Tuesday, August 7, 2012

Talesh on Dispute Resolution Design

Shauhin A. Talesh has posted a paper entitled "How Dispute Resolution Design Matters: An Organizational Analysis of Dispute Resolution Structures and Consumer Lemon Laws" on SSRN. 


This study demonstrates how the structure of dispute
resolution shapes the extent to which managerial and business values influence
the meaning and implementation of consumer protection law, and consequently,
the extent to which repeat players are advantaged. My analysis draws from,
links, and contributes to two literatures that examine the relationship between
organizational governance structures and law: neo-institutional studies of law
and organizations and socio-legal studies of repeat players’ advantages in
disputing. Specifically, I compare an instance where powerful state consumer
protection laws are resolved in private dispute resolution forums funded by
automobile manufacturers but operated by independent third-party organizations
(California) with one where consumer disputes are resolved in public
alternative dispute resolution processes run and administered by the state
(Vermont). Through in-depth interviews and an ethnographic study of the
training programs that dispute resolution arbitrators undergo in each state, I
show how different dispute resolution structures operating in California and
Vermont give different meanings to substantially similar lemon laws. Although
my data do not allow me to establish a causal relationship, they strongly
suggest that the form of the dispute resolution structure, and how business and
state actors construct the meaning of lemon laws through these structures, have
critical implications for the effectiveness of consumer protection laws for



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