Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Recall: Judge Hudson ruled last month that the individual health insurance mandate in the federal health care reform legislation exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority because it required a positive act (and didn't merely prohibit action)--a popular position among those who argue against the mandate's constitutionality.
But Yung points out that Judge Hudson ruled just over a year earlier that a different federal requirement to act was well within Commerce Clause authority. That case, U.S. v. Dean, involved the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) and its requirement that sex offenders registered with the comprehensive national registration system that SORNA created--whether or not they cross state lines. Yung:
In the case of health care reform, opponents have argued that Congress' power extends only to "activities" and that the so-called "mandate" actually punishes people for "inactivity"--failing to purchase health insurance. In the case of sex-offender registration, a similar "inactivity" is being regulated: failing to register with the government. Like Hudson, every federal appellate court that has reviewed the federal sex-offender-registration law has found it to be within Congress' powers.
Despite the similarities between the statutes, the more recent opinion by Hudson is radically different from when he reviewed the federal sex-offender-registration statute. In his opinion regarding the health care law, Judge Hudson wrote that in order to "survive a constitutional challenge, the subject matter must be economic in nature . . . and it must involve activity."
That clear statement of law simply cannot be reconciled with his prior opinion because a failure to register as a sex offender is neither economic nor activity.
Judge Hudson wrote this in Dean:
When evaluating the impact of an activity on interstate commerce, the [Fourth Circuit] commented that "the question is not simply whether one particular offense has a measurable impact upon interstate commerce, but whether the relevant class of acts has such an impact." With this principle in mind, the Fourth Circuit concluded that "even though the comprehensive federal registration system created by SORNA may implicate a sex offender who does not cross state lines, the potential for recidivism and flight across state lines of all sex offenders is sufficiently real and substantial to be taken as a serious and extensive part of the larger interstate problem, justifying the comprehensive regulation. The court found further support for its conclusion in the fact that Congress's regulatory scheme would be severely hampered unless all sex offenders were required to register.
As a result of the Fourth Circuit's analysis . . . this Court finds that the registration requirements detailed in [SORNA] are valid under the Commerce Clause. . . .
Dean, 670 F. Supp. 457, 460 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). (Judge Hudson's refers to the Fourth Circuit case of U.S. v. Gould, which upheld the federal criminal penalty for sex offenders who travel across state lines and fail to register, but which did not directly opine on the federal regulation to register in the first place. Again: this regulation applies whether or not a sex offender crosses state lines.)
Judge Hudson's analysis above seems to apply with even greater force to the individual mandate.
But more: Judge Hudson went on to write that the Necessary and Proper Clause provided additional support for this conclusion. And notably he cited no Fourth Circuit case for this part of his opinion, suggesting that he wasn't merely and begrudgingly following the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Gould but (if there were any doubt) also using his own judgment, thus underscoring the inconsistency with his more recent health reform ruling.