Monday, November 2, 2015
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments today in Spokeo v. Robins, the case testing whether Congress can confer standing on a plaintiff by statute, even when the plaintiff lacks a sufficient and independent harm for Article III standing purposes.
The case is important for what it will say about access to the courts, and, in particular, class actions. The justices at oral arguments seemed sharply divided along conventional ideological lines, with progressives favoring access and conservatives, including Justice Kennedy, going the other way. If so, the case will take its place among the line of cases coming out of the Roberts Court that limit access to the judiciary and favor (corporate and government) defendants.
(Check out the outstanding Vanderbilt roundtable on the case, with six different takes, available here.)
The case arose when Spokeo, the owner of a web-site that provides searchable reports containing personal information about individuals, reported false information about Thomas Robins. For example, Spokeo reported that Robins had a graduate degree (he doesn't), that he was employed in a professional or technical field, with "very strong" "economic health" and wealth in the "Top 10% (he's unemployed), and that he's in his 50s, married, with children (he's not in his 50s, not married, and no children).
Robins filed suit, claiming that Spokeo's representations violated the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. He sought damages under the Act for a willful violation. Robins claimed that Spokeo's false report made it harder for him to find a job.
Justices Kagan and Scalia marked out the competing positions early in Spokeo's argument, and at times bypassed Spokeo's attorney (Andrew Pincus) entirely and simply argued with each other. At one point, Justice Scalia even intervened to answer a question for Pincus, and then told Pincus that it was the right answer. In short, Justice Kagan argued that Congress identified a concrete harm in the Act and provided a remedy for it; Justice Scalia argued that any harm was merely "procedural," because any harm was only Spokeo's violation of the Act's procedures (with no additional concrete harm). Here's a little of the exchange:
Justice Kagan: But did that procedural requirement--this is--this is exactly what Lujan says, "It's a procedural requirement the disregard of which could impair a concrete interest of the plaintiff."
And we distinguished that from procedural requirements in vacuo.
. . .
Justice Scalia: Excuse me. That--that would lead to the conclusion that anybody can sue . . . not just somebody who--whose information was wrong.
Pincus seemed to make an important concession in response to a question by Justice Kennedy, whether "Congress could have drafted a statute that would allow [Robins] to bring suit?" Pincus said yes, and proceeded to describe it--basically a statute that required a plaintiff to show a concrete harm that would be sufficient for Article III. If Justice Kennedy is in play, Pincus's softer position may assuage any concerns over an extreme position that Congress can never confer standing. The softer position also saves other statutes that have similar Congress-confered-standing provisions. (Justice Kennedy picked up this theme with Robins's attorney (William Consovoy) and noted that Consovoy's position of a Congress-created-harm (alone) seemed circular--but Consovoy didn't seem to give a satisfying answer.) At one point Pincus made another important concession: some plaintiffs might have standing under the FCRA, so long as they show an independent and sufficient harm.
On the other side, Chief Justice Roberts pressed Consovoy early on the limits of his argument--a point we're likely to see in the opinion:
Chief Justice Roberts: What about a law that says you get a--a--$10,000 statutory damages if a company publishes inaccurate information about you? . . . The company publishes your phone number, but it's wrong. That is inaccurate information about you, but you have no injury whatever. Can that person bring an action for that statutory damage?
Consovoy didn't have a response, or, rather, his response only opened new cans of worms. (Justice Breyer intervened and offered an interpretation of the statutory language that gives a cause of action to "any consumer who has obtained--who suffers from false information.") Chief Justice Roberts and Consovoy had a similar exchange later in the argument, too. Consovoy maintained that the FCRA was different than the Chief's hypotheticals, because the FCRA authorizes damages only for someone who was injured. He didn't seem to persuade the Chief on this point, though, despite Justice Breyer's help.
Justice Alito pointed to the record and argued that it didn't support a concrete harm. Indeed, he pointed out that nobody in the record (other than Robins himself) searched for him on Spokeo--a "quintessential speculative harm"--probably another point we'll see in the final opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts asked a different question--and a far more loaded one (politically, and constitutionally)--to the government, amicus for Robins:
Chief Justice Roberts: [L]et's kind of say your--your--Congress thinks that the president is not doing enough to stop illegal immigration, so it passes a law that says, anyone in a border State--so it's particularized--who is unemployed may bring an action against an illegal immigrant who has a job. And they get damages, maybe they get an injunction.
. . .
And I would have thought that the--the president would be concerned about Congress being able to create its own enforcement mechanism. I thought that you would be concerned that that would interfere with the executive prerogative.
The government tried to distinguish the hypo, but, again, counsel probably didn't persuade the conservatives.
November 2, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, October 28, 2015
The Pacific Legal Foundation filed a cert. petition yesterday, asking the Supreme Court to review a D.C. Circuit ruling that the individual mandate in Obamacare didn't violate the Origination Clause. We posted on the D.C. Circuit ruling here.
The Origination Clause, Article I, Section 7, Cl. 1, says that "All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills." Because the Court upheld the individual mandate under Congress's taxing power, the logic goes, the ACA was a "bill for raising revenue." And while a bill that ultimately became Obamacare originated in the House, the Senate gutted that bill and replaced it with the ACA. The Pacific Legal Foundation argues that this violated the Origination Clause.
The D.C. Circuit flatly rejected the argument. It said, in short, that the individual mandate wasn't a "bill for raising revenue" for Origination Clause purposes, even if Congress enacted it under its taxing authority.
Here are the QPs in the cert. petition:
1. Is the tax on going without health insurance a "Bill for raising Revenue" to which the Origination Clause applies?
2. Was the Senate's gut-and-replace procedure a constitutionally valid "amend[ment]" pursuant to the Origination Clause?
Tuesday, October 6, 2015
Judge Tanya Chutkan (D.D.C.) last week denied the District of Columbia's motion to dismiss key parts of a claim by D.C. charter schools that the D.C. government under-funded them in comparison to District public schools. The lengthy ruling is laden with analysis on the constitutional relationship between Congress and the District, much of it indeterminate, reminding us just how complicated this relationship can be.
The plaintiff charter schools brought the case, arguing that the D.C. government funneled extra money to D.C. public schools, but not charter schools, in violation of the District Clause and Home Rule Act, the Supremacy Clause, and the School Reform Act. In particular, the plaintiffs argued that the D.C. government violated the Home Rule Act by altering a a congressional act (the School Reform Act) without specific congressional authorization. The District countered that it has authority under the Home Rule Act to amend or repeal the School Reform Act, because the School Reform Act applies only to the District.
Judge Chutkan ruled that neither the case law nor the Home Rule Act tells when Congress acts in tandem with the D.C. City Council (so that the Council could alter a congressional act), or when Congress has the final word--at least in the abstract. So she turned to the text and history of the School Reform Act to answer the question here. But Judge Chutkan said that the School Reform Act was similarly indeterminate. She wrote that the Act's apparent mandatory language on equal school funding for charters and public schools wasn't dispositive, because "if the District can (and has) repealed Acts of Congress that used the term 'shall,' then that term alone cannot necessarily delineate Congress' intent with respect to the Council's authority.'" Moreover, Judge Chutkan said that the legislative history of the School Reform Act didn't answer the question. The upshot: "As it stands, the uniform funding formula is on the books, and it is not clear whether it has been violated, whether it has been amended or repealed by Council enactments (through Congressional acquiescence or otherwise), or whether the challenged actions do not implicate or conflict with the funding formula at all." She thus denied the District's motion to dismiss the District Clause, Home Rule Act, and School Reform Act claims. The ruling means that these claims can move forward.
In contrast, Judge Chutkan did dismiss the plaintiffs' Supremacy Clause claim. That's because the Supremacy Clause doesn't apply to congressional acts over D.C.; the District Clause does. The analysis is the same, Judge Chutkan wrote, but the Supremacy Clause doesn't do the work.
Tuesday, September 29, 2015
The D.C. Circuit ruled in Jarkesy v. SEC that the target of an SEC administrative proceeding has to run the administrative course before he can challenge the proceeding in federal court for violating his constitutional rights.
The ruling aligns with a recent Seventh Circuit decision, but is at odds with some of the district courts that have ruled on the question.
The SEC brought an administrative proceeding against George Jarkesy, charging him with securities fraud. Before the SEC ruled on the case, but after Jarkesy's co-respondents settled (in a way that didn't look good for Jarkesy), Jarkesy sued in federal court to stop the proceeding, arguing that it violated various constitutional rights.
The district court dismissed Jarkesy's case, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.
The court applied the two-part framework in Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich and held (1) that congressional intent to require a litigant to proceed exclusively through the SEC's statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review was "fairly discernible in the statutory scheme" itself and (2) that Jarkesy's claims were "of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within [the SEC's] statutory structure."
The court rejected an argument that Jarkesy's case was like the plaintiffs' challenge in Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB. In that case, the Supreme Court sustained district-court jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' facial constitutional challenge to Sarbanes-Oxley. The court also rejected an approach that would distinguish between different types of constitutional challenges (allowing some on collateral attack, but not allowing others). The court explained:
We do not read the Free Enterprise Court's characterization of the plaintiffs' claims in that case, however, to define a new category of collateral claims that fall outside an otherwise exclusive administrative scheme. In its subsequent decision in Elgin [v. Department of the Treasury], the Court considered and rejected the idea that one could divine an exception to an otherwise exclusive administrative scheme based on the distinction between various types of constitutional challenges. "[A] jurisdictional rule based on the nature of an employee's constitutional claim would deprive the aggrieved employee, the MSPB, and the district court of clear guidance about the proper forum for the employee's claims at the outset of the case," the Court wrote, dismissing the plaintiffs' proposed line between constitutional challenges to statutes and other types of constitutional arguments to be "hazy at best and incoherent at worst." The Elgin Court also rejected the dissent's proffered rule making an exception to the CSRA scheme specifically for facial attacks on statutes. The Court explained that "the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every case involving a constitutional challenge."
Monday, September 28, 2015
The D.C. Circuit announced that it would rehear en banc a panel's earlier judgment vacating the military commission conviction of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, an alien enemy combatant who one time bragged about his role in the 9/11 attacked.
A panel this past June vacated al Bahlul's conviction for inchoate conspiracy. The panel said that the conviction violated Article III because it was based on "the purely domestic crime" of inchoate conspiracy, which is not an offense under the international law of war.
The panel's summer ruling was a victory for al Bahlul and a blow to the government in conducting military commission trials. But the court's latest ruling gives it a second bite at this apple. The ruling vacates the panel's summer judgment and sets oral argument before the entire court for December 1, 2015.
Wednesday, September 9, 2015
Judge Rosemary Collyer (D.D.C.) ruled today that the U.S. House of Representatives has standing to pursue its claim that the administration spent money on a portion of the Affordable Care Act without a valid congressional appropriation. But at the same time, Judge Collyer ruled that the House lacked standing to sue for an administration decision to delay the time when employers have to provide minimum health insurance to their employees.
The split ruling means that the House's case against the administration for spending unappropriated funds can go forward, while the case for extending the time for the employer mandate cannot.
But Judge Collyer's ruling is certainly not the last word on this case. The government will undoubtedly appeal.
And just to be clear: this is not a ruling on the merits. It only says that a part of the case can go forward.
The case arose when the House authorized the Speaker to file suit in federal court against HHS Secretary Burwell and Treasury Secretary Lew for spending money on an ACA program without an appropriation and for unilaterally extending the statutory time for employers to comply with the employer mandate.
As to the spending claim, the House said that a provision of the ACA, Section 1402, which authorizes federal reimbursements to insurance companies for reducing the cost of insurance to certain eligible beneficiaries (as required by the ACA), never received a valid appropriation. That is, Congress never funded the provision. That's a problem, the House said, because Article I, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution says that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . ." In short, the administration's funding of Section 1402 violated the Constitution.
As to the employer mandate claim, the House said that the administration pushed back the employer mandate beyond December 31, 2013, the date set in the ACA, without congressional authorization. (The House couched this in constitutional terms, but, as Judge Collyer wrote, it's really essentially a statutory claim.)
The Secretaries filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.
Judge Collyer denied the motion as to the appropriations theory, but granted it as to the employer mandate claim. According to Judge Collyer, the House could show an institutional harm from the administration's use of non-appropriated funds (because the Constitution itself specifies a role in appropriations for the Congress, which the House said that the administration ignored here, and because the claim isn't about the administration's execution of law). But at the same time she wrote that the House couldn't show a particular institutional harm for the administration's push-back for the employer mandate (because this claim was all about the administration's execution of the law--a role reserved under the Constitution to the executive). She explained:
Distilled to their essences, the Non-Appropriation Theory alleges that the Executive was unfaithful to the Constitution, while the Employer-Mandate Theory alleges that the Executive was unfaithful to a statute, the ACA. That is a critical distinction, inasmuch as the Court finds that the House has standing to assert the first but not the second.
As to the employer mandate claim, she said,
The [House's] argument proves too much. If it were accepted, every instance of an extra-statutory action by an Executive officer might constitute a cognizable constitutional violation, redressable by Congress through a lawsuit. Such a conclusion would contradict decades of administrative law and precedent, in which courts have guarded against "the specter of 'general legislative standing' based upon claims that the Executive Branch is misinterpreting a statute or the Constitution."
We'll watch this case on appeal.
September 9, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, September 2, 2015
The D.C. Circuit today denied attorneys' fees to Shelby County growing out of its successful challenge to the coverage formula for preclearance in the Voting Rights Act. But more importantly: A majority on the panel rejected Shelby County's states' rights interpretation of the VRA.
The case arose out of Shelby County's motion for attorneys' fees after the Supreme Court struck Section 4 of the VRA, the coverage formula for preclearance, in Shelby County v. Holder. The VRA fee-shifting provision says,
In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the [F]ourteenth or [F]ifteenth [A]mendment, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable [attorneys'] fee, reasonable expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses as part of the costs.
But to win attorneys' fees, Shelby County had to show (1) that it was eligible for fees under the provision and (2) that it was entitled to them under Newman v. Piggie Park.
All three on the panel agreed that Shelby County wasn't entitled under Piggie Park. That's because "Shelby County's lawsuit did not facilitate enforcement of the VRA; it made enforcing the VRA's preclearance regime impossible." "Shelby County's argument boils down to the proposition that Congress introduced the fee-shifting provision into the VRA in 1975 with the express goal of inducing a private party to bring a lawsuit to neuter the Act's central tool. But that makes no sense." (Emphasis in original.) That was enough to deny attorneys' fees.
But that's also where the case gets interesting. On the eligibility prong, Shelby County argued that it was eligible for fees under the statute, because it prevailed in an action to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and that these guarantees include "the structural rights of the states." That last part is a bold departure from the plain language of the amendments and any cases interpreting them; it assumes that the amendments contain some (unenumerated) version of states' rights, which, in turn, could limit the amendments' protection of individual voting rights.
The court left that question open. Judge Griffith, writing for the court, dodged it by relying only on the Piggie Park prong. Judge Silberman, in concurrence, seemed (more or less) to agree (at least on this point). Only Judge Tatel specifically took on Shelby County's reading. Judge Tatel wrote that the question was simple: "Obviously, neither of these [amendments] includes any guarantees of state autonomy over voting. . . . The two Amendments thus 'guarantee' not state autonomy, but rather the right of citizens to vote, and they expressly guarantee that right against state interference."
The upshot is that the court appears to have left Shelby County's states' rights interpretation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on the table, an open question. This means that the Supreme Court could step in and answer it--it Shelby County's favor. (And given the Court's states' rights approach in the original case, this seems like a possibility.)
Still, the court's reasoning on Piggie Park is extremely thorough, and seems written to insulate the ruling against Supreme Court reversal.
Friday, August 28, 2015
The Ninth Circuit yesterday upheld federal laws criminalizing sexual assaults in facilities where federal inmates are held by agreement with state and local governments. The ruling is a baby-step extension of United States v. Comstock, the Court's 2010 case holding that Congress had authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to authorize civil detention of "sexually dangerous" federal prisoners beyond their term of imprisonment. It's a baby-step beyond Comstock, because these laws have the added feature that they operate within state and local detention facilities--where the federal government contracts to hold federal inmates.
Sabil Mujahid brought the facial claim against the federal statutes, arguing that they exceeded Congress's authority and ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment. The provisions criminalized sexual assault "in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General." By its plain terms, the provision outlaws sexual assault by non-federal inmates in these facilities, too, but Mujahid is a federal inmate, and the court limited its ruling to federal inmates.
The court, applying Comstock, flatly rejected Mujahid's claims. In short:
Like the civil commitment statute in Comstock, [these statutes] are not facially unconstitutional; they are "a 'necessary and proper' means of exercising the federal authority that permits Congress to create federal criminal laws, to punish their violation, to imprison violators, to provide appropriately for those imprisoned, and to maintain the security of those who are not imprisoned but who may be affected by the federal imprisonment of others. See Comstock.
As I said, the court specifically did not rule on the statutes as applied to state inmates in these same facilities. That question may raise more complicated issues (but just slightly).
Friday, July 24, 2015
The D.C. Circuit on Friday ruled that a case challenging the constitutionality of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau can move forward. At the same time, the court dismissed claims against Dodd-Frank's Financial Stability Oversight Council and the government's orderly liquidation authority.
The mixed ruling sends the plaintiffs' case against the CFPB and the recess appointment of Director Richard Cordray back to the district court for a ruling on the merits. We'll undoubtedly see this case back at the D.C. Circuit.
We last posted on a challenge to the CFPB here. (The D.C. Circuit dismissed that case for lack of standing.)
The State National Bank of Big Spring and a number of states brought the case, arguing four points. First, the Bank argued that the CFPB is unconstitutional, because, as an independent agency, it has to be headed by multiple members, not a single director (as it is). Moreover, the bank says that Congress's delegation to the CFPB violates the non-delegation doctrine.
Second, the Bank argues that President Obama appointed Director Cordray as a recess appointment during a three-day intra-session Senate recess, in violation of Noel Canning. (Cordray was subsequently confirmed by the Senate, but the Bank says his actions in the meantime are invalid.)
Third, the Bank claims that the Financial Stability Oversight Council, which monitors the stability of the U.S. financial system and responds to emerging threats and has statutory authority to designate certain "too big to fail" financial companies for additional regulation, violates the non-delegation doctrine and related separation-of-powers principles.
Finally, the states claim that Dodd-Frank's liquidation authority, which permits the government to liquidate failing financial companies that pose a risk to financial stability, violates the non-delegation doctrine and the Bankruptcy Clause's guarantee of uniform bankruptcy laws.
The court held that the bank, as an entity actually regulated by the CFPB, had standing. The court also said that the bank's claims were ripe, under Abbott Labs and Free Enterprise Fund (the PCAOB case).
But the court ruled that the Bank lacked standing to challenge the Council. In particular, it rejected the Bank's novel claim that the Bank was harmed because the Council designated one of the Bank's competitors as "too big to fail," thus giving the competitor a "reputational subsidy."
The court also held that the states lacked standing to challenge the government's liquidation authority. The states said that they invested pension funds in financial companies, that states are therefore creditors in possible future liquidations, that such liquidations could deprive the states of uniform treatment, and that as a result the states' current investments are worth less. The court said this was too speculative.
July 24, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Nondelegation Doctrine, Ripeness, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, July 8, 2015
In its opinion in Morales-Santana v. Lynch, a unanimous panel of the Second Circuit has held that the differential requirements regarding US presence for unwed fathers and unwed mothers to transmit citizenship to their child violated equal protection as included in the Fifth Amendment's protections. It creates a conflict in the circuits and sets up another trip to the United States Supreme Court on the issue, the last one having resulted in a 4-4 split as discussed below.
The statutory scheme at issue, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1409(c), was the one in effect when Morales-Santana was born in 1962 outside the US to unwed parents. His parents married each other in 1970 and he was admitted to the US as a lawful permanent resident in 1975. In 2000, Morales-Santana was placed in removal proceedings after a conviction for various felonies and applied for withholding based on derivative citizenship from his father.
Derivative citizenship, which occurs at the moment of birth, is bestowed on a child born abroad to an unwed citizen mother and non‐citizen father has citizenship at birth so long as the mother was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions for a continuous period of at least one year at some point prior to the child’s birth. By contrast, a child born abroad to an unwed citizen father and non‐citizen mother has citizenship at birth only if the father was present in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the child’s birth for a period or periods totaling at least ten years, with at least five of those years occurring after the age of fourteen. Morales-Santana's father, born in Puerto Rico in 1900, met the one year requirement but not the ten year requirement at the time of his son's birth. Both parties agreed that had Morales‐Santana’s mother, rather than his father, been a citizen continuously present in Puerto Rico until 20 days prior to her nineteenth birthday, she would have satisfied the requirements to confer derivative citizenship on her child. It is this gender‐based difference in treatment that Morales‐Santana claims violated his father’s right to equal protection.
The Second Circuit's decision that the differential requirements for unwed fathers and mothers is unconstitutional must confront several United States Supreme Court decisions that point in a different direction on the equal protection issue in citizenship statutes, including two recent decisions. First, the Court in Nguyen v. INS, (2001) upheld gender discrimination regarding establishment of paternity. The Second Circuit notes that Morales-Santana complied with the statutory provisions upheld in Nguyen: the child was "legitimated" and thus paternity "acknowledged" when his parents married in 1970. Second, and more important, is the Court's per curiam affirmance by an "equally divided Court" in Flores-Villar v. United States in 2011. The Ninth Circuit in Flores-Villar had upheld the differential residency requirement.
Judge Ray Lohier's for the Second Circuit subjects the statutory scheme to intermediate heightened scrutiny under United States v. Virginia (VMI) (1996), rejecting the government's argument that essentially all citizenship statutes should be subject to mere rational basis review.
With regard to the government's proffered interests, the court acknowledged that ensuring a sufficient connection between the child and the United States is important, but then states that the differential treatments of mothers and fathers is unrelated to it: the government
offers no reason, and we see no reason, that unwed fathers need more time than unwed mothers in the United States prior to their child’s birth in order to assimilate the values that the statute seeks to ensure are passed on to citizen children born abroad.
The Second Circuit then recognizes that its "determination conflicts with the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Flores‐Villar, which addressed the same statutory provisions and discussed the same governmental interest in ensuring a connection between child and country."
As to the government's second interest - - - preventing statelessness - - - the court again agrees that it is important, but concludes that this was not a genuine actual interest of the legislation.
Neither the congressional hearings nor the relevant congressional reports concerning the 1940 Act contain any reference to the problem of statelessness for children born abroad. The congressional hearings concerning the 1952 Act are similarly silent about statelessness as a driving concern.
Moreover, even if it had been the government's concern, gender-neutral alternatives - - - which the court notes had been proposed as "far back as 1933" - - - would serve this purpose. Additionally, the ten year differential, which importantly cannot be cured since it attaches at the moment of birth, is substantial. Again, this time in a footnote (n.17), the court acknowledges that its decision differs from that of the Ninth Circuit.
The court then finds the paternity provision unconstitutional and rejects the government's proposed remedy that all derivative citizenship be subject to the longer ten year period.
Presumably, the government will seek certiorari. (And while this case involves a previous statute, the current statute maintains a gender differential). A petition would have a good chance of being granted given the split in the circuits. But the Court's 4-4 split in 2011 in Flores-Villar occurred because Justice Kagan was recused; this would not be the case this time. And perhaps the Obama Administration will chose not to seek review.
Thursday, June 25, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled today that the Affordable Care Act means exactly what Congress thought it meant in the first place: everybody should get--and be able to get--health insurance.
The Court ruled in King v. Burwell that the ACA authorizes federal tax subsidies for qualified purchasers of health insurance on federally-subsidized exchanges. The ruling means that qualified purchasers will continue to receive federal tax subsidies for their health insurance, that they won't go without insurance (at least not for a lack of subsidies), and that Obamacare remains intact.
Opponents attacked the subsidies, arguing that the ACA authorized subsidies only for purchasers on state exchanges, not federally-facilitated exchanges, and that the IRS had to stop extending subsidies to purchasers on federally-facilitated exchanges. Their argument turned on a single phrase in the Act, that subsidies extend to "an Exchange established by the State," despite the overwhelming evidence that the Act, as a whole, was designed to provide universal coverage. Our oral argument preview is here.
The Court today rejected the opponents' arguments. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. He wrote that the phrase "an Exchange established by the State" was ambiguous, given the way the rest of the Act hung together, and that the Court therefore should give the phrase a reading that harmonizes with the rest of the Act, including the Act's clear purpose to provide universal coverage. That reading, he wrote, meant that tax subsidies extend to purchasers on both state-created and federally-facilitated exchanges.
Chief Justice Roberts's opinion is notable for its recognition of the several key components of Obamacare (guaranteed issue, community rating, individual mandate, and tax subsidies) and how they are designed to operate together to ensure universal (or close to universal) coverage. The majority opinion also discussed in some detail how these components evolved and ended up in the ACA and the health-care and health-insurance problems they were designed to solve (including the death spiral).
But Chief Justice Roberts also took the opportunity make a dig on process--how the legislative road to the ACA was hurried and lacked transparency.
Justice Scalia wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. The dissent was predictably colorful, but comes down to this:
The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says "Exchange established by the State" it means "Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government." This is of course quite absurd, and the Court's 21 pages of explanation make it no less so.
Friday, June 12, 2015
The D.C. Circuit today vacated the conspiracy conviction by military commission of Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, an alien enemy combatant who one time bragged about his role in the 9/11 attacks. The court said that the conviction for inchoate conspiracy--a charge that's not an offense under the international law of war--violated the Article III power of the judiciary "by authorizing Executive Branch tribunals to try the purely domestic crime . . . ."
The ruling is a victory of Bahlul and a blow to the government in conducting military commissions. In short, the case says that the government's charge in a military commission must be recognized as violation of the international law of war, and that Congress lacks authority to define an otherwise domestic crime as an international law of war in order to vest a military commission with authority to convict for its violation.
But while the ruling is significant, it's almost certainly not the last word on this case that's already gone up and down the judicial hierarchy. In particular: It's gone en banc at the D.C. Circuit before, and seems likely to go en banc again, if not farther, to the Supreme Court.
The court ruled first that Bahlul's structural challenge (that his conviction violated Article III) was not waivable, and that the court could therefore hear it--and to hear it de novo--even though he didn't raise it below.
The court went on to say that while the government could conduct law-of-war military commissions under Ex Parte Quirin, Quirin and its progeny limit the charges to "offenses against the law of war." But the court held that inchoate conspiracy isn't one of those offenses, that even the government agreed that it isn't, and that Congress didn't have power to define it as such: "Congress cannot, pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause, declare an offense to be an international war crime when the international law of war concededly does not." The court held that because conspiracy is only a domestic offense, and not an international law offense, the Bahlul's conviction by military commission (an Article I tribunal, not an Article III court) impermissibly intruded into the Article III role of the courts.
The court rejected the government's arguments that historical practice and the Necessary and Proper Clause (augmenting the Define and Punish Clause) did the trick.
Judge Tatel, concurring, explained why he joined the en banc court when it previously said that the Ex Post Facto Clause did not prevent Congress from granting military commissions jurisdiction over conspiracy, but now joined Judge Rogers in saying that separation-of-powers did:
The answer is the standard of review. The en banc Court came down the way it did, and I voted the way I did, because al Bahlul had forfeited his [previous] ex post facto challenge by failing to raise it before the Commission, so our review was for plain error. Applying that highly deferential standard, the Court concluded that it was "not 'obvious that conspiracy was "not . . . triable by law-of-war commissions" at the time al Bahlul committed his crimes.
But the court reviewed Bahlul's structural challenge de novo. And "[i]n my view, whether Article III prohibits military commissions from trying conspiracy turns on what Ex Parte Quirin says and what Hamdan does not"--that "the law-of-war exception is exclusively international," and does not include domestic crimes.
Judge Henderson wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the majority's approach to Congress's power to define the international law of war would restrict Congress to only what the international community has said, and, worse, by the judiciary's reckoning:
My colleagues contend--as a matter of constitutional law, not simply comity--that the Congress cannot authorize military-commission trials unless the international community agrees, jot and tittle, that the offense in question violates the law of war. And the contend of international law is to be determine by--who else?--the Judiciary, with little or no deference to the political branches.
June 12, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, War Powers | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, June 8, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled today in Zivotofsky v. Kerry that the President has exclusive power of recognition of foreign sovereigns, and that a congressional attempt to force the President to recognize sovereignty over Jerusalem (by Israel) impermissibly intrudes on the President's power.
The ruling is a decisive win for the presidency over Congress in the area of recognition of foreign sovereignty. It also puts an end to this highly politicized case involving U.S. recognition of sovereignty over Jerusalem.
Recall that Congress enacted legislation requiring the State Department to put "Israel" as the country-of-birth on a passport of any U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, upon the request of the passport applicant. President George W. Bush signed the legislation, but with a signing statement saying that this was unconstitutional. The State Department has long had regs that say that only "Jerusalem" (and not "Israel") go on the passport of a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, so as not to tilt the balance toward one side on the sensitive question of who has sovereignty over Jerusalem.
Justice Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Kennedy said that the text and history of the Reception Clause (giving the President power to "receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers") gives the President alone authority to recognize foreign sovereigns. He wrote that the text and purpose of Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act--which required the State Department to list "Israel" as the country-of-birth for a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, upon the passport applicant's request--intruded on that authority.
Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion; Justice filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part; Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissent (joined by Justice Alito); and Justice Scalia wrote a dissent (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito).
We'll have more analysis and review later.
Friday, June 5, 2015
The D.C. Circuit this week upheld a key authority of the EPA for enforcing the Clean Air Act against federalism and congressional authority challenges. The per curiam ruling rejected other challenges to EPA action, as well, and means that the case is dismissed. The ruling leaves intact the EPA's authority to designate geographic areas as noncompliant with the Clean Air Act and to take certain enforcement actions.
The federalism challenge in the case, Mississippi Commission on Environmental Quality v. EPA, sought to exploit the plurality's ruling in NFIB, where the Court held that Obamacare's Medicaid expansion couldn't condition a state's entire Medicaid grant on the ACA's Medicaid expansion. But the court rejected that argument, easily distinguishing Medicaid expansion and the EPA's actions here, as described below.
The case tested EPA's authority to designate certain geographic areas as noncompliant with the Clean Air Act's National Ambient Air Quality Standards. A variety of plaintiffs lodged complaints, but only two, Wise County, Texas, and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, raised constitutional claims. They argued that the EPA's designation of Wise County as a nonattainment area violated the Tenth Amendment and due process, and exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.
The court rejected these arguments. The court ruled that the Clean Air Act "authorizes the EPA to promulgate and administer a federal implementation plan of its own if the State fails to submit an adequate state implementation plan." The court said that's not commandeering, because the federal government isn't requiring the state or state officers to implement the federal plan.
The court also ruled that the Clean Air Act's sanctions for noncompliance--re-direction of a portion of federal highway funds to federal programs that would improve air quality--were not unduly coercive under NFIB. That's because they don't come close to the size of a state's federal Medicaid grant, and because it wasn't a new program that came as a surprise to the states. Indeed, the condition has been on the books (and states have taken advantage of it) for decades.
The court said that the Clean Air Act's delegation of authority to the EPA to designate areas as noncompliant is well within Congress's Commerce Clause authority. The court said that dirty air blows across state lines, causing a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and that the activities in Wise County that led to the dirty air themselves have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Finally, the court rejected a due process claim that the EPA administrator for Region 6 was biased. The court said that the administrator's past professional activities and statements did not rise to the level of an "unalterably closed mind" or an inability or unwillingness "to rationally consider arguments."
As mentioned, the court rejected other arguments against the EPA's authority, too, mostly under the APA.
Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Florida Governor Rick Scott filed suit yesterday against the federal government arguing that its move to take away the state's Low Income Pool money compels the state to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act--all in violation of the anti-commandeering principle and the "gun to the head" principle in NFIB v. Sebelius.
We posted on Florida's LIP and the constitutional issues here. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities just put out a very helpful backgrounder here.
In short, LIP is a federal program that pays health-care providers for uncompensated care for the poor. Medicaid, and the ACA's Medicaid expansion, pays directly for health care for that same population.
The lawsuit argues that the federal government threatened to take away the state's LIP money unless the state expands Medicaid under the ACA--and that this amounts to unconstitutional coercion in violation of federalism principles and the Tenth Amendment under NFIB.
But the case is a sham. The federal government doesn't appear to be strong-arming Florida into expanding Medicaid as much as it appears to prefer to spend money directly on health insurance for the poor instead of paying for uncompensated care for them. That's a policy choice that the federal government can make. States have no entitlement to LIP money, or to any particular federal approach to providing health care for the poor. And when the feds take away LIP funds, Florida's choice is clear: figure out a way to cover care for the poor, or don't.
Governor Scott claims that this isn't a real choice, because the state can't afford to let the poor go without health insurance. If that's right, he can implement his own program, or he can expand Medicaid. This hardly seems like compulsion.
The case is obviously politically, and not constitutionally, motivated, and probably has little chance of success on the merits. "Probably," because so many thought the same thing about NFIB, before the Court got a hold of it.
There's another commonality with NFIB: Governor Scott hired Paul Clement to represent him.
Monday, April 27, 2015
The Fifth Circuit on Friday dismissed a case challenging both the individual and employer mandates in the Affordable Care Act under the Origination Clause. The court said that the individual plaintiff challenging the individual mandate lacked standing, and that the corporation challenging the employer mandate was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. The ruling dismisses the case, with little or no chance of a successful appeal.
The case, Hotze v. Burwell, was brought by a medical doctor, Steven Hotze, and his employer, Braidwood Management. The plaintiffs argued that the ACA's individual and employer mandates violated the Origination Clause, because they are "bills for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House." Their theory: The ACA was a Senate amendment to a shell of a House bill that already passed, so that in fact the ACA really originated in the Senate. If so--and if the individual mandate is authorized by the Taxing Clause (and not the Commerce Clause), as the Court held--then, they claimed, the whole ACA should have started in the House. Because it really didn't, it violated the Origination Clause.
But there was a problem even before the court got to the merits: Hotze already had health insurance through Braidwood, and so would not have to purchase insurance or pay the tax penalty. This meant that he didn't suffer a harm.
Hotze neglected to say in his complaint that his insurance wasn't up to ACA snuff (and that he'd have to drop it and buy new insurance or pay the tax penalty), so all he had for an injury was that the ACA forced him to make hard health-insurance choices. The court said that this wasn't enough for standing.
Hotze also argued that when the employer mandate takes effect, Braidwood would have to offer him less desirable insurance. The court said that this theory wasn't tightly enough tied (or at all tied) to the individual mandate, however, so this didn't support standing, either.
Finally, Hotze said that the ACA forced his insurance premiums up. The court rejected this theory, too, saying that it amounts to a generalized grievance.
The court also dismissed Braidwood's challenge to the employer mandate, but this time under the Anti-Injunction Act. The AIA bars courts from hearing any challenge to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax.
Even if the court had addressed the merits, however, this case didn't appear to be going anywhere. That's because the ACA did originate in the House, even if in a shell bill later amended by the Senate to include the full ACA. The plaintiffs argued that the Senate amendment wasn't germane to the House bill (and was thus an unconstitutional end-run around the Origination Clause), but the government argued that the Origination Clause didn't contain a germane-ness requirement--a point the district court found convincing.
The district court dismissed the case on the merits, ruling that the ACA didn't violate the Origination Clause. Good bet the Fifth Circuit would have, too.
Monday, March 30, 2015
The Supreme Court today declined to review Coons v. Lew, the Ninth Circuit case holding that the plaintiffs' challenge to the ACA's Independent Payment Advisory Board was not ripe and rejecting the plaintiffs' challenges to the individual mandate. Today's non-action leaves the Ninth Circuit's ruling--and the IPAB and the individual mandate--in place (although it's not a ruling on the merits).
The plaintiffs in Coons challenged IPAB, the so-called "death panel," on the ground that it violated the non-delegation doctrine. IPAB is a 15-member administrative board that will monitor the growth of Medicare spending. If actual growth exceeds expected growth, IPAB will recommend a reduction in the growth rate to the "savings target" set by the Chief Actuary of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. IPAB's recommendations go to Congress, and Congress must either consider and vote on them, or pass superseding legislation. (If there's no superseding legislation, the Secretary must implement the recommendations as submitted.)
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs' challenge wasn't ripe. In particular, it said that Plaintiff Novack's claims that IPAB would reduce the Medicare payments he receives for treating his patients, and that IPAB would set in motion market displacements that would harm him financially, were speculative.
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the individual mandate violated their substantive due process rights (to medical autonomy and informational privacy), and that the ACA did not preempt Arizona's constitutional provision that says that Arizonans can't be forced to buy insurance.
The Supreme Court's decision today is not a ruling on the merits of any of these claims--all of which were far-fetched from the get-go--but it leaves the Ninth Circuit ruling in place.
The decision says nothing about the likely direction the Court will take in King v. Burwell, the case testing whether the IRS exceeded its statutory authority by extending tax credits to individual health insurance purchasers on a federally facilitated exchange.
Thursday, March 26, 2015
The Fifth Circuit dismissed most of the plaintiff's Family and Medical Leave Act case in Bryant v. Texas Dep't of Aging and Disability Services, holding that most claims were barred by state sovereign immunity and qualified immunity. But the court remanded the question whether the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages against her supervisor is barred by state sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff, Tammy Bryant, sued her employer, Texas Department of Aging and Disability Services, and her direct supervisor, Kim Littleton, for interfering with her self-care FMLA leave and for retaliating against her for taking FMLA leave. She sought reinstatement and monetary damages.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed most of Bryant's case. The court ruled that while Congress validly abrogated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the FMLA's family-care provision, Nev. Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs, Congress did not validly abrogate with respect to the self-care provision. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland. As a result, the department had Eleventh Amendment immunity against Brant's self-care claims for monetary damages.
As to Bryant's claim for reinstatement, the court said that the Ex Parte Young exception (allowing plaintiffs to sue a state for prospective relief) did not apply to suits against state agencies; it only applies against state employees acting in their official capacities.
The court ruled further that Littleton enjoyed qualified immunity from Bryant's interference claims, because Bryant failed to show that Littleton violated clearly established law.
Finally, the court remanded Bryant's claim for monetary damages against Littleton. The court recognized that this "depends on the state's being the real party in interest" and left it to the lower court to work that out.
March 26, 2015 in Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Courts and Judging, Eleventh Amendment, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Thursday, March 12, 2015
After the Supreme Court in NFIB v. Sebelius reduced the cost to states of declining to expand Medicaid under the ACA, or Obamacare, many states predictably declined to expand. The situation seemed to leave the federal government with little leverage to encourage states to expand Medicaid. That may be changing, at least in Florida.
Recall that the Court ruled in NFIB v. Sebelius that states could decline to expand Medicaid under the ACA and lose only the additional Medicaid expansion funding (and not their entire Medicaid budget). As a result, the federal government had little power to encourage states to expand their Medicaid programs, and, indeed, many states declined to expand--and thus declined to offer Medicaid coverage to millions of low-income individuals. Florida was one of those states, and, as a result, about 764,000 Floridians fell into a coverage gap.
But it turns out that the federal government, through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, runs another program touching on health-coverage for uninsured low-income individuals, the Low Income Pool. LIP provides federal funding to states to compensate hospitals and other providers for treating uninsured patients. The program currently provides about $2 billion per year to Florida, although Florida requested an increase to $4.5 billion.
The LIP renewal gives CMS leverage with the state to re-encourage Medicaid expansion, consistent with NFIB v. Sebelius. That's because LIP provides federal funds for medical coverage for substantially the same population that would be covered by Medicaid expansion (uninsured low-income individuals). In short, the federal government could pay states through LIP, or through Medicaid expansion. But it doesn't make sense to double-pay for the same services through both programs. So CMS can decline to renew Florida's LIP payments--and thus strongly encourage the state to adopt Medicaid expansion.
The gambit may be working: the state senate is now looking at Medicaid expansion (albeit with some of the strings that other states have put on their programs, like work requirements and co-pays). The state house reportedly still opposes expansion, however, and Governor Scott is careful to separate the two issues, LIP and Medicaid expansion, so as not to tie them in discussions with CMS. (Governor Scott wrote that he won't "backfill" a loss of LIP money with state funds. "Florida taxpayers fund our federal government and deserve to get a return on their investment.")
Depending on how this all plays out in Florida, this could be a model for encouraging Medicaid expansion in other states with LIP programs coming due.
Monday, March 9, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled today in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association that the Department of Labor need not engage in notice-and-comment rule-making when it changes a Department interpretation of an existing rule. At the same time, the Court overturned the D.C. Circuit rule that forced agencies to do this whenever an agency wished to issue a new interpretation that deviated significantly from an old one.
The ruling thus re-shifts power back to executive agencies in determining the meaning of their own regulations. That's because Congress didn't require agencies to use notice-and-comment rule-making for interpretations, but the D.C. Circuit did, when a new interpretation deviated significantly from an old one--that is, when an agency changed its interpretation. By overturning that decision, and putting interpretive decisions back in the exclusive hands of the agencies (with loose, deferential judicial oversight), the Court re-set the balance that Congress struck. The ruling is thus a victory for agencies and their power to interpret their own regulations without notice-and-comment rule-making and with deferential judicial review. (More on that last part below.)
The case grows out of DOL's re-interpretation of its FLSA rule on minimum wage and overtime for mortgage-loan offices. The agency's rule exempts certain classes of employees, including individuals who are "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity . . . or in the capacity of outside salesman . . . ." In 1999 and 2001, DOL issued interpretive letters opining that mortgage-loan officers did not qualify for this exemption. In 2006, however, DOL reversed course and opined that mortgage-loan officers did meet the exemption. But in 2010, DOL went back to its old position, withdrew the 2006 interpretation, and opined that mortgage-loan officers didn't meet the exemption.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires agencies to provide public notice and an opportunity to comment when they propose new rules and regulations under an authorizing statute. But the APA does not require this notice-and-comment rule-making when an agency simply issues an interpretation. Seeing the potential for abuse, the D.C. Circuit devised a court-created rule that said that agencies still had to use notice-and-comment rule-making, even for a mere interpretation. The D.C. Circuit rule is called the Paralyzed Veterans rule, after the case that established it.
So the question in Mortgage Bankers Association was whether DOL had to use notice-and-comment rule-making in issuing its 2010 interpretation.
The Supreme Court said no. The Court, in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor, ruled that the APA by its plain terms exempts interpretative decisions from the notice-and-comment requirement, and that the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans rule violated those plain terms. Justice Sotomayor wrote that Congress, in enacting the APA, considered the costs and benefits of applying notice-and-comment rule-making requirements to agency interpretations, and that Congress decided that notice-and-comment procedures weren't necessary.
All nine justices agreed on the result, but Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito each wrote separately to take issue in different ways and to different degrees with judicial deference to agency interpretations. In other words, they're not sure that the courts should defer to agency interpretations (even if courts do validly defer to agency rules), or they reject deference altogether. Judicial deference to agency interpretations comes from Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co. and Auer v. Robbins. In Auer (relying on Seminole Rock) the Court held that agencies may authoritatively resolve ambiguities in their own regulations.
The rule that courts defer to an agency's interpretation of its authorizing statute is well settled in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council. This is called Chevron deference. But Auer extended that deference to an agency's interpretation of its own rules. This Auer deference is what caught the eyes of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
They all indicated that they'd reconsider Auer deference if given the chance. Justices Scalia and Thomas both outlined their (separate) separation-of-powers objections to Auer deference. In short, Justice Scalia expressed concern that an agency could both write its own rule and then interpret that rule without meaningful oversight; Justice Thomas explained why Auer deference took power away from the judiciary and gave it to the executive agencies.
Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy signed on in full to Justice Sotomayor's opinion (as did Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan). None of these joined Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, or Justice Alito and the concerns with Auer deference that they expressed.