Friday, May 12, 2017

Mulligan on Subrin & Main on State Adoption of FRCP Amendments

This week on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Lou Mulligan’s essay, But the Feds Do It That Way!

Lou reviews a recent article by Steve Subrin and Thom Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 501 (2016).

 

 

 

May 12, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, State Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 24, 2017

Thornburg on Hoffman on Pleading

Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Beth Thornburg’s essay, A Well-Pleaded Argument. Beth reviews Lonny Hoffman’s recent piece, Plausible Theory, Implausible Conclusions, 83 U. Chicago L. Rev. Online 143 (2016).

 

 

 

April 24, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Twombly/Iqbal, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS Denies Cert in Summary Judgment Case

Today the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston. Unlike most cert denials, this one prompted written opinions—one dissenting and one concurring. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, authored a dissenting opinion, which begins:

Just after midnight on October 29, 2010, a Houston police officer shot petitioner Ricardo Salazar-Limon in the back. Salazar-Limon claims the officer shot him as he tried to walk away from a confrontation with the officer on an overpass. The officer, by contrast, claims that Salazar-Limon turned toward him and reached for his waistband—as if for a gun—before the officer fired a shot. The question whether the officer used excessive force in shooting Salazar-Limon thus turns in large part on which man is telling the truth. Our legal system entrusts this decision to a jury sitting as finder of fact, not a judge reviewing a paper record.

The courts below thought otherwise. The District Court credited the officer’s version of events and granted summary judgment to respondents—the officer and the city. 97 F. Supp. 3d 898 (SD Tex. 2015). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 826 F. 3d 272 (2016). But summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(a). The courts below failed to heed that mandate. Three Terms ago, we summarily reversed the Fifth Circuit in a case “reflect[ing] a clear misapprehension of summary judgment standards.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (per curiam) (slip op., at 10). This case reflects the same fundamental error. I respectfully dissent from the Court’s failure to grant certiorari and reverse.

Download Salazar-Limon v Houston (dissenting)

Justice Alito authored an opinion concurring in the cert denial. An excerpt:

The dissent acknowledges that summary judgment would be proper if the record compelled the conclusion that Salazar-Limon reached for his waist, but the dissent believes that, if the case had gone to trial, a jury could have reasonably inferred that Salazar-Limon did not reach for his waist—even if Salazar-Limon never testified to that fact. The dissent’s conclusion is surely debatable. But in any event, this Court does not typically grant a petition for a writ of certiorari to review a factual question of this sort, see this Court’s Rule 10, and I therefore concur in the denial of review here.

Download Salazar-Limon v Houston (concurring)

 

 

 

 

April 24, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 2, 2017

Subrin and Main: States Should Not Adopt FRCP Amendments

Newly published: Stephen N. Subrin and Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 501 (Winter 2016).

From the Introduction:

Of course, the Federal Rules and their amendments could be the product of a flawed rulemaking process, fail to deliver on the promise of uniformity, and yet still be compelling content that is suitable for adoption by the states. But it turns out that proponents of replication at the state level would have to make a lot of assumptions that turn out not to be true, namely that:

  • the number, the substantive mix, and the stakes of federal and state caseloads, respectively, are the same;
  • the state courts have the judicial resources that federal procedure pre-supposes;
  • the litigants in state courts can afford federal practice;
  • the federal procedural amendments, whether by actual amendment or judicial decree, are working well for most cases;
  • the drastic diminution of trials and juries in federal courts are salutary for our democracy; and
  • state court procedural experimentation should be discouraged.

The Conclusion reveals the misguided nature of these assumptions. This Article will give examples of the mismatch of the federal amendments for the state court caseload.

The Conclusion ends with a question for state court judges. Simply put, what do you want your role as judges to be? The federal judiciary has become a huge bureaucracy (judges represent only a small percentage of the personnel) which has essentially given up on the major role of adjudication. They spend little time in the court room, and, on average, “preside over a civil trial approximately once every three months.” They, and in large measure the lawyers who appear before them, have had little experience with trials or with juries. They dispose of cases on dispositive motions and urge settlement or alternative modes of dispute resolution. The American jury is disappearing, and to have a trial is thought to be a judicial failure. This is not hyperbole. We hope that state judges avoid replicating this, and instead offer alternative models.

April 2, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, State Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

March Oral Arguments at SCOTUS

Several interesting civil procedure cases on the Supreme Court’s March 2017 oral argument calendar (more details in the links)...

Today (3/21): Microsoft v. Baker

Tomorrow (3/22): Water Splash v. Menon

Monday (3/27): TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods

 

 

 

 

March 21, 2017 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 20, 2017

Call for Papers: Akron Law Review Symposium on the 2015 FRCP Amendments

The Akron Law Review is publishing a symposium issue entitled Discovery and the Impact of the December 2015 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. From the announcement:

The Akron Law Review invites papers regarding the application and impact of the 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including articles relating to proportionality and the scope of discovery; protective orders regarding cost-shifting in discovery; sanctions for failing to preserve electronically stored information; measures to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive litigation; court application of the amended discovery rules; and the impact of the rule amendment process on rule content. This symposium issue will be published in the Akron Law Review in the 2017-2018 Academic Year.

Details in the full announcement below...

Download Akron Law Review Discovery Symposium Call for Papers

 

 

 

 

 

March 20, 2017 in Conferences/Symposia, Discovery, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

Federal Court Ruling on Boilerplate Discovery Objections

A very interesting ruling came down today from District Judge Mark Bennett of the Northern District of Iowa. From the opening paragraph:

This ruling involves one of the least favorite tasks of federal trial and appellate judges—determining whether counsel and/or the parties should be sanctioned for discovery abuses. This case squarely presents the issue of why excellent, thoughtful, highly professional, and exceptionally civil and courteous lawyers are addicted to “boilerplate” discovery objections.

Judge Bennett finds that the parties’ objections violated several discovery rules, including Rule 26(b)(5)’s provisions on asserting privileges and Rules 33 and 34’s requirements that objections to interrogatories and requests for production be stated “with specificity.” He concludes (footnotes omitted):

To address the serious problem of “boilerplate” discovery objections, my new Supplemental Trial Management Order advises the lawyers for the parties that “in conducting discovery, form or boilerplate objections shall not be used and, if used, may subject the party and/or its counsel to sanctions. Objections must be specific and state an adequate individualized basis.” The Order also imposes an “affirmative duty to notify the court of alleged discovery abuse” and warns of the possible sanctions for obstructionist discovery conduct.

I recall the words of a former U.S. Attorney General in a different context: “Each time a [person] stands up for an ideal, or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes out against injustice, [they] send[ ] forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from a million different centers of energy and daring, those ripples build a current which can sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.” I pledge to do my part— enough of the warning shots across the bow.

The conduct identified in the Show Cause Order does not warrant sanctions, notwithstanding that the conduct was contrary to the requirements for discovery responses in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. NO MORE WARNINGS. IN THE FUTURE, USING “BOILERPLATE” OBJECTIONS TO DISCOVERY IN ANY CASE BEFORE ME PLACES COUNSEL AND THEIR CLIENTS AT RISK FOR SUBSTANTIAL SANCTIONS.

The case is Liguria Foods v. Griffith Laboratories.

Download 14cv3041.Liguria v. Griffith.Order On Show Cause.final.031317

 

 

 

March 14, 2017 in Discovery, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, March 10, 2017

House of Representatives Passes H.R. 725 & H.R. 985

We covered earlier several bills that could make significant changes to federal civil procedure. Two of these passed the House of Representatives yesterday.

Stay tuned. Getting to 60 votes in the Senate will be a more difficult proposition.

 

 

 

 

March 10, 2017 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 2, 2017

House May Receive Amendments to Bills on Rule 11, Class Actions, MDLs, and Joinder

The House of Representatives Committee on Rules has announced that it will meet the week of March 6 “to grant a rule that may provide a structured amendment process for floor consideration of” H.R. 720 (amendments to FRCP 11), H.R. 725 (on so-called “fraudulent” joinder), and H.R. 985 (on class actions and MDLs).

Hat tip: Adam Zimmerman

March 2, 2017 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 22, 2017

Grossi on The Claim

Simona Grossi has posted on SSRN a draft of her article, The Claim. Here’s the abstract:

I felt compelled to write this article when I realized that our law interpreters and reformers lack an understanding of the meaning and role of the claim in the federal system, and yet modern scholarship has not produced any study or helpful guidance on the topic.

I spent my fall 2016 at the Yale Law School to work on Charles E. Clark’s collected papers, which are stored in the Yale’s Archives. Clark was the driving force behind the adoption of the Federal Rules. His papers contain his thoughts, notes, sketches, and ideas on procedural law and on the system of federal rules he was designing. Clark’s clear procedural vision produced Rules that have lasted, almost untouched, for almost 80 years. Those Rules assigned to the claim a primary role. And that is not surprising, as the claim is the essential litigation unit, the heartbeat of the case, a demand for justice. Clark was a legal realist and believed that courts were powerful instruments of democracy, intended to allow and foster the development and enforcement of substantive rights. By gradually losing an understanding of, and an interest in, the claim, we have developed doctrines that obstruct and distort the judiciary’s democratic dispute-resolution mission.

My article is intended to offer a comprehensive study of the claim and the role of the claim in the various doctrines that govern procedure in federal courts. Based on that understanding, the article develops a theory of federal practice and procedure that centers on the claim, a theory that assigns to the claim a primary, and yet a non-dispositive role in litigation analysis.

 

 

 

February 22, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 17, 2017

Five Questionable Bills About Civil Lawsuits Pass House Judiciary Committee

Five bills that would generally operate to favor corporate defendants in civil lawsuits have passed the House Judiciary Committee with blinding speed and have been referred to the full House: 

Bill

Title

Original sponsor

H.R. 985

Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act

Bob Goodlatte (R-VA-6)

H.R. 906

Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency (FACT) Act

Blake Farenthold (R-TX-27)

H.R. 732

Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act

Bob Goodlatte (R-VA-6)

H.R. 725

Innocent Party Protection Act

Ken Buck (R-CO-4)

H.R. 720

Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act

Lamar Smith (R-TX-21)

            We briefly described four of the bills here.  The bills are opposed by over 50 advocacy groups for civil rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection.  

February 17, 2017 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 13, 2017

While Trump Distracts, Republicans Introduce Four Bills Restricting Ordinary Citizens’ Access to the Courts

Four bills have been introduced in Congress that would limit plaintiffs' access to the courts.  The title of each bill is misleading, in that the effect of each bill would be very different from what its title indicates. 

1.  Probably the most far-ranging bill is the so-called "Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017," H.R. 985.   

This bill would critically hobble class actions by making them much more difficult to certify and reducing the compensation to plaintiffs’ class action lawyers. 

The major provisions of the bill with respect to class actions are (this is not an exhaustive list):

Continue reading

February 13, 2017 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, February 1, 2017

Perennial "Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act" Introduced Again in House and Senate

In what is beginning to feel like the Groundhog Day of civil procedure bills, LARA has been reintroduced in the Senate and the House for the umpteenth (I think the fifth) time.  Although the text of the bills is not yet available, they are likely to be the same as the last version, which was described on this blog here.  Essentially, the bills would amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to eliminate the 21-day "safe harbor" and to make sanctions mandatory instead of discretionary if a violation is found. 

The press release by Senator Grassley, one of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Senate, is a rehash of all the alternative facts repeated for years by defendants to discredit civil litigation.  

The Advisory Committee, however, knows that there are not "thousands of frivolous lawsuits" in our federal courts and would be unlikely to amend Rule 11 based upon that falsehood.  I assume that is one reason the bills propose an end run around the Rules Enabling Act process.        

February 1, 2017 in Current Affairs, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 31, 2017

Parrillo on Contempt Findings Against the Federal Government

Nick Parrillo has posted on SSRN a draft of his article, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power. Here’s the abstract:

Scholars of administrative law focus overwhelmingly on lawsuits to review federal government action while assuming that, if plaintiffs win such lawsuits, the government will do what the court says. But in fact, the federal government’s compliance with court orders is imperfect and fraught, especially with orders compelling the government to act affirmatively. Such orders can strain a federal agency’s resources, interfere with its other legally-required tasks, and force it to make decisions on little information. An agency hit with such an order will often warn the judge that it badly needs more latitude and more time to comply. Judges relent, cutting slack and extending deadlines. The plaintiff who has “won” the suit finds that victory was merely the start of a tough negotiation that can drag on for years. 

These compliance negotiations are little understood. Basic questions about them are unexplored, including the most fundamental: What is the endgame? That is, if the judge concludes that the agency has delayed too long and demanded too much, is there anything she can do, at long last, to make the agency comply? 

What the judge can do, ultimately, is the same thing as for any disobedient litigant: find the agency (and its high officials) in contempt. But do judges actually make such contempt findings? If so, can judges couple those findings with the sanctions of fine and imprisonment that give contempt its potency against private parties? If not, what use is contempt? The literature is silent on these questions, and conventional research methods, confined to appellate case law, are hopeless for addressing it. There are no opinions of the Supreme Court on the subject, and while the courts of appeals have handled the problem many times, they have dealt with it in a manner calculated to avoid setting clear and general precedent. 

Through an examination of thousands of opinions (especially of district courts), docket sheets, briefs, and other filings, plus archival research and interviews, this Article provides the first general assessment of how federal courts handle the federal government’s disobedience. It makes four conclusions. First, the federal judiciary is willing to issue contempt findings against agencies and officials. Second, while several federal judges believe they can (and have tried to) attach sanctions to these findings, the higher courts have exhibited a virtually complete unwillingness to allow sanctions, at times swooping down at the eleventh hour to rescue an agency from incurring a budget-straining fine or its top official from being thrown in jail. Third, the higher courts, even as they unfailingly thwart sanctions in all but a few minor instances, have bent over backward to avoid making pronouncements that sanctions are categorically unavailable, deliberately keeping the sanctions issue in a state of low salience and at least nominal legal uncertainty. Fourth, even though contempt findings are practically devoid of sanctions, they have a shaming effect that gives them substantial if imperfect deterrent power. 

The efficacy of litigation against agencies rests on a widespread perception that federal officials simply do not disobey court orders and a concomitant norm that identifies any violation as deviant. Contempt findings, regardless of sanctions, are a means of weaponizing that norm by designating the agency and official as violators and subjecting them to shame. But if judges make too many such findings, and especially if they impose (inevitably publicity-grabbing) sanctions, they may risk undermining the perception that officials always comply and thus the norm that they do so. The judiciary therefore may sometimes pull its punches to preserve the substantial yet limited norm-based power it has.

 

 

 

 

January 31, 2017 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Mullenix on Stancil on Economic Theory, Equality & Procedural Justice

Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Linda Mullenix’s essay, Infusing Civil Rulemaking with Economic Theory. Linda reviews Paul Stancil’s recent article, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, which is forthcoming in the Iowa Law Review.

 

 

 

 

January 24, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, January 18, 2017

SCOTUS Oral Argument in Abbasi

Today the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in three consolidated cases raising issues relating to Bivens, qualified immunity, and pleading standards.

The cases are Ziglar v. Abbasi (No. 15-1358), Ashcroft v. Abbasi (No. 15-1359), and Hasty v. Abbasi (No. 15-1363). You can find more details on the cases here.

Here’s the transcript from today’s argument.

 

 

 

 

January 18, 2017 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court Cases, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 13, 2017

SCOTUS Cert Grant on Article III Standing & Intervention

Today the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., which presents the following question:

Whether intervenors participating in a lawsuit as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) must have Article III standing (as three circuits have held), or whether Article III is satisfied so long as there is a valid case or controversy between the named parties (as seven circuits have held).

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog.

 

 

 

January 13, 2017 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

D.C. Circuit Denies Motion to Intervene in ACA Appeal

Yesterday the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied an attempt by two consumers to intervene in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell (No. 16-5202). The case involves, among other things, whether the House of Representatives has Article III standing to sue regarding the Executive Branch’s administration of the Affordable Care Act.

Here is the text of yesterday’s order:

Upon consideration of the motion for leave to intervene, the responses thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for leave to intervene be denied. Movant-intervenors have not demonstrated that they are entitled to intervene in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24; Building and Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (enumerating the requirements for intervention under Rule 24 and applying those factors to a motion to intervene in an appellate proceeding). This case shall continue to be held in abeyance, with motions to govern further proceedings due February 21, 2017. See Order (Dec. 5, 2016).

Download DC Circuit Order

Here is the initial motion to intervene:

Download DC Circuit Motion to Intervene

 

 

 

January 13, 2017 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 10, 2017

Interesting Class Action Decision from the Ninth Circuit

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Briseno v. ConAgra Foods Inc., which addresses what has come to be known in other federal courts as the “ascertainability” requirement. The entire opinion is worth a read, but here are some highlights.

At the outset, the court took issue with the term “ascertainability.” It explained in a footnote:

ConAgra called this a failure of “ascertainability.” We refrain from referring to “ascertainability” in this opinion because courts ascribe widely varied meanings to that term. For example, some courts use the word “ascertainability” to deny certification of classes that are not clearly or objectively defined. See, e.g., Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–26 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a class defined as all owners of beneficial interests in a particular bond series, without reference to the time owned, was too indefinite); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming denial of class certification because a class composed of state residents “active in the ‘peace movement’” was uncertain and overbroad). Others have used the term in referring to classes defined in terms of success on the merits. See, e.g., EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding and instructing the district court to consider, “as part of its class-definition analysis,” inter alia , whether the proposed classes could be defined without creating a fail-safe class).

Stated more precisely, ConAgra’s argument was that “there would be no administratively feasible way to identify members of the proposed classes because consumers would not be able to reliably identify themselves as class members.” The court, however, rejected the argument that class certification requires—separate and apart from the enumerated requirements in Rule 23—that there be “an administratively feasible way to determine who is in the class.” It wrote: “We have not previously interpreted Rule 23 to require such a demonstration, and, for the reasons that follow, we do not do so now.”

The court also said the following about case law from other circuits:

We recognize that the Third Circuit does require putative class representatives to demonstrate “administrative feasibility” as a prerequisite to class certification. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2013). The Third Circuit justifies its administrative feasibility requirement not through the text of Rule 23 but rather as a necessary tool to ensure that the “class will actually function as a class.” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 162. The Third Circuit suggests that its administrative feasibility prerequisite achieves this goal by (1) mitigating administrative burdens; (2) safeguarding the interests of absent and bona fide class members; and (3) protecting the due process rights of defendants. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307, 310. The Seventh Circuit soundly rejected those justifications in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), and the Sixth Circuit followed suit, see Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Mullins in declining to follow Carrera). We likewise conclude that Rule 23’s enumerated criteria already address the interests that motivated the Third Circuit and, therefore, that an independent administrative feasibility requirement is unnecessary.

Download Briseno (9th Cir)

 

 

January 10, 2017 in Class Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 3, 2017

2017 AALS Annual Meeting

The 2017 AALS Annual Meeting is happening in San Francisco this week. Here are some panels that may be of interest:

Continue reading

January 3, 2017 in Conferences/Symposia, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, MDLs | Permalink | Comments (0)