Thursday, March 7, 2013

Idaho District Judge Holds Portions of State's Abortion Law Unconstitutional

In the latest chapter of McCormack v. Hiedeman, District Judge Lynn Winmill issued a 42 page opinion (Memorandum Decision and Order) yesterday holding various provisions in Idaho's abortion law unconstitutional, including the 20 week pregnancy ban unconstitutional.

Agrippine_de_Claude_MellanRecall that the Ninth Circuit last year found that Idaho's prosecution of McCormack for "self-abortion" constituted an undue burden and was unconstitutional.  McCormack, who purchased abortion "medications" over the internet, was the subject of an excellent indepth article which we discussed here. At that time, it seemed as if the case was concluded.

However, Judge Winmill rejected the prosecutor's argument that the case was moot, noting that a party "cannot conjure up mootness by ceasing the challenged conduct only for practical or strategic reasons - - - such as avoiding litigation."  The judge further held that the prosecutor's promise not to prosecute would not bind his successors and that his subsequent offer of transactional immunity to McCormack was not timely or binding.  Further, the judge noted that pregnancy is "capable of repetition yet evading review."

Judge Winmill also held that the physician in the case had standing, including to assert his patients' constitutional claims.

On the merits, Judge Winmill held that the self-abortion provision is a substantial obstacle and therefore unconstitutional, adopting the Ninth Circuit's reasoning.

Judge Winmill also held unconstitutional the provisions imposing criminal liability on abortion providers who perform first trimester abortions outside a hospital or a properly staffed and equipped office or a clinic and requires that “physicians have made satisfactory arrangements” for emergency hospital care.  The judge accepted the physician's argument that the terms “properly” and “satisfactory” are unconstitutionally vague therefore placing an undue burden on women seeking first trimester abortions. There is some confusion in the judge's reliance on Gonzales v. Carhart in this passage, but the judge finds that the Idaho statute is not sufficiently specific.

Additionally, the judge found unconstitutional the Idaho provisions  banning abortions at twenty weeks in PUCPA, the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act.  He reasoned that PUCPA does not contain mention the health or safety of the pregnant woman, that its only purpose was to limit the available options for the woman, and that the legislature cannot place viability at a set point. 

Given this opinion, it is likely that McCormack v. Heidman will be returning to the Ninth Circuit.

RR
[image via]

March 7, 2013 in Abortion, Due Process (Substantive), Family, Fourteenth Amendment, Gender, Medical Decisions, Opinion Analysis, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, February 25, 2013

Daily Read: Dimock on Torture, Music, and Literature

Peter Dimock's just published book, George Anderson: Notes for a Love Song in Imperial Time, is a novelistic intervention in contemporary anguish about the legality of torture. 

9781564788016In a starred review, Publishers Weekly explains,

The novel takes the form of a letter from Theo Fales, editor and memoir ghostwriter for former CIA operatives, to David Kallen, a government official who directed Special Forces trainers to torture him before signing a document that led to the legalization of torture by the George W. Bush administration. Fales attempts to teach Kallen a method he devised as a, "means by which every person rids the self of its inordinate attachment to empire and creates reciprocity."

It's a brief but challenging book, interweaving music and literature to interrogate the roles of lawyers and journalists regarding the use of torture.   It is worth a read by anyone exploring how the constitutionality of "enhanced interrogation" should be decided.

RR

 

February 25, 2013 in Books, Due Process (Substantive), Executive Authority, News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, January 7, 2013

Daily Read: Pam Karlan on the 2011 United States Supreme Court Term

Pamela Karlan's "Democracy and Disdain" is the Forward to Harvard Law Review's annual Supreme Court issue for the 2011 Term and is a compelling - - - indeed, necessary and delightful - - - read.  Karlan's central thesis, as the title aptly communicates, is that the Roberts' Court has little but disdain for the democratic process.  By "Roberts' Court," of course, she means the five Justices who usually form the majority, including Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and Kennedy.  

File19105
Professor Karlan (pictured) concludes that this disdain will ultimately bring the Court into disrepute, comparing the present state of affairs unfavorably with the Warren Court:

The Roberts Court’s narrow substantive reading of enumerated powers maps fairly closely onto the contemporary conservative political agenda. To the extent that the conservative agenda gains popular acceptance, the Court may garner acclaim as a guardian of constitutional values. But if the public rejects that agenda, or remains sharply divided, the Court risks being perceived as simply another partisan institution. The Court’s current status rests in substantial measure on its having been on the right side of history in Brown v. Board of Education. Only time will tell whether the Court will retain that status given the choices the Roberts Court is making.

Karlan is adept at comparing the present Court to previous ones, not only including the Warren Court.  Spoiler alert: When she quotes Justice Roberts, she might not be quoting the 2012 John Roberts but the 1936 Owen Roberts, a device she uses to especially good effect.  Also to good effect is her usage of other justices, colloquies in oral argument, the occasional poet, and theorist.  The writing is broad and engaging without being precious.  It makes her analysis of the cases even more trenchant, situated in larger themes and trends.

Of course, not all ConLawProfs will agree with Karlan's views of the Court, including one subsection entitled "Protecting Spenders and Suspecting Voters," and another "Suspecting Congress."    And Karlan's argument is hardly unique, as anyone who recalls Rehnquist Court scholarship, including the excellent 2001 article "Dissing Congress," by Ruth Colker and James J. Brudney can attest.  And it is especially noteworthy that  the Court did uphold the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, a case that Karlan extensively discusses and more interestingly, situates within the Term's other less notable decisions. 

But this is a must read article before beginning the new semester. 

And after that, read George Wills' Washington Post op-ed, Karlan's response, and responses in the Harvard Law Review Online Forum by Randy Barnett and Stephen Calabresi.

RR
[image of Pamela Karlan via]

January 7, 2013 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Elections and Voting, Fifteenth Amendment, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, History, Interpretation, Race, Recent Cases, Reconstruction Era Amendments, Scholarship, Separation of Powers, Supremacy Clause, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, January 4, 2013

Daily Read: The Story Behind The Ninth Circuit's Self-Abortion Opinion

In September, the Ninth Circuit rendered its opinion in McCormack v. Hiedeman regarding the constitutionality of Idaho's "unlawful abortion" statutes that makes it a felony for any woman to undergo an abortion in a manner not authorized by statute.  McCormack had been charged by the prosecutor Mark Hiedeman based on her procurement of abortion "medications" over the internet.  The court held that imposing a criminal sanction on a woman poses an undue burden under Casey, but the decision was restricted to McCormack given the absence of class certification.

But who is Jennie Linn McCormack?  And how common is procuring abortion "medications" via the internet?

Tnr-cover_1231121Journalist Ada Calhoun's cover article in this month's The New Republic, "The Rise of DIY Abortions," paints a vivid portrait of Jennie Linn McCormack, as well as her attorney ("an avid fan of The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo books. He saw the character of dogged reporter Mikael Blomkvist as a good role model for a lawyer. . . ").  

Calhoun also contextualizes McCormack's situation:

Determining how many American women have had home abortions is exceedingly difficult: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention does not track illegal abortions. There is no blood test for drugs like Cytotec, and so such an abortion is indistinguishable from a natural miscarriage, even to a doctor. However, the proliferation of online dispensers suggests a rising demand. There are thousands of websites selling Cytotec for as little as $45 to $75 (compared with $300 to $800 for a legal medicated abortion in a clinic). Some claim to offer the harder-to-come-by Mifeprex, but may in fact be peddling Cytotec, or aspirin, or nothing at all. (Possible sources for the drugs include Mexico, where Cytotec is available over the counter, or even the United States, since it’s also prescribed here as an ulcer medication.)

The question of how drugs like Mifeprex and Cytotec are sold and administered is emerging as the next major front in the abortion debate.

Calhoun's article is a must-read for anyone teaching, writing, or thinking about abortion and is sure to be discussed at the many conferences devoted to Roe v. Wade's 40th anniversary, such as this one at the NYC Bar.

RR

January 4, 2013 in Abortion, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Family, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Gender, Medical Decisions, Recent Cases, Teaching Tips | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

NYC Bar Event on 40th Anniversary of Roe v. Wade

NycbarlogoThe Fortieth Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's Landmark Decision, Roe V. Wade
Monday, January 14, 2013 6:30 pm-8:00 pm

2013 marks the 40th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, establishing the constitutionally-protected right to abortion. This program will discuss the evolution of the right to abortion in the courts, public opinion, and political discourse since then and will address the current status of reproductive rights in the United States, including its role in the 2012 presidential election.

Moderator: PRISCILLA SMITH, Senior Fellow at the Information Society Project at the Yale Law School

Speakers:
LOUISE MELLING
, Director, ACLU Center for Liberty
RUTHANN ROBSON
, Professor of Law & University Distinguished Professor, CUNY School of Law
KATHLEEN MORRELL, MD, Physicians for Reproductive Choice and Health
JESSICA GONZALEZ-ROJAS
, Executive Director, National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health
BEBE ANDERSON, Director, U.S. Legal Program, Center for Reproductive Rights

Sponsors: Sex and Law Committee, Pamela Zimmerman, Chair

More information here.

January 4, 2013 in Abortion, Conferences, Due Process (Substantive), Family, Fundamental Rights, Gender, Medical Decisions, Privacy, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, December 6, 2012

Daily Read: Bradley Manning's Attorney on C-Span

Some excellent reporting and gathering of materials from C-SPAN on the Bradley Manning case, involving constitutional issues of state secrets, First Amendment, and due process, among others.

Today's daily "read" is the video from an event discussing the Manning case features a very rare appearance by Manning's attorney, David Coombs.   The introduction of Coombs starts at 22:40.  Coombs discusses the "unlawful pretrial punishment motion" regarding Manning's treatment during detention which he describes as "criminal" before the move to Leavenworth, the public attention to the case, whistle-blowing.  He also responds to vetted questions: he lauds the military justice system, including the judges and any possible panel, as educated, open-minded, and fair; discusses his own legal career; generally discusses the relationship between the "press" and an "aiding the enemy" offense; the perils of "trying the case in the press;" and privileged communication between attorney and client.   Interestingly absent is any discussion of Manning's sexuality.

.

 

This is definitey worth a listen!

RR

December 6, 2012 in Courts and Judging, Criminal Procedure, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Foreign Affairs, News, Sexuality, State Secrets | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, December 3, 2012

District Court Upholds Federal Ban on Body Armor

Judge Thomas Johnston (WDWV) ruled in U.S. v. Mark that the federal ban on body armor possession by a convicted felon did not violate the Second Amendment or Due Process Clause, and that Congress did not exceed its authority in enacting the ban under the Commerce Clause.

Mark brought his challenge after he was charged and convicted of possession of body armor by a felon under 18 U.S.C. Secs. 931 and 921(a)(35).  Federal marshalls found the body armor, along with a cache of weapons, in a protective sweep of his home after his arrest. 

Judge Johnston ruled that the statutes did not violate the Second Amendment, because there was no indication that the Framers intended to protect body armor in the Second Amendment, and there was no case law on body armor providing any additional guidance.  He wrote that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague under due process in defining "body armor," because Section 931 gives a definition "that is readily understandable to the ordinary person."  Op. at 19.  And he held that the jurisdictional element in Section 931 was indistinguishable from the jurisdictional element in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), the statute penalizing possession of firearms by convicted felons and upheld by the Fourth Circuit--on the basis of its jurisdictional element.

Judge Johnston also ruled the marshalls' search, a protective sweep of the home after arrest, didn't violate the Fourth Amendment.

SDS

December 3, 2012 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Criminal Procedure, Due Process (Substantive), Fourth Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Second Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

The Constitutional Status of Adultery in the Military

Adultery has been dominating the news, including questions about whether or not it can "still be a crime."  As a constitutional matter, any answer must invoke the Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas.  Recall that Justice Scalia, dissenting, in Lawrence wrote that:

State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers' [v. Hardwick] validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.

As Scalia recognized, Lawrence "calls into question" the criminalization of adultery.  It would be very unlikely a law criminalizing adultery would survive a constitutional challenge after Lawrence.

The_Scarlet_Letter_(1926_film)But is the military different?  Military courts held that consensual adult sodomy - - - the same crime at issue in Lawrence - - - could be criminalized as a military matter, despite Lawrence, although the application of the consensual sodomy provision could be unconstitutional as applied in certain circumstances.  The central inquiry was whether there were "factors unique to the military environment" that allowed the acts to be constitutionally criminalized.

Writing in 2010, law student Katherine Annuschat, in her comment, An Affair to Remember: The State of the Crime of Adultery in the Military, 47 San Diego L. Rev. 1161, demonstrates "the military's willingness to pursue adultery prosecutions for questionable motives," and argues that "the obsolescence of these statutes in the public mind" and their questionable constitutional pedigree support removal of adultery from the enumerated offenses under the general Uniform of Military Justice article 134.   Similarly, writing a year earlier, attorney  Christopher Scott Maravilla, in The Other Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Adultery Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice After Lawrence v. Texas, 37 Capital U. L. Rev. 659 (2009) concluded that the criminal sanctions for adultery, as well as sodomy, should be "constructively" removed from military laws, although sexual acts could be relevant to other violations of the military code of conduct.

It is doubtful that adultery - - - without more - - - can be constitutionally criminalized, even in the military context.  But perhaps there is always "more."

RR
[image: 1926 movie poster via]


November 14, 2012 in Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Family, Fundamental Rights, History, News, Privacy, Scholarship, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Constitutionalism and Jobs

In New York City on Friday:

 

Lung aronowitz

RR

November 14, 2012 in Affirmative Action, Conferences, Due Process (Substantive), Federalism, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

CFP: Civil Gideon

The deadline is imminent - -  November 15 at 11.59 pm - - - to submit proposals and papers for the University of District of Columbia School of Law's March Symposium

373px-Gideon_petition_for_certiorari "Expanding the Civil Right to Counsel: 50 Years After Gideon."

The University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law seeks submissions for its 2013 Law Review Symposium on the topic of expanding the civil right to counsel. This symposium seeks to explore the legal and societal implications of creating a civil right to counsel. Submissions may also address the approaches to providing counsel to civil litigants that have been adopted in U.S. and international jurisdictions, and the impact on litigation outcomes in those jurisdictions. 

Symposium submissions may examine the relative merits of creating a right to counsel in civil cases legislatively, through court rules, or pursuant to state constitutions. Participants in the symposium will address the challenges to creation and implementation of a civil right to counsel through these mechanisms, as well as creation of a civil right to counsel through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Law Review also seeks articles discussing the history of Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services and the prospects for a civil right to counsel under the U.S. Constitution. Panels may address discrete issues ranging from creation and implementation challenges to jurisdictional comparisons to constitutional construction of the right to counsel.

More information and submission details here.

Some ideas and resources we previously discussed on ConLawProf Blog are here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

RR
[image: Gideon's Petition for Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, via]

November 13, 2012 in Conferences, Due Process (Substantive) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, October 12, 2012

Daily Read: Vikram Amar on Scalia on Originalism

Over at Justia today, ConLawProf Vikram Amar (pictured) responds to Justice Scalia's well-publicized and controversial remarks that originalism makes issues such as "homosexuality" and abortion "easy."

AmarAmar writes:

But to say that originalism is important and helpful does not mean that it is easy. To see this, let us first look at what it would mean to say that all constitutional disputes should be analyzed and resolved by exclusive reference to originalism.  It would mean, among other things, that the Supreme Court’s cases from the 1960s holding that states may not impose poll taxes or property qualifications on the franchise, because under the Equal Protection Clause and other parts of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment there is an individual right to vote for legislative elections, are flawed.  So too would be the cases holding, again under the Equal Protection Clause, that states cannot draw voter districts of significantly different sizes (thereby discriminating against urban voters); originalism would call into question the idea that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees “one person, one vote” in legislative elections.

 Amar does not add - - - and perhaps he does not need to - - - any discussion of Bush v. Gore

Instead, Amar focuses his argument on cases that Scalia himself implicated.  Amar's ultimate conclusion is probably one that almost every law student, and most ConLawProfs, could credit:

My point here is not to disagree with any particular outcome that Justice Scalia supports in these or other areas—in fact, I sometimes agree with his constitutional bottom line, and at other times do not.  But my goal here has simply been to suggest that all of this stuff is a long way from “easy.”

RR

October 12, 2012 in Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, October 2, 2012

Eighth Circuit on Due Process Constraints of Punitive Damages (and First Amendment)

In its opinion in Ondrisek v. Hoffman, a panel of the Eighth Circuit held  "Despite the exceptionally reprehensible nature of Alamo’s conduct, it would be unconstitutional to let the punitive damages – and their 10:1 ratio to compensatory damages – stand."

The Defendant, Bernie Hoffman, a/k/a Tony Alamo (pictured right), was the leader of Tony Alamo Christian Ministries Tony Alamo(TACM).  The Plaintiffs, Spencer Ondrisek and Seth Calagna were raised in TACM, and suffered extreme brutality until they managed to escape at age 18.  As the panel opinion states:

Spencer Ondrisek and Seth Calagna were raised in TACM. They were forced to work without pay starting at the age of 8. Alamo began threatening to beat Ondrisek when he was 11. Alamo told him that if he disobeyed, he would be enlisted in the military and “shot and killed.” When he was 12, Alamo had an “enforcer” severely beat him because he made a small tunnel while hauling dirt for the church. As Ondrisek received discipline of 15 to 20 blows to his face, Alamo made his father watch. Ondrisek then received 20 to 30 strikes from a paddle that was three feet long, an inch-and-a-half thick, and three or four inches wide. He was unable to sit for several days and not allowed to attend services because the swelling on his face was too visible. Two years later Alamo had Ondrisek beaten again for horseplay. He sustained 15 to 20 hits to his mouth, beginning to bleed after the second blow. He also received 30 to 40 paddles (maybe more), causing severe bruising that did not fully heal for several weeks. He has permanent scarring from the beating. At 15, Ondrisek’s schooling stopped, and he began working on the church’s property 70 hours a week. He was forced to attend services and listen to Alamo’s recordings daily. As punishment for falling asleep as a night watchman, Alamo required him to fast two days, giving him only water. At 16 or 17, Ondrisek was beaten for a third time after being falsely accused of bullying. He was slapped 20 or more times in the face, and paddled 40 times. Ondrisek blacked out, but no one took him to a hospital. His hand was severely injured and still causes him pain.

Calagna’s youth at TACM was similar to Ondrisek’s. When he was 14, Calagna’s parents woke him at 4 a.m. to have him beaten. He was hit so hard he vomited. His face was unrecognizable afterwards; his injuries took weeks to heal. Less than a month later, he witnessed his father get beaten, causing him emotional distress. He was beaten again at 17 for talking about “Harry Potter.” He was struck until the paddle broke and then hit again with a larger board. In addition to physical abuse, both boys experienced verbal abuse. They both contemplated suicide, “unable to imagine that death would be worse.” At 18, Ondrisek and Calagna escaped TACM separately. They still have trouble sleeping, experiencing nightmares and flashbacks. Alamo is currently serving a 175-year sentence for 10 counts of transporting minors across state lines for illicit sex.

A jury awarded each plaintiff $3 million in compensatory damages and $30 million in punitive damages.

The Eighth Circuit quickly rejected Alamo's argument that his actions were protected by the First Amendment free exercise clause.  The panel also rejected Alamo's appeal regarding a denied jury instruction on corporal punishment and regarding compensatory damages.  However, the panel found meritorous Alamo's argument that the $30 million punitive damages award violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of “grossly excessive” civil punishment under BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).

The panel reduced the punitive damages to $12 million for each plaintiff, at a ratio of 4:1.  The panel opinion provided an instructive chart of Eighth Circuit cases regarding due process punitive damage decisions in support of its decision.

It does seem, however, that the chart elides the gravity of the case against Alamo.  As the panel admits, the compensatory damages in the various cases are generally less than a million dollars.  Moreover, it does not seem as if any of the charted cases involve such prolonged acts.

Perhaps Tony Alamo's prolonged intentional torts should be considered "off the charts," at least for the "grossly excessive" analysis of punitive damages in a due process analysis.

RR

October 2, 2012 in Cases and Case Materials, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, September 20, 2012

Daily Read: Supreme Court Opinions Lack Rigor?

From the SCOTUSBlog same-sex marriage symposium, discussing how the Supreme Court should rule if the Court accepts Perry (the Proposition 8 case) or any of the DOMA cases, including Massachusetts v. United States Department of HHS and Gill v. Office of Personnel Management:

 

Zola_LeandreThe suggestions of clearly articulated standards and rigorous analysis are not simply the fantasies of a law professor.  While Supreme Court opinions need not be constitutional law examination answers, neither should they be confusing, or marred by sarcasm or sentimentality.  Students studying law should be exposed to more Supreme Court opinions demonstrating trenchant analysis rather than rhetorical politics.

Clearly articulated standards might also allow the lower federal courts as well as the state courts to engage in their own rigorous analysis rather than attempt to discern the correct standard from Supreme Court precedents that are unclear, internally inconsistent, or point in several directions.  This is not to say that the same-sex marriage issue should have been easily resolved by lower courts or that the applications of the standard are not difficult and value-laden.  However, the grappling of the lower courts for several years now regarding the actual holding of Romer v. Evans, as well as Loving v. Virginia, could have been avoided.

 

The full post is here.

RR
[image via]

September 20, 2012 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

Ninth Circuit on the Unconstitutionality of Criminalizing Women's Self-Abortion

449px-The_PrisonerIn its opinion in McCormack v. Hiedeman today, a panel of the Ninth Circuit considered the constitutionality of Idaho's "unlawful abortion" statutes, making it a felony for any woman to undergo an abortion in a manner not authorized by statute.  McCormack had been charged with a felony by the prosecutor Mark Hiedeman based on her procurement of abortion "medications" over the internet.  While a state magistrate had dismissed the charge without prejudice, the prosecutor had not determined whether or not to re-file a criminal complaint. McCormack brought an action in the federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the Idaho statutes.  The district judge granted a preliminary injunction against the statutes' enforcement.

At the heart of the constitutional inquiry was whether or not a pregnant woman could be constitutionally held criminally liable under an abortion statute.  The prosecutor essentially argued that criminalizing nonphysicians performing abortions is consistent with Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.   

The Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with the district judge that imposing criminal sanctions on a pregnant woman imposes an "undue burden" under Casey.  The "undue burden" resulted because the statute required the woman to police the abortion providers' actions or risk criminal sanctions herself:

If a woman terminates her pregnancy during the first trimester but fails to ask the physician whether the office has made “satisfactory arrangements with one or more acute care hospitals within reasonable proximity thereof providing for the prompt availability of hospital care as may be required due to complications or emergencies that might arise,” she would be subject to a felony charge if the physician has not made such arrangements. Idaho Code § 18-608(1). If a woman finds a doctor who provides abor- tions during the second trimester of a woman’s pregnancy, but the doctor fails to tell the pregnant woman that the abortion will be performed in a clinic as opposed to a hospital, the pregnant woman would be subject to felony charges. Idaho Code § 18-608(2). Or, as is the case here, if a woman elects to take physician prescribed pills obtained over the internet to end her pregnancy, which is not authorized by statute, she is subject to felony charges. Idaho Code §§18-608(1)-18- 608(3).

The court also found McCormack's economic situation and the lack of abortion providers in her area to contribute to the "undue burden."

The Ninth Circuit panel found McCormack had standing, but narrowed the district court's injunctive relief to apply only to McCormack since there had been no class certification.

For pregnant women facing prosecutions under abortion statutes, the Ninth Circuit's opinion is an important and persuasive statement on the unconstitutionality of criminal sanctions.

RR
[image: The Prisoner, artist unknown, circa 1907, via]

September 11, 2012 in Abortion, Due Process (Substantive), Gender, Medical Decisions, Opinion Analysis, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 31, 2012

Fordham Discussion of the Constitutionality of "Targeted Killings"

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

Ninth Circuit Grants Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Death Row Inmate on Equal Protection and Due Process Grounds

In a divided opinion in Ayala v. Wong, the Ninth Circuit today granted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on equal protection and due process grounds.  

As the opinion describes, during the

selection of the jury that convicted Ayala and sentenced him to death, the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to strike all of the black and Hispanic jurors available for challenge. The trial judge concluded that Ayala had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but permitted the prosecution to give its justifications for the challenges of these jurors in an in camera hearing from which Ayala and his counsel were excluded. The trial judge then accepted the prosecution’s justifications for its strikes without disclosing them to the defense or permitting it to respond.

The failure to disclose the prosecution's rationales and allow defense counsel to demonstrate they were pretextual violates the process the Court mandated in Batson.  In Alaya's case, this was compounded by what the opinion labels  "the state’s later loss of a large portion of the record."  This portion included juror information and the court concluded that because "the state’s loss of the questionnaires deprived Ayala of the ability to meaningfully appeal the denial of his Batson claim, he was deprived of due process."

The_Jury_by_John_Morgan
In a dissenting opinion as lengthy as the majority, Judge Consuelo M. Callahan accuses the majority of not honoring the procedural obstacles to Alaya's claim, of making unwarranted suppositions, and of opening the floodgates.  She writes:

In essence, the majority holds that because the record does not affirmatively negate the existence of a possible racial bias, the existence of such a bias may be assumed. Under this approach all Batson challenges in federal habeas petitions must be granted because no one can disprove a negative.

Yet the converse would also be true, of course.  If Alaya's petition were not granted, it would allow judges to deny all litigants, including criminal defendants, the ability to refute the proffered race-neutral explanation, and to absolutely insulate a Batson claim from appellate review.

RR
[image: The Jury by John Morgan, 1861, via]

August 29, 2012 in Criminal Procedure, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Opinion Analysis, Race | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, August 28, 2012

Ohio Federal District Judge Enjoins Portions of State Provisional Voting Scheme

496px-1850_Mitchell_Map_of_Ohio_-_Geographicus_-_Ohio-m-50A federal district judge has enjoined specific provisions of Ohio’s election code that disqualify provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct or cast with deficiencies in the ballot envelope form, when the ballot’s deficiency is the result of an error by the poll worker.  In the 61 page opinion in the consolidated case, SEIU v. Husted, Judge Algenon Marbley first describes the "turbulent saga of Ohio’s provisional voting regime." The bulk of the opinion is a carefully reasoned application of equal protection principles to the various provisions as part of the likelihood of success on the merits prong for granting a preliminary injunction. 

Marbley's opinion considers four equal protection challenges: the Wrong-Precinct Ballot Prohibition;  Ballot Envelope Deficiencies; Disparate Impact of Poll-Worker Error by County; and Unequal Treatment of Provisional Voters.  The most extensive analysis focuses on the wrong precinct issue, especially given the part that poll workers play in the process resulting in errors.

The Judge does cite Bush v. Gore several times, including quoting the statement that "[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.” Bush, 531 U.S. at 104-05.  As expected, the Sixth Circuit case of Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Hunter I”) is also prominent, not only for its adoption of Bush v. Gore language but because many of the same issues are involved. The opinion is sure to be quickly appealed to the Sixth Circuit, even as a complaint challenging Ohio's early voting regime on the basis of equal protection is also being litigated.

All the documents in the case can be found over at  ElectionLaw@Moritiz blog, as well as an analysis by Prof Edward Foley.

RR
[image: 1850 map of Ohio via]

August 28, 2012 in Due Process (Substantive), Elections and Voting, Equal Protection, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, August 23, 2012

Ninth Circuit "Interprets" Constitution of Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands

In a brief opinion, a panel of the Ninth Circuit interpreted the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to provide no property interest in continued employment necessary for a due process claim by a Special Assistant to the Governor.  More precisely, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the opinion of the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, having certified the questions to the Supreme Court and attaching the court's opinion as an appendix to its own.

Northern_Mariana_Islands_mapThe Commonwealth Constitution, Article III, section 22, establishes an "Office of Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs," and provides that the "governor shall appoint a person, who is qualified by virtue of education and experience, to be the special assistant" and the "special assistant may be removed only for cause."

In Peter-Palican v. Government of Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Ms. Peter-Palican argued that the new governor's termination of her as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women's Affairs violated her due process rights. 

The Ninth Circuit held that the "removal for cause" did not extend beyond the term of the governor who appointed her, adopting the Commonwealth's Supreme Court decision.  Thus, Ms. Peter-Palican did not have the requisite property interest as a threshold for a due process inquiry. 

LocationNorthernMarianas

The Ninth Circuit's determination that the Commonwealth Supreme Court is the final arbiter of its constitution comports with general federalism principles, although the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands is not a state. Indeed, its status is rather unique, governed by the "Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America," approved by Congress, and signed by President Ford in 1976.  The Covenant exempts specific portions of the Constitution as well as specific federal laws (importantly, immigration and minimum wage laws) unless adopted by the Commonwealth. 

The "removal for cause" provision in a constitution would seem to provide some protection from changing elected officials such as governors.  Perhaps if the position were not a "special assistant to the governor" the Commonwealth Supreme Court - - - and the Ninth Circuit - - - would have viewed the matter differently.

RR
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August 23, 2012 in Comparative Constitutionalism, Due Process (Substantive), Opinion Analysis, State Constitutional Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, August 17, 2012

Federal DC Judge Enjoins Small Business Affirmative Action Program as Applied to Military Simulators

In an extensive opinion in DynaLantic Corp. v. United States Department of Defense, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan has enjoined the Small Business Administration and the Department of Defense from awarding procurements for military simulators under the Section 8(a) program without first articulating a strong basis in evidence for doing so.

Huey_HelicopterIn a nutshell, the judge found that the constitutionality infirmity resided in the agencies' failure to specifically determine "that it is necessary or appropriate to set aside contracts in the military simulation and training industry."  Relying upon City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion), Judge Sullivan stated that " Croson made clear that the government must provide evidence demonstrating there were eligible minorities in the relevant market - in that case, the Richmond construction industry - that were denied entry or access notwithstanding their eligibility," and thus the agencies' lack of specific studies relating to the military simulation industry was fatal.

Yet Judge Sullivan rejected the facial challenge to Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act which permits the federal government to limit the issuance of certain contracts to socially and economically disadvantaged businesses.  The corporation argued that the Section 8(a) program - - - a program that evolved from Executive Orders issued by Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon in response to the Kerner Commission - - - violated the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Applying the rigorous standard of United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). requiring that the "challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid,” Judge Sullivan carefully considered reams of studies, data, and information, as well as the corporation's arguments attacking the provision for being both overinclusive and underinclusive.

This litigation began in 1995 when the Navy determined it would award its contract for a flight simulator for the Huey helicopter (pictured above) through the Section 8 (a) program.  DynaLantic's lawsuit was dismissed for standing, the D.C. Circuit reversed, and then protracted litigation continued as Congress reauthorized the program and a plethora of studies, evidence, and arguments accumulated.

As the educational affirmative action case of Fisher goes to the United States Supreme Court,  DynaLantic is a reminder of the continued legacy of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), as well as Croson in the government procurement context. 

RR
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August 17, 2012 in Affirmative Action, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Fifth Amendment, Race, Reconstruction Era Amendments | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, August 12, 2012

Senior Federal District Judge Rejects Challenge to Hawai'i Opposite-Sex Only Marriage Statute

In in an opinion exceeding 100 pages, Judge Alan Kay, Senior District Judge for the District of Hawai'i, upheld the Hawai'i marriage scheme in Jackson v. Abercrombie.  The plaintiffs had argued that Hawai'i Constitution Article 1, Section 23 stating that “[t]he legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite- sex couples,” and Hawaii Revised Statutes § 572-1, which states that marriage “shall be only between a man and a woman,” violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution.  Governor Abercrombie's Answer agreed with the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.  However, Defendant Fuddy, Hawai'i Director of Health, and Intervenor Hawai'i Family Forum, opposed the plaintiffs, and the Judge resolved the case on Summary Judgment.

800px-Sunset_next_to_Waikiki_Beach,_Oahu,_Hawai,_USA1Those conversant with same-sex marriage jurisprudence in the United States will recall that Hawai'i is a landmark in the second-generation litigation: In Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), the Hawai'i Supreme Court found the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the state constitution.  This decision prompted the state constitutional amendment, Article I, Section 3, referenced above (and interestingly in terms of judicial review, not prohibiting same-sex marriage but allocating that power only to the legislature and not to the courts).  It also prompted Congress to pass DOMA - - - the Defense of Marriage Act - - - constitutionally suspect at present.

Judge Kay rehearses these histories at length.  However, he rests his rejection of the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges on a "decision" of the first-generation of same-sex marriage litigation:  The United States Supreme Court’s summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.).  For Judge Kay: "Baker is the last word from the Supreme Court regarding the constitutionality of a state law limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and thus remains binding on this Court."  (Opinion at 46).

Most courts considering the issue have rejected the 1972 summary dismissal in Baker v. Nelson as binding precedent.  Thus, Judge Kay also provides an "alternative analysis"  under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.  He applies rational basis review, concluding that "marriage" can be reserved to opposite-sex couples because the legislature can rationally choose to encourage the stability of relationships that have the ability to "procreate naturally" and choose to promote the raising of children by "a mother and a father."  Judge Kay also credits the legislature's rational choice to "proceed with caution" in an area of social change: 

Hawaii could rationally conclude that by enacting the reciprocal beneficiaries act, followed years later by the civil unions law, and retaining the definition of marriage as a union between a man and woman, it is addressing a highly-debated social issue cautiously. By doing so, it may observe the effect of the reciprocal beneficiaries and civil unions laws before deciding whether or not to extend the title marriage, along with the already conferred legal rights, to same-sex couples.

Yet Judge Kay's ultimate rejection goes further.  He writes that  "to suddenly constitutionalize the issue of same-sex marriage “would short-circuit” the legislative actions that have been taking place in Hawaii."   (Opinion at 118).  Certainly, the judicial restraint arguments are familiar by now, but to write in 2012 that the plaintiffs seek to  "suddenly constitutionalize the issue of same-sex marriage"  is odd.  Indeed, it is undermined by Judge Kay's own opinion with its careful history of second-generation litigation since 1990 and his reliance on a summary dismissal in 1972.

The plaintiffs are doubtless preparing their appeal to the Ninth Circuit.

RR
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August 12, 2012 in Cases and Case Materials, Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, Gender, Opinion Analysis, Reproductive Rights, Sexual Orientation, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)