NJ held that there is no Establishment Clause violation when the National Museum at the former World Trade Center towers destroyed on September 11, often colloquially known as the "Ground Zero" Museum or the September 11 Museum, chose to display a large Latin cross.
Importantly, the cross is placed in the museum's Historical Exhibition in the section, “Finding Meaning at Ground Zero,” as part of the September 11 historical narrative. On appeal, the American Atheists seemingly narrowed the original challenge and argued that the defendants "impermissibly promote Christianity in violation of the Establishment Clause and deny atheists equal protection of the laws by displaying The Cross at Ground Zero in the Museum unaccompanied by some item acknowledging that atheists were among the victims and rescuers on September 11."
The unanimous panel's 42 page opinion applies Lemon v. Kurtzman to the Establishment Clause issue and much more briefly considers the equal protection argument.
Here's the court's summary of its conclusion:
1. Displaying The Cross at Ground Zero in the National September 11 Museum does not violate the Establishment Clause because:
a. the stated purpose of displaying The Cross at Ground Zero to tell the story of how some people used faith to cope with the tragedy is genuine, and an objective observer would understand the purpose of the display to be secular;
b. an objective observer would not view the display as endorsing religion generally, or Christianity specifically, because it is part of an exhibit entitled “Finding Meaning at Ground Zero”; the exhibit includes various nonreligious as well as religious artifacts that people at Ground Zero used for solace; and the textual displays accompanying the cross communicate its historical significance within this larger context; and
c. there is no evidence that the static display of this genuine historic artifact excessively entangles the government with religion.
2. In the absence of any Establishment Clause violation or any evidence of discriminatory animus toward atheists, the Museum did not deny equal protection by displaying The Cross at Ground Zero and refusing plaintiffs’ request to fund an accompanying symbol commemorating atheists.
It would be doubtful if this case goes any further; the cross at the museum looks as if it is there to stay.
Monday, July 14, 2014
Geoff Stone (Chicago) writes over at Huffington Post that religious tests for public office, which are still around in eight state constitutions, may well be upheld by the Roberts Court, should they ever be tested.
Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas all have these provisions, though they go unenforced. That's because the Court struck these tests in 1961 in Torcaso v. Watkins. But Stone says if the issue were to return to this Court, testing one of the eight state constitutional provisions, the five conservative justices may well reverse Torcaso and uphold the religious test.
But why would they disagree with Torcaso? After all, the reasoning of that unanimous decision seems clearly correct. But the five conservative justices on the Court today clearly do not share the general constitutional understandings of the Court in 1961. This is so across a range of issues, but perhaps most conspicuously in the realm of religion. Indeed, the Court's five conservative justices have consistently taken positions that come out quite aggressively in support of the interests of religion.
Stone cites Hobby Lobby and Town of Greece as just two recent decisions supporting this conclusion. Stone also argues that these five justices have already demonstrated their willingness to overturn well settled precedent. See Citizens United; Heller; Gonzales v. Carhart.
Friday, June 27, 2014
Here's the problem:
In August 2008, a municipality erected a sign "Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!," with a directional arrow and “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicting a gold cross and a white Bible, on a right of way bordering a property owner's property. The property owner engaged in a bit of her own speech, on her own property, posting a sign of her own directly in front of the church sign which read "This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” The municipality threatened the property owner with sanctions for her sign, which she removed. The propery owner filed a complaint pursuant to 42 USC §1983 in federal court in November 2012 alleging constitutional violations by the municipality based on the church sign, which remains standing, and her own offending sign, which she had removed. The state statute of limitations for tort claims is two years.
The Third Circuit's opinion in Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny addressed exactly this problem. The complaint alleged that the "church sign" violated the Establishment Clause, while the threats to prosecute plaintiff for erecting her own sign violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. Generally, because §1983 does not have a statute of limitations, state law provides the applicable time limitations. The district judge dismissed the complaint based on the statute of limitations because the actions occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint. Reversing on the Establishment Clause claim only, the Third Circuit found that the state statute of limitations did not bar the claim.
The plaintiff's attorney argued that the two year statute of limitations for the church sign should be viewed as a "continuing violation." As the court noted, this is more often part of a statute of limitations inquiry in an employment discrimination case: "where only in retrospect will a plaintiff recognize that seemingly unconnected incidents were, in fact, part and parcel of a larger discriminatory pattern." But here, the court accepted the municipality's argument that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply because the sign "is merely an effect" of the action - - - erecting the sign - - -that was within the statute of limitations.
But the Third Circuit found that the state's two year statute of limitations was inapplicable because although §1983 does not have a statute of limitations and state law provides the pertinent time limitations, this is true only "if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). The Court found that Establishment Clause rights are very important and that while other constitutional rights are also important
what further distinguishes Tearpock-Martini’s claim, and Establishment Clause claims in general, is that the traditional rationales justifying a limitations period—“to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims,” “facilitat[e] the administration of claims,” and “promot[e] judicial efficiency,” [citation omitted] —simply have no persuasive force in this context. Tearpock-Martini’s challenge is to a still- existing monument that communicates anew an allegedly unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the government each time it is viewed. Strict application of the statutory limitations period both serves no salutary purpose and threatens to immunize indefinitely the presence of an allegedly unconstitutional display.
Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that it could not find any precedent for finding an Establishment Clause challenge time-barred in a passive monument case, and indeed the cases were the opposite, citing, most persuasively, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (display of Ten Commandments challenged 40 years after installation).
The Third Circuit's conclusion seems exactly right: how can there be a statute of limitations on an Establishment Clause violation of a passive monument? However, in this case, because this particular plaintiff knew about the sign, and even objected to it, one could have expected her to act more quickly. Yet the very notion of an Establishment Clause violation caused by a still existing monument or even sign is that it is a continuing one.
Tuesday, June 17, 2014
Over a dissent from Justice Scalia, joined by Thomas, the United States Supreme Court decided not to review the closely watched Elmbrook School District v. Doe. The case was relisted by the Court at least ten times before the petition for certiorari was finally denied.
Recall as we discussed almost two years ago, the Seventh Circuit en banc found a First Amendment Establishment Clause violation when two high schools held their graduation ceremonies in a church. Justice Scalia's dissent contended that because the Seventh Circuit's opinion is now "fundamentally inconsistent" with a "number of points" "made clear" by Town of Greece v. Galloway - - - this Term's controversial 5-4 decision upholding town council's prayer - - - "the Court ought, at a minimum, to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand for reconsideration (GVR)."
Yet Scalia's dissent might be most noteworthy for its casual evisceration of the Establishment Clause:
Some there are—many, perhaps—who are offended by public displays of religion. Religion, they believe, is a personal matter; if it must be given external manifestation, that should not occur in public places where others may be offended. I can understand that attitude: It parallels my own toward the playing in public of rock music or Stravinsky. And I too am especially annoyed when the intrusion upon my inner peace occurs while I am part of a captive audience, as on a municipal bus or in the waiting room of a public agency.
My own aversion cannot be imposed by law because of the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 790 (1989); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210–211 (1975). Certain of this Court’s cases, however, have allowed the aversion to religious displays to be enforced directly through the First Amendment, at least in public facilities and with respect to public ceremonies—this despite the fact that the First Amendment explicitly favors religion and is, so to speak, agnostic about music.
(emphasis in original).
However, with the denial of certiorari in Elmbrook School District, the line between adult activities such as legislative meetings and "school" activities such as graduations persists in Establishment Clause doctrine.
Wednesday, June 11, 2014
The Sixth Circuit today denied a preliminary injunction to a group of religious employers and religious nonprofits challenging the exemption from and the accommodation to the contraception mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The ruling is just the latest in a line of challenges to the accommodation. We posted most recently here. (These cases are different than the Hobby Lobby case now before the Supreme Court: these cases involve religious nonprofits that take issue with the accommodation to the contraception mandate, where the Hobby Lobby case involves a corporation's challenge to the mandate itself.)
The cases are unusual, even surprising, in that the plaintiffs challenge the government's attempt to accommodate their religious beliefs as itself a violation of their religious rights.
The organizations challenged the exemption from and the accommodation to the mandate under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment (speech and religion clauses). The court ruled that they failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and thus affirmed the lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction.
The court noted that some of the plaintiffs were religious employers who qualified for the exemption from the mandate. Because the exemption exempts them, and because it does not require any particular act on the part of the organizations, the court said that the exemption didn't violate the organizations' speech or religious rights.
As to the religious non-profits, the court said that they qualify for the accommodation by simply certifying that they object to the mandate--and that this didn't interfere with their religious or free speech rights. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the certification itself somehow implicated the organizations in providing contraception in violation of their religious rights or free speech rights. In language shy of, but no less certain than, the almost hostile ruling by Judge Posner in the Seventh Circuit rejecting a similar claim the court said,
The appellants are not required to "provide" contraceptive coverage. . . . The appellants are not required to "pay for" contraceptive coverage. . . . Moreover, the appellants are not required to "facilitate access to" contraceptive coverage. . . . Submitting the self-certification form to the insurance issuer or third-party administrator does not "trigger" contraceptive coverage; it is federal law that requires the insurance issuer or the third-party administrator to provide this coverage.
Monday, May 5, 2014
In a sharply divided opinion today in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the United States Supreme Court has decided that religious prayers at the beginning of a town board meeting do not violate the Establishment Clause.
Recall that the Second Circuit had concluded that the Town of Greece's practice of prayer since 1999 "impermissibly affiliated the town with a single creed, Christianity." At oral argument, the discussion centered on an application of Marsh v. Chambers (1983), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Nebraska legislature's employment of a chaplain to lead a legislative prayer, and the question of whether the "town board" a "hybrid" body making adjudicative findings as well as engaging in legislative acts. Recall also that the Obama administration filed an amicus brief in support of the Town of Greece.
Writing for the majority - - - except for Part II-B in which Justices Scalia and Thomas did not join - - - Justice Kennedy concluded that there was no Establishment Clause violation based upon Marsh v. Chambers. First, the majority opinion held that Marsh v. Chambers does not require nonsectarian or ecumenical prayer. Instead, it is acceptable that while a
number of the prayers did invoke the name of Jesus, the Heavenly Father, or the Holy Spirit, but they also invoked universal themes, as by celebrating the changing of the seasons or calling for a “spirit of cooperation” among town leaders.
Absent a pattern of prayers that over time denigrate, proselytize, or betray an impermissi ble government purpose, a challenge based solely on the content of a prayer will not likely establish a constitutional violation. Marsh, indeed, requires an inquiry into the prayer opportunity as a whole, rather than into the contents of a single prayer.
In the plurality section, Justice Kennedy rejected the relevance of the "intimate setting of a town board meeting" to a finding that the prayer "coerces participation by nondaherents." Rather, the principle audience for the prayers "is not, indeed, the public but lawmakers themselves." The analysis, Kennedy writes, "would be different if town board members directed the public to participate in the prayers, singled out dissidents for opprobrium, or indicated that their decisions might be influenced by a person's acquiescence in the prayer opportunity."
Justices Thomas and Scalia did not join Part II-B; they essentially reject the coercion test ("peer pressure, unpleasant as it may be, is not coercion"). Justice Thomas also (as he has done in the past) rejects the incorporation of the Establishment Clause to the states, and certainly to a municipality.
In the major dissent authored by Justice Kagan - - - joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer (who also authored a separate dissent) and Sotomayor - - -the emphasis is on the factual record. Kagan distinguishes Marsh v. Chambers and argues the situation in the Town of Greece is outside its "protective ambit."
the chaplain of the month stands with his back to the Town Board; his real audience is the group he is facing— the 10 or so members of the public, perhaps including children. And he typically addresses those people, as even the majority observes, as though he is “directing [his] congregation.” He almost always begins with some version of “Let us all pray to gether.” Often, he calls on everyone to stand and bow their heads, and he may ask them to recite a common prayer with him. He refers, constantly, to a collective “we”—to “our” savior, for example, to the presence of the Holy Spirit in “our” lives, or to “our brother the Lord Jesus Christ.” In essence, the chaplain leads, as the first part of a town meeting, a highly intimate (albeit relatively brief) prayer service, with the public serving as his congregation.
Further, Justice Kagan writes, "no one can fairly read the prayers from Greece’s Town meetings as anything other than explicitly Christian—constantly and exclusively so." Because of these practices, she concludes, the Town of Greece has "betrayed" the "promise" of the First Amendment: "full and equal membership in the polity for members of every religious group."
The Supreme Court's divided opinion illustrates that religion in the town square - - - or the town board meeting - - - remains divisive.
Monday, April 7, 2014
Recall that in November 2013 we posted "UK Supreme Court Confronts Clash Between Freedom of Religion and Gay Equality: Is the Issue Coming to The US Supreme Court Soon?"
The answer is "no," at least if "soon" means the case discussed in that post, Elane Photography v. Willock, a decision from the New Mexico Supreme Court in favor of a same-sex couple against a wedding photographer. The petition concentrated on the First Amendment speech rights of the photographer rather than religious rights; the Court denied certiorari today.
Meanwhile, Lady Brenda Hale, a Justice on the UK Supreme Court, appeared at a Comparative and Administrative Law Conference last month at Yale and spoke on the topic of "Religion and Sexual Orientation: The clash of equality rights," posting her written remarks on the UK Supreme Court site. Justice Hall considered the Bull case which we discussed as well as cases from Canada and the EU, all presenting the same basic issue: should religious persons be exempt from anti-discrimination laws? Justice Lady Hale offers some interesting observations: "it is fascinating that a country with an established church can be less respectful of religious feelings than one without." She also discusses direct and indirect discrimination and reiterates a point she made in the Bull case itself:
Both homosexuals and Christians were subject to the same laws requiring them not to discriminate in the running of their businesses. So if homosexual hotel keepers had refused a room to an opposite sex or Christian couple, they too would have been acting unlawfully.
This leads her to proclaim:
If you go into the market place you cannot pick and choose which laws you will obey and which you will not.
This may be an indication of how Lady Brenda Hale would rule in Hobby Lobby so recently argued before the United States Supreme Court, assuming the English Parliament would enact a statute similar to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
Another difference: The arguments before the UK Supreme Court are televised live.
April 7, 2014 in Comparative Constitutionalism, Current Affairs, Establishment Clause, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, International, Religion, Speech, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Thursday, April 3, 2014
Does a city policy governing "extended use" of school facilities that excludes permits for the "purpose of holding religious worship services, or otherwise using a school as a house of worship" violate the First Amendment?
The Second Circuit in its opinion in Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of the City of New York answered in the negative, a majority of the panel holding that the policy, Regulation I.Q., does not violate either the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause.
If this controversy sounds familiar, that would not be surprising. We discussed it here, and as today's opinion notes, the litigation has been "long-running," citing Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Bronx Household IV”); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Bronx Household III”); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997).
Today's opinion - - - Bronx Household V - - - reverses the district judge's grant of an injunction on Free Exercise claims which were arguably not before the courts previously. The majority of the Second Circuit panel, in an opinion by Judge Pierre Leval joined by Guido Calabresi, carefully refuted the district judge's reasoning. In short, the panel majority held that Locke v Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (finding that the exclusion of devotional theology degree programs from eligibility for state scholarships does not violate Free Exercise Clause) was more apposite than Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)(holding that an ordinance "targeting" the Santeria practice of animal sacrifice merited strict scrutiny and violated the Free Exercise Clause).
The panel rejected the argument that the Regulation I.Q. targets religion generally or targets religions that have worship services. The panel also rejected the attempt to distinguish the scholarship in Locke v, Davey, noting that under the "extended use" policy, the city subsidizes the use of school facilities since the organizations can use the facilities without cost. The panel also found that the city's desire not to violate the Establishment Clause was a valid one. As the panel summarized:
In view of (1) the absence of discriminatory animus on the part of the Board against religion, or against religions that conduct worship services; (2) the bona fides and the reasonableness of the Board’s concern that offering school facilities for the subsidized conduct of religious worship services would create a substantial risk of incurring a violation of the Establishment Clause claim; and (3) the fact that the Board’s policy (a) leaves all persons and religions free to practice religion without interference as they choose, (b) treats all users, whether religious or secular, in identical fashion, and (c) imposes no burden on any religion, leaving all free to conduct worship services wherever they choose other than the Board’s schools; as well as the other reasons recited in this opinion and in Bronx Household IV, we conclude that Reg. I.Q. does not violate Plaintiffs’ rights to free exercise of religion, whether or not it is subject to strict scrutiny.
As to the Establishment Clause, the court rejected Bronx Household's argument that for the city to determine what constituted "religious worship services" would infringe the Establishment Clause. Bronx Household relied upon Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) - - - an example of how doctrine has been changing during this protracted litigation - - - but the majority expressed a very different view:
Hosanna-Tabor, moreover, does not merely fail to support Bronx Household’s claim of Establishment Clause violation due to excessive entanglement by the Board; it actively contradicts the argument. This is because in Hosanna-Tabor the Supreme Court itself did precisely what the District Court found a governmental entity prohibited from doing.
In other words, when the United States Supreme Court "undertook to make its own determination whether the plaintiff was a minister subject to the ministerial exception," it engaged in the very same type of determination that Bronx Household argues would violate the Establishment Clause.
If Senior Judge John Walker, dissenting, has his way, the Court might have a chance to discuss this Establishment Clause rationale again. Walker contends that this "case presents substantial questions involving the contours of both religion clauses and the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the resolution of which are ripe for Supreme Court review." Most certainly, Bronx Household will be quoting that language in any petition seeking Supreme Court review.
Friday, February 21, 2014
In an opinion dripping with contempt for Notre Dame's litigation strategies and legal theories, the Seventh Circuit today affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction for the university in its challenge against the contraception mandate in Obamacare. The ruling in Notre Dame v. Sebelius sends the case back to the district court for full proceedings and denies Notre Dame interim relief.
It also pulls back the curtain on Notre Dame's claim, revealing just how far-fetched it is.
The issue in this case--whether the government's accommodation for religious nonprofits to exempt themselves from the contraception mandate itself violates religious freedom--is the same issue in Little Sisters, the case in which the Supreme Court recently allowed a religious nonprofit to sidestep the mandate and the accommodation pending its appeal on the merits to the Tenth Circuit.
Recall that the government crafted an accommodation to the Obamacare requirement that employers provide health-insurance options that include contraception for females. The accommodation allowed religious nonprofits (like Little Sisters and Notre Dame) to shift the mandate to their insurers or third-party administrators (which then would have to provide contraception options to the insured employees and students free of charge) by completing a short form indicating that they have a religious objection to contraception.
Notre Dame, Little Sisters, and other religious nonprofits sued, arguing that the accommodation itself violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit's ruling addresses only whether Notre Dame qualifies for a preliminary injunction from the accommodation (and mandate) while its case proceeds to the merits. But in answering that question, the court had to determine whether Notre Dame is likely to succeed on the merits. And the court said that it wasn't.
Right out of the gate, the court practically mocked the university for asking for something that the court couldn't deliver--because of the university's litigation tactics. In particular, the court noted that Notre Dame filed its case late, close to the mandate's (and the accommodation's) implementation date, so that it was forced to either file the form for the accommodation or incur fines under the Affordable Care Act. Notre Dame filed the form, and its administrator notified Notre Dame employees that contraception was available to them. With the cat out of the bag, the court wondered what relief does Notre Dame want? Revoking the form would do nothing, because federal law requires the administrator (not Notre Dame) to provide contraception. But the court can't order the administrator to stop providing contraception, because Notre Dame neglected to join the administrator in the case.
As to the merits, the court was equally dismissive. In particular, the court rejected Notre Dame's "trigger" theory--that by signing the accommodation form, it triggers, or enables, contraception coverage by a third party, against its religious beliefs. The court dismissed this out of hand:
The key word is "enable," and it's inaccurate. Federal law, not the religious organization's signing and mailing the form, requires health-care insurers, along with third-party administrators or self-insured health plans, to cover contraceptive services. By refusing to fill out the form Notre Dame would subject itself to penalties, but [its insurance company and administrator] would still be required by federal law to provide the services to the university's students and employees unless and until their contractual relations with Notre Dame terminated.
The court wrote further,
The novelty of Notre Dame's claim--not for the exemption, which it has, but for the right to have it without having to ask for it--deserves emphasis. . . . What makes this case and others like it involving the contraception exemption paradoxical and virtually unprecedented is that the beneficiaries of the religious exemption are claiming that the exemption process itself imposes a substantial burden on their religious faiths. . . .
The process of claiming one's exemption from the duty to provide contraceptive coverage is the opposite of cumbersome. It amounts to signing one's name and mailing the signed form to two addresses. Notre Dame may consider the process a substantial burden, but substantiality--like compelling government interest--is for the court to decide. Otherwise there would have been no need for Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to prefix "substantial" to "burden."
The court also held that Notre Dame was not likely to succeed on its Establishment Clause claim, that the Act treats religions differently than religious organizations for the purpose of exemption from the contraception mandate.
The court did find potential merit in Notre Dame's claim that a regulation that forbids a religious nonprofit from interfering with a third-party administrator's arrangements to provide for contraceptive services violates free speech. But the court said that the parties "failed to place the issue in focus," and so didn't rule on it.
Judge Flaum dissented, arguing that the court should have granted Notre Dame's motion to dismiss the appeal after three Notre Dame students joined the appeal to argue that Notre Dame's religious conviction was not sincere, and that Notre Dame showed a likelihood of success on the merits.
Sunday, February 9, 2014
Before the opening of each town hall meeting, the Mayor recites a prayer - - -
Almighty God, we thank You for the many favours that You have granted Saguenay and its citizens, including freedom, opportunities for development and peace. Guide us in our deliberations as members of the municipal council and help us to be well aware of our duties and responsibilities. Grant us the wisdom, knowledge and understanding that will enable us to preserve the advantages that our city enjoys, so that everyone can benefit from them and we can make wise decisions. Amen.
Although a government official - - - rather than someone selected by government officials - - - recites the prayer (in French), the similarties to Town of Greece v. Galloway, argued before the United States Supreme Court in November, are obvious. However, the religious practice of the City of Saguenay in the province of Quebec, is going before the Supreme Court of Canada in Mouvement laïque québécois (MLQ) v. City of Saguenay. (Americans might analogize the Quebecois MLQ to American organizations such as Freedom from Religion).
There's a terrific discussion of the case by Victor Yee over at "The Court," a blog from Osgoode Hall about the Supreme Court of Canada.
Any decision by the Supreme Court could have implications for Quebec's controversial attempt to regulate the wearing of "ostentatious" religious gear by public employees and might draw on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. N.S., involving the right of a witness in a criminal prosecution to wear a veil. Although the challenge in City of Saguenay is akin to a US Constitutional "Establishment Clause" challenge and the Canadian doctrine of government religious neutrality.
Wednesday, January 15, 2014
Oklahoma District Judge Joe Heaton declined to find that the Oklahoma license plate violated the First Amendment or other constitutional rights of Keith Cressman in his opinion in Cressman v. Thompson.
Recall that the Tenth Circuit, in a divided opinion in June 2013, held that Cressman had made plausible allegations that the symbol on the Oklahoma license plate - - - arguably the “Sacred Rain Arrow” - - - could be the basis of a compelled speech claim, similar to the classic First Amendment case of Wooley v. Maynard.
But on remand, Judge Heaton found that the plate's image (pictured below and included as the final page on Judge Heaton's opinion) did not rise to the level of symbolic speech with a particularized message. Although stating that there should be a broad interpretation, Judge Heaton nevertheless held:
Viewed by itself, all the disputed image involves is a depiction of a Native American shooting a bow and arrow. There is nothing about the image that suggests the man is praying or that the arrow he is shooting is sacred. There is nothing about the image that suggests he is worried about rain, or the lack thereof. There is nothing about the image that suggests he believes in one god, no god, or several. It simply depicts a Native American shooting a bow and arrow.
Judge Heaton rejected the constitutional significance of the "other things" Cressman learned about the image through "research." He opined that the "fact that additional research is necessary to know or identify the message of which plaintiff complains is itself “strong evidence” that the image, as such, is not subject to constitutional protection." Further, the image on the license plate is "not an exact replica" of the "Sacred Rain Arrow” sculpture; the plate image has the arrow pointing at a 60 degree angle "a pose consistent with a variety of scenarios in which a bow and arrow might be used," while the sculpture "involves a Native American shooting his arrow almost vertically into the air, a pose which arguably is more suggestive of a spiritual motive or connection."
Additionally, Cressman did not object to the words "Native America" on the license plate, another distinction from Wooley v. Maynard's "Live Free or Die" New Hampshire license plate.
Judge Heaton's final paragraph expressed a lack of sympathy for Cressman along with a suggestion:
The absence of a constitutional violation does not, of course, mean that plaintiff lacks a practical solution to the problem as he sees it. Oklahoma provides a simple, inexpensive, and readily available alternative, in the form of a specialty plate, for those who object to any aspect of a standard plate, an option which plaintiff has exercised both before and since his concerns with the current standard license plate arose.
Saturday, December 14, 2013
In a 91 page opinion in Brown v. Buhman, federal district judge Clark Waddoups has concluded that Utah's anti-bigamy statute is partially unconstitutional.
The statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-101, provides:
- (1) A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person.
- (2) Bigamy is a felony of the third degree.
- (3) It shall be a defense to bigamy that the accused reasonably believed he and the other person were legally eligible to remarry.
The challengers to the statute, the Browns, are famous from the reality program Sister Wives and the accompanying book ) and are represented by Professor Jonathan Turley, who blogs about the case here.
The judge's scholarly opinion includes a discussion of Edward Said's groundbreaking book Orientalism as a critique of the well-known passage in the United States Supreme Court’s 1879 decision in Reynolds v. United States upholding the criminalization of polygamy by reasoning, in part, that "Polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."
Judge Waddoups considers both the due process challenge (applying Washington v. Glucksberg) and the free exercise challenge (applying Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah).
In the due process analysis, the judge specifically found
there is no “fundamental right” to polygamy under Glucksberg. To phrase it with a “careful description” of the asserted right [citations omitted], no “fundamental right” exists to have official State recognition or legitimation of individuals’ “purported” polygamous marriages—relationships entered into knowing that one of the parties to such a plural marriage is already legally married in the eyes of the State. The fundamental right or liberty interest that was under consideration in Glucksberg is instructive for the analysis of whether the asserted right to polygamy is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”
The judge also found that the criminalization of what it called the "religious cohabitation" portion of the statute did not rise to the level of a fundamental right, extensively discussing Lawrence v. Texas and the Tenth Circuit's limiting interpretation of Lawrence.
However, the judge did find that "the cohabitation prong does not survive rational basis review under the substantive due process analysis." This analysis implicitly imported a type of equal protection analysis, with the judge concluding:
Adultery, including adulterous cohabitation, is not prosecuted. Religious cohabitation, however, is subject to prosecution at the limitless discretion of local and State prosecutors, despite a general policy not to prosecute religiously motivated polygamy. The court finds no rational basis to distinguish between the two, not least with regard to the State interest in protecting the institution of marriage.
Complementing this conclusion regarding discriminatory enforcement, the judge's free exercise of religion analysis concludes that while the Utah statute may be facially neutral, the cohabitation prong is not "operationally neutral" and not of general applicability. The judge therefore applied strict scrutiny to the cohabitation prong and easily concluded the statute failed.
As an alternative free exercise analysis, the judge reasoned that the cohabitation prong also merited strict scrutiny because it involved a "hybrid rights" analysis under Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith (1990), given the claims of due process, but also claims that the judge did not extensively analyzes such as free association, free speech, establishment, and equal protection.
Thus, the judge concluded the cohabitation prong of the statute is "unconstitutional on numerous grounds." However, the court explicitly narrowed the constructions of “marry” and “purports to marry" in the statute, so that the Utah statute continues to "remain in force as prohibiting bigamy in the literal sense—the fraudulent or otherwise impermissible possession of two purportedly valid marriage licenses for the purpose of entering into more than one purportedly legal marriage." Not surprisingly then, the judge's opinion does not cite the Supreme Court's opinion last term in United States v. Windsor involving DOMA and same-sex marriage, in which Justice Scalia, dissenting, invoked the effect the decision would have on polygamy. [I've previously discussed the similarities of same-sex marriage and polygamy claims here].
Given the district judge's narrowing construction and the clear constitutional issues with the Utah statute's breadth, it might be possible that the state does not appeal.
December 14, 2013 in Books, Equal Protection, Establishment Clause, Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, Gender, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, November 6, 2013
Oral Arguments in Town of Greece v Galloway: Can the Town Council Ask Those Attending to Bow Their Heads and Pray?
The Court today heard oral arguments in Town of Greece v. Galloway regarding a New York town's practice of opening its council meetings with prayers, the large majority of which have been Christian.
unanimous panel opinion of the Second Circuit held that the town meetings practice of legislative prayer since 1999 "impermissibly affiliated the town with a single creed, Christianity" and violated the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The case has attracted much attention - - - a great PBS video is here - - - and in a move that surprised some, the Obama Administration filed a brief in support of the town.
Doctrinally, the arguments centered on an application of Marsh v. Chambers (1983), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Nebraska legislature's employment of a chaplain to lead a legislative prayer. The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, was seemingly not worried that the same chaplain had been employed for almost two decades, and relied upon the historical practice of legislative prayer. Among the many references to Marsh in the argument and its reliance on history is this one with (ConLawProf) Douglas Laycock, representing the challengers to the prayer, after some laughter:
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, I'm serious about this. This involves government very heavily in religion.
MR. LAYCOCK: Well, government became very heavily involved in religion when we decided there could be prayers to open legislative sessions. Marsh is the source of government involvement in religion. And now the question is how to manage the problems that arise from that.
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Marsh is not the source of government involvement religion in this respect. The First Congress is the source.
MR. LAYCOCK: Fair enough. The tradition to which Marsh points.
JUSTICE ALITO: The First Congress that also adopted the First Amendment.
Yet another possible distinction from Marsh is the Town of Greece town council is a "hybrid" body which has administrative function and persons appearing before it who are seeking specific relief, as well as being local. Justice Ginsburg complimented the Deputy Solicitor General, who argued as amicus curiae, supporting the Town of Greece, for being "quite candid" about this quality and stating that it would be proper to have "certain checks" in that setting. But the nature of those checks preoccupied the arguments. Does it matter how far the prayer and the "hearing" are separated in time? Should there be guidelines for those giving the prayers - - - and how much does this involve (entangle) the government in religious matters? Does it matter if the attendees are asked to show their hands if they personally feel in need of prayer? (To which Justice Scalia interjected, "That's not a prayer.") Additionally, there was little satisfaction with either the coercion or endorsement tests, and the (in)famous Lemon test made no appearance at all.
For some Justices, prayer as practiced in the Town of Greece council meetings seemed deeply troubling. For example, Justice Kagan quickly interrupted Thomas Hungar, arguing on behalf of the town:
JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Hungar, I'm wondering what you would think of the following: Suppose that as we began this session of the Court, the Chief Justice had called a minister up to the front of the courtroom, facing the lawyers, maybe the parties, maybe the spectators. And the minister had asked everyone to stand and to bow their heads in prayer and the minister said the following: He said, we acknowledge the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross. We draw strength from His resurrection. Blessed are you who has raised up the Lord Jesus. You who will raise us in our turn and put us by His side. The members of the Court who had stood responded amen, made the sign of the cross, and the Chief Justice then called your case.
During his rebuttal argument, Mr. Hungar's attempt to demonstrate the town was not sectarian in its prayer was less than successful for Justice Sotomayor:
MR. HUNGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
First I would like to correct one factual misimpression, the assertion that only non-Christian prayer-givers delivered the prayer after 2008. It's not in the record, but the official web site of the Town of Greece shows that at least four non-Christian prayer-givers delivered prayers thereafter in 2009, '10, '11 and '13.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel.
MR. HUNGAR: I'm sorry?
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: One a year.
MR. HUNGAR: I'm sorry, Your Honor?
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Four additional people after the suit was filed.
MR. HUNGAR: Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: One a year.
MR. HUNGAR: Approximately.
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How often does the legislature meet?
HUNGAR: Once a month.
And on the sectarian line . . . . .