Thursday, July 3, 2014

Hobby Lobby Aftermath: Does "Person" in RFRA Include a Guantanamo Bay Detainee?

In an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order filed today in Hassan v. Obama in the District Court for the District of Columbia, the petitioner relies on Monday's controversial decision by the United States Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby.

Petitioner, Imad Abdullah Hassan, a detainee at Guantánamo Bay, invokes the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) to prevent the federal government from depriving him of " the right to participate in communal prayers during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan," a tenet of his religious faith. 

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As the motion outlines, the DC Circuit had previously held in Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532-33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), that the Guantánamo Bay detainees are not protected “person[s]” within the meaning of the RFRA.  The court in Rasul "bypassed the dictionary definition of “person” and instead looked to prior case law prescribing the scope of the word “person” for purposes of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments— which did not, in the Rasul court’s view, apply to nonresident aliens." 

However, the motion argues this is a "dead letter" after the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby which "eviscerates the reasoning in Rasul and makes clear that Petitioner, as a flesh-and-blood human being, is among the 'person[s]' protected by the RFRA."  Indeed, the court in Rasul held that in RFRA Congress merely "intended to incorporate the standard governing free exercise claims that prevailed before the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith," and that such claims did not include resident noncitizens.  But in Hobby Lobby, the Justice Alito's opinion for the Court explicitly states:

the results would be absurd if RFRA merely restored this Court’s pre-Smith decisions in ossified form and did not allow a plaintiff to raise a RFRA claim unless that plaintiff fell within a category of plaintiffs one of whom had brought a free-exercise claim that this Court entertained in the years before Smith. For example, we are not aware of any pre-Smith case in which this Court entertained a free-exercise claim brought by a resident noncitizen. Are such persons also beyond RFRA’s protective reach simply because the Court never addressed their rights before Smith?

[Opinion at 33].

Thus, the motion argues that

a nonresident alien Guantánamo Bay detainee, who inarguably has constitutional rights in what is de facto sovereign U.S. territory, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), must also enjoy the protections extended by the RFRA.

****

Hobby Lobby leads inexorably to the conclusion that the nonresident alien detainees at Guantánamo Bay are “person[s]” protected by the RFRA. The Dictionary Act definition of “person” includes “individuals.” 1 U.S.C. § 1. The Dictionary Act does not confine “individuals” to U.S. citizens, just as it does not confine “corporations” to U.S. corporations; nor does it confine “individuals” to U.S. residents. The Guantánamo Bay detainees, as flesh-and- blood human beings, are surely “individuals,” and thus they are no less “person[s]” than are the for-profit corporations in Hobby Lobby or the resident noncitizens whom Hobby Lobby gives as an example of persons to whom the RFRA must apply. The fact that the detainees are at Guantánamo Bay changes nothing, for Hobby Lobby makes clear that a “person” whose religious free exercise is burdened under color of law need not be a U.S. citizen or resident in order to enjoy the RFRA’s protections.

The application of Hobby Lobby to "persons" who are detainees at Guantánamo Bay might be an unforeseen consequence of the decision, but the motion makes a convincing argument that it is a logical one grounded in the Court's holding and language.

 

July 3, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Recent Cases, Religion, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

New York's Highest Court Finds Cyberbullying Law Violates First Amendment

In its opinion in People v. Marquan M, the New York Court of Appeals (NY's highest court), found that Albany Local Law 11 (2010)  criminalizing cyberbullying was unconstitutional under the First Amendment. 

The local law for Albany County criminalized cyberbullying against any "minor or person" (with "person" interestingly defined as including corporations) with cyberbullying defined as:

any act of communicating or causing a communication to be sent by mechanical or electronic means, including posting statements on the internet or through a computer or email network, disseminating embarrassing or sexually explicit photographs; disseminating private, personal, false or sexual information, or sending hate mail, with no legitimate private, personal, or public purpose, with the intent to harass, annoy, threaten, abuse, taunt, intimidate, torment, humiliate, or otherwise inflict significant emotional harm on another person.

450px-Bully_Free_ZoneThe majority opinion, authored by Judge Victoria Graffeo for four additional judges over a two-judge dissent, found that the law was overbroad under the First Amendment: "the provision would criminalize a broad spectrum of speech outside the popular understanding of cyberbullying, including, for example: an email disclosing private information about a corporation or a telephone conversation meant to annoy an adult." 

The defendant and his actions here - - - a 15 year old who used Facebook to anonymously post "photographs of high-school classmates and other adolescents, with detailed descriptions of their alleged sexual practices and predilections, sexual partners and other types of personal information," with "vulgar and offensive" "descriptive captions" - - -  were within the "cyberbullying" that the Local Law intended to proscribe.  But even Albany County agreed that the local law was overbroad.  However, the County argued that the severability clause of the local law should be employed to excise the word "person" so that the only covered victims were minors.  But the court found that even that would not "cure all of the law's constitutional ills."   The dissenters would have engaged in saving constructions.

In ruling that a local law intended to criminalize as a misdemeanor cyberbullying did not survive the First Amendment because it was overbroad, New York's highest court left open the possibility that a prohibition of cyberbullying could be more narrowly crafted to survive First Amendment review:  "the First Amendment does not give defendant the right to engage in these activities." 

However, the court's opinion offers little guidance about how such a law or policy should be drafted.  New York's Dignity for All Students Act  as amended in 2012 places the responsibility for developing "policies and procedures intended to create a school environment that is free from harassment, bullying and discrimination" on school boards.  While Albany's law was a general criminal statute, school boards will undoubtedly be considering Marquan M. as they review their current "cyberbullying" prohibitions in light of the First Amendment.  They may also be recalling the Third Circuit's unhelpful intervention in a pair of "My Space" cases in which principals were arguably "bullied. 

And undoubtedly, those interested in cyberbullying in and out of schools will be watching the "true threats on Facebook case," Elonis v. United States, to be heard by the United States Supreme Court next Term.

 [image via]

July 3, 2014 in Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Speech, State Constitutional Law, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Federal District Judge Declares Kentucky's Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional

In his opinion today in Love v. Beshear, Judge John Heyburn held that the Kentucky provisions prohibiting same-sex marriage violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but stayed the issuance of an injunction pending a resolution by the Sixth Circuit.

Recall that in February, Judge Heyburn ruled in Bourke v. Beshear that Kentucky's statutory and state constitutional provisions defining marriage as limited to one man and one woman violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause when applied to same-sex spouses married in another state.

Today's opinion considers those same constitutional and statutory provisions - - - KY. CONST. § 233A; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.005, .020(1)(d) (West 2014) - - - but in the context of a right to marry under Kentucky law.  And, not surprisingly, today's opinion reaches similar conclusions to the earlier case of Bourke v. Beshear.

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Judge Heyburn quickly concludes that Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), in which the Supreme Court dismissed “for want of a substantial federal question” a challenge to a Minnesota Supreme Court ruling concluding that a same-sex couple did not have the right to marry under the federal Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses, is not precedential.  It "is difficult to take seriously the argument that Baker bars Plaintiffs’ challenge," given that the rule for the precedential value of a summary disposition includes the exception "unless doctrinal developments indicate that the Court would rule differently now."  As Judge Heyburn states: "Since 1972, a virtual tidal wave of pertinent doctrinal developments has swept across the constitutional landscape."

In considering these doctrinal developments and the applicable standard of scrutiny under Equal Protection doctrine, Judge Heyburn first considers the right at stake.  He analyzes whether the right to marry is a fundamental right, but concludes that this precise question is one that "neither the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has answered."  Heyburn declines to engage in "overreaching" on this issue, because the fundamental rights analysis is unnecessary given the analysis regarding sexual orientation classifications.

Judge Heyburn's conclusion on the level of scrutiny to be applied is intermediate scrutiny.  Note that this is a departure from his earlier decision in Bourke to apply rational basis.  Here, his conclusion - - - admittedly not supported by specific Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit precedent - -  is that "homosexual persons constitute a quasi-suspect class based on the weight of the factors and on analogy to the classifications recognized as suspect and quasi- suspect.” He reaches this conclusion by applying four factors:  historical discrimination;  the ability to contribute to society;  immutable defining characteristics; and  political powerlessness.  Thus, the opinion would ordinarily then apply the  intermediate scrutiny standard as articulated by the court: "“substantially related to an important governmental objective."

But Judge Heyburn takes a different path, similar to the one he took in Bourke v. Beshear:

Ultimately, Kentucky’s laws banning same-sex marriage cannot withstand constitutional review regardless of the standard. The Court will demonstrate this by analyzing Plaintiffs’ challenge under rational basis review.

In discussing Kentucky's profferred interests, Judge Heyburn writes that the state's "arguments are not those of serious people."  Moreover, he concludes that the means chosen are not rationally related:

Even assuming the state has a legitimate interest in promoting procreation, the Court fails to see, and Defendant never explains, how the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage has any effect whatsoever on procreation among heterosexual spouses. Excluding same-sex couples from marriage does not change the number of heterosexual couples who choose to get married, the number who choose to have children, or the number of children they have.

Judge Heyburn's last section of the opinion addresses Kentuckians, but in a much more restrained manner than his earlier opinion in Bourke.  In Love v. Beshear, Judge Heyburn notes

Since this Court’s Bourke opinion [in February 2014], the legal landscape of same-sex marriage rights across the country has evolved considerably, with eight additional federal district courts and one circuit court invalidating state constitutional provisions and statutes that denied same-sex couples the right to marry.

Heyburn cites the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Kitchen v. Herbert, as well as the district court opinions in Baskin v. Bogan (Indiana); Wolf v. Walker (Wisconsin);   Whitewood v. Wolf (Pennsylvania); Geiger v. Kitzhaber (Oregon); Latta v. Otter  (Idaho); De Leon v. Perry (Texas);  DeBoer v. Snyder (Michigan); and  Bostic v. Rainey  (Virgina).

He adds that with "this opinion, this Court joins their company."

It remains to be seen, however, whether the Sixth Circuit will also join this increasingly large assembly.

July 1, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Equal Protection, Family, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, June 30, 2014

Divided Supreme Court Recognizes Right of Closely Held Corporations Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties under RFRA to Avoid "Contraceptive Mandate"

On this last day of the 2013-2014 Term, the Court delivered its long-awaited opinion in "Hobby Lobby" - - now Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc. consolidated with Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Burwell - - - on the question of whether corporations (or their owner/shareholders) be able to interpose a religious objection under RFRA (the Religious Freedom Restoration Act)  to a federal requirement that employers provide health insurance to employees that includes contraceptive coverage?  Here's our primer on the issues for more detail.  Recall that the Tenth Circuit en banc in Hobby Lobby ruled for the corporation, while the Third Circuit panel in Conestoga Woods ruled for the government, and several other courts entered the fray with disparate results. 

The oral arguments  in March were contentious and so too are the opinions in this 5-4 decision. 

Birth_Control_Review_1919bThe majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito, holds that closely-held corporations such as Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties are "persons" within the meaning of RFRA and thus are entitled to raise a claim.  The Court looks at Congressional intent in RFRA, its own precedent allowing RFRA claims by nonprofit corporations, and policy issues about the difficulty of determining the "beliefs" of a corporation, and held that closely held corporation that make a profit are "persons" within RFRA.

The Court then held that the challenged HHS regulations ("the contraceptive mandate") did substantially burden the business owners religious beliefs because they believe if they comply with the mandate they will be "facilitating abortions" and if they do not comply, they will face substantial fines. The Court rejected the argument that the link between the insurance coverage paid by an employer and an employee being reimbursed by the insurance company for obtaining contraception was too attenuated.

Given this finding, under RFRA, the Court applies "strict scrutiny," but interestingly assumes that the government satisfies the "compelling government interest" prong.  However, the Court finds that the HHS mandate is not the "least restrictive means" to accomplish its goal: the system already in place for accommodating the religious beliefs of nonprofit entities granted exemptions under the regulations and statute.

 Justice Kennedy writes a brief concurring opinion.  As we discussed,  Kennedy was focused on as the "Justice to watch" and he stresses that the existence of government accommodation already in existence.

 The "principal dissent" (as the Court's opinion often characterizes it) is by Justice Ginsburg,  joined by Sotomayor in full, and by Breyer and Kagan (except to a section regarding the construction of RFRA as applying to corporate persons).  The dissent begins by labeling the majority's decision as one of "startling breadth" that allows corporations to "opt out" of  "any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs."  Justice Ginsburg argues there is a slippery slope in the majority's least restrictive means analysis, despite the majority's attempt to cabin it:

And where is the stopping point to the “let the government pay” alternative? Suppose an employer’s sincerely held religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the minimum wage, or according women equal pay for substantially similar work? Does it rank as a less restrictive alternative to require the government to provide the money or benefit to which the employer has a religion-based objection? Because the Court cannot easily answer that question, it proposes something else: Extension to commercial enterprises of the accommodation already afforded to nonprofit religion-based organizations. “At a minimum,” according to the Court, such an approach would not “impinge on [Hobby Lobby’s and Conestoga’s] religious belief.”  I have already discussed the “special solicitude” generally accorded nonprofit religion-based organizations that exist to serve a community of believers, solicitude never before accorded to commercial enterprises comprising employees of diverse faiths.

Ultimately, the Court hedges on its proposal to align for- profit enterprises with nonprofit religion-based organizations. “We do not decide today whether [the] approach [the opinion advances] complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims.”  Counsel for Hobby Lobby was similarly noncommittal.

[citations and footnotes omitted].

Whether or not the Court's opinion is narrow or broad might depend more on one's political outlook and one's view of the Court as "chipping away" or as "careful crafting."

However, recall that RFRA - - - the Religious Freedom Restoration Act - - - is a statute passed by Congress that changed the standard of review the Court had announced be accorded religious claims; many now believe that Congress will be called upon to change RFRA, including perhaps the definition of "person" to exclude for-profit corporations, or to repeal RFRA in its entirety.

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June 30, 2014 in Abortion, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Family, First Amendment, Gender, Medical Decisions, Opinion Analysis, Religion, Reproductive Rights, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, June 27, 2014

Seventh Circuit Grants Stay of Indiana Same-Sex Marriage Order

In an order this evening, a Seventh Circuit panel - - - Judges Posner, Williams, and Hamilton - - -has granted the emergency motion for stay pending appeal and issued a stay in Baskin v. Bogan. 

As we discussed on Wednesday, United States District Judge Richard Young in Baskin v. Bogan permanently enjoined Indiana officials from enforcing its requirement that marriage requires a female and a male, and its ban on the recognition of same sex marriages legally valid in other states.

June 27, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Family, Fourteenth Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Third Circuit on Statute of Limitations in Establishment Clause Challenges

Here's the problem:

In August 2008, a municipality erected a sign "Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!," with a directional arrow and “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicting a gold cross and a white Bible, on a right of way bordering a property owner's property.  The property owner engaged in a bit of her own speech, on her own property, posting a sign of her own directly in front of the church sign which read "This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!”  The municipality threatened the property owner with sanctions for her sign, which she removed.  The propery owner filed a complaint pursuant to 42 USC §1983 in federal court in November 2012 alleging constitutional violations by the municipality based on the church sign, which remains standing, and her own offending sign, which she had removed.  The state statute of limitations for tort claims is two years.

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Downtown Shickshinny, Pennsylvania via

The Third Circuit's opinion in Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny addressed exactly this problem.  The complaint alleged that the "church sign" violated the Establishment Clause, while the threats to prosecute plaintiff for erecting her own sign violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment.   Generally, because §1983 does not have a statute of limitations,  state law provides the applicable time limitations.  The district judge dismissed the complaint based on the statute of limitations because the actions occurred more than two years prior to the filing of the complaint.  Reversing on the Establishment Clause claim only, the Third Circuit found that the state statute of limitations did not bar the claim.

The plaintiff's attorney argued that the two year statute of limitations for the church sign should be viewed as a "continuing violation."  As the court noted, this is more often part of a statute of limitations inquiry in an employment discrimination case: "where only in retrospect will a plaintiff recognize that seemingly unconnected incidents were, in fact, part and parcel of a larger discriminatory pattern."  But here, the court accepted the municipality's argument that the continuing violation doctrine does not apply because the sign "is merely an effect" of the action  - - - erecting the sign - - -that was within the statute of limitations.

But the Third Circuit found that the state's two year statute of limitations was inapplicable because although §1983 does not have a statute of limitations and state law provides the pertinent time limitations, this is true only "if it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so.” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).  The Court found that Establishment Clause rights are very important and that while other constitutional rights are also important

what further distinguishes Tearpock-Martini’s claim, and Establishment Clause claims in general, is that the traditional rationales justifying a limitations period—“to protect defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims,” “facilitat[e] the administration of claims,” and “promot[e] judicial efficiency,” [citation omitted] —simply have no persuasive force in this context. Tearpock-Martini’s challenge is to a still- existing monument that communicates anew an allegedly unconstitutional endorsement of religion by the government each time it is viewed. Strict application of the statutory limitations period both serves no salutary purpose and threatens to immunize indefinitely the presence of an allegedly unconstitutional display.

Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that it could not find any precedent for finding an Establishment Clause challenge time-barred in a passive monument case, and indeed the cases were the opposite, citing, most persuasively, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (display of Ten Commandments challenged 40 years after installation).

 The Third Circuit's conclusion seems exactly right: how can there be a statute of limitations on an Establishment Clause violation of a passive monument?  However, in this case, because this particular plaintiff knew about the sign, and even objected to it, one could have expected her to act more quickly.  Yet the very notion of an Establishment Clause violation caused by a still existing monument or even sign is that it is a continuing one.

June 27, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Establishment Clause, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, June 26, 2014

United States Supreme Court Declares Massachusetts' Buffer Zone Unconstitutional in McCullen v. Coakley

A unanimous Court, albeit in separate opinions, found the Massachusetts statute imposing a 35 foot buffer zone around places where abortions are performed violates the First Amendment in its opinion in McCullen v. Coakley,  reversing the First Circuit.

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts - - - who, unusually, did not ask any questions during the oral argument - - -found that the statute was not subject to strict scrutiny because it was content and viewpoint neutral, despite arguments to the contrary.  However, the Court found that the statute failed the so-called "time, place, and manner" test articulated in  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (1989).   The Court's opinion - - - joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan - - - concluded that the statute burdened more speech than necessary and was not sufficiently closely tailored.  In large part, this was based on the statute's exceptional coverage of public streets and sidewalks.  It was also based on the specific petitioners in the case, who are not "protesters," but people who "attempt to engage women approaching the clinics in what they call 'sidewalk coun­seling,' which involves offering information about alternatives to abortion and help pursuing those options." Further, the Court articulated other less restrictive means available to Massachusetts, including targeted injunctions, and found that the record did not support the need for Massachusetts' sweeping approach.  As the Court concluded:

Petitioners wish to converse with their fellow citizens about an important subject on the public streets and sidewalks—sites that have hosted discussions about the issues of the day throughout history. Respondents assert undeniably significant interests in maintaining public safety on those same streets and sidewalks, as well as in preserving access to adjacent healthcare facilities. But here the Commonwealth has pursued those interests by the extreme step of closing a substantial portion of a tradi­ tional public forum to all speakers. It has done so without seriously addressing the problem through alternatives that leave the forum open for its time-honored purposes. The Commonwealth may not do that consistent with the First Amendment.

Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, criticizes the Court's opinion as one

that has Something for Everyone, and the more significant portion continues the onward march of abortion-speech-only jurisprudence. That is the first half of the Court’s analysis, which concludes that a statute of this sort is not content based and hence not subject to so-called strict scrutiny. The Court reaches out to decide that question unnecessarily—or at least unnecessarily insofar as legal analysis is concerned.

Justice Alito, wrote separately but briefly to express his belief that the statute discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.

The takeaway is this: In a unanimous opinion, the Court ruled that Massachusetts went too far in seeking to protect the reproductive rights of women seeking abortions and infringed the First Amendment rights of those who seek to counsel them to change their minds.  The Court's opinion approves more narrow methods governments might use to protect the reproductive rights of women entering clincs.  But four Justices seem inclined to find a violation of the First Amendment in even more narrow government attempts.

June 26, 2014 in Abortion, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Gender, Speech | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, June 25, 2014

Federal District Judge Invalidates Indiana Laws Banning Same-Sex Marriage

In his decision today in Baskin v. Bogan, United States District Judge Richard Young permanently enjoined Indiana officials from enforcing its requirement that marriage requires a female and a male, and its ban on the recognition of same sex marriages legally valid in other states, Indiana Code Section 31-11-1-1 (subsections a & b).

621px-Flag_map_of_Indiana.svgAfter resolving problems of the proper defendant and quickly disposing of the argument that Baker v. Nelson's summary finding by the Supreme Court in 1972 has meaningful precedential value, Judge Young's opinion proceeds along three separate tracks.

First, Judge Young finds that marriage is a fundamental right and therefore the statutory ban on same-sex marriage should be subject to strict scrutiny.  Judge Young concluded that the scope of the fundamental right is not limited, quoting Judge Black's opinion in Henry v. Himes that the United States Supreme Court has not limited this fundamental right in its pertinent cases; the Court  "consistently describes a general ‘fundamental right to marry’ rather than ‘the right to interracial marriage,’ ‘the right to inmate marriage,’ or ‘the right of people owing child support to marry.’"  Applying strict scrutiny, Judge Young articulates the state's proffered interest "in conferring the special benefit of civil marriage to only one man and one woman is justified by its interest in encouraging the couple to stay together for the sake of any unintended children that their sexual union may create," but declines to asess it and assumes that it is "sufficiently important interest."  However, Judge Young finds that the state has not demonstrated that the statute is “closely tailored” to that interest, but instead is  "both over- and under-inclusive."

Second, Judge Young analyzes the statute on the basis of equal protection, rejecting the argument that the statute makes a gender classification and concluding that it makes a sexual orientation classification.  While Judge Young contends that while it might be time to "reconsider" whether sexual orientation classifications should be analyzed under rational basis scrutiny, the "court will leave that decision to the Seventh Circuit, where this case will surely be headed."  Applying rational basis scrutiny, however, Judge Young concludes that there is no rational relationship to the interests proffered by the state.

Third, Judge Young independently analyzes subsection b of the statute, applying to recognition.  The judge notes that the "parties agree that out-of-state, same-sex marriages are treated differently than out-of-state, opposite-sex marriages," and thus "the question is whether that difference violates the Equal Protection Clause."  Again, applying rational basis scrutiny, Judge Young concludes:

Defendants proffer that the state refuses to recognize same-sex marriages because it conflicts with the State’s philosophy of marriage – that is that marriage is to ameliorate the consequences of unintended children. Recognizing the valid same-sex marriages performed in other states, however, has no link whatsoever to whether opposite-sex couples have children or stay together for those children. Thus, there is no rational basis to refuse recognition and void out-of-state, same-sex marriages.

Judge Young's opinion is economical (at 36 pages), well-structured, and well-supported with relevant citations.  Judge Young did not issue a stay of his opinion.  One assumes that such a decision may be sought from the Seventh Circuit.

UPDATE HERE

June 25, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Gender, Opinion Analysis, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tenth Circuit Holds Utah's Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional in a Divided Decision

In a divided decision, the Tenth Circuit opinion in Kitchen v. Herbert held that the

Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, those who wish to marry a person of the same sex are entitled to exercise the same fundamental right as is recognized for persons who wish to marry a person of the opposite sex, and that [Utah's state constitution's] Amendment 3 and similar statutory enactments do not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Affirming the district court's decision as well as its analysis, the Tenth Circuit panel majority, authored by Judge Carlos Lucero, and joined by Judge Jerome Holmes, applied strict scrutiny because it found that the "right to marry is a fundamental liberty."

In applying strict scrutiny, the panel majority assumed that three of the four interests advanced by the government - - - (1) “fostering a child-centric marriage culture that encourages parents to subordinate their own interests to the needs of their children”; (2) “children being raised by their biological mothers and fathers—or at least by a married mother and father—in a stable home”; (3) “ensuring adequate reproduction” - - - were compelling.  However, the court found that the means chosen - - - the prohibition of same-sex marriage - - - did not sufficiently serve these interests.  Instead, each of the

justifications rests fundamentally on a sleight of hand in which same-sex marriage is used as a proxy for a different characteristic shared by both same-sex and some opposite-sex couples.

The court noted that Justice Scalia, dissenting in Windsor, and numerous district judges, reached a similiar conclusion.  The majority observed that the lack of narrow tailoring is "often revealed" by underinclusiveness, finding it important that Utah did not ban nonprocreative marriages. 

The court's analysis of each of the three rationales is substantial and erudite, firmly rooted in precedent and well-reasoned.

As to the fourth and final interest asserted by the government - - -“accommodating religious freedom and reducing the potential for civic strife,” - - - the court reasoned that "the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that public opposition cannot provide cover for a violation of fundamental rights" and emphasized that its "decision relates solely to civil marriage." 

Dissenting from the more than 60 page majority opinion, Judge Paul Kelly wrote more than 40 pages in disagreement (although he did agree with the majority on the standing issue, making the opinion concurring in part).   Not surprisingly, he disagreed with the level of scrutiny to be applied; he concluded that there was no fundamental right at issue and would have applied rational basis scrutiny.  Also not surprisingly, he would have concluded that Utah's ban on same-sex marriage satisfied this most easily satisfied level of scrutiny given the state's interests in (1) responsible procreation, (2) effective parenting, and (3) the desire to proceed cautiously in this evolving area.

More surprisingly, Judge Kelly found that the Supreme Court's per curiam dismissal in 1972 of Baker v. Nelson, for "want of a substantial federal question" controlling ; it  "should foreclose the Plaintiffs’ claims, at least in this court," notwithstanding the Court's decision invalidating the federal Defense of Marriage Act's ban on recognition of same-sex marriage last term in Windsor.

 If - -  and most probably when - - - the United States Supreme Court does consider the issue of state laws banning same-sex marriage, Baker v. Nelson will be irrelevant and the Court will directly grapple with issues if fundamental constitutional rights and levels of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection doctrines. 

Given that the Tenth Circuit stayed its decision pending the disposition of any subsequently filed petition for certiorari it may be that both sides seek review from the United States Supreme Court,

June 25, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Gender, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, June 23, 2014

Will on Presidential Overreach

George Will weighed in again today on presidential overreach in Stopping a Lawless President, joining the increasing (and partisan) drumbeat against President Obama's efforts to work around congressional non-action and obstruction.  In the piece, Will takes aim at President Obama's "perpetrat[ion] [of] more than 40 suspensions of the law."  (Emphasis in original.)  Among these: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals and the delayed implementation of the ACA's employer mandate.  "Institutional derangement driven by unchecked presidential aggrandizement did not begin with Barack Obama, but his offenses against the separation of powers have been egregious in quantity and qualitatively different."

Will also explores a problem for those who'd like to stop presidential overreach in court: they don't have standing.  That's because President Obama's actions have generally helped people, not harmed them, leaving only certain taxpayers and frustrated legislators to complain.  As Will points out, David Rivkin and Elizabeth Price Foley floated a theory earlier this year in Politico that would allow legislators to sue.  And the House recently passed Rep. Gowdy's cleverly named ENFORCE the Law Act of 2014 ("Executive Needs to Faithfully Observe and Respect Congressional Enactments"), authorizing House or Senate lawsuits against the president to require enforcement of the law.  That bill will surely die in the Senate.  But Rivkin and Foley's arguments for standing don't depend on legislation.

Still, Rivkin and Foley's arguments run up against language from Justice Scalia's dissent in U.S. v. Windsor (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas), quoted in the dissenting views in the House report on the ENFORCE the Law Act:

Heretofore in our national history, the President's failure to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," could only be brought before a judicial tribunal by someone whose concrete interests were harmed by that alleged failure.  Justice Alito would create a system in which Congress can hale the Executive before the courts not only to vindicate its own institutional powers to act, but to correct a perceived inadequacy in the execution of its laws.  This system would lay to rest Tocqueville's priase of our judicial system as one which "intimately binds the case made for the law with the case made for one man," one in which legislation is "no longer exposed to the daily aggression of the parties," and in which "the political question that the judge must resolve is linked to the interest of private litigants."

That would be replaced by a system in which Congress and the Executive can pop immediately into court, in their institutional capacity, whenever the President refuses to implement a statute he believes to be unconstitutional, and whenever he implements a law in a manner that is not to Congress's liking. . . .

If majorities in both Houses of Congress care enough about the matter, they have available innumerable ways to compel executive action without a lawsuit--from refusing to confirm Presidential appointees to the elimination of funding.

June 23, 2014 in Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, News, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, June 19, 2014

Ninth Circuit Declares LA's Prohibition of Vehicle as "Living Quarters" Unconstitutional

In its opinion in Desertain v. City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit held that a provision of the Los Angeles municipal code prohibiting using automobiles as living quarters was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Section 85.02 of the municipal code, entitled "Use of streets and public parking lots for habitation" provides:

No person shall use a vehicle parked or standing upon any City street, or upon any parking lot owned by the City of Los Angeles and under the control of the City of Los Angeles or under control of the Los Angeles County Department of Beaches and Harbors, as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise.

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image via

In finding the provision unconstitutionally vague, the court's opinion authored by Judge Harry Pregerson considered whether it gave adequate notice of the acts prohibited as required by City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), and focused on the four plaintiffs and their arrests:

Plaintiffs are left guessing as to what behavior would subject them to citation and arrest by an officer. Is it impermissible to eat food in a vehicle? Is it illegal to keep a sleeping bag? Canned food? Books? What about speaking on a cell phone? Or staying in the car to get out of the rain? These are all actions Plaintiffs were taking when arrested for violation of the ordinance, all of which are otherwise perfectly legal. And despite Plaintiffs’ repeated attempts to comply with Section 85.02, there appears to be nothing they can do to avoid violating the statute short of discarding all of their possessions or their vehicles, or leaving Los Angeles entirely. All in all, this broad and cryptic statute criminalizes innocent behavior, making it impossible for citizens to know how to keep their conduct within the pale.

As the court noted, the ordinance was "amorphous" enough to include "any vacationer who drives through Los Angeles in an RV."

However, the seeming reality that vacationers in RVs were not arrested led the court to its second reason for concluding the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.  The court found that the ordinance "promotes arbitrary enforcement that targets the homeless," as is inconsistent with Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).  The ordinance is "broad enough to cover any driver in Los Angeles who eats food or transports personal belongings in his or her vehicle," yet "it appears to be applied only to the homeless."  While the city might certainly have relied upon a limiting construction, its memo attempting to do so was "disfavored" by the law enforcement head of the homelessness task force and police officers did not follow it. 

In the first pages of the opinion, the court discussed four of the individual plaintiffs in detail.  In its final paragraph, the court summarized their plight and its rationale:

For many homeless persons, their automobile may be their last major possession — the means by which they can look for work and seek social services. The City of Los Angeles has many options at its disposal to alleviate the plight and suffering of its homeless citizens. Selectively preventing the homeless and the poor from using their vehicles for activities many other citizens also conduct in their cars should not be one of those options.

June 19, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Food and Drink, Fourteenth Amendment, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Unanimous Supreme Court in Lane v. Franks: First Amendment Protects Public Employee's Subpoenaed Testimony

 

In an unanimous opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, with an exceedingly brief concurring opinion by Justice Thomas, joined by Scalia and Alito, the Court held in Lane v. Franks that the First Amendment "protects a public employee who provided truthful sworn testimony, compelled by subpoena, outside the course of his ordinary job responsibilities."  However the Court held that the defendant sued in his personal capacity had qualified immunity because such a holding was not "beyond debate."

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Forain, Scène de tribunal, circa 1910 via


Recall from our previous discussions of the case including the certiorari grant, the law professors amicus brief, and  oral argument that the underlying facts are extremely sympathetic to Edward Lane, the public employee who uncovered gross corruption of an elected state legislator and was later subpoenaed to testify in the federal criminal prosecution.  Indeed, even the Attorney General for the state contended at oral argument that the Eleventh Circuit was incorrect to conclude that the employee's speech was not within the strictures of the Court's most recent public employee First Amendment case, Garcetti v. Ceballos

On the issue of qualified immunity, however, the Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit, finding that although the Eleventh Circuit was clearly wrong on the merits, the First Amendment right was not sufficiently "clearly established" at the time Lane was terminated by the college president.

My longer analysis of today's opinion is at SCOTUSBlog here.

June 19, 2014 in Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Opinion Analysis, Scholarship, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, June 17, 2014

Supreme Court Denies Certiorari in Elmbrook School District: The "Graduation in a Church" Case

Over a dissent from Justice Scalia, joined by Thomas, the United States Supreme Court decided not to review the closely watched Elmbrook School District v. Doe.  The case was relisted by the Court at least ten times before the petition for certiorari was finally denied.

Recall as we discussed almost two years ago,  the Seventh Circuit en banc found a First Amendment Establishment Clause violation when two high schools held their graduation ceremonies in a church.  Justice Scalia's dissent contended that because the Seventh Circuit's opinion is now "fundamentally inconsistent" with a "number of points" "made clear" by Town of Greece v. Galloway  - - - this Term's controversial 5-4 decision upholding town council's prayer - - - "the Court ought, at a minimum, to grant certiorari, vacate the judgment, and remand for reconsideration (GVR)."

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image via

Yet Scalia's dissent might be most noteworthy for its casual evisceration of the Establishment Clause:

Some there are—many, perhaps—who are offended by public displays of religion. Religion, they believe, is a personal matter; if it must be given external manifestation, that should not occur in public places where others may be offended. I can understand that attitude: It parallels my own toward the playing in public of rock music or Stravinsky. And I too am especially annoyed when the intrusion upon my inner peace occurs while I am part of a captive audience, as on a municipal bus or in the waiting room of a public agency.

My own aversion cannot be imposed by law because of the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 790 (1989); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U. S. 205, 210–211 (1975). Certain of this Court’s cases, however, have allowed the aversion to religious displays to be enforced directly through the First Amendment, at least in public facilities and with respect to public ceremonies—this despite the fact that the First Amendment explicitly favors religion and is, so to speak, agnostic about music.

(emphasis in original).

However, with the denial of certiorari in Elmbrook School District, the line between adult activities such as legislative meetings and "school" activities such as graduations persists in Establishment Clause doctrine.

 

June 17, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Establishment Clause, First Amendment, History, Religion, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, June 16, 2014

No Damage Claim for U.S. Citizen Tortured in Africa

Judge Emmet G. Sullivan (D.D.C.) on Friday dismissed a case brought by a U.S. citizen against FBI agents for torturing and mistreating him as a terrorist suspect in Africa in violation of his constitutional rights

The plaintiff, Amir Meshal, was visiting Somalia in November 2006.  When fighting erupted there, Meshal fled to Kenya.  Upon arrival, he was captured by Kenyan soldiers, detained, and later interrogated repeatedly by FBI agents, who used threats, accusations that Meshal was a terrorist, and physical force to intimidate him.  Later, Meshal was transferred to Somalia, then Ethiopia, where interrogations by FBI agents continued.  Throughout, Meshal was denied outside communication (until U.S. consular officials later gained access to him), access to an attorney, and access to foreign courts.  In all, Meshal was detained abroad for four months.  He was never charged with a crime.

Meshal filed a Bivens suit for damages against the agents, but Judge Sullivan dismissed the case.  Judge Sullivan was highly critical of the U.S. government's treatment of Meshal and of the federal courts' refusal to hear Bivens claims by other U.S. citizens mistreated by government agents.  But he nevertheless concluded that the D.C. Circuit's ruling in Doe, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Lebron, and the Seventh Circuit's ruling in Vance compelled him to dismiss Meshal's case.  DoeLebron, and Vance all also involved U.S. citizens suing government officers for violations of constitutional right in similar circumstances.  The circuit courts all ruled that "special factors" counseled against a Bivens remedy, however, because they all arose in the context of the military and national security.

Given the state of the law, there is no chance of a successful appeal.  But that didn't stop Judge Sullivan from delivering a full-throated condemnation of the agents' actions, the courts' rulings, and Congress's failure to create a remedy for U.S. citizens who are mistreated in these situations:

The facts alleged in this case and the legal questions presented are deeply troubling.  Although Congress has legislated with respect to detainee rights, it has provided no civil remedies for U.S. citizens subject to the appalling mistreatment Mr. Meshal has alleged against officials of his own government.  To deny him a judicial remedy under Bivens raises serious concerns about the separation of powers, the role of the judiciary, and whether our courts have the power to protect our own citizens from constitutional violations by our government when those violations occur abroad.

 

June 16, 2014 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Fundamental Rights, News, Opinion Analysis, War Powers | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, June 11, 2014

California State Trial Judge Declares Teacher Tenure Provisions Unconstitutional

In a 16 page "tentative decision" in Vergara v. California, Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Rolf Treu has declared that the state tenure statutes for public school teachers violate the California Constitution's provisions on equal protection and provision of education.

The so-called "tenure statutes" challenged in the action are provisions of California's Education Code governing teacher employment, including

The California constitutional provisions at issue include the state's equal protection clause in Article I §7, and the Article IX provisions relating to Education, including the "general diffusion of knowledge" section, §1 and the requirement that the legislature "shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported,"§5.

Students matter
image via "Students Matter" the organization funding Vergara

Judge Treu based his decision largely on equality grounds, but noted that the California Supreme Court had previously held education to be a fundamental right.  Importantly, the judge found that the trial showed that "there are a significant number of grossly ineffective teachers currently active in California classrooms."  Judge Treu also found, although did not elaborate, that there was a "disproportionate impact on poor and minority students."  The judge applied strict scrutiny to the challenged statutes.

As to the permanent employment statute,  Judge Treu found that it disadvantaged both students and teachers, noting that California's short time frame for tenure - - - less than two years - - - was an outlier: the vast majority of states (32) have a three year time frame. 

Regarding the dismissal statutes, Judge Treu noted that dismissal of a teacher could take two to ten years and "cost $50,000 to $450,000," and that while due process for teachers was an "entirely legitimate issue" these statutes provided "uber due process."  The judge found that the provisions were "so complex, time consuming and expensive" that the statutes violated the state constitutional equal protection rights of the student plaintiffs.

Likewise, Judge Treu found that the LIFO statute violated the state constitutional equal protection rights of the student plaintiffs.  Judge Treu again noted that California was in a distinct minority of 10 states in which this seniority system was absolute and allowed no consideration of teacher effectiveness, with 20 states providing that seniority was a factor, and 19 states leaving the decision to the discretion of government. 

Judge Treu's relatively brief decision followed a rather high profile trial financed by a tech entrepreneur.  The opinion does not have a full discussion of the facts, especially those supporting the impact on poor and racial minority students. 

Vergara is heir to cases such as San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973),  in which the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to school financing as disadvantaging students of color, and Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby, in which the Texas Supreme Court found the school financing scheme unconstitutional under the state constitution, including a "general diffusion of knowledge" provision.   Yet Vergara turns the focus from state resources to "bad teachers" and can tap into anti-teacher and anti-union and anti-government worker sentiments.

Judge Treu concludes his decision with an invocation of Alexander Hamilton's Federalist Paper 78 on separation of powers, noting that it is not the task of the judiciary to advise the legislature on a solution.  But as the history of  Texas' Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby demonstrates, legislative solutions in school equality can have an extended career in the courts.

Most likely, Judge Treu's Vergara decision will itself be subject to further judicial interpretations in the appellate process.

June 11, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Opinion Analysis, Race, State Constitutional Law | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, June 5, 2014

Daily Video: Brenda Cossman on Canada's Parliamentary Responses to Bedford Decision

Recall that in Canada v. Bedford, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously declared several provisions of Canada's criminal code regulating prostitution and sex work to be inconsistent with the Canadian Constitution's Charter of Rights and thus unconstitutional.  The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year from its December 2013 decision to allow Parliament to act.

Parliament is acting, but not in the manner that some anticipated.

Here's University of Toronto Law Professor Brenda Cossman discussing the proposed law in a video for Canada's Globe & Mail:

Globe and Mail
full video here

 If Parliament does pass this legislation, it seems as if it will be swiftly challenged.  And perhaps the Canada Supreme Court will have a chance to reconsider whether giving Parliament a chance to correct the defects is the best way to proceed.

 

June 5, 2014 in Comparative Constitutionalism, Courts and Judging, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Daily Read: Ellen Katz on Hobby Lobby and Citizens United

Image_facbioIn her relatively brief essay Hobby Lobby and the Pathology of Citizens United, available on ssrn, Professor Ellen Katz (pictured) advances a doctrinal and jurisprudential argument - - - rather than political or consequentialist ones - - - for the "danger" of Citizens United v. FEC.

Katz contends:

Citizens United read a number of prior decisions to adopt rules those decisions deliberately chose not to espouse. This is not an entirely new move for the Court as it has previously cast off a decision’s doctrinal limits and stated normative claims. The contribution of Citizens United, however, was to normalize this stance. The Roberts Court seems increasingly comfortable approaching precedent just as it did in that case. This Essay identifies this move as a consistent practice across a number of decisions, and explains both why it is likely to be used in the pending ACA cases and beyond, and why it is cause for deep concern.

It is a phenomenon Katz labels "fanciful precedent."  She contends it was operative in last Term's controversial Shelby County v. Holder.

She argues that it was prominent in Citizens United related to the Court's use of First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti (an issue of footnotes as we discuss here and here), in a manner that might foreshadow any Robert Court opinion in Hobby Lobby "relying" on United States v. Lee and Braunfeld v. Brown

Katz's short piece is worth a read as we await the Court's decision in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (and Conestoga Woods Specialties, Corp. v. Sebelius) argued in March. 

June 5, 2014 in Campaign Finance, Courts and Judging, Elections and Voting, First Amendment, Interpretation, Religion, Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

United States Supreme Court Denies Stay of Oregon Same-Sex Marriage Ruling

Without dissent or opinion, the United States Supreme Court denied the application of stay in National Organization for Marriage v. Geiger.  The application was made to Justice Kennedy (as Circuit Justice) and "by him referred to the Court." 

The National Organization for Marriage (NOM) was not a party to the orginal case, Geiger v. Kitzhaber in which Oregon District Judge Michael McShane declared unconstitutional the state’s same-sex marriage prohibition in Article 15 of the state constitution, as we discussed here.

Recall that Oregon conceded that the state law was unconstitutional; hence the application by NOM.  However, while Judge McShane did not analyze defendant standing or Article III "case and controversy" in Geiger, NOM's application for a stay in Geiger raises even more serious Article III issues after Hollingsworth v. Perry.

June 5, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Family, Federalism, Fourteenth Amendment, Sexual Orientation, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, May 23, 2014

Daily Read: Lithwick on Murphy on Scalia

Scalia bookDahlia Lithwick highlights the problematics of religion in her review in The Atlantic of the new biography of Justice Antonin Scalia, Scalia: A Court of One, by Bruce Allen Murphy. 

Lithwick highlights the Supreme Court's recent decision in Town of Greece v. Galloway upholding the constitutionality of  Christian prayers at a town board meeting and the upcoming decision in Hobby Lobby on the claims of a for-profit corporation to an exemption from the federal requirement that employer insurance coverage include contraception benefits. 

She is very complimentary of the biography:

In Bruce Allen Murphy, Scalia has met a timely and unintimidated biographer ready to probe. A professor of civil rights at Lafayette College, Murphy refuses to be daunted by the silence that surrounds most discussions about religion and the Court. In his view, understanding one of the most dazzling and polarizing jurists on the Supreme Court entails, above all, examining the inevitably murky relationship between judicial decision making and religious devotion.

Indeed, she writes

Murphy does not shrink from adjudicating Scalia’s dueling public claims: that separating faith from public life is impossible and, at the same time, that he himself has done just that on the Court.

From Lithwick's review, A Court of One is  a must-read this summer. But Lithwick's review is also a must-read; she conjectures that "Murphy misses the moral of his own story."

May 23, 2014 in Books, Courts and Judging, First Amendment, Interpretation, Religion, Supreme Court (US) | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, May 20, 2014

Pennsylvania District Judge Declares State's Same-Sex Marriage Ban Unconstitutional

In his opinion in Whitewood v. Wolf, Judge John E. Jones, III, announced that Pennsylvania would "join the twelve federal district courts across the country" that had declared their respective same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional.

The judge considered both a Due Process and Equal Protection challenge to Pennsylvania's statutory ban on same-sex marriage and found both had merit.

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1827 Finley map of Pennsylvania

Regarding due process, he concluded that

 the fundamental right to marry as protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution encompasses the right to marry a person of one’s own sex. . . . that this fundamental right is infringed upon by 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102, which defines marriage as between one man and one woman and thus precludes same-sex marriage. Accordingly, 23 Pa. C.S. § 1102 is unconstitutional.

Judge Jones' equal protection analysis first considered the proper level of scrutiny for sexual orientation and after extensive discussion of the factors (a modified Carolene Products analysis), he concluded that sexual orientation classifications are quasi-suspect and deserve heightened scrutiny. The application of this standard is relatively brief:

Significantly, Defendants claim only that the objectives are “legitimate,” advancing no argument that the interests are “important” state interests as required to withstand heightened scrutiny. Also, Defendants do not explain the relationship between the classification and the governmental objectives served; much less do they provide an exceedingly persuasive justification. In essence, Defendants argue within the framework of deferential review and go no further.  Indeed, it is unsurprising that Defendants muster no argument engaging the strictures of heightened scrutiny, as we, too, are unable to fathom an ingenuous defense saving the Marriage Laws from being invalidated under this more-searching standard.

Resembling many of the other opinions, including yesterday's opinion from an Oregon federal judge, Judge Jones' 39 page opinion acknowledges its part in a growing trend, cites all the other federal cases, includes a reference to Scalia's dissenting opinion in Windsor to support its rationale, and includes an acknowledgement of the divisiveness of the issue but invokes a historical perspective (represented by Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown v. Board of Education) in its relatively brief conclusion. 

It differs from other similar opinions in explicitly resting its Equal Protection analysis in intermediate scrutiny befitting a quasi-suspect class.

But the doctrinal differences are less noteworthy than the tide of federal judges (and some state judges) striking down their state laws banning same-sex marriage.

May 20, 2014 in Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Family, Fundamental Rights, Opinion Analysis, Recent Cases | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)