Tuesday, December 2, 2008
Here's a provocative pair of articles on the merits and demerits of a plural executive:
Christopher Berry (U. Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy) and Jacob Gersen (U. Chicago Law) give a normative argument in The Unbundled Executive for a partially unbundled executive--"a plural executive regime in which discrete authority is taken from the President and given exclusively to a directly elected executive official, for example, a directly elected War Executive, Education Executive, or Agriculture Executive." The idea, of course, is quite familiar to American state government: Executive authority in the states is divided between a popularly elected governor, attorney general, and secretary of state. But we rarely (ever?) hear serious academic discussion these days about a plural Article II executive.
Steven Calabresi (Northwestern) and Nicholas Terrell (Northwestern JD, '10) respond in The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled Executive with thoughtful arguments why Berry and Gersen are wrong, and, in any event, why their argument has nothing to do with unitary executive theory.
These are interesting, provocative, and fun (yes, fun)--a welcome diversion from the increasingly common fare on the unitary executive.