Wednesday, April 29, 2015
Florida Governor Rick Scott filed suit yesterday against the federal government arguing that its move to take away the state's Low Income Pool money compels the state to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act--all in violation of the anti-commandeering principle and the "gun to the head" principle in NFIB v. Sebelius.
We posted on Florida's LIP and the constitutional issues here. The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities just put out a very helpful backgrounder here.
In short, LIP is a federal program that pays health-care providers for uncompensated care for the poor. Medicaid, and the ACA's Medicaid expansion, pays directly for health care for that same population.
The lawsuit argues that the federal government threatened to take away the state's LIP money unless the state expands Medicaid under the ACA--and that this amounts to unconstitutional coercion in violation of federalism principles and the Tenth Amendment under NFIB.
But the case is a sham. The federal government doesn't appear to be strong-arming Florida into expanding Medicaid as much as it appears to prefer to spend money directly on health insurance for the poor instead of paying for uncompensated care for them. That's a policy choice that the federal government can make. States have no entitlement to LIP money, or to any particular federal approach to providing health care for the poor. And when the feds take away LIP funds, Florida's choice is clear: figure out a way to cover care for the poor, or don't.
Governor Scott claims that this isn't a real choice, because the state can't afford to let the poor go without health insurance. If that's right, he can implement his own program, or he can expand Medicaid. This hardly seems like compulsion.
The case is obviously politically, and not constitutionally, motivated, and probably has little chance of success on the merits. "Probably," because so many thought the same thing about NFIB, before the Court got a hold of it.
There's another commonality with NFIB: Governor Scott hired Paul Clement to represent him.
The case centers around Oklahoma's use of midazolam as the first drug in the cocktail. In particular the case asks whether midazolam, a sedative, reliably induces a sufficiently pain-free state so that the condemned prisoner wouldn't feel the intense pain associated with the second drug, potassium chloride. (Everyone agrees that potassium chloride alone causes intense pain and suffering. The pain is described as burning alive, or burning from the inside out.) If so, there's probably no constitutional problem with midazolam. (Under Baze, the Court upheld a different lethal injection protocol on the assumption, supported in the record, that the first drug reliably produced a deep, coma-like unconsciousness.) If not, however, Oklahoma's protocol may violate the Eighth Amendment.
But there's a problem: Nobody seems to know for sure. More: the state's expert's testimony at trial on a key point about how midazolam works was wrong--so much so that the state itself backed away from that testimony. That means that the district court's ruling, based on its conclusion that midazolam sufficiently protects against pain, based on the state's expert's testimony, is seriously flawed. (Justice Kagan described it as "gobbledygook." That seems about right.)
The Court focused principally on two questions today. The first, whether the state's use of midazolam reliably induces a sufficiently pain-free state so that the condemned prisoner wouldn't suffer from potassium chloride, seemed to divide the Court along conventional ideological lines. The progressive wing went with the condemned (against the use of midazolam), and the conservatives went with the state. The second question--whether the petitioners bear the burden to show that midazolam does not induce the state (and to identify a constitutional alternative for the state), or whether the state bears the burden to show that its use of midazolam does not cause intense pain and suffering--divided the Court the same way.
Justice Kennedy is probably the swing vote, but he was relatively quiet today. He only piped up when the arguments turned to whether the petitioners contributed to the problem in the first place. (Oklahoma started using midazolam because it couldn't gain access to the barbiturate drugs that more reliably protect against pain--and that the Court upheld in Baze. Oklahoma can't gain access to the barbiturate drugs because manufacturers have stopped supplying them, for ethical reasons, for use in lethal injections. Justice Alito suggested that opponents of the death penalty contributed to that situation, and that the Court shouldn't be complicit in this "guerrilla war" against the death penalty.) Justice Kennedy simply asked what relevance this all had to the case. Answer from the petitioners: none.
On one level, the case asks pretty narrow and technical questions about a particular drug and the burdens in proving an Eighth Amendment violation under Baze.
But on another level, the case potentially strikes a serious blow against the death penalty itself. That's because if the Court strikes Oklahoma's use of midazolam (whatever it does with the burden), Oklahoma and other lethal-injection states will have to look to a much less attractive alternative--something like electrocution, the gas chamber, or even a firing squad. (That's "much less attractive" on the barbarity scale, not the constitutional one (alas).) Some states have already moved in this direction. If that happens across the board, moves like this could erode public support for the death penalty. And if that's true, a ruling for the petitioners could be much more than a narrow, technical ruling on lethal injections: it could strike a serious practical blow against the death penalty itself.
In a likely response to last week's decision by a federal district judge that the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) must accept an anti-Muslim advert (representing that Jihad means "Kill Jews"), the MTA today amended its advertising policy to exclude all political advertisements.
The new policy's purpose is to"convert the MTA’s Property from a designated public forum into a limited public forum by excluding advertising of a political nature." The new policy prohibits advertising that:
Is political in nature, including but not limited to advertisements that either:
Are directed or addressed to the action, inaction, prospective action or policies of a governmental entity, except as permitted in Sections IV.A.2–IV.A.3 of this Policy [governing advertising by the MTA itself or government agencies]; or
Prominently or predominately advocate or express a political message, including but not limited to an opinion, position, or viewpoint regarding disputed economic, political, moral, religious or social issues or related matters, or support for or opposition to disputed issues or causes.
The issue of anti-Muslim adverts on public transportation has caused much activity in the courts. The new MTA policy is similar to one considered by the Sixth Circuit which found a rejection of an anti-Muslim advertisement in southern Michigan buses by the governmental authority SMART to be constitutional under SMART's policy prohibiting several categories of advertising including "political or political campaign advertising."
[UPDATE: Here's some reporting on the issue by NPR's NYC station.]
In a well-crafted but hardly surprising opinion in Abu-Jamal v. Kane, Chief Judge Christopher Conner of the Middle District of Pennsylvania concluded that Pennsylvania's "Revictimization Relief Act" is unconstitutional.
Recall that Act provided:
In addition to any other right of action and any other remedy provided by law, a victim of a personal injury crime may bring a civil action against an offender in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain injunctive and other appropriate relief, including reasonable attorney fees and other costs associated with the litigation, for conduct which perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim.
At the time of signing, it was clear that the Act was primarily directed at Mumia Abu-Jamal; Abu-Jamal brought suit soon after the Act was passed; another challenge was brought by Prison Legal News and consolidated.
Judge Conner began his opinion by noting that the First Amendment does not "evanesce" at the prison gate, and ended it by stating that the First Amendment does not "evanesce at any gate." (emphasis in original). In applying well-settled First Amendment doctrine, Judge Conner focused on both Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Board (1991) (holding unconstitutional the so-called "Son of Sam" law) and Snyder v. Phelps (2011) (essentially holding that free speech trumped the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). Judge Conner easily rejected the State's argument that the statute regulated "conduct" - - - which is, after all, the word in the statute and which would merit lower scrutiny - - - noting that:
throughout its brief legislative gestation, the law was championed primarily as a device for suppressing offender speech. The Act's sponsor extolled its capacity to silence Abu-Jamal in particular. The chairman of the house judiciary committee opined that the Act would end the "extreme distress" suffered by victims when offenders achieve celebrity, admonishing Goddard College for providing a "cold blooded murderer" [Abu-Jamal] with a speaking forum.
(emphasis in original; citations to Stipulation omitted). As a content-regulation, the Act "instantly fails" the exacting scrutiny standard according to Judge Conner.
In addition to the content-restriction fatality, Judge Conner found that the Act was impermissibly vague and substantially overbroad as those doctrines are derived from due process. The Act's "central limitation" turns on the unknowable emotive response of victims, which a person cannot determine "short of clairvoyance." Moreover, the Act applies to "offenders," a term the statute does not define, and which could presumably apply to a wide swath of persons, including non-offender third parties who publish statements by offenders. Relatedly, the overbreadth defect of the Act concerned the judge:
[T]he Act ostensibly affects protected - - - and critically important - - - speech, including: pardon applications, clemency petitions, and any testimony given in connections with those filings; public expressions of innocence, confessions, or apologies; legislative testimony in support of improved prison conditions and reformed juvenile justice systems; programs encouraging at-risk youth to avoid lives of crime; or any public speech or written work whatsoever, regardless of the speaker's intention or the work's relation to the offense.
In other words, if the victim can demonstrate "mental anguish," the statute would be satisfied. And, combined with the broad notion of "offender," taken to its "logical conclusion," the Act would "limit an accused person's right to profess his innocence before proven guilty."
Pennsylvania would be wise not to appeal this judgment. It would have even been more wise if the legislature had not passed - - - and the Governor had not signed - - - such a patently unconstitutional statute last year.
In its 5-4 opinion in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, the Court concluded that Florida's Code of Judicial Conduct 7C(1) prohibiting the personal solicitation of campaign funds by judicial candidates does not violate the First Amendment.
From the oral arguments, it did seem as if the opinion would be closely divided, but it was less predictable that Chief Justice Roberts would be writing for the majority upholding Florida's Canon7C(1). In the majority opinion, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in full, and by Ginsburg except as to part II, Roberts began:
Our Founders vested authority to appoint federal judges in the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen- ate, and entrusted those judges to hold their offices during good behavior. The Constitution permits States to make a different choice, and most of them have done so. In 39 States, voters elect trial or appellate judges at the polls. In an effort to preserve public confidence in the integrity of their judiciaries, many of those States prohibit judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting funds for their campaigns. We must decide whether the First Amendment permits such restrictions on speech.
We hold that it does. Judges are not politicians, even when they come to the bench by way of the ballot. And a State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial candidates like campaigners for political office. A State may assure its people that judges will apply the law without fear or favor—and without having personally asked anyone for money. We affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court.
However, writing only for a plurality, Chief Justice Roberts, relying on Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002), held that a "State may restrict the speech of a judicial candidate only if the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest." The plurality rejected the Florida Bar's argument, supported by several amici, that the Canon should be subject to the more permissive standard of Buckley v. Valeo (1976) requiring that the law be “closely drawn” to match a “sufficiently important interest.” It concluded that the “closely drawn” standard is a "poor fit" for this case which is a claimed violation of a right to free speech rather than a claimed violation of “freedom of political association.”
Justice Ginsburg, concurring, reiterated her dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White regarding the standard of review, and emphasized that the Court's "recent campaign-finance decisions, trained on political actors, should not hold sway for judicial elections," specifically discussing Citizens United (2010) and McCutcheon (2014). Justice Breyer, who joined the Chief Justice's opinion in full, nevertheless wrote briefly regarding the standard of review, reiterating his previous statements that he views "this Court’s doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny as guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied."
Despite the highest scrutiny, however, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion for the Court declared that
Canon 7C(1) advances the State’s compelling interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary, and it does so through means narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessarily abridging speech. This is therefore one of the rare cases in which a speech restriction withstands strict scrutiny.
The Court found that “protecting the integrity of the judiciary” and “maintaining the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary” were both compelling governmental interests. (The Court did not discuss a specific interest of lawyers or their clients in judicial integrity). As to the narrow tailoring, the Court rejected the "underinclusive" argument - - - essentially that judicial candidates could indirectly solicit campaign funds - - - by noting that while underinclusivity may raise a "red flag," there is no "freestanding 'underinclusiveness limitation.'” Here, the Court concluded that
personal solicitation by judicial candidates implicates a different problem than solicitation by campaign committees. However similar the two solicitations may be in substance, a State may conclude that they present markedly different appearances to the public. Florida’s choice to allow solicitation by campaign committees does not undermine its decision to ban solicitation by judges.
There are three dissenting opinions by the Justices: Scalia, joined by Thomas; Kennedy, and Alito. As the author of Caperton v. Massey, on which the Court partially relies for its compelling governmental interest in judicial integrity, Kennedy's opinion is perhaps most noteworthy. (And recall that Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Caperton). Caperton, based in due process rather than free speech, is uncited in Kennedy's concurring opinion, which focuses on the First Amendment:
This separate dissent is written to underscore the irony in the Court’s having concluded that the very First Amendment protections judges must enforce should be lessened when a judicial candidate’s own speech is at issue. It is written to underscore, too, the irony in the Court’s having weakened the rigors of the First Amendment in a case concerning elections, a paradigmatic forum for speech and a process intended to protect freedom in so many other manifestations.
At the crux of Kennedy's dissent, as the other dissents, is the similarity of judicial elections to political elections. The distinction - - - or lack thereof - - - between judicial and other elections is the linchpin on which the differing views of the case pivot. Chief Justice Roberts ends the Court's opinion with an originalist reflection on that distinction:
The desirability of judicial elections is a question that has sparked disagreement for more than 200 years. Hamilton believed that appointing judges to positions with life tenure constituted “the best expedient which can be devised in any government to secure a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws.” The Federalist No. 78, at 465. Jefferson thought that making judges “dependent on none but themselves” ran counter to the principle of “a government founded on the public will.” 12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 5 (P. Ford ed. 1905). The federal courts reflect the view of Hamilton; most States have sided with Jefferson. Both methods have given our Nation jurists of wisdom and rectitude who have devoted themselves to maintaining “the public’s respect . . . and a reserve of public goodwill, without becoming subservient to public opinion.” Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. Rich. L. Rev. 579, 596 (2004).
It is not our place to resolve this enduring debate. Our limited task is to apply the Constitution to the question presented in this case. Judicial candidates have a First Amendment right to speak in support of their campaigns. States have a compelling interest in preserving public confidence in their judiciaries. When the State adopts a narrowly tailored restriction like the one at issue here, those principles do not conflict. A State’s decision to elect judges does not compel it to compromise public confidence in their integrity.
Tuesday, April 28, 2015
The Court today heard oral arguments in two parts in the consolidated cases of Obergefell v. Hodges on certiorari from the Sixth Circuit opinion which had created a split in the circuits on the issue of the constitutionality of same-sex marriage bans. There have been a record number of amicus briefs filed in the cases highlighting the interest in the case.
For oral argument on the first certified question - - -does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex? - - - Mary Bonauto argued for the Petitioners; Solicitor Donald Verrilli argued for the United States as amicus curiae supporting Petitioners; and John Bursh, as Special Assistant Attorney for Michigan argued for Respondents.
For oral argument on the second certified question - - - does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? - - -Douglas Hallward-Driemeier argued for Petitioners and Joseph Whalen, Associate Solicitor General of Tennessee, argued for Respondents.
The Court and the advocates acknowledged that the second question is only reached if the first question is answered in the negative: Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan both posited this principle with Hallward-Driemeier and Whalen, respectively, agreeing. Chief Justice Roberts noted that" we only get to the second question if you've lost on that point already, if we've said States do not have to recognize same-sex marriage as a marriage," and later raised the issue of whether the second question made practical sense:
It certainly undermines the State interest that we would, assuming arguendo, have recognized in the first case, to say that they must welcome in their borders people who have been married elsewhere. It'd simply be a matter of time until they would, in effect, be recognizing that within the State.
The themes of the oral arguments held no surprising issues:
Is a same-sex marriage decision by the Court premature? Interestingly, Justice Kennedy pointed out that it is "about the same time between Brown and Loving as between Lawrence and this case. It's about 10 years."
Should it be the Court or the states that should decide? The question of the proper role of judicial review has long preoccupied the courts in the context of same-sex marriage. Justice Scalia raised this issue several times, but when John Bursh raised it on behalf of Michigan, Justice Kagan responded that "we don't live in a pure democracy; we live in a constitutional democracy."
Is the race analogy apt? Bursch distinguished Loving (as well as Turner v. Safley and Zablocki v. Redhail) because previous cases involved man-woman marriage and "States' interest in linking children to their biological" parents.
Is there a slippery slope? What about polygamous and incestuous marriages? What about age of consent laws?
What about religious freedom? How do we know that ministers won't be forced to perform "gay marriages"?
Should the case be resolved on Equal Protection or Due Process? Justice Kennedy asked General Verrilli about Glucksberg, Verrilli replied:
GENERAL VERRILLI: Justice Kennedy, forgive me for answering the question this way. We do recognize that there's a profound connection between liberty and equality, but the United States has advanced only an equal protection argument. We haven't made the fundamental rights argument under Glucksberg. And therefore, I'm not sure it would be appropriate for me not having briefed it to comment on that.
JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, can you tell me why you didn't make the fundamental argument?
GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, because we think well, because we think while we do see that there is, of course, this profound connection, we do think that for reasons like the ones implicit in the Chief Justice's question, that this issue really sounds in equal protection, as we understand it, because the question is equal participation in a State conferred status and institution. And that's why we think of it in equalprotection terms
Counsel, I'm I'm not sure it's necessary to get into sexual orientation to resolve the case. I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can't. And the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn't that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?
The open question is whether the Court's opinion will be as predictable as the questions.
April 28, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Due Process (Substantive), Equal Protection, Federalism, First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Fundamental Rights, Oral Argument Analysis, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)
The Supreme Court will hear a challenge to Oklahoma's three-drug lethal injection protocol tomorrow, the last day of scheduled oral arguments for the Term. Here's an excerpt from my preview of the case, Glossip v. Gross, for the ABA Preview of United States Supreme Court Cases, with permission:
For many years, Oklahoma administered the death penalty using a three-drug lethal-injection protocol that included sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride. The first drug, sodium thiopental, is a fast-acting barbiturate sedative that is designed to induce a deep, coma-like state of unconsciousness in the condemned. The second drug, pancuronium bromide, is a paralytic agent that is designed to inhibit all muscular-skeletal movements, thus paralyzing the diaphragm and stopping respiration. The third drug, potassium chloride, interferes with the electrical signals that stimulate heart contractions and thus induces cardiac arrest.
Since 2010, however, Oklahoma has been unable to obtain the first drug, sodium thiopental, for use in executions. Oklahoma used an alternative barbiturate, pentobarbital, for a brief period, but that drug, too, became unavailable for use in executions. (Oklahoma was not alone. Other states that used sodium thiopental in executions also saw their sources dry up. Those states, too, turned to pentobarbital or a similar barbiturate capable of producing a deep coma. But soon enough, the sources for pentobarbital also dried up.)
So in early 2014, Oklahoma substituted midazolam hydrochloride (midazolam) for sodium thiopental and pentobarbital as the first drug in its protocol. (Oklahoma retained pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride as the second and third drugs, respectively.) Midazolam is a sedative in the benzodiazepine family of drugs. Midazolam and other benzodiazepines are prescribed to treat anxiety disorders and insomnia, to reduce anxiety before general anesthesia, and for conscious sedation in minor outpatient procedures. Unlike barbiturates, midazolam does not reliably produce a deep, coma-like state that would render a person insensate to severe pain; and it is not used as the sole drug to maintain general anesthesia during a painful procedure. (There is some dispute on this point. The state’s expert testified at trial that 500 milligrams would induce and maintain coma-like unconsciousness between its administration and death. The petitioners, however, take issue with the expert’s methodology, as described more below.) Indeed, studies show that although midazolam can cause unconsciousness, a person on midazolam can be “jolted into consciousness” by the infliction of pain. (Midazolam itself does not reduce or relieve pain.) Moreover, midazolam has a “ceiling effect.” This means that beyond a certain dosage, an additional increase in dosage does not produce a corresponding increase in effect.
Oklahoma first used midazolam on April 29, 2014, in its execution of Clayton Lockett. The state administered 100 milligrams of midazolam, and Lockett was declared unconscious seven minutes later. But during the administration of the second and third drugs, Lockett awoke. He writhed in the gurney, bucked his head, and said, “This shit is fucking with my mind,” “Something is wrong,” and “The drugs aren’t working.” Lockett died 24 minutes later. While a subsequent investigation found that a catheter failure caused the drugs to infiltrate Lockett’s tissue instead of directly entering his bloodstream (as they should have), this would not have significantly impacted midazolam’s effectiveness, because it has a rapid absorption rate even when not administered intravenously.
Lockett’s experience was not unique. Ohio and Arizona both used a mixture of midazolam and hydromorphone in executions with similar results. In January 2014, Ohio used 10 milligrams of midazolam and 40 milligrams of hyodromorphone to execute Dennis McGuire. McGuire gasped for nearly ten minutes before his death. In July 2014, Arizona used more of each drug, 750 milligrams of each, to execute Joseph Wood. Wood gasped for nearly two hours before dying.
After its investigation into Lockett’s execution, Oklahoma adopted a new execution protocol, effective September 30, 2014. The new protocol gives the Director of Oklahoma’s Department of Corrections sole discretion to select among four alternative drugs or drug combinations to be used in lethal injection executions. The first alternative calls for the administration of 5,000 milligrams of pentobarbital in a one-drug procedure. The second alternative provides for the administration of 5,000 milligrams of sodium pentothal in a one-drug procedure. The third alternative calls for the administration of 500 milligrams of midazolam and 500 milligrams of hydromorphone. The fourth alternative calls for the administration of 500 milligrams of midazolam, 100 milligrams of vecoronium bromide, and 240 milliequivalents of potassium chloride. The new protocol requires the Director to inform the condemned of his or her decision in writing ten calendar days before the scheduled execution.
Richard Glossip and other death-row prisoners, including Charles Warner, sued Oklahoma and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop the state from carrying out executions in an unconstitutional manner, including through the use of midazolam in a three-drug protocol. The district court denied relief. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
On January 13, 2015, petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court along with an application to stay their scheduled executions. On January 15, 2015, the Court denied the stay application. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, dissented.
That same evening, Oklahoma used its fourth alternative drug combination, which includes midazolam as the first of three drugs, to execute Charles Warner. (This combination is the same combination that the state used to execute Lockett, but with a much higher dose of midazolam.) After Warner was injected with midazolam, but before he was sedated past the point of speech, his last words were reported as “my body is on fire.”
A week later, on January 23, 2015, the Court agreed to hear the appeal. The state then applied for a stay of execution for the remaining three petitioners, asking the Court to stay the executions “until final disposition in Oklahoma’s favor . . . or, alternatively, until [the state] has in its possession a viable alternative to midazolam for use in its executions.” The Court granted the stay on January 28, 2015, ordering that the state’s “executions using midazolam are stayed pending final disposition of this case.”
The Supreme Court upheld a three-drug protocol like Oklahoma’s old protocol, including sodium thiopental as the first drug, seven years ago in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S 35 (2008). In that case, the challengers conceded that an execution under the protocol would be humane and constitutional if performed correctly. But they argued that there was a significant risk that the procedures would not be performed correctly. In particular, they claimed that the sodium thiopental would not be properly administered to achieve its intended effect, thus resulting in severe pain upon the administration of the second and third drugs. The challengers argued that a different protocol—a one-drug protocol using a single dose of sodium thiopental or another barbiturate—would solve this problem.
The Court rejected this argument. A plurality of the Court ruled that the challengers failed to show that the three-drug protocol would create a “substantial risk of serious harm,” an “objectively intolerable risk of harm” that would prevent prison officials from pleading that they were “subjectively blameless for purposes of the Eighth Amendment.” The plurality also held that the challengers failed to show that their proposed alternative effectively addressed a “substantial risk of serious harm.” The plurality wrote,
To qualify, the alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. If a State refuses to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for adhering to its current method of execution, then a State’s refusal to change its method can be viewed as “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment.
The Court in Baze thus articulated the standard for an Eighth Amendment violation. It also set a standard for when a condemned prisoner challenges the administration of a protocol and suggests an alternative.
But this case is different than Baze for two reasons. First, the first drug in Oklahoma’s protocol is midazolam, a sedative, and not sodium thiopental or another barbiturate. As a result, this case raises a new question: whether a lethal injection protocol that includes midazolam as the first drug violates the Eighth Amendment. Next, Glossip and the other challengers (together, Glossip) do not merely take on the administration of the protocol; they challenge the protocol itself. In particular, Glossip does not concede (as the Baze challengers did) that the protocol, if properly administered, is constitutional. Instead, Glossip challenges the protocol itself (even if properly administered). Given these differences, this case asks whether and how the courts should apply the Baze standards to challenges that are meaningfully different than those in Baze itself.
Glossip argues first that Oklahoma’s use of midazolam violates the Eighth Amendment because it creates a “substantial risk of serious harm” or an “objectively intolerable risk of harm” in violation of Baze. Glossip says that unlike properly administered sodium thiopental, midazolam does not reliably induce a deep, coma-like unconsciousness that would render a person insensate to pain, and that, indeed, clinical studies show that when midazolam was used in surgery, patients felt pain. Moreover, he claims that there is no substantial practice among the states of using midazolam for lethal injections (again, in contrast to the widespread use of sodium thiopental, at least when it was available). Glossip says that only four states have used midazolam in an execution, and only two have used it as anesthesia.
Glossip contends that the lower court’s decision to credit the state’s expert that a 500-milligram dose of midazolam would induce a deep unconsciousness was clear error. Glossip claims that the expert supported his opinion with only undisclosed or unreliable sources and mathematical error, and that the expert’s supposition about how the drug works “has no acceptance in the scientific community.” Instead, Glossip says that midazolam’s properties, including its ceiling effect, mean that it cannot reliably induce a deep, coma-like unconsciousness.
On the second issue, Glossip argues that the Tenth Circuit erred in setting a higher standard for a stay of execution than the one set by the plurality’s decision in Baze. Glossip says that the traditional standard for obtaining a stay requires, among other things, “a significant possibility of success on the merits.” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006). He says that the Baze plurality did not modify or overrule that standard. Yet he claims that the Tenth Circuit and other courts have construed Baze to set a new and higher standard, one that all but forecloses a stay. He contends that this is wrong. Glossip claims that, if anything, a higher standard should apply only to cases like Baze, where a death-row prisoner challenges a concededly valid method of execution but seeks to show a step that “the State could take as a failsafe for other, independently adequate measures.” But where, as here, a person lodges a claim that the state’s method itself violates the Eighth Amendment, Glossip contends that the traditional stay standard should apply.
Finally, on the third issue, Glossip argues that the Tenth Circuit also erred in requiring the petitioners to propose a commercially available alternative drug for their executions. Glossip claims that the Eighth Amendment prohibits certain punishments, independent of whether market forces prevent a state from adopting its preferred alternative. Glossip says that Hill supports this principle, and Baze did not overrule it. Glossip writes, “The vitality of a core constitutional guarantee does not vary with the marketing decisions or supply constraints of private corporations.”
Oklahoma argues first that the Court should dismiss the appeal as improvidently granted. The state says that Glossip is challenging the lower courts’ fact-finding, and that the fact-finding at issue was not even necessary to the courts’ judgments. Oklahoma claims that this kind of fact-based dispute is ill-suited to Supreme Court review.
Oklahoma argues next that its use of midazolam does not create a “substantial risk of serious harm.” The state says, contrary to Glossip’s assertion, a 500-milligram dose of midazolam can induce a deep, coma-like unconsciousness. Indeed, the state claims that the record evidence indicates that a large dose of midazolam produces unconsciousness sufficiently deep to render a person insensate “to even extremely painful stimuli.” Oklahoma says that midazolam’s lack of analgesic properties is irrelevant, because it induces deep unconsciousness. It claims that the risk of paradoxical reactions is extremely low. And it contends that any ceiling effect has not been sufficiently established. Oklahoma also claims that its other “robust procedural safeguards” “will eliminate” the risk of severe pain.
Oklahoma argues that the district court did not err in admitting the opinions of its expert. The state says that Glossip’s challenges to the expert’s methodology lack merit and that the district court properly relied on the expert’s testimony. Oklahoma claims that the Tenth Circuit gave Glossip “every benefit of the doubt” and still ruled that none of Glossip’s challenges undermined the scientific reliability of the state’s evidence at trial.
Oklahoma argues on the second issue that the Tenth Circuit properly applied the standard that Glossip seeks here. Oklahoma says that the Tenth Circuit explicitly applied the proper standard for a preliminary injunction, and that the Supreme Court cannot assume that the Tenth Circuit applied a higher standard without saying so. Moreover, the state claims that the district court ruled that Glossip failed to meet the burden under an even more relaxed standard. And Oklahoma contends that in any event the Baze standard should apply to Glossip’s claim. The state says that the Baze plurality was clear when it wrote, “A stay of execution may not be granted on grounds such as those asserted here unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain * * * [that] is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives.”
Finally, on the third issue, Oklahoma argues that Glossip did not show that an alternative execution method is available that will substantially lower the risk of severe pain, which Oklahoma says is the Tenth Circuit’s alternative (not principal) holding. The state says that the Baze plurality’s requirement that a challenger identify an alternative was a “broadly applicable standard” designed to provide adequate guidance in method-of-execution cases. Oklahoma claims that all courts of appeals so far have applied Baze this (broader) way. The state says that this makes sense: Because the death penalty itself is constitutional (even if some pain results), any challenge to a method of execution that fails to identify a feasible alternative method that would result in substantially less pain amounts to a challenge to the death penalty itself. And this, the state claims, is already foreclosed by the Constitution.
Thirty-two states plus the federal government currently have a death penalty. All of these jurisdictions use lethal injection as the primary method of execution, but many have a back-up (electrocution, gas chamber, and even hanging and firing squad) in case lethal injection drugs become unavailable. (Check out deathpenaltyinfo.org for more information on state-by-state approaches to the death penalty.)
States started using lethal injection in the 1980s as a more humane method of execution, theoretically free of unnecessary pain, in reaction to the risks associated with other methods of execution. When states first adopted lethal injection, the vast majority left their statutes purposefully vague on the procedure and delegated the development of a protocol to prison officials. Historically, most states and the federal government used a three-drug protocol like Oklahoma’s earlier protocol, which included sodium thiopental or another barbiturate as the first drug. (For an excellent and critical history, check out the amicus curiae brief filed by The Louis Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School of Law. Amicus argues, like Glossip, that states developed and modified their drug protocols not with the kind of medical or scientific rigor that we might expect, but in reaction to court decisions and out of expedience.)
But in the 7 years since Baze came down, states have moved away from the original three-drug protocol. This is at least in part because states’ sources for sodium thiopental and alternative barbiturates for use in executions have largely dried up, as international drug suppliers have refused to sell drugs for use in executions. As a result, some states have turned to compounding pharmacies to obtain lethal drugs, others have altered their protocols, and yet others have authorized alternative methods of execution when lethal drugs are not available. (For example, Utah’s governor signed a bill on March 23, 2015, allowing the use of firing squads in executions if the state is unable to obtain lethal injection drugs.)
Against this backdrop, Glossip is important because it will give states additional guidance on when a particular drug protocol violates the Eighth Amendment, and what challengers must show to prove it.
If Baze is any indication (and, indeed, if the complicated route to the Court in Glossip is any indication), the Court is deeply divided on how to evaluate these claims. While the Court upheld the protocol in Baze by a 7-2 vote, the case produced seven different opinions. Since Baze came down, Justice Sotomayor replaced Justice Souter (who dissented in Baze), and Justice Kagan replaced Justice Stevens (who wrote a separate concurrence arguing that the death penalty is unconstitutional but ultimately deferring to precedents). While these changes may not alter the head-count in this case, they may add yet another dimension to the reasoning.
Just to be clear: This case does not test the constitutionality of the death penalty itself, but instead tests the constitutionality of a particular drug protocol in administering the death penalty. It also tests the standards by which courts should evaluate challenges to a particular method of execution.
But as states continue to have problems obtaining sodium thiopental and similar barbiturates, and as they therefore increasingly look to alternative drug protocols and other methods of execution, these standards will become increasingly important in death penalty challenges. In this way, even though Glossip does not test the death penalty itself, the Court’s ruling will, as a practical matter, put a heavy thumb on the scale either for or against the death penalty.
Monday, April 27, 2015
A divided panel of the Seventh Circuit today upheld a local ordinance banning assault weapons and large-capacity magazines against a Second Amendment challenge. The ruling in Friedman v. City of Highland Park means that the ordinance, by Highland Park, a Chicago suburb, stays in place for now. But this case is a good candidate for en banc and even Supreme Court review, so we likely haven't seen the end of it.
The case is full of turns. For example, Judge Easterbrook, for the majority, used history against the plaintiffs, even though opponents of gun regulation have so often used history in support of their points. He also used federalism against the plaintiffs, even though opponents of gun regulation so often look to "states' rights" in this and other areas. He turned the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia into a point about the states' ability to decide what weapons should be available to civilians. And finally he turned the gun-rights victories at the Supreme Court against the plaintiffs: If the plaintiffs can already possess handguns and long-guns for self-defense (as the Court has ruled, why do they also need semi-automatic weapons?
The case is also full of both social science and common sense. For example, "That laws similar to Highland Park's reduce the share of gun crimes involving assault weapons is established by the data." And, "But assault weapons with large-capacity magazines can fire more shots, faster, and thus can be more dangerous in the aggregate. Why else are they the weapons of choice in mass shootings?"
But aside from the turns, the social science, and the common sense, the case is notable for the Second Amendment rule it uses. Judge Easterbrook declined to apply any particular tier of scrutiny and instead applied this test:
[W]hether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time of ratification or those that have "some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia," and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.
Judge Easterbrook essentially said that this is the best a lower court can do when the Supreme Court has declined to set a particular level of scrutiny (or other test).
As to the requirement of a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, the court said that "states, which are in charge of militias, should be allowed to decide when civilians can possess military-grade firearms, so as to have them available when the militia is called to duty." As to whether the law allows other means of self-defense, the court noted that Highland Park residents can still use handguns and long-guns for self-defense, and that the Court said that was enough.
He even at one point went so far as to say that if Highland Park's ban only "reduces the perceived risk from a mass shooting, and makes the public feel safer as a result, that's a substantial benefit."
In wrapping up, Judge Easterbrook went even more deferential:
The best way to evaluate the relation among assault weapons, crime, and self-defense is through the political process and scholarly debate, not by parsing ambiguous passages in the Supreme Court's opinions. The central role of representative democracy is no less part of the Constitution than is the Second Amendment: when there is no definitive constitutional rule, matters are left to the legislative process.
And he went more on federalism:
Another constitutional principle is relevant: the Constitution establishes a federal republic where local differences are cherished as elements of liberty, rather than eliminated in a search for national uniformity. McDonald circumscribes the scope of permissible experimentation by state and local governments, but it does not foreclose all possibility of experimentation. Within the limits established by the Justices in Heller and McDonald, federalism and diversity still have a claim. Whether those limits should be extended is in the end a question for the Justices.
Judge Manion dissented, arguing that the "ordinance infringes upon the rights of . . . citizens to keep weapons in their homes for the purpose of defending themselves, their families, and their property."
The Fifth Circuit on Friday dismissed a case challenging both the individual and employer mandates in the Affordable Care Act under the Origination Clause. The court said that the individual plaintiff challenging the individual mandate lacked standing, and that the corporation challenging the employer mandate was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. The ruling dismisses the case, with little or no chance of a successful appeal.
The case, Hotze v. Burwell, was brought by a medical doctor, Steven Hotze, and his employer, Braidwood Management. The plaintiffs argued that the ACA's individual and employer mandates violated the Origination Clause, because they are "bills for raising Revenue" that did not "originate in the House." Their theory: The ACA was a Senate amendment to a shell of a House bill that already passed, so that in fact the ACA really originated in the Senate. If so--and if the individual mandate is authorized by the Taxing Clause (and not the Commerce Clause), as the Court held--then, they claimed, the whole ACA should have started in the House. Because it really didn't, it violated the Origination Clause.
But there was a problem even before the court got to the merits: Hotze already had health insurance through Braidwood, and so would not have to purchase insurance or pay the tax penalty. This meant that he didn't suffer a harm.
Hotze neglected to say in his complaint that his insurance wasn't up to ACA snuff (and that he'd have to drop it and buy new insurance or pay the tax penalty), so all he had for an injury was that the ACA forced him to make hard health-insurance choices. The court said that this wasn't enough for standing.
Hotze also argued that when the employer mandate takes effect, Braidwood would have to offer him less desirable insurance. The court said that this theory wasn't tightly enough tied (or at all tied) to the individual mandate, however, so this didn't support standing, either.
Finally, Hotze said that the ACA forced his insurance premiums up. The court rejected this theory, too, saying that it amounts to a generalized grievance.
The court also dismissed Braidwood's challenge to the employer mandate, but this time under the Anti-Injunction Act. The AIA bars courts from hearing any challenge to restrain the assessment or collection of any tax.
Even if the court had addressed the merits, however, this case didn't appear to be going anywhere. That's because the ACA did originate in the House, even if in a shell bill later amended by the Senate to include the full ACA. The plaintiffs argued that the Senate amendment wasn't germane to the House bill (and was thus an unconstitutional end-run around the Origination Clause), but the government argued that the Origination Clause didn't contain a germane-ness requirement--a point the district court found convincing.
The district court dismissed the case on the merits, ruling that the ACA didn't violate the Origination Clause. Good bet the Fifth Circuit would have, too.
Friday, April 24, 2015
The D.C. Circuit ruled today that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge EPA and NHTSA's standards for greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks. The ruling means that the case is dismissed, and the standards stay in place.
The case, Delta Construction v. EPA, tests a joint effort by the EPA and NHTSA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automobiles and trucks. The agencies issued coordinated rules, one set of rules for cars and, later, one set for trucks. (The D.C. Circuit previously upheld the car rules, and the Supreme Court denied review.)
The plaintiffs--business, associations, and individuals in California, and Plant Oil Powered Diesel (or POP Diesel), a company that promotes the use of vegetable oil in place of traditional diesel fuel--sued, arguing that the regulations were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The California plaintiffs challenged the EPA rules only; POP Diesel challenged both the EPA and NHTSA rules. The California plaintiffs argued that the regs jacked up the price of cars and trucks in the state; POP Diesel argued that the truck rule makes its product economically unfeasible.
The court held that the California plaintiffs lacked standing, because they couldn't show causation and redressability. That's because even if they won on the merits--and the court struck the EPA rules--the NHTSA rules would still drive the prices of their vehicles up. In other words, because both agencies' sets of rules did the same thing, defeating one wouldn't solve their alleged problem.
As to POP Diesel, the court said that it didn't fall within the zone of interests protected by the portion of the Clean Air Act governing emissions standards for motor vehicles. The court said that economic interests, like POP Diesel's, without more, aren't within the congressional goals of the Act, and that POP Diesel's green approach alone doesn't put it within the Act's zone of interests.
The court dismissed the case and ended the plaintiffs' challenge to the emissions regs.
Before 2011, Arizona law required that voter registration forms include a blank space for the registrant’s party preference. But a 2011 law required the voter registration form distributed by the Arizona Secretary of State to list the two largest parties (as measured by number of registered voters) on the form, as well as provide a blank line for “other party preferences.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-152(A)(5).
In response to the amendment, the Arizona Secretary of State revised box 14 on the Registration Form, and the opinion includes this illustration:
Minority parties Arizona Green Party and the Arizona Libertarian Party challenged the new law as violative of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In its opinion in Arizona Libertarian Party v. Bennett, the Ninth Circuit upheld the statute as constitutional.
The panel majority opinion by Judge Tashima noted the intertwining of the equality and First Amendment claims:
“Restrictions on voting can burden equal protection rights as well as ‘interwoven strands of liberty’ protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments—namely, the ‘right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.’”
It stated that the party challenging the law bears “the initial burden of showing that [the state’s] ballot access requirements seriously restrict the availability of political opportunity" and that here any burden was de minimis. The panel thus applied rational basis scrutiny which the new form easily passed.
Concurring, Judge McKeown argued that the rational basis review burden-shifting standards derived from Ninth Circuit precedent and which the majority applied were "inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to analyzing voting rights challenges." Instead, the court should apply the balancing tests articulated in Burdick v. Takushi (1992) and reiterated in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board (2008), although Judge McKeown acknowledged that the "semantic distinction between the balancing test and the rational basis standard" may make little difference in most cases. Indeed, here Judge McKeown recognized that Arizona's asserted interests in reducing printing costs and easing administrative efficiency are “sufficiently weighty to justify” the speculative burden on the plaintiff minority parties' rights.
Wednesday, April 22, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled this week in Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. that the Natural Gas Act did not preempt retail gas purchasers' antitrust lawsuits against sellers (gas pipelines) for manipulating gas indexes used to set contract rates. Our argument review of the case is here.
The case arose when retail, intrastate purchasers of gas sued gas sellers for falsely reporting gas price data to industry journals that buyers and sellers used to set their contract price for gas purchases. The false reporting resulted in higher gas prices than the true market rate, so purchasers overpaid for their gas. Purchasers sued sellers under state antitrust laws. The sellers moved to dismiss, arguing that the state antitrust suits (by then removed to federal court) were preempted by the Natural Gas Act and FERC's authority under the Act.
Under the NGA, FERC has authority to regulate interstate, wholesale gas sales (sometimes called "jurisdictional" sales), but not intrastate, retail sales. Indeed, the NGA "was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power [over retail sales], not to handicap or dilute it in any way."
So the question was whether the price manipulation, which affected the buyers' intrastate purchases but also affected interstate, wholesale gas prices, was preempted by the NGA.
But there was a catch: the sellers (joined by the government, as amicus) only argued field preemption. Everyone agreed that the NGA contained no express preemption provision, and the sellers did not raise a conflict preemption argument.
The Court said that the answer lies in the "target at which the state law aims." In other words, because the state antitrust suits targeted sellers for manipulation of intrastate (non-jurisdictional) rates, it didn't matter that the manipulation also affected interstate, wholesale (jurisdictional) rates (over which FERC has authority). If the state law aims at intrastate sales, there's no field preemption by the NGA.
But the Court expressly withheld judgment on conflict preemption, leaving that question to the lower courts. It also expressly withheld judgment on the question whether FERC's determination that the NGA field preempts the buyers' claim holds any sway. The Court said that neither the sellers nor the government pointed to any FERC determination, so the Court wouldn't rule on it.
The case is a clear victory for gas purchasers who paid higher-than-market prices because of price manipulation by sellers. Those cases now go back to the lower courts to proceed on the merits.
But at the same time the case also suggests a strategy for sellers in the next round of antitrust litigation: Look for a way to argue conflict preemption (if there is such a way), and ask FERC to opine on the scope of NGA's field preemption.
The issue of a federal regulatory scheme of raisins returned to the United States Supreme Court for another round of oral arguments today in Horne v. Department of Agriculture.
Recall that in a brief opinion in June 2013, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that the Hornes did state a claim for regulatory taking. The claim arises from a regulatory program under the authority of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) of 1937, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., that mandates that a certain percentage of a raisins be put in "reserve" each year. By resisting the program, the Hornes have become "outlaws" or heroes of sorts.
While the Hornes continue to argue that the program constitutes a taking, in today's oral argument Michael McConnell representing the Hornes pressed the issue of the taking as a per se one rather than a regulatory one because the Department of Agriculture takes possession and title of the raisins.
The Deputy Solicitor General, Edwin Kneedler, rejected the Chief Justice's humorous suggestion that government would "come up with the truck and you get the shovels and you take their raisins, probably in the dark of night," by insisting that under the Order, the producer submits the raisins to the handler who divides them into two categories. The reserve raisins are separated for later sale, the proceeds of which are pooled and distributed back to the producers. However, Kneedler did admit that one can assume that the government committee takes title in order to sell the raisins.
There were also questions of even if there was a taking whether any "just compensation" was due. In other words, what if the government taking resulted in no loss - - - or even a benefit - - - to the Hornes?
But the Justices seemed bothered by the program, with Justice Scalia expressing this discomfort most blatantly: "Central planning was thought to work very well in 1937, and Russia tried it for a long time." Perhaps the program - - - and the 8 or 10 or maybe more programs that are similar - - - is simply a relic of another time.
However, as Justice Kagan made clear, whether the program was sensible or ridiculous was not for the Court to decide and, she implied, irrelevant to the taking analysis.
In a 28 page opinion district judge John Koeltl has granted a preliminary injunction - - - stayed for 30 days - - - requiring New York's transit authority to accept anti-Muslim advertisements on its buses.
The case, American Freedom Defense Initiative v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority (AFDI v. MTA) should be read as part of a series of cases involving often but not always successful attempts to place anti-Muslim adverts in public places. Previously in NYC, a federal judge found the Metropolitan Transit Authority's initial rejection of the advertisements under its (since amended) "civilty standard" to be unconstitutional and the advertisements appeared, causing some NYC residents to engage in "more speech" in reaction to the advertisements. On the contrary, the Sixth Circuit found the rejection of similar advertisements in southern Michigan buses by the governmental authority SMART to be constitutional under its policy prohibiting several categories of advertising including "political or political campaign advertising." Last month, a Philadelphia district judge granted a preliminary injunction in favor of AFDI and found SEPTA's anti-disparagement standard for advertising on its buses, and its rejection of the proffered AFDI advertisement, violates the First Amendment. On the other hand, also last month, the Ninth Circuit upheld the rejection of advertisements proposed by Seattle Mideast Awareness Campaign applying a limited public forum doctrine.
Judge Koeltl described the advert, known as the "Killing Jews" ad, as portraying
a menacing-looking man whose head and face are mostly covered by a head scarf. The ad includes a quote from “Hamas MTV”: “Killing Jews is Worship that draws us close to Allah.” Underneath the quote, the ad stated: “That’s His Jihad. What’s yours?”
The MTA determined that the ad violated MTA Standard § (a)(x), prohibiting material “the display of which the MTA reasonably foresees would imminently incite or provoke violence or other immediate breach of the peace.” Thus, the MTA argued that it excluded the Killing Jews ad because it falls into two separate categories of unprotected speech: “fighting words,” under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), and incitement of violence or lawlessness under Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969).
Judge Koeltl held that "this case plainly does not present the rare occurrence where one of these seldom-applied categories is met."
Koeltl's reasoning rested on the MTA's failure to show that this particular ad would immediately provoke violence. The judge discounted the MTA's argument that NYC is a preferred "terrorism target" in favor of a view of a multicultural urbanity:
Indeed, the defendants [MTA] underestimate the tolerant quality of New Yorkers and overestimate the potential impact of these fleeting advertisements. It strains credulity to believe that New Yorkers would be incited to violence by ads that did not incite residents of Chicago and San Francisco to similar acts. This is not to minimize the terror threats to New York City, but those threats do not arise from these fleeting advertisements.
Subjecting the advertisement's rejection to strict scrutiny, the judge further held that the exclusion of the Killing Jews ad is not narrowly tailored to achieve any security interests. "Rather than banning an advertisement outright, the transit authorities could run the disputed advertisement with adjacent disclaimers, or counter-advertisements, expressing disagreement with the ad and/or explaining its context," including its parodying of another ad campaign regarding the positive aspects of the word "jihad."
While these "more speech" suggestions are directed to the MTA, New Yorkers have also been known to resort to individualized attempts at "more speech," raising the problem of the MTA's efforts to combat "vandalism."
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
The Supreme Court ruled today in Rodriguez v. United States that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a dog sniff that extends the duration of an otherwise lawful traffic stop, as measured by the time it reasonably takes an officer to complete the mission of the stop. But the ruling doesn't end the case: The Court sent the case back to the lower court for determination of whether the dog sniff was nevertheless independently justified under the Fourth Amendment.
The case arose when an officer pulled Rodriguez over for a traffic violation, issued a warning, then engaged in a dog sniff (which revealed drugs, which led to Rodriguez's prosecution). In other words, the dog sniff came after the purpose, or mission, of the traffic stop expired and thus extended the stop beyond the period reasonably required to complete the mission. The Court previously ruled in Illinois v. Caballes that the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff in the course of an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But this case asked whether the Fourth Amendment also allowed that sniff when it extended the length of the stop.
The Court said no. Justice Ginsburg wrote for the Court, including Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. She wrote that a dog sniff that extends the length of the stop violates the Fourth Amendment, without some independent justification for it.
So: How to know if a dog sniff extends the length of the stop? Look to the officer's mission in making the stop in the first place: the "time reasonably required to complete [the stop's] mission."
Because the Court refused to draw a bright line at the point when an officer issues a ticket (and instead looked to the total time of the stop, whenever the mission is complete), the rule could mean that some dog sniffs in the course of a traffic stop (upheld under Caballes) would now violate the Fourth Amendment. Again, the touchstone is whether the sniff extends the "time reasonably required to complete [the stop's] mission."
The Court rejected the Eighth Circuit's holding that the sniff was reasonable because it only extended the time of the stop a little bit.
Justice Thomas wrote the principal dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito. Justice Thomas argued that because the stop was reasonably executed the sniff was OK.
He also argued that there was independent justification for the dog sniff--a point that Justice Alito also made in a separate dissent, but a point that Justice Kennedy did not join. The district court found that there was no independent justification for the sniff, but the Eighth Circuit did not rule on the question.
The case now goes back to the Eighth Circuit for a ruling on this issue. If the lower court finds an independent justification for the sniff (for reasons described by Justices Thomas and Alito, for example), then the evidence (drugs) can come in, and Rodriguez could still be convicted.
Thursday, April 16, 2015
The United States Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments on April 28 in the same-sex marriage cases, now styled as Obergefell v. Hodges, a consolidated appeal from the Sixth Circuit’s decision in DeBoer v. Snyder, reversing the district court decisions in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee that had held the same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional, and creating a circuit split.
Recall that the Court certified two questions:
1)Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license a marriage between two people of the same sex?
2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state?
The case has attracted what seems to be a record number of amicus briefs. As we discussed last year, previous top amicus brief attractors were the same-sex marriage cases of Windsor and Perry, which garnered 96 and 80 amicus briefs respectively, and the 2013 affirmative action case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, which attracted 92. [Note that the "Obamacare" Affordable Care Act cases including 2012's consolidated cases of NFIB v. Sebelius attracted 136 amicus briefs.]
The count for Obergefell v. Hodges stands at 139. 147 [updated: 17 April 2015] 149 [updated] LINKS TO ALL THE BRIEFS ARE AVAILABLE ON THE ABA WEBSITE HERE.
76 77 amicus briefs support the Petitioners, who contend that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional.
58 66 67 amicus briefs support the Respondents, who contend that same-sex marriage bans are constitutional.
05 amicus briefs support neither party (but as described below, generally support Respondents).
According to the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 37, an amicus curiae brief’s purpose is to bring to the attention of the Court “relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the parties.” While such a brief “may be of considerable help to the Court,” an “amicus curiae brief that does not serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.”
An impressive number of the Amicus Briefs are authored or signed by law professors. Other Amici include academics in other fields, academic institutions or programs, governmental entities or persons, organizations, and individuals, often in combination. Some of these have been previously involved in same-sex marriage or sexuality issues and others less obviously so, with a number being religious organizations. Several of these briefs have been profiled in the press; all are linked on the Supreme Court’s website and on SCOTUSBlog.
Here is a quick - - - if lengthy - - - summary of the Amici and their arguments, organized by party being supported and within that, by identity of Amici, beginning with briefs having substantial law professor involvement, then government parties or persons, then non-legal academics, followed by organizations including religious groups, and finally by those offering individual perspectives. [Late additions appear below]Special thanks to City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law Class of 2016 students, Aliya Shain & AnnaJames Wipfler, for excellent research.
April 16, 2015 in Courts and Judging, Equal Protection, Establishment Clause, Family, Federalism, First Amendment, Foreign Affairs, Fourteenth Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Full Faith and Credit Clause, Fundamental Rights, Gender, History, Interpretation, Privacy, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Race, Recent Cases, Reproductive Rights, Scholarship, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Standing, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (3)
Wednesday, April 15, 2015
In a case with similarities to Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway decided by the United States Supreme Court last year, the Supreme Court of Canada today rendered its judgment in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) finding that a prayer at a municipal council meeting violated the constitution.
S regularly attended the public meetings of the municipal council of the City of Saguenay [Quebec]. At the start of each meeting, the mayor would recite a prayer after making the sign of the cross while saying [translation] “in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit”. The prayer also ended with the sign of the cross and the same words. Other councillors and City officials would cross themselves at the beginning and end of the prayer as well. In one of the council chambers, there was a Sacred Heart statue fitted with a red electric votive light. In another, there was a crucifix hanging on the wall. S, who considers himself an atheist, felt uncomfortable with this display, which he considered religious, and asked the mayor to stop the practice. When the mayor refused, S complained to the Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse. He argued that his freedom of conscience and religion was being infringed, contrary to ss. 3 and 10 of the Quebec Charter, and asked that the recitation of the prayer cease and that all religious symbols be removed from council chambers.
The original Tribunal found the practice unconstitutional, but the Court of Appeal held that the prayer "expressed universal values" and "could not be identified with any particular religion." It also reasoned that the "religious symbols were works of art that were devoid of religious connotation and did not affect the state’s neutrality." According to the Court of Appeal, S had not been discriminated against on the ground of freedom of conscience and religion; any interference with S's beliefs was "trivial or insubstantial."
While some of the issues before the Supreme Court of Canada involved procedural ones regarding the appeal, the Court was clear that the municipality's practice was unconstitutional. Similar to an analysis under the US Constitution's First Amendment, the Supreme Court of Canada grappled with issues such as hostility to religion and the "slippery slope" of other religious practices:
The prayer recited by the municipal council in breach of the state’s duty of neutrality resulted in a distinction, exclusion and preference based on religion — that is, based on S’s sincere atheism — which, in combination with the circumstances in which the prayer was recited, turned the meetings into a preferential space for people with theistic beliefs. The latter could participate in municipal democracy in an environment favourable to the expression of their beliefs. Although non‑believers could also participate, the price for doing so was isolation, exclusion and stigmatization. This impaired S’s right to exercise his freedom of conscience and religion. The attempt at accommodation provided for in the by‑law, namely giving those who preferred not to attend the recitation of the prayer the time they needed to re‑enter the council chamber, had the effect of exacerbating the discrimination. The Tribunal’s findings to the effect that the interference with S’s freedom of conscience and religion was more than trivial or insubstantial were supported by solid evidence, and deference is owed to the Tribunal’s assessment of the effect of the prayer on S’s freedom of conscience and religion.
Barring the municipal council from reciting the prayer would not amount to giving atheism and agnosticism prevalence over religious beliefs. There is a distinction between unbelief and true neutrality. True neutrality presupposes abstention, but it does not amount to a stand favouring one view over another. Moreover, it has not been established in this case that the prayer is non‑denominational. The Tribunal’s findings of fact instead tend toward the opposite result. Be that as it may, the respondents themselves conceded at the hearing that the prayer is nonetheless a religious practice. Even if it is said to be inclusive, it may nevertheless exclude non-believers. As for the proposed analogy to the prayer recited by the Speaker of the House of Commons, in the absence of evidence concerning that prayer, it would be inappropriate to use it to support a finding that the City’s prayer is valid. Finally, the reference to the supremacy of God in the preamble to the Canadian Charter cannot lead to an interpretation of freedom of conscience and religion that authorizes the state to consciously profess a theistic faith. The preamble articulates the political theory on which the Charter’s protections are based. The express provisions of the Canadian Charter and of the Quebec Charter, such as those regarding freedom of conscience and religion, must be given a generous and expansive interpretation. This is necessary to ensure that those to whom these charters apply enjoy the full benefit of the rights and freedoms, and that the purpose of the charters is attained.
The Court explicitly linked the state's duty of neutrality - - - akin to the First Amendment's (anti-)Establishment Clause - - - to the maintenance of a free and democratic society. "This pursuit requires the state to encourage everyone to participate freely in public life regardless of their beliefs." This principle may have special resonance when one considers the largely French (and Catholic) Quebec as compared to the other largely English (and Protestant) other provinces.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Town of Greece, the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment is not closely divided; only one Justice writes separately to discuss some of the procedural issues, but otherwise concurs. For US ConLawProfs, City of Saguenay is well worth a comparative read.
Monday, April 13, 2015
The Seventh Circuit today affirmed a lower court ruling granting qualified immunity to a police officer who falsely reported to 911 and then called off another officer before the plaintiff was sexually assaulted. The ruling affirms the dismissal of the plaintiff's civil rights and state-law claims against the officer and ends the case.
The case, Doe v. Village of Arlington Heights, arose when an Arlington Heights police officer, Officer Del Boccio, responded to a 911 call and saw Doe with three young men in an apparently intoxicated state near an apartment building. When Del Boccio arrived, one of the young men was holding up Doe from behind, because she could not stand up by herself. Del Boccio consulted with the apartment manager, who told Del Boccio that the young men were taking Doe home. Del Boccio also rolled down his window to talk to the three young men. But he didn't ask Doe or any of the three young men for identification or otherwise investigate.
Del Boccio then reported to dispatch that he checked the scene and the subjects of the 911 call were gone on arrival. He also called off Officer Spoerry, who had been dispatched to the scnee.
After Del Boccio left the scene, the three young men carried Doe into a laundry room. The apartment manager called 911. Mount Prospect officers responded, entered the laundry room, and caught one of the young men sexually assaulting Doe.
Doe sued Del Boccio and the city for federal civil rights violations and various state law claims. Del Boccio moved to dismiss based on qualified immunity. The district court granted immunity and dismissed the case.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, ruling that Del Boccio didn't violate a clearly established constitutional right when he falsely reported to dispatch that the subjects of the 911 call were gone on arrival and when he called off Officer Spoerry. The court alternatively held that Doe's case was foreclosed by DeShaney v. Winnebago County:
Here, we can only speculate whether Del Boccio made Doe worse off, whether by calling off Officer Spoerry or falsely reporting to dispatch.
This is not a case in which Doe was safe, or even considerably safer, before Del Boccio acted. His alleged conduct did not turn a potential danger into an actual one; Doe was in actual danger already. Therefore, Del Boccio had no constitutional duty to protect her. But even if calling off Officer Spoerry violated Doe's constitutional rights, it was not clearly established and Del Boccio nonetheless would be entitled to qualified immunity.
Tuesday, April 7, 2015
The Fifth Circuit today affirmed the dismissal of a challenge to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or "DACA," program by a group of ICE agents and deportation officers and the State of Mississippi. We previously posted on the suit here.
The plaintiffs lodged several claims against the DACA program, including a separation-of-powers and a violation of the Take Care Clause. They claimed that they had standing because Mississippi incurred expenses for state benefits for "illegal aliens" and because DACA forced the officers to violate the law, change the way they enforced the law, and face job sanctions for not deferring.
The court today rejected these standing claims and affirmed the dismissal of case. As to Mississippi, the court said that any injury was "purely speculative because there was no concrete evidence that Mississippi's costs had increased or will increase as a result of DACA." As to the officers, the court said that a violation of their oath to uphold the laws was not a sufficient injury for standing purposes; that their burden to comply with DACA also wasn't a sufficient injury and that in any event they failed to allege specific facts to support it; and that any threat of employment sanctions for not enforcing DACA was too speculative.
As to this last point, the court emphasized that DACA requires individual officers to "exercise their discretion in deciding to grant deferred action, and this judgment should be exercised on a case-by-case basis." This feature of DACA, of course, also goes to the merits by hard-wiring DACA with prosecutorial discretion and putting the program squarely within executive discretionary authority. As to standing, the court said that this feature makes it unlikely that an officer would be sanctioned for exercising discretion to deport.
Today's ruling says nothing about the merits of DACA. But it does illustrate why it's so hard to bring a challenge to DACA in court.
Friday, April 3, 2015
The en banc Ninth Circuit's opinion in Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition v. Norris rejected First Amendment challenges to two requirements that the State of California and the City of Chula Vista, California, place on persons who wish to sponsor a local ballot measure:
that the official proponent of a ballot measure be an elector, thereby disqualifying corporations and associations from holding that position; and
that the official proponent’s name appear on each section of the initiative petition that is circulated to voters for their signature.
Writing for the unanimous en banc court and affirming the district judge, Judge Reinhardt concluded that the provisions were "plainly constitutional."
On the first provision, the court held that the requirement that an official proponent—a person seeking a unique position in a quintessentially legislative process—be an elector satisfied the First Amendment. It concluded that
The plaintiffs seek a legislative power and, as they conceded at oral argument, many legislative and official political acts are properly reserved to members of the electorate. For example, corporations cannot vote. Nor can they run for political office or be appointed to fill vacancies. Under California law, they cannot sign initiative petitions, sign candidate nominating papers, or introduce legislation, The plaintiffs fail to provide any reason—and we find none—that the state and city may not similarly limit the exercise of the initiative power to members of the relevant political community: electors.
[citations omitted]. The Ninth Circuit rejected the challengers' appeal to Citizens United v. FEC (2010) as mandating strict scrutiny. The challengers argued strict scrutiny was warranted because the California requirement is a direct ban on core political speech; bans disfavored speakers’ speech; and requires speech by proxy. The Ninth Circuit opinion flatly stated that the challengers "are wrong." While the initiative process involves core political speech, the ban is only directed at corporations being the "official proponent—a unique legislative position that may properly be reserved to members of the political community" and corporations can otherwise speak as much as they'd like. As to corporations specifically, the court returned to the notion that corporations are distinct from natural persons, they do not have "the right to vote or to hold public office (or even to sit on the bench)" as the plaintiffs seemingly conceded. "We accordingly refuse to extend Citizens United to grant to corporations and associations the right to hold a distinct, official role in the process of legislating, by initiative or otherwise." Finally, the court summarily rejected the speech by proxy argument:
Under the plaintiffs’ view of Citizens United, the government could not exclude corporations or associations from any position available to human beings because to do so would impermissibly require speech by proxy—an assertion that is clearly untenable.
The second requirement - - - mandating disclosure - - - was subject to "exacting scrutiny" rather than the higher standard of "strict scrutiny," in accordance with Citizens United. The Ninth Circuit also relied heavily on Doe v. Reed (2010) in which the Court upheld disclosure and rejected a "right to be anonymous" when signing a ballot initiative petition. Here, the Ninth Circuit likewise upheld an interest in the integrity of the electoral process, citing Doe v. Reed, and also analyzed the informational interest. The Ninth Circuit also took a swipe at the sincerity of the anonymity argument:
It also bears noting, although we do not base our decision on it in any respect, that the interest of the proponents in anonymity is especially weak given the facts of the instant case. Both Kneebone and Breitfelder engaged in public activities advocating passage of Proposition G beyond the activities required of them as its official proponents, speaking at televised public meetings and having their names used in campaign materials provided to voters. Moreover, they explained in depositions that they did not really desire anonymity, but rather “wanted voters to know that the ‘correct’ sponsor of the ballot initiative was the Association of Builders and Contractors, Inc. and the Chula Vista Citizens for Jobs and Fair Competition.”
More doctrinally, the court concluded that the required "disclosure poses at the most a minimal burden on First Amendment rights."
The decision is a clear rejection of an extension of Citizens United to any type of "corporate speech" and a clear adherence to the constitutionality of disclosure mandates in both Citizens United and Doe v. Reed. And it should be clear that this unanimous opinion is not a good candidate for certiorari.