Monday, June 27, 2016

United States Supreme Court Reaffirms Abortion Access in Whole Woman's Health

The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstdet (previously Cole), declares unconstitutional both the admitting privileges and surgical center requirements of the controversial Texas HB2 statute passed in 2013 (despite the famous filibuster by Wendy Davis).  Justice Breyer, writing for the five Justice majority found that the regulations place a substantial obstacle and constitute an undue burden on the abortion right.

In the first case to address abortion since 2008, the Court clearly reaffirmed the substantial obstacle/undue burden test and found that the Texas' statutory scheme was too restrictive. The divisions amongst the Justices was clear in oral arguments and previous proceedings (a divided Supreme Court previously vacated the Fifth Circuit stay of the district judge's injunction against portions of the law, thus reinstating the district judge's injunction at least in part).

The bulk of the 107 page opinions is Justice Alito's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.  (Note that even if Justice Scalia was still on the bench, the result would have been the same).  Justice Thomas also wrote separately.

Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court rebuked the Fifth Circuit for incorrect doctrine.  

The Court of Appeals’ articulation of the relevant standard is incorrect. The first part of the Court of Appeals’ test may be read to imply that a district court should not consider the existence or nonexistence of medical benefits when considering whether a regulation of abortion constitutes an undue burden. The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws confer. And the second part of the test is wrong to equate the judicial review applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue. The Court of Appeals’ approach simply does not match the standard that this Court laid out in Casey, which asks courts to consider whether any burden imposed on abortion access is “undue.”

The statement that legislatures, and not courts, must resolve questions of medical uncertainty is also inconsistent with this Court’s case law.

[citations omitted].

With the correct standard (re)articulated, the Court then carefully considered the "record evidence" in this extensive litigation and agreed with the district judge that the Texas regulations placed substantial obstacles in the path of women seeking abortions, thus meeting the undue burden test.  The Court also found that the Texas restrictions did little to serve the state's articulated interests in protecting women's health and may actually have undermined the state's interests.

On the admitting privileges requirement, the Court rehearsed the expert evidence at trial and also pointed to amicus briefs, both to explain the context of admitting privileges and the effect of the requirement (including clinic closures). As to the relation to the state's articulated interest in women's health, the Court added:

when directly asked at oral argument whether Texas knew of a single instance in which the new requirement would have helped even one woman obtain better treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of such a case.

The Court also specifically refuted the dissenting opinion's reliance on a well-known Pennsylvania scandal involving Gosnell:

Gosnell’s deplorable crimes could escape detection only because his facility went uninspected for more than 15 years.  Pre-existing Texas law already contained numerous detailed regulations covering abortion facilities, including a requirement that facilities be inspected at least annually.

 Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court engaged in a similar analysis as to the surgical center requirement.  Again, the Court stated that the mandate does not serve the stated interests in women's health" "many surgical-center requirements are inappropriate as applied to surgical abortions."  And again, the Court found that the record evidence as well as "common sense" meant that the (unnecessary) requirements would result in clinic closures which would result in a substantial obstacle to women's reproductive access.

While the Court's opinion is often very specific, Ginsburg's separate but very brief concurrence briefly strikes a broader note:

When a State severely limits access to safe and legal procedures, women in desperate circumstances may resort to unlicensed rogue practitioners, faute de mieux, at great risk to their health and safety.

But whether one takes the specific or broader view, Whole Women's Health is a clear message to lower courts that their judicial function is to apply the current rule in a rigorous manner to preserve abortion access.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2016/06/reaffirms-abortion-access-whole-womans-health.html

Abortion, Due Process (Substantive), Fundamental Rights, Gender, Opinion Analysis | Permalink

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