Monday, January 25, 2016

SCOTUS Decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana: Supreme Court Jurisdiction, State Courts, and Retroactivity

Today the Supreme Court issued a 6-3 decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana, which involves the retroactive effect of the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama (where the Court prohibited mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles).

The case presented both an interesting question of Supreme Court jurisdiction in the context of state collateral review proceedings, and the perennial federal courts challenge of when a new constitutional right applies retroactively. The majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan & Sotomayor) concluded:

(1) The Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review a state court’s failure to recognize, in the context of state collateral review, a federal constitutional right that applies retroactively;

(2) Miller did announce “a substantive rule of constitutional law” that applies retroactively; and

(3) A state may remedy a Miller violation by extending parole eligibility to juvenile offenders.

The three dissenters were Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, who disagreed both on jurisdiction and on the merits. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by both Thomas and Alito, and Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent as well.

Check out Lyle Denniston’s analysis on SCOTUSblog.

 

 

 

 

January 25, 2016 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, State Courts, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 22, 2016

Article on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins Now on St. Thomas Journal of Complex Litigation Website

I'm overcoming my reticence to post twice about one of my articles, because I want to promote the law students at St. Thomas University School of Law who have labored to establish the new St. Thomas Journal of Complex Litigation (JCL).  The final version of my article, "Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: The Illusory 'No-Injury' Class Reaches the Supreme Court," has just been posted on the JCL website.  The abstract is available on SSRN here. 

The St. Thomas JCL is pleased to accept submissions through ExpressO or Scholastica from judges, attorneys, law faculty, and law students.  Information on submissions is here.   

 

 

January 22, 2016 in Class Actions, Recent Scholarship, Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 20, 2016

Today’s SCOTUS Decision in Campbell-Ewald v. Gomez

The Supreme Court issued its decision today in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, a closely watched case on class actions, Article III, and mootness (covered earlier here and here). Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion begins:

Is an unaccepted offer to satisfy the named plaintiff ’s individual claim sufficient to render a case moot when the complaint seeks relief on behalf of the plaintiff and a class of persons similarly situated? This question, on which Courts of Appeals have divided, was reserved in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U. S. ___, ___, ___, n. 4 (2013) (slip op., at 5, 6, n. 4). We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force. Like other unaccepted contract offers, it creates no lasting right or obligation. With the offer off the table, and the defendant’s continuing denial of liability, adversity between the parties persists.

Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is joined by Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas adds a sixth vote, but writes a separate concurring opinion. Chief Justice Roberts writes a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, and Justice Alito writes a dissenting opinion as well.

 

 

 

January 20, 2016 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 15, 2016

SCOTUS Cert Grant in Microsoft v. Baker: Appellate Review of Orders Denying Class Certification

Today the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, limited to the following Court-generated question:

Whether a federal court of appeals has jurisdiction under both Article III and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review an order denying class certification after the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismiss their individual claims with prejudice.

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog.

 

 

January 15, 2016 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 14, 2015

SCOTUS Decision in DIRECTV v. Imburgia: Federal Arbitration Act Overrides State Contract Law (Again)

Today the Supreme Court issued its decision in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia. The vote was 6-3, with Justice Breyer writing the majority opinion. Justice Thomas writes a dissenting opinion, and Justice Ginsburg writes a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Sotomayor.

As covered earlier here and here, Imburgia is another case involving the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The particular issue is whether the FAA allows California to construe an arbitration provision referring to California state law (the “law of your state”) to mean state law as it existed prior to the U.S. Supreme Court invalidating certain aspects of California contract law in its 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. That was how the California Court of Appeal construed the arbitration agreement in Imburgia, but Justice Breyer’s majority opinion disagrees, concluding instead that such a construction itself violates the FAA by failing to “place arbitration contracts on equal footing with all other contracts.”

Continue reading

December 14, 2015 in Class Actions, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (1)

Recent Scholarship: Patent Litigation; Supreme Court Justice Loyalty; “Litigation Trolls”

Three new articles recently posted on SSRN:

1. Christopher Beauchamp (Brooklyn Law School) has posted The First Patent Litigation Explosion, forthcoming in Yale Law Journal.

Abstract:

The twenty-first century “patent litigation explosion” is not unprecedented. In fact, the nineteenth century saw an even bigger surge of patent cases. During that era, the most prolific patent enforcers brought hundreds or even thousands of suits, dwarfing the efforts of today’s leading “trolls.” In 1850, New York City and Philadelphia alone had ten times more patent litigation, per U.S. patent in force, than the entire United States in 2013. Even the absolute quantity of late-nineteenth-century patent cases bears comparison to the numbers filed in recent years: the Southern District of New York in 1880 would have ranked third on the list of districts with the most patent infringement suits filed in 2014 and would have headed the list as recently as 2010.

This Article reveals the forgotten history of the first patent litigation explosion. It first describes the rise of large-scale patent enforcement in the middle of the nineteenth century. It then draws on new data from the archives of two leading federal courts to trace the development of patent litigation from 1840 to 1910 and to outline the scale, composition, and leading causes of the litigation boom. Finally, the Article explores the consequences of this phenomenon for the law and politics of the patent system. The effects of the litigation explosion were profound. The rise of large-scale patent assertion provides a new explanation for patent law’s crucial shift from common law to equity decision making in the middle of the nineteenth century. And at its height, the litigation explosion produced a political backlash that threatened to sweep away the patent system as we know it. Recovering the history of patent law during this formative and turbulent era offers fresh perspectives on the patent reform debates of today.

2. Lee Epstein (Washington University in St. Louis School of Law) and Eric A. Posner (University of Chicago Law School) have posted Supreme Court Justices' Loyalty to the President.

Abstract:

A statistical analysis of voting by Supreme Court justices from 1937-2014 provides evidence of a “loyalty effect”—justices more frequently vote for the government when the president who appointed them is in office than when subsequent presidents lead the government. This effect exists even when subsequent presidents are of the same party as the justices in question. However, the loyalty effect is much stronger for Democratic justices than for Republican justices. This may be because Republican presidents are more ideologically committed than Democratic justices are, leaving less room for demonstrations of loyalty.

 

3. Bradley Wendel (Cornell University School of Law) has posted Litigation Trolls (NYU Law School Center on Civil Justice Symposium on "Litigation Funding: The Basics and Beyond").

Abstract:     

Third-party financing of litigation has been described with a variety of unflattering metaphors. Litigation financers have been likened to gamblers in the courtroom casino, loan sharks, vultures, Wild West outlaws, and busybodies mucking about in the private affairs of others. Now Judge Richard Posner has referred to third-party financers as litigation trolls, an undeniably unflattering comparison to patent trolls. But what it is, if anything, that makes third-party financers “trolls”? Legal claims are, for the most part, freely assignable, the proceeds of claims are assignable, and various strangers to the underlying lawsuit, including liability insurers and plaintiffs’ contingency-fee counsel, are permitted to have an economic interest in the outcome of the litigation. On one view, therefore, third-party litigation investment is just another innovative financial product that enables risk to be carved up and allocated more efficiently. Life insurance, attorney contingent fees, and derivative contracts on exchange-traded commodities were all formerly regarded with extreme suspicion, but are now widely accepted. But people still hate patent trolls. So whether litigation funding is some kind of conceptual anomaly is an important question because, as it happens, Posner’s dictum coincides with a public-relations campaign by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to stigmatize third-party litigation financing and saddle the industry with new and burdensome regulations. This short paper evaluates the conceptual critique of litigation financing by comparison with two other areas in which it is claimed that some form of financing “just doesn’t sit right” in light of the nature and function of the legal system – patent trolling and contributions to judicial election campaigns.

December 14, 2015 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 1, 2015

Today's SCOTUS Decision on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act

Today the Supreme Court issued its first opinion in an argued case this Term: OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs. In an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court unanimously held that a lawsuit against the Austrian state-owned railway was barred by Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. From the opinion:

Respondent Carol Sachs is a resident of California who purchased in the United States a Eurail pass for rail travel in Europe. She suffered traumatic personal injuries when she fell onto the tracks at the Innsbruck, Austria, train station while attempting to board a train operated by the Austrian state-owned railway. She sued the railway in Federal District Court, arguing that her suit was not barred by sovereign immunity because it is “based upon” the railway’s sale of the pass to her in the United States. We disagree and conclude that her action is instead “based upon” the railway’s conduct in Innsbruck. We therefore hold that her suit falls outside the commercial activity exception and is barred by sovereign immunity. 

Our earlier coverage is here.

 

 

December 1, 2015 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 30, 2015

Steinman on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

In another recent essay on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (see also here and here), Professor Joan E. Steinman (IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law) has posted on SSRN her article, Spokeo, Where Shalt Thou Stand?  This article is forthcoming in Vanderbilt Law Review, Vol. 68 (2015).

Abstract:     

This essay analyzes three distinct issues raised by Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins and considers where the Court will stand on each of them. First, I consider whether the Court will decide the question on which it granted certiorari: "[w]hether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute?" I explain why the Court might dismiss its writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Second, I address whether Spokeo, Inc. or Robins has the better of the argument concerning Robins’ standing to sue. I opine that the Court’s decisions regarding standing in disputes concerning informational rights and wrongs indicate that it should find that the injury alleged by Robins is sufficiently concrete to confer Article III standing, and that Robins also satisfies prudential standing doctrines. Finally, I argue that the Court should not be dissuaded from so holding by the fact that the suit was brought as a class action.

 

November 30, 2015 in Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Hessick on Understanding Standing and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

Professor F. Andrew Hessick (University of Utah - S.J. Quinney School of Law) has posted on SSRN his article, "Understanding Standing."  The article is forthcoming in Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc.

Abstract:

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which is before the Supreme Court this term, poses a fundamental question of Article III standing: Does a person have standing to sue to seek redress for the violation of a substantive statutory right, even if he did not suffer any factual harm from the violation of that right?

Standing is one of the doctrines that define the power of the federal judiciary. Federal courts cannot hear all disputes. Instead, Article III authorizes them to resolve only “cases” and “controversies.” The Supreme Court has interpreted those terms to authorize federal courts to resolve only those disputes that were “traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” This restriction, the Court has said, is critical to maintaining the separation of powers. According to the Court, standing enforces these limits on the judicial power.

Despite standing’s importance to maintaining the federal judiciary’s proper role in the federal government, the Court has been inconsistent on what a plaintiff must show to establish standing. Some cases say that the violation of an individual right is enough; others suggest that a factual harm is required. That inconsistency underlies the standing dispute in Spokeo. If the purpose of Article III standing is to protect the separation of powers by restricting federal courts to resolving only those disputes that courts historically could hear, the answer to that question is clear: the violation of a legal right alone should support Article III standing.

November 30, 2015 in Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 20, 2015

Supreme Court Mapping Project: The Collateral Order Doctrine

Over at his In Progress blog, Colin Starger has mapped out everyone’s favorite judicially-crafted exception the final judgment rule, showing “19 of the Supreme Court’s collateral order cases using a modified Spaeth Projection.” 

 

 

 

November 20, 2015 in Federal Courts, Supreme Court Cases, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, November 13, 2015

Moore on Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

I have recently posted on SSRN an article, "Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins: The Illusory 'No-Injury' Class Reaches the Supreme Court." The article is forthcoming in the newly-established St. Thomas Journal of Complex Litigation, which is currently welcoming submissions.

Abstract:

The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (Mem.) (2015) casts a shadow on the long-accepted constitutional principle that Congress has the authority to enact a statute to regulate corporations’ behavior for the public good, and to provide a private right of action to a person as to whom the statute is violated.  That right of action often provides for the award of a minimum amount of statutory damages as an alternative or in addition to actual damages. 

Congress has enacted numerous such statutes, including the one at issue in Spokeo, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which was passed forty-five years ago.  Suddenly, within the last ten years, corporate litigation activists have invented a new argument to avoid regulatory statutes that provide for statutory damages.  They claim that a “mere” statutory violation is an “injury in law” rather than the “injury in fact” required for Article III standing.  And they are launching a frontal assault on Congress’s constitutional authority to enact any statute that provides a private right of action for its violation, accusing Congress of thereby violating Article III by “creating standing.” 

Corporate litigation activists then apply to a class representative the argument that the violation of a person’s statutory rights is not an “injury in fact,” and call the result a “no-injury class.”  The appellation “no-injury class” is another misleading verbal weapon of recent vintage.

This article hopes to makes three small contributions to the burgeoning literature on Spokeo, which at this writing has not yet been decided.  First, the Question Presented to the Supreme Court is misleading and overbroad.  It implies that the plaintiff in Spokeo, Thomas Robins, has been found not to have suffered any “concrete harm,” but the case is still at the pleading stage.  Thus, the question is simply whether Robins’s complaint contains sufficient allegations of injury, assumed to be true on a motion to dismiss, to establish Article III standing.  Further, the Question Presented implies that a ruling involving the FCRA (the statute at issue in Spokeo) will be generalizable to all other statutes that create a private right of action and allow statutory damages, without recognizing the many variations in these statutes’ language and operation.

Second, the article sketches the historical legal difference between the words “injury” and “damage.”  “Injury” connotes the violation of one’s legal right, even if one has not sustained any actual harm, while “damage” means a loss or harm, even if one has no legal right to sue.  The Supreme Court has adhered to these meanings since Marbury v. Madison.  Given that historical distinction, the term “injury in fact” is confusing and somewhat self-contradictory: under the definition of “injury” as the violation of a legal right, the term “injury in fact” is akin to “violation of a legal right in fact.”  Further, the petitioner Spokeo’s newly-discovered phrase “injury in law” – which has never been used in a single United States Supreme Court opinion -- is redundant.  Under the definition of “injury” as the violation of a legal right, the phrase “injury in law” is akin to “legal right in law.”  But however nonsensical, the epithet “injury in law” serves a useful purpose for corporate activists: it minimizes, even ridicules, so-called “technical,” “trifling” statutes that regulate corporate behavior.   

Finally, the petitioner Spokeo and its numerous business-oriented amici could have made the very same argument they are making in Spokeo – that the violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is not itself an “injury in fact” – only nine years ago in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007), but did not.  In Safeco, the putative class alleged that insurers Safeco and GEICO had not complied with the FCRA’s requirement of sending the class members notice of an “adverse action” when the insurers did not charge them the lowest available insurance rate because of a less-than-perfect credit report.  The defendants’ amici repeatedly stated that the plaintiffs in Safeco had not alleged any “actual harm” or “actual damages” even though they sought $1,000 in statutory damages for each member of the class (as the FCRA allows).  Thus, Safeco presented exactly the same alleged “no-injury” situation, under exactly the same statute, as Spokeo.  Yet the Safeco petitioners and their amici (four of which are also amici in Spokeo) failed to argue that the class representatives lacked Article III standing or that violation of the FCRA was not an “injury in fact.”  It seems fair to ask why not, if the Article III argument is so compelling.  One might speculate that the reason is that corporate litigation activists have only recently contrived the “statutory-violation-is-not-an-injury-in-fact” argument.                        

November 13, 2015 in Class Actions, Recent Scholarship, Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

Today’s SCOTUS Oral Argument in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo

The Supreme Court heard oral argument today in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, which presents the questions:

(I) Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample.

(II) Whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.

Here is the transcript. For our earlier coverage of the case, see here and here.

 

 

November 10, 2015 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, November 2, 2015

Today’s SCOTUS Oral Argument in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins

The Supreme Court hears oral argument today in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which presents the question:

Whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.

For our earlier coverage, see here, here, and here. You should also check out Amy Howe’s preview of the argument for SCOTUSblog and the Vanderbilt Law Review’s En Banc Roundtable on the case, available here.

UPDATE: The transcript of the oral argument has now been posted.

 

November 2, 2015 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Recent Scholarship, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, October 14, 2015

Today’s SCOTUS Oral Argument in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez

The Supreme Court heard oral argument today in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, which presents some important questions regarding Article III, mootness, and class actions. The transcript is here.

 

 

October 14, 2015 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Procedure Scholars Mostly Support Employees in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo

Four amicus briefs by law professors have been filed in the Supreme Court in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (to be argued November 10, 2015).  Three of the law professors’ briefs support the respondent (the plaintiff class), and the fourth supports neither party.

 

The case has been a marathon, eight years and counting.  In 2007, plaintiffs filed a class action (under Iowa state law and under Rule 23(b)(3)) and representative action (under the Fair Labor Standards Act) in the Northern District of Iowa.  Plaintiffs sued on behalf of employees of Defendant Tyson Foods at its meat processing facility in Storm Lake, Iowa.  The class sought unpaid overtime wages for uncompensated time spent donning and doffing clothing and protective equipment and other associated tasks.

 

In 2008, the district court certified both a collective action class and a Rule 23(b)(3) class, narrowing the class originally sought by the plaintiffs to include only those employees paid under a “gang time” compensation system in the Kill, Cut, or Retrim departments.  Over 500 employees opted into the FLSA class.  There are a few thousand members of the Rule 23(b)(3) class.

 

After losing the class certification motion, Tyson filed a motion to consolidate the case via multidistrict litigation with other, similar cases against Tyson.  However, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied consolidation because discovery was likely to “proceed on a plant-by-plant basis.” 

 

The plaintiff class survived a motion for summary judgment and a motion to decertify the class in 2011. 

 

After a nine-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for the class of $2,892,378.70. With liquidated damages, the final judgment totaled $5,785,757.40.  The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment.  Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791, 796 (8th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015).

 

As Tyson phrases them, the two Questions Presented in the Supreme Court are:

 

(1)   Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample; and

(2)   whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.

 

Three of the law professors’ briefs address the first question:

Brief of Civil Procedure Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party

(Allan Erbsen, Kevin M. Clermont, Richard D. Freer, Mark Moller, and Howard M. Wasserman)

 

Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Professors in Support of Respondents  

(Jonah B. Gelbach, Stephen B. Burbank, J. Maria Glover, Arthur R. Miller, Alexander A. Reinert, Adam N. Steinman, and Tobias Barrington Wolff) 

 

Brief of Amicus Curiae Complex Litigation Law Professors in Support of Respondents  

(Sergio J. Campos, Suzette M. Malveaux, David Rosenberg, Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Jay Tidmarsh, and Adam S. Zimmerman )

 

One of the law professors’ briefs addresses the second question:

 

Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Alexandra D. Lahav & Sachin S. Pandya in Support of Respondents 

 

 

 

October 14, 2015 in Class Actions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 12, 2015

Oral Argument in DIRECTV v. Imburgia: Arbitration Clauses in California, Again

The Supreme Court heard oral argument in DIRECTV v. Imburgia, No. 14-462, on October 6.  The issue is "Whether the California Court of Appeal erred by holding, in direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit, that a reference to state law in an arbitration agreement governed by the Federal Arbitration Act requires the application of state law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act."

 

Ronald Mann at SCOTUSBlog has an analysis here.  The transcript is here.

October 12, 2015 in Class Actions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 5, 2015

Today’s SCOTUS Oral Argument in OBB Personenverkehr v. Sachs

The new Supreme Court Term kicked off today with oral argument in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs. The case involves a couple of issues regarding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). Those issues are interesting in their own right, but today’s argument (transcript here) also featured some notable exchanges on personal jurisdiction, forum selection clauses, and other civil procedure topics.

 

 

October 5, 2015 in Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 1, 2015

Happy October! SCOTUS Cert Grants of Interest (Bank Markazi; Americold; MHN)

Today the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated order list from the end-of-summer “long conference.” It granted certiorari in a few cases that folks interested in civil procedure and federal courts will want to keep an eye on:

Bank Markazi v. Peterson (No. 14-770), from the Second Circuit, is a separation-of-powers challenge to a congressional statute involving the execution of a judgment against bonds held by the Central Bank of Iran. Here is the question presented by the petitioner:

This case concerns nearly $2 billion of bonds in which Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran, held an interest in Europe as part of its foreign currency reserves. Plaintiffs, who hold default judgments against Iran, tried to seize the assets. While the case was pending, Congress enacted § 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772. By its terms, that statute applies only to this one case: to “the financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518 (BSJ) (GWG).” Id. § 8772(b). “In order to ensure that Iran is held accountable for paying the judgments,” it provides that, notwithstanding any other state or federal law, the assets “shall be subject to execution” upon only two findings—essentially, that Bank Markazi has a beneficial interest in them and that no one else does. Id. § 8772(a)(1), (2). The question presented is:

Whether § 8772—a statute that effectively directs a particular result in a single pending case—violates the separation of powers.

Americold Logistics, LLC v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. (No. 14-1382), from the Tenth Circuit, involves how to determine the citizenship of a trust for purposes of diversity jurisdiction:

Petitioners Americold Logistics, LLC and Americold Realty Trust – a corporation and real estate investment trust, respectively – removed a case from Kansas state court to the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, asserting the parties were diverse. No party challenged the removal, and the District Court ruled on the merits of that litigation without addressing any issue relating to diversity jurisdiction. Likewise, neither party raised any jurisdictional challenge on appeal to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Tenth Circuit, however, sua sponte queried whether there was full diversity of citizenship among the parties. In particular, the judges challenged whether the citizenship of Americold Realty Trust, a business trust, should be determined by reference to its trustees’ citizenship, or instead by reference to some broader set of factors. This issue has deeply split courts across the country. Joining the minority of courts, the Tenth Circuit held the jurisdictional inquiry extends, at a minimum, to the citizenship of a trust’s beneficiaries in addition to its trustees’ citizenship. In this case, doing so destroyed diversity of citizenship among the parties.

The question presented by this petition is: Whether the Tenth Circuit wrongly deepened a pervasive circuit split among the federal circuits regarding whether the citizenship of a trust for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is based on the citizenship of the controlling trustees, the trust beneficiaries, or some combination of both.

MHN Government Services, Inc. v. Zaborowski (No. 14-1458), from the Ninth Circuit, is another case involving the relationship between the Federal Arbitration Act and state contract law. Here is the question presented by the petitioners:

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that an arbitration agreement shall be enforced “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract,” 9 U.S.C. § 2. California law applies one rule of contract severability to contracts in general, and a separate rule of contract severability to agreements to arbitrate. The arbitration-only rule disfavors arbitration and applies even when the agreement contains an express severability clause. Its application in this case conflicts with binding precedent of this Court and with opinions of four other courts of appeals.

The question presented is whether California’s arbitration-only severability rule is preempted by the FAA.  

You can find coverage of today’s cert. grants from SCOTUSblog’s Lyle Denniston here.

 

October 1, 2015 in Federal Courts, Recent Decisions, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 17, 2015

Recent Papers on Article III Standing; More Academic Amici Favoring Respondent in Spokeo Case

In addition to Restitution and Remedies Scholars, two other groups of scholars filed amicus briefs in the Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins on the side of Respondent:

Information Privacy Law Scholars 

Public Law Professors

 

Academics filed no amicus briefs in favor of Petitioner Spokeo. 

 

Two other articles on Article III standing have recently been posted on SSRN:

'Spooky Action at a Distance': Intangible Injury in Fact in the Information Age by Seth F. Kreimer of University of Pennsylvania Law School.  Abstract:

Two decades after Justice Douglas coined “injury in fact” as the token of admission to federal court under Article III, Justice Scalia sealed it into the constitutional canon in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. In the two decades since Lujan, Justice Scalia has thrown increasingly pointed barbs at the permissive standing doctrine of the Warren Court, maintaining it is founded on impermissible recognition of "Psychic Injury." Justice Scalia and his acolytes take the position that Article III requires a tough minded, common sense and practical approach. Injuries in fact must be "tangible" "direct" "concrete" "de facto" realities in time and space free from spooky entities like "Psychic Injury."

Albert Einstein famously took the position that quantum mechanics could not be a proper and complete theory on the ground that "[P]hysics should represent a reality in time and space, free from spooky actions at a distance." The problem that ultimately overtook Einstein's argument was that experimental results vindicating quantum mechanics stubbornly continued to appear in the journals. The burden of this paper is to demonstrate that spooky "injuries in fact" involving information have stubbornly continued to appear in United States Reports. It demonstrates that the Court has regularly adjudicated the controversies of the information age: disputes regarding illicit acquisition of information, denial of access to information, improper exposure to information and intellectual property. And it argues that the Court will continue to do so.

These adjudications fatally undermine an account of Article III that insists on "direct" "tangible" and "palpable" injuries to physical or economic interests as the price of admission to the federal courthouse, and profoundly alter notions of "particularized" and "imminent" injury. Information is by nature intangible, and information plays an increasingly dominant role in our social, economic, political and cultural life. Information is largely non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Violations of duties regarding information thus regularly result in injuries that are "general" rather than "particularized." And, with the advent of the Internet, informational harm is pandemically "imminent": information can be spookily and instantaneously "present" at opposite ends of the country, or of the globe.

 

Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs Challenging Greenhouse Gas Regulations by Bradford C. Mank of University of Cincinnati Law School.  Abstract:

An important unresolved question is whether non-state plaintiffs have standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution to sue in federal courts in climate change cases. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held a state government could sue the U.S. government to address climate change issues, and suggested, but did not decide, that private litigants might have lesser rights than states. In Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, the Ninth Circuit held that private groups did not have standing to challenge Washington State’s failure to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from five oil refineries, and implied that private plaintiffs may never bring climate change suits because such suits are generalized grievances and the Massachusetts exception for GHG suits applies only to states. However, dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc, three judges argued that the panel’s opinion was overly broad in interpreting the Massachusetts decision to deny standing rights to all non-state GHG plaintiffs. In recent district court decisions, two different federal judges concluded that private plaintiffs may have Article III standing to challenge the government’s regulation of climate change or greenhouse gases. In Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA, the Western District of Washington held the plaintiff suffered concrete standing injuries from the defendant EPA’s approval of Washington’s and Oregon’s decisions not to identify any waters experiencing ocean acidification as impaired under the Clean Water Act (CWA). In distinguishing the Washington Environmental Council decision, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs demonstrated local GHG impacts, and local mitigation efforts could partially redress the injuries to their members. In Murray Energy Corporation v. Gina McCarthy, Administrator of EPA, the Northern District of West Virginia concluded that that the plaintiffs sufficiently established that the EPA violated its duty under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to examine the employment impacts of its enforcement and regulations under the Act on employment in the coal mining industry to have standing. The Murray decision’s focus on employment injuries could be used to provide standing in a challenge to GHG regulations. While there is an argument that expanding standing to non-state GHG plaintiffs could flood the federal courts with too many suits, courts can manage the number of climate change suits by requiring a meaningful demonstration of a connection between GHG emissions and harms to the plaintiffs, and by giving substantial deference to reasonable government regulatory policies in this area.

September 17, 2015 in Recent Scholarship, Standing, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 14, 2015

Scholars File Amicus Brief in Spokeo Case Supporting Respondent Robins

On September 8, 2015, ten current or former law professors filed their Brief of Restitution and Remedies Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent. 

 

The brief states (at pp. 1-2):

 

If this Court were to adopt petitioner’s proposed rule — that a plaintiff who suffers no harm beyond the loss of his legal rights has no standing to sue — it could wreak havoc with the law of restitution and unjust enrichment, barring many long-established causes of action from federal courts. This important body of law long predates the American founding and serves essential functions, especially in private law but in parts of public law as well.

 

These amici take no position on the underlying statutory claim.

 

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

 

Petitioner’s sweeping and ill-defined argument that no plaintiff can have standing without proof of “concrete harm” is aimed at claims for statutory minimum damages. The Court should reject this frontal assault on statutory remedies. But whatever the Court does with respect to statutory damages, it should take care not to inadvertently sweep away much of the law of restitution.

 

The ten individual amici are Mark P. Gergen, Andrew Kull, Douglas Laycock, Colleen P. Murphy, Phil C. Neal, Doug Rendleman, Caprice Roberts, Chaim Saiman, Emily L. Sherwin, and Michael Traynor.  Nine of the ten amici participated in drafting the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment as Reporter, Adviser, or on the Members Consultative Group.

September 14, 2015 in Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)