Thursday, January 12, 2012
This week the Supreme Court issued its decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, covered earlier here. The issue, begins Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, is "whether the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U. S. C. §1679 et seq., precludes enforcement of an arbitration agreement in a lawsuit alleging violations of that Act."
Answer: It does not. “Because the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitrable forum, the [Federal Arbitration Act] requires the arbitration agreement to be enforced according to its terms.”
Justice Ginsburg is the lone dissenter. Justice Sotomayor authors a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan, which begins:
Claims alleging the violation of a statute, such as the Credit Repair Organizations Act (Act), 15 U. S. C. §1679 et seq., are generally subject to valid arbitration agreements unless Congress evinces a contrary intent in the text, history, or purpose of the statute. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20, 26 (1991). I agree with the Court that Congress has not shown that intent here. But for the reasons stated by the dissent, I find this to be a much closer case than the majority opinion suggests.
For more coverage, check out this analysis at SCOTUSblog by Prof. Ronald Mann (Columbia).