Friday, January 10, 2014
The Supreme Court will hear oral arguments on Monday in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the case testing the President's recess appointment power. In particular, the case tests whether the President can make a recess appointment during a prolonged intra-session recess of the Senate in which the Senate sits in pro forma sessions every three days. We most recently posted on the case here.
Here's a preview, reprinted, with permission, from the ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases:
The National Labor Relations Board, or the NLRB or the Board, consists of five members who are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Three members constitute a quorum, and without three or more members the Board cannot adjudicate cases involving unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act.
On January 3, 2012, Board membership fell to two members. The next day, on January 4, 2012, President Obama sought to fill the three vacancies with recess appointments pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. That Clause allows the president “to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate,” without obtaining the usual advice and consent. Thus President Obama purported to appoint Sharon Block, Terence F. Flynn, and Richard F. Griffin to seats that had become vacant on January 3, 2012, August 27, 2010, and August 27, 2011, respectively. The appointments, if valid, would have completed the five-member NLRB. (Two Board members, Chairman Mark G. Pearce and Brian Hayes, were confirmed by the Senate on June 22, 2010. Neither party disputes the validity of their appointments.)
President Obama purported to use the recess appointment power, because at the time the Senate was not meeting regularly. Instead, the Senate was operating pursuant to a unanimous consent agreement that provided that the Senate would meet in pro forma sessions only, “with no business conducted,” every three business days from January 3, the beginning of the second session of the 112th Congress, to January 23, 2012. The agreement said that each pro forma session would be followed immediately by another adjournment. The agreement meant that no senators were required to attend, except the one who gaveled in and out each pro forma session. (A previous and similar unanimous consent agreement ran from December 17 to January 3, 2012. The Senate interrupted that agreement once, on December 23, 2011, to pass a temporary extension to the reduced payroll tax.)
On February 8, 2012, a three-member panel of the Board, composed of Block, Hayes, and Flynn, affirmed the findings of an NLRB administrative law judge (ALJ) that Noel Canning engaged in an unfair labor practice. (The ALJ found that Noel Canning refused to execute a written collective bargaining agreement incorporating terms, related to wages and pension, that the union and Noel Canning agreed upon during contract negotiations. The ALJ found that Noel Canning’s refusal to execute an agreement violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.) Noel Canning appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, challenging the NLRB’s decision on its merits, and arguing that the Board could not act lawfully because it lacked a quorum. The court rejected Noel Canning’s arguments on the merits, but ruled that the NLRB lacked a quorum, and therefore did not act lawfully, because President Obama’s appointments violated the Recess Appointments Clause.
The Board sought review in the Supreme Court, presenting two questions that had been decided by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court granted review and directed the parties also to address “[w]hether the President’s recess-appointment power may be exercised when the Senate is convening every three days in pro forma sessions.”
The Recess Appointments Clause, Article II, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution, provides that “[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” The Clause is designed to allow the president to fill vacancies that would otherwise require the advice and consent of the Senate when the Senate is not available to provide advice and consent. This case tests the pliability of that Clause.
The parties’ arguments turn on the plain language, meaning, and history of the Clause and presidential practice. In particular, the parties dispute (1) whether the Senate was on “the Recess” on January 4, 2012, when President Obama appointed the three members of the NLRB, (2) whether the vacancies on the NLRB “happen[ed] during the Recess of the Senate,” and (3) whether the president can exercise his recess-appointment authority when the Senate is convening every three days in pro forma sessions.
On each question, the parties also wrangle over separation-of-powers principles. In short, the government argues that the Senate should not be able to frustrate the president’s constitutional duty to execute the laws by holding up appointments by recessing with only pro forma sessions. Noel Canning counters that the president’s position represents a dramatic power grab over the recess appointment authority, at the expense of the Senate.
What is “the Recess”?
The government argues that the phrase “the Recess” applies to both an inter-session recess (that is, one between sessions of Congress) and an intra-session recess (that is, one during a session of Congress, as here). The government says that the definite article “the” does not change that. It contends that “the” is commonly used to refer to a category of events (and not a particular event, like “the [only inter-session] Recess”), even elsewhere in the Constitution itself. It also claims that the phrase “the Recess” was, by 1787, regularly used to describe the equivalent of intra-session breaks of the British Parliament, state legislatures, the Continental Congress, and even the Constitutional Convention.
The government argues that excluding intra-session recesses from the Clause would undermine its purposes. In particular, the government says that excluding intra-session recesses would prevent the president from filling vacant offices, and thus exercising his constitutional responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, whenever the Senate is unavailable to provide advice and consent for a significant period of time.
Finally, the government claims that long-standing practice supports intra-session recess appointments throughout the nation’s history, and even before 1943. (The government particularly takes on the court of appeals’ assumption that there were only a handful of intra-session recess appointments before 1943, suggesting that presidents before 1943 thought they lacked the power to make them.) The government says, contrary to the court of appeals’ assumption, that presidents made intra-session recess appointments “in every year before 1943 in which there was an intra-session recess of significant duration.” It claims that “[a]t least fourteen Presidents have, collectively, made at least 600 civilian appointments (and thousands of military ones) during intra-session recesses.” And it contends that the practice was endorsed in a 1921 attorney general opinion and described as “the accepted view” in a 1948 comptroller general opinion. It says that nearly all presidents after President Truman made intra-session recess appointments, and that opinions of the attorney general, the Office of Legal Counsel, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit all reaffirmed the validated of intra-session recess appointments during that most recent period.
Noel Canning argues that the plain language of the Clause means that the president can exercise his recess appointment power only during inter-session recesses. Noel Canning claims that the Clause links “the Recess” with the “next Session,” so that “the Recess” refers only to inter-session breaks. It says that the Clause makes “the Recess” and the “Session” alternating states, so that “the Recess” must fall between “Session[s],” that is, formal, numbered Sessions of the Senate (and not daily “sessions”). Stated only slightly differently, Noel Canning contends that the plain language means that the Senate cannot be in “the Recess” and “the Session” at the same time—a condition necessary to support the government’s reading.
Noel Canning argues that the original understanding and historical practice support its plain reading of the Clause. It says that its reading is supported by “every executive or congressional official to construe the Clause prior to 1948,” by early commentators, and by other ratification-era documents and provisions. As to the historical practice, it claims that no president other than Andrew Johnson even attempted to make a recess appointment during an intra-session recess before 1921.
Finally, Noel Canning argues that the government’s position is not supported by the text, original meaning, or historical practice. Instead, it contends, the government’s position is simply the latest in a relatively recent series of increasingly aggressive assertions by the executive branch of mid-session recess appointment power.
Did the Vacancies Happen During the Recess?
The government argues that the Recess Appointments Clause authorizes the president to fill vacancies that exist during the recess, and not just those that arose during the recess. The government claims that the phrase “Vacancies that may happen during the Recess” is ambiguous (as recognized by President Jefferson in 1802 and by Attorney General Wirt in 1823), but can reasonably be read to include vacancies that exist during the recess. It says that this reading best serves the Clause’s purposes, to allow the president to fill all vacancies that occur. It claims that the contrary reading would cause offices to remain vacant “solely because prior occupants died or resigned—or those offices were first established—shortly before, rather than shortly after, a recess began.
The government also argues that long-standing practice supports this reading. The government says that since the 1820s, the vast majority of presidents have made recess appointments to fill vacancies that arose before a recess and existed during the recess. It claims that this practice was supported by a series of attorney general opinions and every court of appeals prior to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling here. The government says that before 1823, contrary to the court of appeals’ assumption, there was no settled understanding of this issue. But it contends that “there were indications from each of the first four Presidents—including actual appointments by Washington, Jefferson, and Madison—that recess appointments can indeed be used to fill vacancies that pre-existed the recess.”
Noel Canning argues that the plain text supports its position. In particular, it says that the Clause’s requirement that the vacancy must “happen during” “the Recess” means that the vacancy must arise during the recess. It says that the government’s contrary reading would erase the phrase “may happen during” from the Clause.
Noel Canning argues that its reading is supported by the original understanding and historical practice. It says that the first four presidents understood that the Clause was limited to those vacancies that arose during the recess, as did the Senate and numerous courts until the late nineteenth century. It contends that the executive branch’s longstanding practice “has been more equivocal than [the government] lets on,” and that the “Senate’s resistance more robust.” But in any event, it claims, that the political branches’ practices cannot override the Clause’s plain language and its structural protection against presidential overreach.
Did This Break Constitute a Recess?
The government argues that the Senate’s 20-day break, with only fleeting pro forma sessions in which no business was to be conducted, was a “recess” under the Recess Appointments Clause. The government claims that both the Senate (since 1905) and the president (since 1921) have formally recognized that the Senate is in “recess” under the Clause when the Senate’s members do not have to attend sessions and when the Senate cannot receive communications from the president or participate in making appointments. The government contends that these conditions held during the 20-day period here, notwithstanding the periodic pro forma sessions.
The government argues that the mere possibility that the Senate might have overturned its unanimous consent agreement, recalled its members, and conducted business cannot change this. The government contends that if that possibility alone meant that the president could not make a recess appointment, then the recess appointment power would be dormant anytime the Senate might come back into session, including during traditional inter-session recesses.
The government argues that historical practice does not support the use of pro forma sessions to prevent the president from making recess appointments. The government says that no president has acknowledged that pro forma sessions would prevent him from making a recess appointment, and that there is no settled presidential acquiescence in the practice of using pro forma sessions to frustrate a president’s use of the recess appointment power. Moreover, the government claims that the use of pro forma sessions by the House and Senate to comply with the Adjournment Clause (which prevents either house from adjourning for more than three days without the consent of the other) does not provide precedent for the Senate’s use of pro forma sessions here. The government says that the better view of this practice is that pro forma sessions do not satisfy the Adjournment Clause.
Finally, the government argues that the Senate’s use of pro forma sessions to frustrate the president’s exercise of his recess appointment power disrupts the balance of powers in Article II. The government says that this gambit—which the Senate has used since 2007 “to string together breaks in business lasting as long as 47 days”—would undermine the president’s constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
Noel Canning argues that the president cannot make recess appointments when the Senate convenes pro forma sessions every three days. It claims that the Senate has used pro forma sessions for a variety of purposes since 1854 (including for Adjournment Clause purposes), that the executive has recognized the validity of those sessions, and that presidents have historically refrained from recess appointments during pro forma sessions. Noel Canning contends that the executive branch previously acknowledged that pro forma sessions count under the Clause, and that this administration previously “expressly recognized that pro forma sessions preclude recess appointments.” (At oral argument in New Process Steel v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, in 2010, Neal Katyal, then Principal Deputy Solicitor General, said, in response to a question from Chief Justice Roberts on the recess appointment power: “I think our office has opined the recess has to be longer than 3 days.” But just four days later, President Obama made a recess appointment to the NLRB.)
Noel Canning argues that pro forma sessions are actual and legitimate Senate sessions, with the capability of conducting business. Noel Canning says that this is so regardless of whether members have to attend. It also claims that the president has no authority to second-guess the Senate’s internal operations, including its use of pro forma sessions.
This case threatens a key practice by presidents of both parties in filling executive vacancies in the face of an obstructionist Senate and ensuring the continued operations of executive departments. The appendices in the government’s merits brief, detailing recess appointments starting from the Washington administration, show just how widely this practice has been used—and how a rejection of the practice could threaten so many appointments and operations of the executive branch. The facts of this case well illustrate that threat: President Obama made his recess appointments to the NLRB in order to sidestep Senate obstructionism; without valid recess appointments, the NLRB would have had no authority to enforce the National Labor Relations Act.
But the case threatens more than just this particular NLRB. As the government writes in its certiorari brief, “[t]he decision potentially calls into question every final decision of the Board since January 4, 2012,” earlier Board orders, and the actions of “almost any federal officer who received a recess appointment during an intra-session recess, or who was appointed to fill a vacancy that did not first arise during the recess in which the appointment was made . . . .” Considering the number of recess appointments (again, identified in the appendices to the government’s merits brief), there may be numerous such actions across the federal bureaucracy.
On the other hand, the case threatens a key Senate tool in checking the president. The Senate’s practice of using pro forma sessions to frustrate the President’s use of the recess-appointment power could be a very effective way for some in the Senate (or even the House, by way of the Adjournment Clause, see below) to advance their own agendas by way of the appointment process.
Aside from its implications, this case marks the latest round in the escalating gamesmanship between both parties in Congress and the White House over executive nominees. That gamesmanship includes (as relevant here) the use of the filibuster in the Senate to frustrate presidential appointments; the president’s use of the recess-appointment power to sidestep a filibuster or other obstruction in the Senate; and congressional efforts to prevent the president from exercising the recess appointment power. Those efforts include pro forma sessions, as in this case, and even House efforts to prevent a recess in the Senate. (For example, in May and June, 2011, Republicans in the Senate and House urged the Speaker of the House John Boehner to “prevent any and all recess appointments by preventing the Senate from recessing for the remainder of the 112th Congress.” The House could do this, because the Adjournment Clause says that “Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .” Between May 12, 2011, and the end of that year, no concurrent resolution of adjournment was introduced in either chamber, and as a result the Senate held pro forma sessions every three days during extended breaks (rather than going on “recess.”) This case is just the latest move in this escalating struggle over nominations.
But the case is probably somewhat less significant than it was just a few months ago. That’s because the Senate’s abolishment of the filibuster in late 2012 for executive and lower court appointments removed a significant block to appointments—one that spurred the president’s use of the recess appointment authority in the first place. If the abolishment of the filibuster continues to mean that the president’s nominees can get a vote in the Senate, the president may not need to resort to the recess appointment power as much. (This could change if the Senate and the White House are controlled by different parties, so that a bare majority of the opposite party in the Senate could reject a nominee, even without resorting to the filibuster.)
There is a way that the Court could dodge the issue entirely. At least one amici, Professor Victor Williams, argued at the certiorari stage and again at the merits stage that the Court should dismiss the case as a nonjusticiable political question. If the Court so ruled, it would reverse the circuit court’s ruling on the constitutional question. That would mean that President Obama’s recess appointments to the NLRB would be valid, and that the circuit court’s ruling on the merits (against Noel Canning) would stand.
Rachel Maddow posits the possibility that the scandal surrounding New Jersey Governor Chris Christie and the traffic jam by the city of Fort Lee at the George Washington Bridge may have less to do with the election than with the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Much of Maddow's conjecture rests on the timing of the now infamous email "Time for some traffic problems in Fort Lee," sent on the morning of August 13, 2013 by a top Christie aide from her private email account to a Port of Authority official who responded "Got it."
But to understand the Maddow theory, one needs to return to 2010. Recall that as we discussed in May 2010, there was a potential "constitutional conflict" brewing over Governor Christie's non-"reappointment" of John Wallace, then the only African-American of the seven state justices on the New Jersey Supreme Court. And recall also that despite objections from retired members of the judicary, Christie reportedly found "laughable" any notion that politics was not part of the judicial appointment process, pointing to the fact that there would be another election in 2013.
But John Wallace was not the only NJ Supreme Court Justice whose reappointment would be at issue during Christie's first term. Another Justice, supported by Christie, was due before the Senate. And the NJ Senate Democrats - - - led by a legislator from Fort Lee - - - may not have been being co-operative. In any case, Christie withdrew his reappointment of that Justice the evening before the GW Bridge lane closures began.
Here's the video from the Rachel Maddow Show:
Worth a read with details is the discussion of MSNBC's Steve Benen.
Friday, December 13, 2013
The Senate yesterday confirmed Nina Pillard (Georgetown) to the D.C. Circuit, after previously filibustering her nomination. (The Senate earlier this week confirmed Patricia Millett, another earlier filibustered nominee.)
Think Progress has a really nice piece comparing Pillard to Ruth Bader Ginsburg on her contribution to women's rights, and predicting that she'll "imediately rocket to the top of the Democratic shortlist of potential nominees to the Supreme Court." From TP:
Pillard was a member of the legal team in United States v. Virginia, which eliminated the Virginia Military Institute's discriminatory policies against women and cemented the rule that no law may engage in gender discrimination unless there is an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for doing so. Seven years later, Pillard argued and won Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, an important case helping women (and men) with families have a fair opportunity to participate in the workplace.
Indeed, it is likely that there is only one other judge currently on the bench who accomplished as much as a litigator for women's rights as Judge Pillard did in her career as an attorney--Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.
Thursday, November 21, 2013
Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced today that he's proposing changes to the Senate rules that would abolish the filibuster for most judicial and executive branch nominees. Reid's proposal would reportedly retain the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees.
Reid is reportedly prepared to go nuclear--that is, to change the rules by a simple majority vote.
Reid's proposal comes on the heels of three successful filibusters in as many weeks by Senate Republicans of President Obama's picks for the D.C. Circuit.
Monday, November 18, 2013
Senate Republicans once again successfully blocked a nominee for the D.C. Circuit. Today's vote, 38 to 53, fell seven short of the 60 needed to overcome the Republican filibuster of Robert Wilkins's nomination to the court. Politico reports here.
Some Senate Democrats are making more noise about using the nuclear option, that is, getting rid of the filibuster (the cloture rule) for judicial nominees. Republicans (still) say that the court isn't busy enough to fill the three vacancies, and that they're just doing the same thing that Democrats did when they blocked President Bush's nominee to the court, Peter Keisler.
Active judges on the court are evenly divided between those appointed by Democrats and those appointed by Republicans. But five of the court's six senior judges--who still sit and decide cases--are appointed by conservatives. Indeed, 15 of the last 19 appointments to the court were by Republican presidents.
Tuesday, November 12, 2013
The Senate failed to break a Republican-led filibuster today on President Obama's nomination of Nina Pillard to the D.C. Circuit. The vote on the cloture motion was 56-41, but 60 votes are needed to close debate.
The move marks the second time in two weeks that Republicans have successfully filibustered President Obama's nominees to the D.C. Circuit. The last failed cloture vote came on October 31, on Patricia Millett's nomination.
Republicans complain that the President is trying to "stack" this court, often called the second most important court in the country. But that's not exactly right: Democratic Presidents still have a ways to make up with their nominees on the court, as we explained here. The American Constitution Society's JudicialNominations.org has more information about judicial vacancies, including the D.C. Circuit, here.
No word whether the Democrats will use the nuclear option (and eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominations), but TPM Livewire reports that Senate Grassley "dared Democrats to 'go ahead,'" warning that such a move would make it easier for future Republicans "to appoint judges like Antonin Scalia."
Thursday, October 31, 2013
Senate Republicans today successfully filibustered Patricia Millett's nomination for the D.C. Circuit. The Senate voted 55-38 to end debate and proceed to a vote on the nomination, but the body needed 60 votes under Senate rules. The Republicans' move blocks the nomination, unless and until the Senate can muster 60 votes, or changes its rules.
Millett would fill one of three vacancies on the court. The Republicans' move means that this exceptionally important court--often called the second most important court in the country--continues to operate three shy of a full bench. The move also means that the court continues to be dominated by judges appointed by Republican presidents (despite Republicans' argues to the contrary). (There's an even split among the active judges, but judges appointed by Republicans are dominant among the semi-retired. Those semi-retired judges still sit and help decide cases.) Finally, the move means that a supremely well qualified nominee who receieved bipartisan praise won't get the nod from the Senate, despite receiving a majority to proceed to a vote.
No word yet whether Democrats will use the nuclear option and try to change the filibuster rule to bypass Republican obstruction, or whether leaders will come up with some other way to proceed.
UPDATE: Here's a link to the roll-call (h/t Glenn Sugameli).
Wednesday, October 30, 2013
Millett's nomination comes before the full Senate tomorrow, and there's indication that Republicans could filibuster. If so, Senator Leahy is quoted in the NYT, "I think that the pressure on changing the [cloture] rules would be almost insurmountable." Democrats will have 55 votes in the Senate tomorrow, after Cory Booker, newly elected Democrat of New Jersey, is seated. That means that they need to pick up five Republicans to close debate.
Meanwhile, the House Judiciary Committee joined the fray, holding a hearing yesterday titled, "Are More Judges Always the Answer?" The thrust of the hearing--and one of the Republicans' argument against Millett's appointment: the D.C. Circuit doesn't do enough work to justify filling the seat. (There are currently three vacancies on the court.)
Republicans also argue that President Obama is trying to "stack" the court with judges who will be friendly to his regulatory agenda. (The court is now evenly split between judges appointed by Republican presidents and judges appointed by Democats.)
Wednesday, October 23, 2013
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (D.D.C.) dismissed a separation-of-powers challenge to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, an independent agency created by Dodd-Frank that's tasked with the responsibility for "ensuring that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive." (This case challenges the CFPB on separation-of-powers grounds. We most recently posted on the other challenge to the recess-appointed head of the CFPB here. The recess appointment question is heading to the Supreme Court in Noel Canning.)
But the order dismissing the case in the D.C. District didn't touch the merits, and the plaintiffs in the D.C. case will undoubtedly raise the same constitutional claims in the underlying enforcement action against them in the Central District of California.
The case, Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, arose after the CFPB filed an enforcement action against Morgan Drexen in the Central District of California. Morgan Drexen and its "attorney-client" then filed for injunctive and declaratory relief in the D.C. District, seeking to halt the enforcement action in the Central District of California, arguing that the CFPB violates constitutional separation-of-powers principles. The result: two parallel cases in two different courts, one enforcement action and one facial challenge, challenging the CFPB on constitutional grounds.
Update: Morgan Drexen filed in the D.C. court before the CFPB filed its case in California.
But Judge Kollar-Kotelly didn't bite. Instead, the court ruled that injunctive and declaratory relief in the D.C. District would be inappropriate with the case pending in California--and that Morgan Drexen could obtain complete relief on its claim there. (The court said that ruling on the matter would frustrate both the final judgment rule (because Morgan Drexen could immediately appeal a D.C. District ruling on the merits, but not a ruling from the Central District of California denying a motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds) and the principle of constitutional avoidance (because the Central District of California could dodge the constitutional issues and rule on other grounds, but the D.C. District case would force the court to address the constitutional claims). The court also ruled that declaratory relief was inappropriate.
The court held that Morgan Drexen's "attorney-client" lacked standing, becuase she couldn't point to specific or generalized interference with the attorney-client privilege, or any other harm in the CFPB's investigation or enforcement action against Morgan Drexen.
The case ends this collateral piece of the litigation, but it doesn't end the enforcement action, still pending in the Central District of California. Morgan Drexen raises the same constitutional claims, and other statutory claims, as defenses in that case.
October 23, 2013 in Appointment and Removal Powers, Cases and Case Materials, Congressional Authority, Executive Authority, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Opinion Analysis, Separation of Powers, Standing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
Wednesday, October 16, 2013
Jeffrey Toobin writes in the Daily Comment at The New Yorker that the Noel Canning case on recess appointments, now before the Supreme Court, could lead to an entirely new level of dysfunction in Washington--putting the current crisis to shame. That is, if the Court strikes President Obama's recess appointments to the NLRB. (Our latest post on Noel Canning, with links to earlier posts and lower court rulings, is here.) Toobin explains:
If the ruling by the D.C. Circuit [striking President Obama's recess appointments to the NLRB] is upheld, the result will be a massive shift of power from Presidents to Senate minorities. Forty senators will have the power to stop an agency from functioning. Given the general political inclinations of the contemporary G.O.P., this would be a tremendous victory. They don't want an N.L.R.B. at all, and they don't care for most other regulatory agencies, either. The D.C. Circuit decision is more than a gift of a minority veto on individual members of a commission; it's a minority veto on the very existence of vunerable federal agencies.
The Canning case brings together several themes of recent political life: fierce congressional obstruction of President Obama, aggressive use of the courts by conservative activists, precedent-shattering rulings by conservative judges to undo the work of the democratically elected branches of government. As with so many of these struggles during the Obama era, the outcome is far from certain.
Monday, June 24, 2013
The Supreme Court today agreed to review the President's recess appointment authority. The Court granted cert. to the D.C. Circuit and agreed to hear an appeal in Noel Canning v. NLRB, the case testing the President's authority under the Recess Appointments Clause to appoint members to the NLRB during an intra-session recess in the Senate. Our post on the D.C. Circuit's ruling--holding that the President lacks authority--including links to prior posts, is here.
Recall that the D.C. Circuit ruled President Obama's appointments to the NLRB unconstitutional. The Third Circuit followed suit.
The Supreme Court's move today gives the high court an opportunity to weigh in.
Tuesday, June 4, 2013
President Obama made good today on his earlier plan to simultaneously nominate three people to the D.C. Circuit. The nominations are designed to fill the three vacancies on the court and to force Republicans' hand on judicial nominations. The White House promises an aggressive push to get the three confirmed. The tactic is designed to put a finer public point on Republican foot-dragging on judicial nominations, should the party decide to hold up these three nominees. Roll Call reports here.
The three are: Patricia Ann Millett; Cornelia T.L. Pillard; and Robert Leon Wilkins.
Meanwhile, the Republican line is that the D.C. Circuit is underworked--and that it doesn't need to fill the three vacant seats. Thus Senator Grassley introduced S. 699, which would eliminate the three vacant seats from the D.C. Circuit and reallocate two of them--one to the Second Circuit, and one to the Eleventh Circuit.
Tuesday, May 28, 2013
President Obama plans to simultaneously nominate three judges to the D.C. Circuit, reports the NYT and HuffPo. The nominations would fill the three remaining vacancies on the 11-member court. The reports come the week after the Senate voted 97-0 to approve the President's nomination of Deputy SG Sri Srinivasan--nearly a year after his nomination.
The move is part of a strategy by Senate Democrats to highlight obstruction of judicial nominees by Senate Republicans. Democrats hope that by putting up three nominations at once, Republicans will be less likely to foot-drag (because foot-dragging on three nominations, and not just one, would highlight Republicans' obstruction).
Senate Republicans have reacted, calling the this an effort to "stack the court" (Senator McConnell's words). According to the NYT, Senate Republicans are considering a proposal to eliminate the three empty seats on the court and move two of them to other circuits.
The measure, S. 699, sponsored by Senator Grassley, would eliminate the three seats from the D.C. Circuit, add one seat to the Second Circuit, and add one seat to the Eleventh Circuit. If it could ever get out of the Senate, it would surely meet a veto.
The NYT reports that some Democrats think that Republican overreaching on these nominations could bring enough public pressure to change Senate rules to prohibit filibusters on judicial nominations.
Monday, May 20, 2013
A divided three-judge panel of the Third Circuit last week invalidated President Obama's recess appointment of Craig Becker as a member of the National Labor Relations Board. The ruling, National Labor Relations Board v. New Vista Nursing and Rehabilitation, marks the second time a federal appeals court invalidated President Obama's "intrasession" recess appointments. The first came earlier this year from the D.C. Circuit, in the Noel Canning case. We posted on that case when it came down, and more recently when the government filed for cert. review at the Supreme Court.
The Third Circuit, like the D.C. Circuit before it, ruled that "the Recess of the Senate" in the Recess Appointments Clause refers only to the period between sessions of the Senate, or intersession breaks, and not breaks while the Senate is in session, or intrasession breaks. Because President Obama appointed Becker while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions every three or four days--during intrasession breaks--the court said that Becker's appointment was invalid. And because Becker's appointment was invalid, the NLRB lacked a quorum to issue a bargaining order to a New Jersey nursing facility that was at the center of the dispute.
Judge Greenaway, Jr., wrote a lengthy dissent, stating that "[t]he Majority's rationale undoes an appointments process that has successfully operated within our separation of powers regime for over 220 years."
As we said, the government has already filed its cert. petition in the Noel Canning case. Now with this ruling, the Court is all but certain to take the question up and issue a final ruling on "intrasession" recess appointments.
Wednesday, May 8, 2013
A three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit struck the enforcement mechanisms for the NLRB rule requiring employers to post a notice of employee rights. The ruling yesterday in National Association of Manufacturers v. NLRB means that the NLRB rule is invalid.
The case strikes a blow at the NLRB effort to educate employees on their workplace rights, in an era where union membership is way down (7.3% of the private workforce) and where more and more workers enter the workplace without knowledge of their rights.
The case arose after the NLRB promulgated a rule that required employers to post a notice of employee rights in the workplace. Violation of the rule came with an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. (It also came with a suspension of the running of the six-month period for filing any unfair labor practice charge, and it constituted evidence of unlawful motive in a case in which motive is an issue.)
The rule says,
[a]ll employers subject to the NLRA must post notices to employees, in conspicuous places, informing them of their NLRA rights, together with Board contact information and information concerning basic enforcement procedures . . . .
29 C.F.R. Sec. 104.202(a). (Here's the single-page version of the notice poster.) But the plaintiffs argued that this violated the NLRA and free speech. The court agreed, concluding that the rule violated Section 8(a), which says:
The expressing of any views, arguments, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this [Act], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
The court said that "[a]lthough Section 8(a) precludes the Board from finding noncoercive employer speech to be an unfair labor practice, or evidence of an unfair labor practice, the Board's rule does both."
The court rejected the NLRB's argument that the required post is the Board's speech, not the employer's speech. Comparing Section 8(a) to First Amendment law, the court said that it didn't matter: dissemination of messages gets the same free speech treatment as creation of messages.
The court also rejected the NLRB's argument based on UAW-Labor Employment & Training Corp. v. Chao, (D.C. Cir. 2003), which upheld President Bush's executive order requiring government contractors to post notice at their workplaces informing employees of their rights not to be forced to join a union or to pay union dues for nonrepresentational activities. (The plaintiffs in that case argued only that President Bush's EO was preempted by the NLRA; they lodged no First Amendment claim.) The difference, according to the court: there was no prospect in UAW of a contractor's being charged with an unfair labor practice for failing to post the required notice.
(Two members of the panel, Judges Henderson and Brown, would have gone farther and ruled that the NLRB lacked authority to pomulgate the posting rule.)
The court addressed the preliminary issue whether the NLRB had a quorum when it promulgated the rule, in light of its recent ruling in Noel Canning v. NLRB that President Obama's recess appointments were invalid. But the court held that the NLRB had a quorum when the rule was filed with the Office of the Federal Register (the relevant time), even if it didn't have a quorum when the rule was published.
Friday, April 26, 2013
The Obama Administration filed its Petition for Writ of Certiorari yesterday in NLRB v. Noel Canning, the case testing whether President Obama's recess appointments of three NLRB members satisfied the Recess Appointments Clause.
Recall that the D.C. Circuit ruled that they didn't. (Here's our coverage of the lower court ruling, with links to resources.) That court held that the Recess Appointments Clause permits a recess appointment only during an inter-session recess of Congress (i.e., a recess that occurs between one enumerated session of Congress and the beginning of the next), not an intra-session recess (i.e., a recess that occurs during the course of a session), and that it permits a recess appointment only for vacancies that arise during an inter-session recess. The court said that because President Obama made the appointments during an intra-session recess of Congress, and because the vacancies did not arise during an inter-session recess of Congress, the appointments were invalid.
The government seeks review of both issues--whether the President can exercise the recess-appointment power during an intra-session recess, and whether the President can fill a vacancy that existed (even if not arose) during a recess.
It's a good bet the Court will take this. There's a circuit split, and the stakes are high. As the government explains:
[The decision below] would deem invalid hundreds of recess appointments made by Presidents since early in the Nation's history. It potentially calls into question every order issued by the National Labor Relations Board since January 4, 2012, and similar reasoning could threaten past and future decisions of other federal agencies.
Petition at 11-12.
Friday, April 12, 2013
Garrett Epps writes in the Atlantic that if originalism's aim was to keep judges from writing their personal views into the law, it has been "an abject failure." His evidence? Chief Judge David Sentelle's ruling in Noel Canning v. NLRB, the D.C. Circuit's January ruling striking President Obama's recess appointments to the NLRB.
Epps criticizes Judge Sentelle's ruling as putting a 1755 definition over the consistent executive practice based on a practical concern, getting the government's business done, and judicial precedent:
For at least a century, presidents--with congressional acquiescence--have interpreted [the Appointments Clause] as giving them the ability to make appointments any time when the Senate is not in session. But Chief Judge David Sentelle looked up the six-word entry for "the" in Samuel Johnson's Dictionary of the English Language, published in 1755, and found that its "original public meaning" was "noting a particular thing," meaning that there can be one and only one "recess" of the Senate.
Epps notes that the Noel Canning rule would have voided 232 appointments under President Reagan, 78 under President G.H.W. Bush, 139 under President Clinton, and 171 under G.W. Bush. Appointees include Alan Greenspan and Lawrence Eagleburger.
Epps points to a recent Congressional Research Service report, The Recess Appointment Power After Noel Canning v. NLRB: Constitutional Implications. The CRS issued a companion report, Practical Implications of Noel Canning on the NLRB and CFPB.
Wednesday, April 10, 2013
The Senate Judiciary Committee begins hearings today (2:30 EDT) on President Obama's nomination of Principal Deputy Solicitor General Sri Srinivasan to the D.C. Circuit. The Committee web-cast is here.
Tuesday, April 9, 2013
President Obama today sent three nominations for full terms at the NLRB to the Senate--a renomination of Board chair Mark Pearce, a Democrat, and nominations of two Republicans. The President nominated two Democrats to full terms in February.
The nominations come just months after the D.C. Circuit ruled in Canning v. NLRB that the President's recess appointments to the Board were invalid. According to TPM, the administration plans to appeal that decision, but in the meantime it "has prompted more than 100 businesses to claim the board lacks authority to take action against them becuase two of its members are not there legitimately."
Thursday, February 14, 2013
The Senate this week reauthorized the Violence Against Women Act and added a provision authorizing Native American Indian tribal courts to try non-Indians for acts of violence against Native American tribal members. The provision, Section 904 of the Senate-passed VAWA, caught the attention of some on the right, who claim it's unconstitutional.
The Heritage Foundation outlined the argument in a post today. According to the post, congressional extension of tribal jurisdiction to non-Indians violates the Appointments Clause and the life-tenure provision in Article III. The reason, according to the post, is simple: tribal judges aren't appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause, and they don't meet the requirements of Article III. They therefore can't mete out punishment against non-Indians.
To unpack this, it helps to understand the debate between congressionally delegated power to tribes versus inherent power of tribes. Advocates of the congressionally-delegated view say that tribes operate pursuant to congressional delegation, and therefore the full force of the Constitution applies. Advocates of the inherent power view say that tribes have inherent sovereignty and authority on their lands, and that they operate pursuant to their own rules and any overriding congressional requirements.
The Supreme Court has weighed in, but barely. It ruled in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe that tribal courts lacked inherent authority over non-Indians, but it suggested that Congress could extend their authority to reach non-Indians. In United States v. Lara, the Court ruled that Congress has authority to relax the restrictions on a tribe's inherent sovereignty to allow it to exercise inherent authority to try non-member Indians.
The Heritage Foundation piece takes the congressionally-delegated-power view. This means, as the piece argues, that the Constitution applies with full force over the tribal courts, and that if they exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians, they, like regular Article III courts, have to meet constitutional requirements. (You might ask why the piece didn't argue that they similarly have to meet due process requirements. The reason: Congress extended due process protections in the earlier Indian Civil Rights Act and in the VAWA itself.)
The Senate took the inherent-authority view. Thus Section 904 of the VAWA says, "the powers of self-government of a participating tribe include the inherent power of that tribe, which is hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over all persons." (Emphasis added.)
Which view is right? Well, the Court has suggested in both Oliphant and Lara that the inherent-authority view is correct. But that view might not get five Justices on the current Court. So we're not sure how the Court would rule.
The Congressional Research Service has a terrific report on the issue here.