Wednesday, February 2, 2011
For those of us who teach the very important Anna Nicole Smith cases, such as Marshall v. Marshall, we can add another teaching arrow to our quiver.
The London Telegraph reports that an Anna Nicole Smith opera will be opening next month at Covent Garden.
Now we know for sure what opera and the Supreme Court have in common.
Now in print in the Ohio State Law Journal is a symposium issue on Originalism and the Jury. The symposium was sponsored by The Ohio State University and the University of Illinois. Contributions, available here, include:
Suja A. Thomas, Foreword, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 883 (2010).
Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, For Jury Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 887 (2010).
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Summary Judgment, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 919 (2010).
Judge Nancy Gertner, Juries and Originalism: Giving “Intelligible Content” to the Right to a Jury Trial, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 935 (2010).
Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Relationship with the Jury, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 959 (2010).
William E. Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American Juries, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1003 (2010).
James Oldham, On the Question of a Complexity Exception to the Seventh Amendment Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1031 (2010).
Gene Schaerr and Jed Brinton, Business and Jury Trials: The Framers’ Vision Versus Modern Reality, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1055 (2010).
Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at common law”, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1071 (2010).
Monday, January 31, 2011
Lumen Mulligan (University of Kansas Law School) has posted Jurisdiction by Cross-Reference to SSRN.
State and federal law often cross-reference each other to provide a rule of decision. The difficulties attendant to these cross-referenced schemes are brought to the fore most clearly when a federal court must determine whether such bodies of law create federal question jurisdiction. Indeed, the federal courts have issued scores of seemingly inconsistent opinions on these cross-referential cases. In this article, I offer an ordering principle for these apparently varied, cross-referential, jurisdictional cases. I argue that the federal courts only take federal question jurisdiction over cross-referenced claims when they, from a departmental perspective, maintain declaratory authority over the cross-referenced law. I defend this thesis by extensively exploring cross-referenced regimes in numerous modes. I also contend that this cross-referential ordering principle offers significant insights into the nature of federal-question claims more generally. Namely, I assert that, contrary to the predominant view, the federal courts do not stand ready to hear cases in which the judiciary as a whole is deployed merely as a fact-finding forum under federal question jurisdiction. Further, I contend that this view of federal question jurisdiction comports with the original understanding of the that font of jurisdiction as well as principles of judicial independence. And that the Court’s tendency to vest federal question jurisdiction upon mere formal distinctions in these contexts often leads to separation of powers difficulties. As such, I advocate that jurisdiction over all cross-referenced regimes proceed on functionalist lines.
Professor Kevin Walsh (Richmond) has posted on SSRN his essay, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate. Here’s the abstract:
Virginia v. Sebelius is a federal lawsuit in which Virginia seeks the invalidation of President Obama’s signature legislative initiative of healthcare reform. Virginia seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to vindicate a state statute declaring that no Virginia resident shall be required to buy health insurance. To defend this state law from the preemptive effect of federal law, Virginia contends that the federal legislation’s individual mandate to buy health insurance is unconstitutional. Virginia’s lawsuit is one of the most closely followed and politically salient federal cases in recent times. Yet neither the federal government nor any other legal commentator has previously identified the way in which the very features of the case that contribute to its political salience also require that it be dismissed for lack of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has placed limits on statutory subject-matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in which a state seeks a declaration that a state statute is not preempted by federal law - precisely the relief sought in Virginia v. Sebelius. These limits insulate federal courts from the strong political forces surrounding lawsuits that seek federal court validation of state nullification statutes. This Essay identifies these heretofore neglected limits, shows why they demand dismissal of Virginia v. Sebelius, and explains why it is appropriate for federal courts to be closed to this type of suit.
(Hat Tip: PrawfsBlawg)