Wednesday, February 22, 2017

Grossi on The Claim

Simona Grossi has posted on SSRN a draft of her article, The Claim. Here’s the abstract:

I felt compelled to write this article when I realized that our law interpreters and reformers lack an understanding of the meaning and role of the claim in the federal system, and yet modern scholarship has not produced any study or helpful guidance on the topic.

I spent my fall 2016 at the Yale Law School to work on Charles E. Clark’s collected papers, which are stored in the Yale’s Archives. Clark was the driving force behind the adoption of the Federal Rules. His papers contain his thoughts, notes, sketches, and ideas on procedural law and on the system of federal rules he was designing. Clark’s clear procedural vision produced Rules that have lasted, almost untouched, for almost 80 years. Those Rules assigned to the claim a primary role. And that is not surprising, as the claim is the essential litigation unit, the heartbeat of the case, a demand for justice. Clark was a legal realist and believed that courts were powerful instruments of democracy, intended to allow and foster the development and enforcement of substantive rights. By gradually losing an understanding of, and an interest in, the claim, we have developed doctrines that obstruct and distort the judiciary’s democratic dispute-resolution mission.

My article is intended to offer a comprehensive study of the claim and the role of the claim in the various doctrines that govern procedure in federal courts. Based on that understanding, the article develops a theory of federal practice and procedure that centers on the claim, a theory that assigns to the claim a primary, and yet a non-dispositive role in litigation analysis.

 

 

 

February 22, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, February 17, 2017

Five Questionable Bills About Civil Lawsuits Pass House Judiciary Committee

Five bills that would generally operate to favor corporate defendants in civil lawsuits have passed the House Judiciary Committee with blinding speed and have been referred to the full House: 

Bill

Title

Original sponsor

H.R. 985

Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act

Bob Goodlatte (R-VA-6)

H.R. 906

Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency (FACT) Act

Blake Farenthold (R-TX-27)

H.R. 732

Stop Settlement Slush Funds Act

Bob Goodlatte (R-VA-6)

H.R. 725

Innocent Party Protection Act

Ken Buck (R-CO-4)

H.R. 720

Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act

Lamar Smith (R-TX-21)

            We briefly described four of the bills here.  The bills are opposed by over 50 advocacy groups for civil rights, consumer protection, and environmental protection.  

February 17, 2017 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 13, 2017

While Trump Distracts, Republicans Introduce Four Bills Restricting Ordinary Citizens’ Access to the Courts

Four bills have been introduced in Congress that would limit plaintiffs' access to the courts.  The title of each bill is misleading, in that the effect of each bill would be very different from what its title indicates. 

1.  Probably the most far-ranging bill is the so-called "Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act of 2017," H.R. 985.   

This bill would critically hobble class actions by making them much more difficult to certify and reducing the compensation to plaintiffs’ class action lawyers. 

The major provisions of the bill with respect to class actions are (this is not an exhaustive list):

Continue reading

February 13, 2017 in Class Actions, Current Affairs, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mass Torts, MDLs, Subject Matter Jurisdiction | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, February 1, 2017

Perennial "Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act" Introduced Again in House and Senate

In what is beginning to feel like the Groundhog Day of civil procedure bills, LARA has been reintroduced in the Senate and the House for the umpteenth (I think the fifth) time.  Although the text of the bills is not yet available, they are likely to be the same as the last version, which was described on this blog here.  Essentially, the bills would amend Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to eliminate the 21-day "safe harbor" and to make sanctions mandatory instead of discretionary if a violation is found. 

The press release by Senator Grassley, one of the co-sponsors of the bill in the Senate, is a rehash of all the alternative facts repeated for years by defendants to discredit civil litigation.  

The Advisory Committee, however, knows that there are not "thousands of frivolous lawsuits" in our federal courts and would be unlikely to amend Rule 11 based upon that falsehood.  I assume that is one reason the bills propose an end run around the Rules Enabling Act process.        

February 1, 2017 in Current Affairs, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 31, 2017

Parrillo on Contempt Findings Against the Federal Government

Nick Parrillo has posted on SSRN a draft of his article, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power. Here’s the abstract:

Scholars of administrative law focus overwhelmingly on lawsuits to review federal government action while assuming that, if plaintiffs win such lawsuits, the government will do what the court says. But in fact, the federal government’s compliance with court orders is imperfect and fraught, especially with orders compelling the government to act affirmatively. Such orders can strain a federal agency’s resources, interfere with its other legally-required tasks, and force it to make decisions on little information. An agency hit with such an order will often warn the judge that it badly needs more latitude and more time to comply. Judges relent, cutting slack and extending deadlines. The plaintiff who has “won” the suit finds that victory was merely the start of a tough negotiation that can drag on for years. 

These compliance negotiations are little understood. Basic questions about them are unexplored, including the most fundamental: What is the endgame? That is, if the judge concludes that the agency has delayed too long and demanded too much, is there anything she can do, at long last, to make the agency comply? 

What the judge can do, ultimately, is the same thing as for any disobedient litigant: find the agency (and its high officials) in contempt. But do judges actually make such contempt findings? If so, can judges couple those findings with the sanctions of fine and imprisonment that give contempt its potency against private parties? If not, what use is contempt? The literature is silent on these questions, and conventional research methods, confined to appellate case law, are hopeless for addressing it. There are no opinions of the Supreme Court on the subject, and while the courts of appeals have handled the problem many times, they have dealt with it in a manner calculated to avoid setting clear and general precedent. 

Through an examination of thousands of opinions (especially of district courts), docket sheets, briefs, and other filings, plus archival research and interviews, this Article provides the first general assessment of how federal courts handle the federal government’s disobedience. It makes four conclusions. First, the federal judiciary is willing to issue contempt findings against agencies and officials. Second, while several federal judges believe they can (and have tried to) attach sanctions to these findings, the higher courts have exhibited a virtually complete unwillingness to allow sanctions, at times swooping down at the eleventh hour to rescue an agency from incurring a budget-straining fine or its top official from being thrown in jail. Third, the higher courts, even as they unfailingly thwart sanctions in all but a few minor instances, have bent over backward to avoid making pronouncements that sanctions are categorically unavailable, deliberately keeping the sanctions issue in a state of low salience and at least nominal legal uncertainty. Fourth, even though contempt findings are practically devoid of sanctions, they have a shaming effect that gives them substantial if imperfect deterrent power. 

The efficacy of litigation against agencies rests on a widespread perception that federal officials simply do not disobey court orders and a concomitant norm that identifies any violation as deviant. Contempt findings, regardless of sanctions, are a means of weaponizing that norm by designating the agency and official as violators and subjecting them to shame. But if judges make too many such findings, and especially if they impose (inevitably publicity-grabbing) sanctions, they may risk undermining the perception that officials always comply and thus the norm that they do so. The judiciary therefore may sometimes pull its punches to preserve the substantial yet limited norm-based power it has.

 

 

 

 

January 31, 2017 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Mullenix on Stancil on Economic Theory, Equality & Procedural Justice

Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Linda Mullenix’s essay, Infusing Civil Rulemaking with Economic Theory. Linda reviews Paul Stancil’s recent article, Substantive Equality and Procedural Justice, which is forthcoming in the Iowa Law Review.

 

 

 

 

January 24, 2017 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, January 18, 2017

SCOTUS Oral Argument in Abbasi

Today the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in three consolidated cases raising issues relating to Bivens, qualified immunity, and pleading standards.

The cases are Ziglar v. Abbasi (No. 15-1358), Ashcroft v. Abbasi (No. 15-1359), and Hasty v. Abbasi (No. 15-1363). You can find more details on the cases here.

Here’s the transcript from today’s argument.

 

 

 

 

January 18, 2017 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supreme Court Cases, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, January 13, 2017

SCOTUS Cert Grant on Article III Standing & Intervention

Today the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., which presents the following question:

Whether intervenors participating in a lawsuit as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) must have Article III standing (as three circuits have held), or whether Article III is satisfied so long as there is a valid case or controversy between the named parties (as seven circuits have held).

You can find all the cert-stage briefing—and follow the merits briefs as they come in—at SCOTUSblog.

 

 

 

January 13, 2017 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

D.C. Circuit Denies Motion to Intervene in ACA Appeal

Yesterday the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit denied an attempt by two consumers to intervene in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell (No. 16-5202). The case involves, among other things, whether the House of Representatives has Article III standing to sue regarding the Executive Branch’s administration of the Affordable Care Act.

Here is the text of yesterday’s order:

Upon consideration of the motion for leave to intervene, the responses thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for leave to intervene be denied. Movant-intervenors have not demonstrated that they are entitled to intervene in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24; Building and Const. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Reich, 40 F.3d 1275, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (enumerating the requirements for intervention under Rule 24 and applying those factors to a motion to intervene in an appellate proceeding). This case shall continue to be held in abeyance, with motions to govern further proceedings due February 21, 2017. See Order (Dec. 5, 2016).

Download DC Circuit Order

Here is the initial motion to intervene:

Download DC Circuit Motion to Intervene

 

 

 

January 13, 2017 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 10, 2017

Interesting Class Action Decision from the Ninth Circuit

Last week, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided Briseno v. ConAgra Foods Inc., which addresses what has come to be known in other federal courts as the “ascertainability” requirement. The entire opinion is worth a read, but here are some highlights.

At the outset, the court took issue with the term “ascertainability.” It explained in a footnote:

ConAgra called this a failure of “ascertainability.” We refrain from referring to “ascertainability” in this opinion because courts ascribe widely varied meanings to that term. For example, some courts use the word “ascertainability” to deny certification of classes that are not clearly or objectively defined. See, e.g., Brecher v. Republic of Argentina, 806 F.3d 22, 24–26 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a class defined as all owners of beneficial interests in a particular bond series, without reference to the time owned, was too indefinite); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (affirming denial of class certification because a class composed of state residents “active in the ‘peace movement’” was uncertain and overbroad). Others have used the term in referring to classes defined in terms of success on the merits. See, e.g., EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 360 n.9 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding and instructing the district court to consider, “as part of its class-definition analysis,” inter alia , whether the proposed classes could be defined without creating a fail-safe class).

Stated more precisely, ConAgra’s argument was that “there would be no administratively feasible way to identify members of the proposed classes because consumers would not be able to reliably identify themselves as class members.” The court, however, rejected the argument that class certification requires—separate and apart from the enumerated requirements in Rule 23—that there be “an administratively feasible way to determine who is in the class.” It wrote: “We have not previously interpreted Rule 23 to require such a demonstration, and, for the reasons that follow, we do not do so now.”

The court also said the following about case law from other circuits:

We recognize that the Third Circuit does require putative class representatives to demonstrate “administrative feasibility” as a prerequisite to class certification. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306–08 (3d Cir. 2013). The Third Circuit justifies its administrative feasibility requirement not through the text of Rule 23 but rather as a necessary tool to ensure that the “class will actually function as a class.” Byrd, 784 F.3d at 162. The Third Circuit suggests that its administrative feasibility prerequisite achieves this goal by (1) mitigating administrative burdens; (2) safeguarding the interests of absent and bona fide class members; and (3) protecting the due process rights of defendants. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307, 310. The Seventh Circuit soundly rejected those justifications in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), and the Sixth Circuit followed suit, see Rikos v. Procter & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Mullins in declining to follow Carrera). We likewise conclude that Rule 23’s enumerated criteria already address the interests that motivated the Third Circuit and, therefore, that an independent administrative feasibility requirement is unnecessary.

Download Briseno (9th Cir)

 

 

January 10, 2017 in Class Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 3, 2017

2017 AALS Annual Meeting

The 2017 AALS Annual Meeting is happening in San Francisco this week. Here are some panels that may be of interest:

Continue reading

January 3, 2017 in Conferences/Symposia, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, MDLs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, December 31, 2016

Chief Justice Roberts Issues Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary

The New Year’s Eve moment everyone has been waiting for: Chief Justice Roberts’ 2016 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary.

The report emphasizes the work of federal district court judges, and there are several references to civil procedure – including the 2015 FRCP amendments that were the focus of last year’s report:

The judge is responsible for supervising the important pretrial process and conducting the trial itself. He resolves discovery disputes, manages the selection of the jury, rules on the admission of evidence, determines the proper and understandable instruction of the jury, and resolves any issues surrounding the acceptance of the verdict and entry of judgment. Each of those steps requires special knowledge, sensitivity, and skill. The judge must have mastery of the complex rules of procedure and evidence and be able to apply those rules to the nuances of a unique controversy.

* * *

As I explained in my 2015 Year-End Report, the Judicial Conference—the policy making body of the federal courts—has revised the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to emphasize the judge’s role in early and effective case management. Those procedural reforms encourage district judges to meet promptly with the lawyers after the complaint is filed, confer about the needs of the case, develop a case management plan, and expedite resolution of pretrial discovery disputes. The reforms are beginning to have a positive effect because already extremely busy judges are willing to undertake more active engagement in managing their dockets, which will pay dividends down the road. A lumberjack saves time when he takes the time to sharpen his ax. This year, we will take a step further and ask district judges to participate in pilot programs to test several promising case management techniques aimed at reducing the costs of discovery.

Download 2016 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary

Now I can return to revising my article, Toward a Lumberjack Theory of Procedure.

 

 

 

December 31, 2016 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 29, 2016

Interesting Seventh Circuit Decision on Summary Judgment

It’s a “nonprecedential disposition,” but the Seventh Circuit’s decision last week in Couvillion v. Speedway LLC features an interesting exchange about summary judgment. The majority (Chief Judge Wood & Judge Easterbrook) affirms the lower court’s grant of summary judgment against a plaintiff who sued Speedway after she was injured while adding air to her tires at a Speedway service station. In the final paragraph, the court writes:

Couvillion also contends that Indiana’s courts favor jury trials in tort suits. See, e.g., Countrymark Cooperative, Inc. v. Hammes, 892 N.E.2d 683, 688 (Ind. App. 2008) (“negligence cases are especially fact sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective reasonable person—one best applied by a jury after hearing all of the evidence.”) * * * . Maybe Indiana’s judiciary would have submitted Couvillion’s claim to a jury. But federal rules govern the allocation of tasks between judge and jury in federal court. See, e.g., Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., 29 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1994). In federal practice, reflected in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the absence of a material factual dispute means that a judge will resolve the case by summary judgment. We know from Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), and other decisions, that federal procedure governs all federal cases, even if this implies an outcome different from the one likely in state court.

There are a couple of interesting points here. One is about the Erie doctrine. My personal view is that the interplay between FRCP 56 and state law is not quite so simple, and that a proper understanding might require a federal court adjudicating a state-law claim to follow state law on certain aspects of summary-judgment practice. [See What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?)].

Another point—which Judge Sykes emphasizes in her dissent—has to do with the majority’s assertion that “In federal practice, reflected in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the absence of a material factual dispute means that a judge will resolve the case by summary judgment.” Judge Sykes writes in response:

Under Rule 56 (and in state practice), a judge may resolve the case by summary judgment only if there is no material factual dispute “and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (emphasis added); see also Ind. R. Trial P. 56(C). The historical facts are undisputed here, but it doesn’t follow that a judge decides liability. Couvillion is entitled to have a jury determine Speedway’s liability unless on this record no reasonable jury could find a breach of duty under §§ 343 and 343A.

There would seem to be federalism dimensions with respect to this issue as well—is it by state or federal law that we decide whether the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law”?

Download Couvillion v Speedway (7th Cir)

(H/T Raffi Melkonian)

 

 

 

December 29, 2016 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, December 27, 2016

Hoffman on Hubbard on Plausibility Pleading

Lonny Hoffman has an essay up on the University of Chicago Law Review Online, Plausible Theory, Implausible Conclusions. Lonny responds to William Hubbard’s recent article, A Fresh Look at Plausibility Pleading, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 693 (2016).

 

 

 

December 27, 2016 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 19, 2016

Tidmarsh on Fitzpatrick & Norris on Discovery Costs and Fee Shifting

Now on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Jay Tidmarsh’s essay, Discovery Costs and Default Rules. Jay reviews a recent paper by Brian Fitzpatrick and Cameron Norris, One-Way Fee Shifting After Summary Judgment.

 

 

 

December 19, 2016 in Discovery, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, December 13, 2016

Magazine article on "Roberts Rules for Protecting Corporations"

Moshe Z. Marvit has published in the American Prospect magazine a piece entitled "Roberts Rules for Protecting Corporations."  The summary is "The chief justice’s changes to the rules for litigation make suing big business a whole lot harder."

 

December 13, 2016 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, December 1, 2016

December 1, 2016: FRCP Amendments Now In Effect

Back in April the U.S. Supreme Court adopted amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 6 ,and 82. Today is the effective date of those amendments.

More details on the amendments are here.

 

 

December 1, 2016 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 29, 2016

This Week's NYU Symposium on Class Actions

The NYU Law Review and the Center on Civil Justice are hosting a symposium entitled “Rule 23 @ 50” this Friday and Saturday. From the announcement:

This is a wonderful time to reflect on Rule 23 – what it was meant to do; whether it has met its promise; if not, why not, and what can be done to remedy the situation; and what is in store for the Rule going forward.

When: December 2–3, 2016.

Where: Vanderbilt Hall, 40 Washington Square South.

Panels will explore the history of the rule, its use in civil rights and mass tort cases, what the rule was meant to accomplish, whether it has done so, and if not, whether there are ways to fix the situation. There will be an oral history interview with Professor Arthur Miller, who was there at the creation of the rule. The conference will conclude with a judges’ roundtable moderated by Professor Miller.

Here is a more detailed program, and here’s where you can RSVP.

 

 

 

November 29, 2016 in Class Actions, Conferences/Symposia, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, November 1, 2016

Public Hearing on Proposed FRCP Amendments: Thursday (11/3) in Washington, D.C.

As covered earlier, the Standing Committee has published proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (along with proposed amendments to the Appellate, Bankruptcy & Criminal Rules). The proposed amendments to Rule 23 (which deal principally with class action settlements) have received much of the attention, but the proposals also include changes to Rules 5, 62, and 65.1.

The first public hearing on the proposed civil rules amendments takes place this Thursday, November 3, in Washington, D.C. The public comment period runs until February 15, 2017.

Here are the U.S. Courts website’s general links for published proposed amendments and rules committee hearings

 

 

 

 

November 1, 2016 in Class Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 20, 2016

Fitzpatrick & Norris on Discovery Costs and Post-Summary Judgment Fee-Shifting

Brian Fitzpatrick and Cameron Norris have posted on SSRN a draft of their article, One-Way Fee Shifting after Summary Judgment. Here’s the abstract:

New, defendant-friendly discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure took effect on December 1, 2015. Although the discovery amendments created more controversy than perhaps anything the rulemakers have done in recent memory, defense-side advocates are pressing a still more ambitious proposal: to outright flip who pays for discovery, from the party who produces the discovery to the party who requests it. We share the view of most commentators that so-called "requester pays" is too extreme. But we also think the current regime — so called "producer pays" — errs too far in the other direction (even after the new amendments to the rules). In this article, we rely on economic analysis to offer a middle way: to ask plaintiffs to pay the cost of responding to their discovery requests only if they do not find anything trial worthy in those requests and lose their cases on summary judgment. Although Congress certainly has the power to implement our proposal, we believe that the rulemakers may be able to do so on their own as well.

 

 

 

 

October 20, 2016 in Discovery, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)