Friday, November 30, 2012

Egypt's Draft Constitution

The Egyptian Constituent Assembly released its draft constitution early Friday.  Here are a few resources:

The Supreme Constitutional Court is scheduled to take up the legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly on Sunday, although the Court might punt on that question while other tribunals rule on the legality of President Morsi's decree shielding his own decisions and decisions of the Assembly from the judiciary.  If Mosri's decree is unconstitutional, then the Court could take up the legitimacy of the Assembly.  In the meantime, President Morsi vowed to put the draft to a vote.

SDS

November 30, 2012 in Comparative Constitutionalism, International, News | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sixth Circuit Strikes Michigan's Bottle Return Label Requirement

The Sixth Circuit ruled in American Beverage Association v. Snyder that Michigan's requirement that returnable beverage containers bear a unique mark violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.  The ruling strikes Michigan's requirement. 

The ruling turns on the dormant Commerce Clause's "extraterritorial doctrine," which, according to one concurring judge on the panel, is "a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new[.]"  If so, this case could offer the Supreme Court a good chance to clean up this corner of the dormant Commerce Clause.

The case involves Michigan's bottle-deposit law, which requires consumers to pay a ten-cent deposit on a beverage container (like a can or bottle).  Containers sold in Michigan must bear a designation--"MI 10c"--in order to distinguish them from containers sold in other states.  Consumers who return a container with the "MI 10c" designation get a ten-cent deposit back when they return the container.  (Michigan is one of ten states with a bottle-deposit law.)

Some consumers discovered that they could return containers in Michigan that were purchased from states that have no deposit law (that is, non-"MI 10c" containers) and net ten cents on each return.  This was especially easy with "reverse vending machines"--automated return machines that did not distinguish between Michigan containers and out-of-state containers.

The Michigan legislature responded by requiring beverage manufacturers to place a unique mark on Michigan returnable containers (in addition to the "MI 10c" mark) that would allow a reverse vending machine to determine whether the container was, in fact, a Michigan returnable container.  Failure to comply could result in a penalty of up to six months' imprisonment or a $2,000 fine or both.

Manufacturers sued, arguing that the requirement amount to an unconstitutional restraint on interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.

The Sixth Circuit agreed.  It ruled that while the requirement did not discriminate against interstate commerce (on its face, in its purpose, or in its effect), it did "directly control[] commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State," and thus was extraterritorial under Healy v. Beer Inst. Inc. (1989).  This doctrine renders extraterritorial regulation "virtually per se invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause."  Op. at 13.

Judge Sutton concurred but wrote separately "to express skepticism about the extraterritoriality doctrine."  Judge Sutton wrote that the doctrine may have outlived its usefulness.

SDS

November 30, 2012 in Cases and Case Materials, Commerce Clause, Dormant Commerce Clause, News, Opinion Analysis | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Nevada District Judge Rejects Challenge to Same-Sex Marriage Exclusion

In an 41 page opinion and order in Sevick v. Sandoval, United States District Judge Robert Jones has rejected an equal protection challenge to Nevada's statutory scheme disallowing same-sex marriage. 

450px-Little_White_ChapelThe judge relied upon Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), in which the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed an equal protection challenge to the Minnesota statutory marital scheme's exclusion of same-sex couples.  While stating that the "present challenge is in the main a garden-variety equal protection challenge precluded by Baker," the judge was undoubtedly aware of Baker's problematic status (a case to be relegated to the dustbin of precedent, perhaps), and provided a full analysis, "so that the Court of Appeals need not remand for further proceedings should it rule that Baker does not control or does not control as broadly as the Court finds."

The judge's well-structured analysis begins with a discussion of the classification, considering the notion that the Nevada scheme makes no classification at all, as well as the notion that the scheme makes a gender classification, but settling for the widely accepted principle that the scheme makes a sexual orientation classification.

In determining the level of scrutiny to be applied, Judge Jones decides in favor of rational basis, noting his disagreement with the Second Circuit in Windsor involving DOMA.  Supporting this conclusion, Judge Jones highlights the factor of political powerlessless and its relationship with the judicial role in a democracy.  For example, Jones writes that "Any minority group can reasonably argue that its political power is less than it might be were the group either not a minority or more popular. That is simply an inherent aspect of democracy."   Additionally, "Gross movements by the judiciary with respect to democratic processes can cause an awkward unbalancing of powers in a Madisonian constitutional democracy."

Moreover, Judge Jones rejects the heightened rational basis of Romer v. Evans and the Ninth Circuit precedent of Perry v. Brown, involving California's Proposition 8, because there is no animus in the Nevada scheme:

Because there has never been a right to same-sex marriage in Nevada, Romer and Perry are inapplicable here as to NRS section 122.020. That section of the NRS removed no preexisting right and effected no change whatsoever to the legal status of homosexuals when adopted by the Nevada Territorial Legislature in 1861. See Nev. Comp. Laws § 196 § 2, at 65 (1861–1873).

On this lowest standard of rational basis, the challenger must negate every conceivable basis - - - an exceedingly, if not impossible task, and Judge Jones not surprisingly finds that the challengers fail to meet their heavy burden.  The "protection of the traditional basis for marriage," is a legitimate one for Judge Jones, and the exclusion of same-sex couples is rationally related to that interest.  This is true even though Nevada has provided for a domestic partnership scheme for same-sex couples.

As the United States Supreme Court considers whether or not to decide the issue of same-sex marriage, either in the Proposition 8 posture of Perry v. Brown or one of the DOMA postures such as the Second Circuit case or First Circuit case - - - all of which invalidated bans on same-sex marriage - - - Judge Jones' opinion demonstrates that the constitutional issue of same-sex marriage remains a contested one, even in a state with otherwise permissive marital regulations. 

RR
[image "Little white chapel" in Las Vegas, Nevada, via]

November 30, 2012 in Equal Protection, Federalism, Gender, Interpretation, Opinion Analysis, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Daily Read: Collegiality and Same Sex Marriage Controversies

As the news is filled with the expected decision from the United States Supreme Court on whether - - - and if so, in what constellation - - - to grant certiorari on the issue of same-sex marriage, including both Proposition 8 and DOMA, Lyle Denniston's excellent discussions at SCOTUSBlog are a welcome resource.

TwolffBut equally vital is Tobias Barrington Wolff's recent brief remarks, to be as an essay in Fordham Law Review entitled Collegiality and Individuality Dignity, and available on ssrn, that discusses the more personal aspects of the issues for some ConLawProfs.

Wolff (pictured) explores the "deep tension that exists for LGBT scholars and lawyers who work" on issues of same-sex marriage and other sexuality issues, "between principles of collegiality and basic principles of individual and human dignity."   For example, "there is this seeming willingness on the part of antigay advocates to go around calling LGBT people unfit parents, and to expect to be treated with courtesy in response. I’ve been doing this for a dozen years, and I have to tell you, in very personal terms: I’m getting a little tired of being courteous in response to this kind of argument."

Wolff concludes:

I’ll just say quickly: One can refuse to engage with these arguments and the people who make them, which is a choice that some LGBT scholars make and is a choice that has obvious costs associated with it. One can continue engaging in a collegial fashion, which is the choice that I have made for most of my career, but carries serious individual costs. Or one can engage with a somewhat sharper- edged critique of the nature of the arguments that are being made, which is part of what, of course, I am doing today, which has its own set of costs and disruptions of the normal collegial atmosphere about it. I acknowledge that.

But I think that the impact upon the individual dignity of LGBT scholars from having to confront these ugly, ugly arguments over and over again is something that needs to be acknowledged as one of the central, central dynamics that warrants attention in conversations about these issues.

Wolff's worth-reading essay is situated in the context of scholarly discourse, but many ConLawProfs experience similar dynamics in the classroom.  How do we discuss these arguments and issues without assaulting each other's dignity?

RR

November 30, 2012 in Family, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Scholarship, Sexual Orientation, Sexuality, Supreme Court (US), Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Maine Governor May Remove Mural Without Violating Free Speech

The First Circuit ruled in Newton v. LePage that the Maine governor did not violate free speech by removing and relocating a mural from the state Department of Labor offices that he said was pro-labor.

Governor LePage ordered the mural's removal from the waiting room at the Maine DOL offices because he said he wanted the state to convey neutrality as between labor and employers.  He said the mural, commissioned by the state and paid for by state and federal funds, didn't cut it.  Five Maine residents sued, arguing that the removal amounted to viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment.

Maine Mural 1

The First Circuit disagreed.  It said that government has wide latitude in determining what art to display, or not to display, especially in a non-public forum (like a government office waiting room), and that it has a sufficient justification in appearing neutral.  Moreover, the court noted that the government didn't propose to remove the mural entirely; instead, it will relocate it to an alternative location.

Maine Mural 2

The court said that this case was easier for the government than Pleasant Grove City v. Summum:

Here, unlike Summum, the issue does not involve a public park, nor does it involve the government's decision whether or not to accept a private donation.  It is also clear that no Equal Protection or Establishment Clause concerns are raised by the case.  This case does not involve the suppression of private speech.

The government reiterated its commitment to relocate the mural at oral argument.  After all, it said, this is now the most famous piece of art in Maine.

SDS

November 29, 2012 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

D.C. Signs Regulation Violates Free Speech

Chief Judge Royce C. Lamberth (D.D.C.) ruled today in Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition v. D.C. that the District of Columbia's regulation governing the posting of signs on city lampposts violated the First Amendment on its face.  Judge Lamberth granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and thus ended this latest chapter in this long-running dispute over D.C. signs.  But the ruling also invites the city to come back with a new sign regulation, maybe leading to the next chapter in this case.

The regulation--after five years of litigation and four changes--now reads,

108.5  A sign, advertisement, or poster shall be affixed for no more than one hundred eighty (180) days.

108.6  A sign, advertisement, or poster related to a specific event shall be removed no later than thirty (30) days following the event to which it is related.  This subsection is not intended to extend the durational restriction in subsection 108.5.

108.11 Within twenty-four hours of posting each sign, advertisement, or poster, two (2) copies of the material shall be filed with an agent of the District of Columbia so designated by the Mayor.  The filing shall include the name, address, and telephone number of the originator of the sign, advertisement, or poster, and if the sign is for an event, the date of the event.

108.13  For purposes of this section, the term "event" refers to an occurrence, happening, activity or series of activities, specific to an identifiable time and place, if referenced on the poster itself or reasonably determined from all circumstances by the inspector.

The court ruled that city lampposts were a designated public forum and that the reg created a content-based distinction (between signs for events and all other signs).  But the court said that the city failed to provide a content-neutral justification for the distinction.  It wasn't enough, the court said, that the city's attorney represented that the reg was designed to reduce litter and enhance aesthetics.  The city had to produce more (like some actual proof of the city's actual purpose).

The court also said that the reg was unconstitutionally vague.  Judge Lamberth ruled that 108.13 allowed an inspector to determine which signs qualified as "event" signs without sufficient criteria or guidance.

This is only the latest ruling in this long-running dispute and may lead to more reg changes and more litigation, especially if the District insists on its distinction between signs for events and all other signs.

SDS

November 29, 2012 in Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Daily Read: Thirteenth Amendment Scholars Supporting Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Act

Did Congress have power pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment to pass the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009

 

Matthew_Shepard_and_James_Byrd,_Jr._Hate_Crimes_Prevention_Ac
President Barack Obama greets Louvon Harris, left, Betty Byrd Boatner, right, both sisters of James Byrd, Jr., and Judy Shepard, center, mother of Matthew Shepard, following his remarks at a reception commemorating the enactment of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act in the East Room of the White House, Oct. 28, 2009. (Official White House Photo by Pete Souza)

The question of the Act's constitutionality is before the Tenth Circuit in an appeal arising from the first prosecution under the Act.  In Hatch v. United States, the defendant challenges 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1), which provides:

 

Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes bodily injury to any person or, through the use of fire, a firearm, a dangerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of any person—

There seems to be little dispute that the three defendants admitted actions against the Native American victim, including branding the victim with a swatstika, fit within the terms of the statute.   But did the statute exceed Congress' power pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment, or does the statute violate equal protection as guarenteed through the Fifth Amendment?

On the Thirteenth Amendment issue, ConLawProfs William M. Carter, Jr., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Alexander Tsesis, and Rebecca E. Zietlow, have filed an amicus brief, available on ssrn, argue that the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement clause gives Congress broad powers.  They contend that the hate crime section should be analyzed under a defential rational basis standard, both because of its provenance in the Thirteenth Amendment and, perhaps most interestingly,  because the statute does not make a racial classification.

This is a terrific read of engaged scholarship as well as a providing a great grounding for a class exercise or student project.

RR

November 29, 2012 in Equal Protection, Fifth Amendment, Interpretation, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Race, Recent Cases, Scholarship, Teaching Tips | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Seventh Circuit Says No First Amendment Violation in Non-Confirmation for Political Support

The Seventh Circuit ruled this week in Embry v. City of Calumet that city aldermen did not violate free speech when they vowed not to ratify the mayor's nominee to be city department commissioner based on the nominee's support of the mayor in the prior election. 

The case arose when Embry, the Commissioner for the Department of Streets and Alleys in Calumet City, a position appointed by the mayor, supported the mayor and a group of aldermen running as a team in the city's election.  The aldermen defected from the team of candidates, however, and pressured Embry to support a rival candidate for another alderman slot.  After Embry declined, the aldermen said they'd oppose ratification of Embry's appointment as Commissioner of a new, consolidated city department (that included Embry's old Department of Streets and Alleys).  The mayor then nominated someone else, the council approved, and Embry lost the job.

Embry sued the aldermen, arguing that their opposition to his appointment violated free speech.  He claimed that his case was governed by the public-employee speech rule in Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education.

The Seventh Circuit disagreed.  The court ruled that Embry's position was a policy-making position, subject to the Elrod-Branti rule that says that for policy-making jobs the "government employer's need for political allegiance . . . outweighs the employee's freedom of expression[.]"  Op. at 4 (quoting Bonds v. Milwaukee Cnty., 207 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2000).  In other words: political appointees can be removed for political reasons.

Moreover, the court said that Embry failed to allege any particular speech unconnected to political affiliation or policy views that led to his non-confirmation.  Embry only alleged that he publicly supported the team, and that he was fired "based on [his] political allegiance to [the mayor]." 

The ruling is consistent with rulings in other circuits and likely ends this case.

SDS

November 28, 2012 in Association, Cases and Case Materials, First Amendment, News, Opinion Analysis, Speech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Daily Read: Rostron on the Second Amendment After Heller and McDonald

The central argument of ConLawProf Allen Rostron's article, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over the Second Amendment, published at 80 George Washington Law Review 703 (2012), and available in draft on ssrn, received further validation with yesterday's Second Circuit opinion upholding a New York law restricting concealed carrying of firearms in public. 

RostronRostron (pictured) considers the range of lower court decisions resulting from challenges to state and local firearm regulations made possible by the Court's recent Second Amendment decisions.  Heller v. District of Columbia, the first "battle" in the gun wars, recognized a Second Amendment right beyond the militia, and in the second battle of 2010, the Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago, incorporated this right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, in neither "battle" did the Supreme Court specify what level of scrutiny or test should be used to assess the validity of gun laws under the Second Amendment, leaving the lower courts to struggle with this issue.

Rostron's contribution is his engagement with the third "battle": the interpretation and application of Heller and McDonald in the lower courts.  He argues that the third phase of the fight over the right to keep and bear arms is moving toward an unusual result, with these decisions reflecting the "pragmatic sentiments of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinions in Heller and McDonald,"  rather than the majority, plurality, or concurring opinions that are long on history and rhetoric and short on doctrine or guidance. 

Rostron is candid about his own preferences and equally candid that the politics or doctrine could shift, including the Court's grant of certiorari in an additional case in order to promulgate a strict scrutiny standard.  For now, however, Rostron's compelling article demonstrates that Breyer's dissent operates in many ways as a majority opinion.

Of course, if Breyer's view had prevailed in the controversial 5-4 decisions in Heller and McDonald, the federal courts would not be busily adjudicating these Second Amendment challenges.

RR

November 28, 2012 in Courts and Judging, Federalism, Profiles in Con Law Teaching, Scholarship, Second Amendment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

International Constitutional Law Blog

Second Circuit on Second Amendment: New York's Gun Licensing Limitation for Concealed Handguns Is Constitutional

In a unanimous opinion today, a Second Circuit panel in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester upheld New York's requirement that applicants prove “proper cause” to obtain licenses to carry handguns for self-defense under New York Penal Law section 400.00(2)(f).  

Affirming the district judge, the panel interpreted the Supreme Court's controversial Heller v. District of Columbia 2008 decision, as well as the subsequent McDonald v. City of Chicago opinion holding that the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller was incorporated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. (Recall that four Justices in McDonald ruled incorporation was through the due process clause, with Justice Thomas concurring in the result, but contending incorporation occurred through the privileges or immunities clause).

Knotted Gun
One of the issues left open by Heller and McDonald was the level of scrutiny to be applied to gun regulations. The plaintiffs, represented by Alan Gura, familiar from both Heller and McDonald, argued that strict scrutiny should apply. In rejecting strict scrutiny, the Second Circuit panel emphasized that the New York regulation at issue was not within the core interest protected by the Heller Court's interpretation of the Second Amendment - - - self-defense within the home - - - but was a limitation of concealed weapons permits to those who could demonstrate a "special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community or of persons engaged in the same profession."  The panel also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the concealed carry permits were akin to prior restraint under the First Amendment. The court stated, "“We are hesitant to import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into Second Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, no court has done so.” (emphasis in original).  Later in the opinion, the court provided an even more convincing argument:

State regulation under the Second Amendment has always been more robust than of other enumerated rights. For example, no law could prohibit felons or the mentally ill from speaking on a particular topic or exercising their religious freedom.

Recall that even the majority opinions in Heller and McDonald maintained that prohibiting felons or the mentally ill from possessing guns was consistent with the Second Amendment.

The Second Circuit decided that "intermediate scrutiny" was "appropriate in this case":  "The proper cause requirement" of the New York law "passes constitutional muster if it is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental interest." 

The substantial (and indeed compelling) governmental interests were "public safety and crime prevention," as the parties seemed to agree.  As to the substantial relationship, the court noted that the "legislative judgment" surrounding these issues was a century old and that the proper cause requirement was a "hallmark" of New York's handgun regulation since then.  The court also noted that the law was not a ban, but a restriction to those persons who have a reason to possess a concealed handgun in public.  New York did submit more current studies, and the court credited these even as it stated that the decision was clearly a policy one for the legislature.  Heller did not, the court ruled, take such "policy choices off the table."

The Second Circuit's opinion is doctrinally well-reasoned, but also a deliberate engagement with the history of gun regulation.  In the very beginning of its analysis, the opinion states

New York’s efforts in regulating the possession and use of firearms predate the Constitution. By 1785, New York had enacted laws regulating when and where firearms could be used, as well as restricting the storage of gun powder.

The court returns again and again to the history, in New York and elsewhere, even as it reiterates that history does not answer the question.

The Second Circuit thus joins the surfeit of courts upholding state gun restrictions, including most recently the Fifth Circuit, despite Heller and McDonald.

RR
[image" The Knotted Gun," sculpture in NYC outside UN, via].

November 27, 2012 in Federalism, History, Opinion Analysis, Second Amendment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Daily Read: Political Parties and Judging

It's something that is, perhaps increasingly, difficult to ignore: the political affiliations of federal judges. 

Adam Liptak's article in the NYT yesterday takes on the subject with a focus on the recent Michigan affirmative action decision from the en banc Sixth Circuit.  Liptak provides the breakdown: "Every one of the eight judges in the majority was nominated by a Democratic president. Every one of the seven judges in dissent was nominated by a Republican president."   This, he argues, is consistent with a forthcoming book, The Behavoir of Federal Judges, an empirical study authored by Lee Epstein, William Landes, and Richard Posner. 

388px-William_Wood,_Vanity_Fair,_1869-03-20Liptak thus rejects - - - at least implicitly - - - the practice of SCOTUSBlog's preeminent reporter and commentator Lyle Dennison whose "note to readers" in his discussion of the Michigan affirmative action case explained; that he would not include "references to the political party affiliation of the Presidents who named the judges to the bench" because "the use of such references invites the reader to draw such a conclusion about partisan influence, without proof."  Denniston, however, did include a caveat: he would provide that information" when "it is clearly demonstrated that the political source of a judge’s selection had a direct bearing upon how that judge voted — admittedly, a very difficult thing to prove."

Whether it is a question of causation, correlation, or coincidence is an issue often raised by law students in ConLaw classes, and one that ConLawProfs struggle to answer from various perspectives.

For Liptak, however, there is predictive certainty.  Referencing the affirmative action case of Fisher v. University of Texas argued in October, he writes:

The justices’ votes in the Texas case are as yet unknown. But here is a good bet: every vote to strike down the program will come from a justice appointed by a Republican president, and every vote to uphold it will come from a justice appointed by a Democratic one.

RR
[image via]

November 27, 2012 in Affirmative Action, Books, Courts and Judging, Current Affairs, Race, Recent Cases, Supreme Court (US), Teaching Tips | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, November 26, 2012

Court Reignites Health Care Reform Challenge

The Supreme Court today reopened one of the cases challenging the federal Affordable Care Act and sent it back for further proceedings at the Fourth Circuit.  The move means that the lower court, and possibly the Supreme Court, will have another crack at certain issues that the Supreme Court dodged this summer in its ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius.

Recall that the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge to the ACA by several individuals and Liberty University in September 2011, holding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred the claim.  The Supreme Court declined to review that case, Liberty University v. Geithner.  But today the Court reopened the case, vacated the Fourth Circuit ruling, and sent the case back for further proceedings in light of the Court's ruling in NFIB.

The plaintiffs in the case originally challenged the universal coverage provision (the so-called "individual mandate," requiring individuals to acquire health insurance or to pay a tax penalty) and the employer mandate (requiring employers with more than 50 employees to provide health insurance coverage for their employees), arguing that they exceeded Congress's taxing and commerce powers and violated the Tenth Amendment, Article I, Section 9's prohibition against unapportioned capitation or direct taxes (the Direct Tax Clause), and the Religion Clauses and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (among others).  (As to the Religion Clauses, the plaintiffs argued that the requirements would cause them to support insurance companies that paid for abortions, a practice that they claimed ran against their religions.) 

The district court ruled against the plaintiffs on all counts and dismissed the case.  The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case under the AIA and didn't reach the merits. 

The Supreme Court ruled in NFIB that the AIA did not bar the Court from ruling on the tax question, that Congress validly enacted the universal coverage provision under its Article I, Section 8 power "to lay and collect Taxes," and that it didn't violate the Direct Tax Clause.  Thus after NFIB these issues appear to remain open on remand:

  • Whether the mandates violate the Religion Clauses or the RFRA;
  • Whether the employer mandate violates the taxing authority or the Direct Tax Clause;
  • Whether the mandates violate equal protection;
  • Whether the mandate violates free speech and associational rights.

As to the Religion Clauses, the district court ruled that the ACA's religious exemptions to universal coverage were permissible accommodations (and thus didn't violate the Establishment Clause) and that the ACA didn't require the plaintiffs to pay for abortions (and thus didn't violate the Free Exercise Clause or the RFRA).

As to the employer mandate: It's hard to see how the Supreme Court's tax analysis of the individual mandate in NFIB wouldn't apply with equal force to the employer mandate.

If the district court was right on the First Amendment and equal protection claims (as it seems), and if the Supreme Court's tax analysis applies with equal force to the employer mandate, this case doesn't seem to have much of a future.

But then again, that's what many of us said about NFIB.

SDS

November 26, 2012 in Abortion, Association, Cases and Case Materials, Commerce Clause, Congressional Authority, Equal Protection, Establishment Clause, First Amendment, Free Exercise Clause, Fundamental Rights, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, News, Religion, Taxing Clause, Tenth Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Daily Read: McElroy on Cameras in the Supreme Court

ZenitThe energy surrounding the Court's anticipated grant of certiorari in at least one of the same-sex marriage cases - - - either one or more of the DOMA cases or the Prop 8 case (Perry v. Brown) - - - raises yet again the question of public access to Supreme Court oral arguments.  While these cases are only the latest, they perhaps have special resonance given the Court's quelling of the planned broadcast of the Proposition 8 trial in federal court on dubious procedural grounds.

Prof Lisa McElroy's article, Cameras at the Supreme Court: A Rhetorical Analysis, forthcoming in BYU Law Review and available in draft on ssrn, argues persuasively for the broadcast of Supreme Court proceedings, based on the public's interest in accessing its government, including the judicial branch.  The contribution of McElroy's excellent piece, however, is that it is not simply an argument, but an engagement with the "stories" the Court - - - and its Justices - - - tell about the Court and its lack of cameras.  McElroy writes that there

can be no doubt that the Court has sincere concerns when it comes to granting public access to the Supreme Court, especially through broadcasting of official Court work. Among them are a desire for day-to- day privacy, a concern that allowing cameras or internet streaming will somehow damage the public’s perception of the Court,  fears that broadcasting could somehow subject the Court or the Justices personally to mockery, and concerns that funny or less-than-devout comments made during oral argument might end up on the Internet or on programs like Jon Stewart.  It is concerned that televising Supreme Court proceedings would change the very nature of those proceedings.

But, she continues,

the question we must ask is whether these concerns add up to a story with a factual basis, or whether they are a fairy tale that the Justices tell Americans–perhaps even themselves. Are the Court’s concerns borne out objectively, or are they instead a part of the story the institution has created (consciously or unconsciously) to justify its refusal to allow the American people virtual and physical access? Are inaccessibility, grandeur, and intimidation the only paths to legitimacy and respect?

Additionally, McElroy discusses whether the members of the Court are simply uncomfortable with technology, or jealous of their privacy (an increasingly untenable rationale), or worried about security, or not interested in change.

For any scholar or student considering issues of public access to Court proceedings, McElroy's article is a treasure as well as a treasure trove.

RR

November 26, 2012 in Scholarship, Supreme Court (US), Television, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)