Tuesday, October 8, 2013

Court Considers Aggregate Campaign Contribution Limits

The Supreme Court today heard oral arguments in McCutcheon v. FEC, the case testing whether aggregate campaign contribution limits violate the First Amendment.

Aggregate limits, established under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, or BCRA, cap the total amount that a contributor can give to candidates, political parties, and political committees.  Aggregate limits supplement base limits, also in the BCRA, which cap the amount that a contributor can give to a particular candidate.  Aggregate limits are designed to prevent a contributor from circumventing the base limits (and thus to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption) by funneling total contributions in excess of the base limits through a variety of different recipients and to a particular candidate.  

Here's how it would work: Suppose Congress capped campaign contributions at $5,000 per candidate per cycle, so that a contributor could give only $5,000 to his or her preferred candidate.  Without more, that contributor could easily bypass that base limit by simply contributing $5,000 to a number of different organizations that could, in turn, support or contribute to the contributor's preferred candidate.  The contributor could thus effectively circumvent the base limit and corrupt his or her preferred candidate by funneling contributions through intermediaries.

Congress recognized this circumvention problem and imposed a cap on aggregate contributions in order to avoid it.  The Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) upheld both the base contribution limit and an aggregate contribution limit, holding that they work to prevent actual and apparent corruption and circumvention.  Later, in BCRA, Congress restructured and increased previous base and aggregate contribution limits and provided for automatic adjustments for inflation.

McCutcheon, a wealthy contributor, challenged the aggregate limits as violating the First Amendment.  (For more on the background, my ABA Preview piece is here.)

The arguments today focused on whether the current aggregate contribution limits continue to do any work with regard to corruption or circumvention.  The RNC and McCutcheon argued that they don't.  They said that other features of the law already prevent circumvention and corruption, and that the aggregate limits therefore only serve to limit free speech and association.  The FEC, on the other hand, said that they do--that they are necessary to close circumvention opportunities even with the other protective features of federal law, and that they prevent corruption.

The right answer, of course, turns on how money can flow in politics.  There were plenty of hypotheticals today (and in the briefing) designed to illustrate how aggregate limits work to prevent corruption and circumvention (and counter-points on why they don't).  Justices Breyer and Kagan led the charge with hypos showing why aggregate limits were necessary; Justice Kennedy expressed interest, as well.  But for every hypo, the petitioners had an explanation why current law already solved the corruption and circumvention problem, even without aggregate limits.  The lack of context and record on this point led Justices Breyer and Sotomayor to wonder whether the case might benefit from further development at the lower court.  (Don't bet on this outcome.)

Justice Alito turned this line of questions on the government and asked SG Verrilli why other features of federal law don't already solve the corruption and circumvention problems.  SG Verrilli seemed to back away from the circumvention interest and answered that a single contributor's very large contribution, dispersed across like-minded candidates and organizations, is itself a corruption problem, and that aggregate limits address this.  The answer didn't seem to satisfy.

Chief Justice Roberts had a different concern: how the aggregate limits affect a contributor's ability to give the maximum amount to as many candidates as he or she wants--and how this limits a contributor's speech and association rights with regard to, say, the tenth candidate that the contributor wants to support.  He also wondered whether there weren't less speech- and association-infringing ways to prevent corruption and circumvention. 

In short, both the Chief Justice and Justice Alito, who together may well control the outcome of this case, seemed accutely concerned that the aggregate limits weren't the best-tailored way for the government to achieve its interests in preventing corruption and circumvention.  At the same time, though, neither Chief Justice nor Justice Alito (nor anybody else today) directly took on Buckley's holding on base and aggregate contribution limits.  (Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas are all on record against Buckley's holding that the government can regulate contributions in the interest of preventing corruption.)  Instead, the arguments focused on whether the non-aggregate-limiting features of BCRA can do the work of preventing corruption and circumvention--and therefore whether the aggregate limits only serve to infringe the First Amendment.  So if the arguments today are any indication, we may see a 5-4 Court striking the aggregate limits because they're not sufficiently tailored to prevent corruption or circumvention--and because they limit too much speech and association.

If so, we'll likely see more total money going directly to candidates, political parties, and committees.  But remember that under Citizens United individuals can already spend as much as they want on "independent" electioneering.  This case won't change that, even if it directs some of that "independent" money to candidates, political parties, and committees for better coordinated expenditures.  (Justice Scalia argued today that the anti-corruption purpose of aggregate limits seems as weak as, or weaker than, an anti-corruption purpose for the independent expenditure restrictions that the Court struck in Citizens United.)  At the same time, this case probably won't upset Buckley's holding that the government can cap base contributions in the interest of preventing actual or apparent corruption.  Indeed, it may not even upset Buckley's holding on aggregate contributions.  Instead, it may only say that under BCRA aggregate limits aren't doing the anti-corruption and anti-circumvention work that they were designed to do, and that they're unduly infringing on the First Amendment.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2013/10/court-considers-aggregate-campaign-contribution-limits.html

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