Tuesday, June 28, 2016

How the Current Version of Rule 5 Frustrates Public Access to Discovery in the “Trump University” Lawsuit and Other Cases

            Most people know by now that Cohen v. Donald Trump, No. 3:13-cv-02519, is a class action in federal court in San Diego alleging that Trump University defrauded thousands of consumers who purchased real estate courses.  What is less widely reported is that the complaint alleges that Donald Trump violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), a federal statute passed in 1970 to make it easier to prosecute members of organized crime – e.g., the Mafia.  Specifically, the complaint alleges that Donald Trump violated RICO by conducting Trump University (the alleged criminal enterprise) through a “pattern of racketeering activity” consisting of crimes of mail fraud and wire fraud. 

 

The Discovery Sought by the News Media

            What does this have to do with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?  Well, hang on.  One of the latest skirmishes in the case is that major news media organizations (CNN, The Washington Post, CBS, and several others) have moved to intervene for the purpose of modifying the protective order so that the videotaped depositions of Donald Trump taken in the case may be released.   

            Earlier, the plaintiff tried to file portions of the videos in court as exhibits to his brief opposing Trump’s motion for summary judgment. The court returned the videos to the plaintiff for failing to comply with a court rule.  The plaintiff promptly moved to file “a series of electronic files of video excerpts from the depositions of Trump, taken on December 10, 2015, and January 21, 2016.”  Trump opposes the motion. 

            But meanwhile, plaintiff’s motion revealed the existence of two days of depositions of Trump in videotape form, of which plaintiff is only seeking to file a fraction.  The putative intervenors (the news media) want it all. 

 

Rule 5 Prohibits the Filing of Discovery in Court Until “Used in the Proceeding

            Perhaps one of the most somnolent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is Rule 5, “Serving and Filing Pleadings and Other Papers.”  Since 2000, Rule 5(d)(1) has prohibited the filing in court of discovery requests and responses (including initial disclosures, depositions, interrogatories, requests for documents, and requests for admission).  From 1980 to 2000, Rule 5 allowed local courts to prohibit the filing of discovery.  (Of course, once a party “uses” the discovery “in a proceeding” – for example, as an exhibit to a summary judgment motion – it must be filed in court.) 

            In contrast, before 1980, Rule 5 required the filing of discovery – depositions, interrogatories, and so forth – in court.  The only reason that was publicly stated for the change to prohibiting the filing of discovery in court was that the copies for filing could be expensive and that the courts did not have enough physical storage space.  But now that everything is digital, it would seem that the issues of expense and physical storage space are moot.   

Continue reading

June 28, 2016 in Current Affairs, Discovery, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 22, 2016

Judge Pro on Federal Magistrate Judges

Judge Philip M. Pro (United States District Court for the District of Nevada) has posted on SSRN his article United States Magistrate Judges: Present but Unaccounted For, forthcoming in the Nevada Law Journal.

Abstract:

The relationship between United States district judges and United States magistrate judges is unique within the American judiciary. United States magistrate judges are the first judges encountered in most federal civil or criminal cases and play an increasingly important role in the adjudication of virtually every case in United States district court. Yet, while the behavior of Article III judges has been the subject of active academic scrutiny, the behavior of magistrate judges, who are appointed to renewable eight-year terms by their Article III district judge colleagues, has largely been ignored. This paper reports the results of interviews of thirty-four magistrate judges and district judges, and through their experiences, explores whether their judicial decision-making relationship, a motivation for re-appointment, or elevation to Article III status influences their judicial behavior and that of their district judge colleagues. The answers to these questions are nuanced and dependent on variables not previously considered, and are best understood in the context of the remarkable evolution of the Magistrate Judges System, which has existed for less than fifty years.

June 22, 2016 in Federal Courts, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 21, 2016

Jacobs on Transient Jurisdiction: If Corporations Are People, Why Can't They Play Tag?

Cody Jacobs (Freedman Fellow, Temple University Beasley School of Law) has published in New Mexico Law Review his article, If Corporations Are People, Why Can't They Play Tag?

Abstract:

The Supreme Court’s decision in Burnham v. Superior Court — despite producing a splintered vote with no opinion garnering a majority of the Court — made one thing clear: an individual defendant can be subject to personal jurisdiction simply by being served with process while he or she happens to be in a forum regardless of whether the defendant has any contacts with that forum. This method of acquiring personal jurisdiction is called transient or “tag” jurisdiction. Tag jurisdiction is older than minimum contacts jurisdiction, and used to be the primary method for determining whether an out of state defendant could be haled into a court. While Burnham held that tag jurisdiction remained constitutionally valid, the court split on the justification for allowing this form of jurisdiction, with four Justices approving the practice under an originalist methodology, and four others approving it based on contemporary notions offairness.

This article argues that both the originalist and fairness-based tests proposed by the principal opinions in Burnham support allowing the assertion of tag jurisdiction over corporations and other entity defendants through in-state service on their officers. This article shows that at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, corporations were often subject to personal jurisdiction based only on their officers’ physical presence in a forum when served with process. The article also demonstrates that the fairness considerations that led four Members of the Court to endorse tag jurisdiction in Burnham apply with even greater force to modern corporations because of their greater ability to take advantage of the protections and services offered by states outside of their own. Finally, the article examines how the application of tag jurisdiction to corporate entities would be in accord with general trends in constitutional law affording corporations rights equivalent to those of natural persons.

 

June 21, 2016 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Clermont on the Last-in-Time Judgment Rule

Professor Kevin M. Clermont (Cornell) has posted to SSRN his article, Limiting the Last-in-Time Judgment Rule. 

Abstract:

A troublesome problem arises when there are two binding but inconsistent judgments: Say the plaintiff loses on a claim (or issue) in the defendant’s state and then, in a second action back home, wins on the same claim (or issue). American law generally holds that the later judgment is the one entitled to preclusive effects. In the leading article on the problem, then-Professor Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested that our last-in-time rule should not apply if the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the second court’s decision against giving full faith and credit. Although that suggestion is unsound, the last-in-time rule indeed should not apply if the first judgment is American and the second judgment comes from a foreign-nation court. To establish those contentions, this Article must go to the depths of res judicata and conflicts law, here and also abroad, where the first-in-time rule reigns. The Article resurfaces to rearrange the puzzle pieces into a simple reformulation—an elaboration but not an amendment—of the American law on inconsistent judgments.

June 21, 2016 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 20, 2016

Coleman on One Percent Procedure

Brooke Coleman has posted on SSRN a draft of her article One Percent Procedure, which is forthcoming in the Washington Law Review. Here’s the abstract:

In this election year, political rhetoric about the one percent is already pervasive, as those with the greatest concentrated wealth prosper and the remaining population stagnates. Because of their affluence, the one percent exercise disproportionate control over political and economic systems. This Article argues that federal civil procedure is similarly a one percent regime. The crème de la crème of the bench and bar, along with equally exclusive litigants, often engage in high-stakes, complex civil litigation. It is this type of litigation that dominates both the elite experience and the public perception of what civil litigation is. This litigation is not particularly common, however; while expensive and well known, it is in the minority. Yet this litigation and the individuals engaged in it have an incongruent influence on how the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and procedural doctrine develop. They create one percent procedure. 

This Article interrogates and connects disparate phenomena related to civil litigation, including the recent discovery amendments and the rise of multidistrict litigation. It demonstrates that the elite — those who are deeply steeped in complex, high-stakes litigation — are setting the agenda and determining the rules for how the entire civil litigation game is played. It further argues that the benefits of a one percent procedure system — notably expertise of the participants — are not worth the costs; indeed, that expertise can be detrimental to the design of a civil litigation system.

As in politics and economics, a system that gives too much control to the one percent risks undervaluing and underserving the remaining ninety-nine. Using social and political science, the Article argues that the homogenous policymaking of one percent procedure creates suboptimal results. The Article concludes that the structures giving rise to one percent procedure must be modified and proposes a set of reforms intended to allow the ninety-nine percent representation in, and access to, the process of constructing our shared civil litigation system.

 

 

June 20, 2016 in Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 15, 2016

Civil Procedure Bar Exam Refreshers on YouTube

Just in time for the July bar exam . . . Professor Ira Nathenson has posted seven new YouTube videos reviewing various aspects of Civil Procedure.   Enjoy!

June 15, 2016 in Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 10, 2016

While We Were Grading: Recent Scholarship on Civil Procedure

Here are seven papers posted on SSRN in the last month relating to civil procedure issues:

  1. We Have a Consensus on Fraud on the Market -- And It's Wrong 

James C. Spindler (University of Texas School of Law; McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin)

Abstract:     

Recent scholarship overwhelmingly contends that the fraud on the market securities class action has neither deterrent nor compensatory effect and should be cut back or even abandoned entirely. This scholarship largely focuses on two critiques: circularity, which holds that shareholder class action claimants are suing themselves, making compensation impossible; and diversification, which holds that fraud constitutes a diversifiable risk, such that diversified shareholders both gain and lose from fraud in equal measure and hence are not negatively impacted. These critiques are arguably the most important and widely-used theoretical development of the last two decades in securities law, and enjoy a broad consensus.

Unfortunately, these critiques are wrong. After tracing the evolution of these critiques, this paper demonstrates economically that, despite widespread acceptance, none of the principal claims of these critiques are correct. In particular: fraud on the market does indeed compensate defrauded purchasers despite circularity (under certain conditions, perfectly); and diversified investors do have expected losses from fraud and have incentives to undertake deadweight precaution costs. Further, the fraud on the market remedy deters both precaution costs and, under certain conditions, fraud itself. The critiques are fundamentally flawed, the academic consensus on fraud on the market is incorrect, and the panoply of reform proposals based on these critiques is without foundation. These critiques have fueled a trend of cutbacks and ongoing existential challenges to fraud on the market (as in Halliburton) that, in light of these results, should be rethought.

Continue reading

June 10, 2016 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 27, 2016

Forced Individual Arbitration of Wage-and-Hour Claims Violates NLRA

            The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Diane Wood, held that forcing an employee to agree to bring any wage-and-hour claim through individual arbitration violated the National Labor Relations Act.  Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., No. 15-2997 (7th Cir. May 26, 2016).

            Epic sent an email to some employees with an agreement requiring them to bring wage-and-hour claims only through individual arbitration and to waive the right to participate in any class, collective, or representative proceeding.  The email said that employees were “deemed to have accepted this Agreement” if they continued to work at Epic. 

            Plaintiff agreed at the time, but later sued Epic in federal court for violations of the overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act and Wisconsin law.  Epic moved to compel individual arbitration.

            Section 7 of the NLRA provides that “[e]mployees shall have the right to self- organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157.  The Seventh Circuit stated, “Section 7’s ‘other concerted activities’ have long been held to include ‘resort to administrative and judicial forums.’”  The court held that “the phrase ‘concerted activities’ in Section 7 should be read broadly to include resort to representative, joint, collective, or class legal remedies.”   Thus, “insofar as it prohibits collective action, Epic’s arbitration provision violates Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.”

            Further, the Federal Arbitration Act did not “save[] the ban on collective action.”  The district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. 

May 27, 2016 in Class Actions, Recent Decisions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 25, 2016

Goings-On in the Committee that Never Sleeps (a/k/a the Civil Rules Advisory Committee)

            The indefatigable Advisory Committee on Civil Rules met on April 14, 2016 and prepared a report to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the Standing Committee), which will meet June 6-7, 2016.  The report begins at page 251 of the Agenda book, and the draft minutes of the April 14 meeting begin at page 489 of the Agenda book.

            The report has three parts.  First, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Standing Committee approve proposed amendments to Rule 5 (e-service and e-filing), Rule 23 (class actions), and Rule 62 (stays of execution of judgment) for publication this summer. 

            Second, the Advisory Committee recommends that the Standing Committee approve two pilot projects for submission to the Judicial Conference.  The first pilot project would test a system of mandatory initial disclosures that would be more robust than those currently required by Rule 26(a)(1).  The second pilot project would test the effectiveness of court-wide adoption of practices to reduce “cost and delay.”

            Third, the Advisory Committee:

 (a) “describes proposals under active consideration for eventual publication and adoption,” including:

  • a new subdivision of Rule 5.2 dealing with redaction (super exciting stuff!);
  • studying “concerns about the operation of Rule 30(b)(6)(deposition of an entity)”; and
  • “consideration of the Rule 81(c) provisions for demanding a jury trial after a case is removed from state court”; and

(b) briefly mentions suggestions for rules amendments that the Committee has “removed from the agenda” (i.e., rejected for now), including:

  • the “separate document” requirement of Rule 58;
  • suggestions to assist pro se litigants;
  • amending the pleading standard in Rule 8(a)(2) (“The time has not yet come for such a project.”); and
  • mandatory disclosure of third-party financing arrangements.

        In future posts, I will discuss some of these developments in more detail.

May 25, 2016 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

SCOTUS Vacates Ninth Circuit in Spokeo, Remands for New “Concreteness” Inquiry

The Supreme Court issued Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, No. 13-1339, earlier this week.  In a majority opinion unlikely to make anyone happy, the Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which held that Robins had adequately alleged Article III standing, and remanded.

A Brief Recap

Robins’ complaint alleged that Spokeo maintained an inaccurate consumer report about him on its website, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s requirement that consumer reporting agencies “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”  In particular, Robins alleged that a photo purporting to be Robins on the site wasn’t him, and that the site incorrectly stated that he was in his 50s, married, employed in a professional or technical field, has children, has a graduate degree, and is in the top 10% for wealth. 

The upshot of this disseminated misinformation, Robins alleged, was that when he was “out of work” and “actively seeking employment,” he encountered “[imminent and ongoing] actual harm to [his] employment prospects.”  

The Majority Opinion

You wouldn’t know that Robins alleged actual harm to his employment prospects by reading the majority opinion, which didn’t mention it.  Instead, the majority opinion by Justice Alito (joined by Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas and inexplicably by Breyer and Kagan) managed to further stultify constitutional standing doctrine by seizing on the Court’s prior repetition of the phrase “concrete and particularized” in describing the “injury in fact” required for standing.  The Court now finds it obvious that these are separate, distinct requirements: (1) concrete and (2) particularized (although the Court cited no case that actually discussed these terms separately).  The Ninth Circuit, held the majority, applied the “particularized” branch but not the “concreteness” branch.

Continue reading

May 18, 2016 in Class Actions, Standing, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 17, 2016

SCOTUS Decision on Arising Under Jurisdiction in Merrill Lynch Case

Yesterday, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Manning.   Justice Kagan wrote the opinion, with Justices Thomas (joined by Justice Sotomayor) concurred in the judgment and wrote separately.  The Court held that the plaintiffs' state law causes of action did not "arise under" § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act, a statute that the Court held has the same "arising under" meaning as 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Ronald Mann has a thorough opinion analysis over at Scotusblog.

Congrats to civ pro prawf Brendan Maher (UConn) whose firm, Stris & Maher represented the plaintiff (respondents) before the Supreme Court.  You can read their merits brief here.

May 17, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 16, 2016

Senate Judiciary Committee to Consider Nominations of Ten Federal Judges This Week

The Senate Judiciary Committee will hold hearings on Wednesday, May 18,  2016, at 10:00 a.m., on the nominations of:

Donald Karl Schott, to be United States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit

Paul Lewis Abrams, to be United States District Judge for the Central District of California

Stephanie A. Finley, to be United States District Judge for the Western District of Louisiana

Claude J. Kelly III, to be United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana

Winfield D. Ong, to be United States District Judge for the Southern District of Indiana

 

On Thursday, May 19, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., the Committee will consider the nominations of:

Ronald G. Russell, to be United States District Judge for the District of Utah

Inga S. Bernstein, to be United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts

Stephanie A. Gallagher, to be United States District Judge for the District of Maryland

Suzanne Mitchell, to be United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma

Scott L. Palk, to be United States District Judge for the Western District of Oklahoma

May 16, 2016 in Current Affairs, Federal Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 2, 2016

CFP: AALS Section on Civil Procedure

AALS Section on Civil Procedure Call for Papers – 2017 AALS Annual Meeting

The AALS Section on Civil Procedure invites papers for its program on “The Roberts Court and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” at the AALS Annual Meeting, on January 3-7, 2017 in San Francisco. The selected paper will be presented on Thursday, January 5, and the panel will be held from 8.30AM to 10.15AM.

TOPIC DESCRIPTION:

This panel discussion will address jurisprudential developments related to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the Roberts Court. The topics will include judicial interpretation of the rules, recurrent doctrinal themes within the rules, recent and proposed amendments to the rules, and the rule making process.

ELIGIBILITY:

Full-time faculty members of AALS member law schools are eligible to submit papers. Pursuant to AALS rules, faculty at fee-paid law schools, foreign faculty, adjunct and visiting faculty (without a full-time position at an AALS member law school), graduate students, fellows, and non-law school faculty are not eligible to submit. Please note that all faculty members presenting at the program are responsible for paying their own annual meeting registration fee and travel expenses.

PAPER SUBMISSION PROCEDURE:

One paper will be selected for presentation at the AALS annual meeting. There is no formal requirement as to the form or length of proposals. However, more complete drafts will be given priority over abstracts, and the presenter is expected to have a draft for commentators one month prior to the beginning of the AALS conference.

The paper will be selected by the Section’s Executive Committee. Please submit only anonymous papers by redacting from the submission the author’s name and any references to the identity of the author. The title of the email submission should read: “Submission – 2017 AALS Section on Civil Procedure.”

DEADLINE:

Please email submissions to the Section Chair Simona Grossi, Professor of Law at: simona.grossi@lls.edu on or before August 19, 2016.

May 2, 2016 in Conferences/Symposia | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 21, 2016

Second Annual Civil Procedure Workshop: Seattle, Washington (July 14-15)

If you’re planning to attend the Second Annual Civil Procedure Workshop, you can register here. You’ll also find information about lodging, including a block of rooms that need to be reserved by June 14, 2016. 

Questions? Contact Liz Porter, Dave Marcus, or Brooke Coleman.

Looking forward to seeing folks in Seattle.

 

 

 

April 21, 2016 in Conferences/Symposia | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

Now on JOTWELL: Thomas on Coleman on Efficiency

Today on the Courts Law section of JOTWELL is Suja Thomas’ essay, Redefining Efficiency In Civil Procedure. Suja reviews Brooke Coleman’s recent article, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1777 (2015).

 

 

March 30, 2016 in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Scholarship, Weblogs | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?

My latest article, The Rise and Fall of Plausibility Pleading?, has just been published in the Vanderbilt Law Review. It builds on some of my earlier work on pleading (here and here), focusing on the Supreme Court’s post-Iqbal decisions on pleading standards (e.g., Johnson v. City of Shelby; Wood v. Moss; Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano). Here’s the abstract:

The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and its 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal unleashed a torrent of scholarly reaction. Commentators charged these decisions with adopting a new pleading regime, "plausibility pleading," that upended the notice-pleading approach that had long prevailed in federal court. Whether a complaint could survive a motion to dismiss — it was argued — now depends on whether the court found the complaint plausible, allowing courts to second-guess a complaint’s allegations without any opportunity for discovery or consideration of actual evidence. Lower courts began to cite Twombly and Iqbal at a remarkably high rate, and empirical work revealed their effect on both dismissal rates and litigant behavior.

Although Twombly and Iqbal were troubling on many levels, the rise of a newly restrictive form of plausibility pleading was not inevitable. There was — and still is — a path forward that would retain the notice-pleading approach set forth in the text of the Federal Rules themselves and confirmed by pre-Twombly case law. This Article describes this reading of Twombly and Iqbal, and explains how more recent Supreme Court pleading decisions are consistent with this understanding. It is crucial, however, that these post-Iqbal decisions and the approach to pleading they reflect receive the same attention that accompanied Twombly, Iqbal, and the rise of plausibility pleading. Otherwise the narrative that Twombly and Iqbal compel a more restrictive pleading standard may become further entrenched, compounding the adverse effects of those problematic decisions.

 

 

March 29, 2016 in Adam Steinman, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Recent Scholarship, Supreme Court Cases, Twombly/Iqbal | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 25, 2016

SCOTUS Decision in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo: Another Important Case on Class Actions

This week the Supreme Court issued its decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, covered here, here, and here. Tyson Foods is one of several important class action cases on the Court’s docket this Term—and the second one decided so far. Like Campbell-Ewald back in January, the Tyson Foods decision is generally good news for proponents of class actions. By a 6-2 vote, the Court upheld class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).

Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion, which was joined in part by Justice Alito. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, which Justice Alito joined. All the opinions are worth a read, but below are a few highlights from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.

First, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the presence of some individualized issues is not fatal to Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement:

The predominance inquiry “asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.” [2 W. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions], §4:49, at 195–196. When “one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.” 7AA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1778, pp. 123–124 (3d ed. 2005) (footnotes omitted).

Justice Kennedy also provided some important guidance on the Supreme Court’s 2011 Wal-Mart decision, clarifying that “Wal-Mart does not stand for the broad proposition that a representative sample is an impermissible means of establishing class-wide liability.” He recognized the practical reality that “[i]n many cases, a representative sample is ‘the only practicable means to collect and present relevant data’ establishing a defendant’s liability. Manual of Complex Litigation §11.493, p. 102 (4th ed. 2004).” And:

In a case where representative evidence is relevant in proving a plaintiff’s individual claim, that evidence cannot be deemed improper merely because the claim is brought on behalf of a class. To so hold would ignore the Rules Enabling Act’s pellucid instruction that use of the class device cannot “abridge . . . any substantive right.” 28 U. S. C. §2072(b).

The Court ultimately did not resolve the second question in Tyson Foods, which was originally framed as “whether a class may be certified if it contains ‘members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages.’” After noting that Tyson Foods had “reframe[d] this argument” in its merits brief, Justice Kennedy declined to address it “because the damages award has not yet been disbursed, nor does the record indicate how it will be disbursed.” The Court therefore remanded the case, recognizing that Tyson Foods “may raise a challenge to the proposed method of allocation when the case returns to the District Court for disbursal of the award.” In his final paragraph of analysis, however, Justice Kennedy noted that the potential for “uninjured class members” to recover from the class judgment appeared to be a problem “of [Tyson Foods’] own making,” because Tyson Foods had argued against having bifurcated liability and damages proceedings.

For additional coverage, check out:

 

March 25, 2016 in Class Actions, Federal Courts, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Recent Decisions, Supreme Court Cases | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 21, 2016

Morley on De Facto Class Actions

Michael Morley (Barry) has posted De Facto Class Actions? Injunctive Relief in Election Law, Voting Rights, and Other Constitutional Cases to SSRN.

When a court holds that a legal provision is unconstitutional; inconsistent with, or preempted by, federal law; or invalid under an agency's organic statute or a framework statute such as the Administrative Procedures Act, the court must decide whether to grant injunctive relief and, if so, how broad that relief should be. In particular, the court must decide whether to issue a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction or a Defendant-Oriented Injunction. A Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction bars the government defendants from enforcing the challenged provision only against the plaintiffs in the case or affected members of plaintiff organizations. A Defendant-Oriented Injunction, in contrast, completely bars the government defendant from enforcing the challenged provision against anyone in the state or nation.

Many courts tend to award Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in election law and voting rights cases, even when they are not brought as class actions, without recognizing or addressing most of the pertinent issues that choice implicates. Individual plaintiffs typically lack Article III standing to seek relief protecting the rights of third parties not before the court. And such third parties may neither fall within the court’s personal jurisdiction nor wish to challenge the provision at issue. Defendant-Oriented Injunctions in non-class cases also raise asymmetric preclusion concerns, undermine the policy considerations underlying Rule 23, and allow trial courts to enforce their rulings beyond the geographic limits of their jurisdiction.

This Article presents a new framework for determining the proper scope of injunctive relief in election law, voting rights, and other constitutional cases. First the court should assess whether granting the requested relief solely to the individual plaintiffs would create unconstitutional disparities concerning fundamental rights in violation of Equal Protection principles, although this seldom, if ever, should be the case. Second, after confirming that limiting relief solely to the individual plaintiffs would be constitutional, the court should then determine whether such a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would be proper under the challenged statute or regulation itself by applying traditional severability principles. If the challenged provision can be applied coherently, and the entity that enacted the provision still would have intended for it to be enforced, even with the plaintiffs excluded from its scope, then a Plaintiff-Oriented Injunction would be the proper remedy. Otherwise, a Defendant-Oriented Injunction is required.

This Article further contends that, when plaintiffs file a non-class case seeking to enjoin a legal provision, the court should determine at the outset whether a Plaintiff- or Defendant-Oriented Injunction would be necessary if the plaintiffs prevail. If a Defendant-Oriented Injunction would be required, the court should order that the case proceed as a Rule 23(b)(2) class action so that all right holders who stand to benefit from a favorable ruling are included as class members. Conducting such an analysis at the outset of the case eliminates most of the concerns implicated by Defendant-Oriented Injunctions.

March 21, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Judge Merrick Garland was "a repeat moderator for Federalist Society events"

If you have been gnashing your teeth over Senate Republicans' stated refusal to vote on the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court, here is some information that may make you feel a little better.

 

  • I cannot discover if Judge Garland actually is or has been a member of the conservative Federalist Society, but he has numerous links to the Society:
    • He listed in the "Experts" link of the website of the Federalist Society.  (It should be noted that the website states that a person’s listing on the Experts page does not imply any “endorsement or relationship between the person and the Federalist Society.”) 
    • Judge Garland moderated a panel called "Changing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Has the Time Come?" on Dec. 9, 2010 hosted by the Federalist Society at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.  One of the panelists argued that discovery costs should routinely be shifted to the party requesting the discovery (something that defense interests have lobbied for ever since, with partial success in the amendment to Rule 26(c)(1)(B)).  Another panelist argued that Rule 4(b), allowing a subpoena to issue against a defendant without a preliminary hearing, is unconstitutional.  A third panelist described Twombly and Iqbal as “perfectly sensible cases.”  Of course, merely by moderating the panel, Judge Garland cannot be understood to be endorsing any of these views.   
    • By my count, Judge Garland has also moderated about ten other panels hosted by The Federalist Society. See, e.g., here and here.  In fact, at the panel on the FRCP described above, the person who introduced Judge Garland as the moderator said to him, “You are a repeat moderator for Federalist Society events.”

President Obama’s political calculation in nominating Judge Garland may be even shrewder than anyone’s given him credit for. 

 

March 21, 2016 in Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, March 18, 2016

Lammon on Appellate Jurisdiction

Bryan Lammon (Toledo) has posted Dizzying Gillespie: The Exaggerated Death of the Balancing Approach and the Inescapable Allure of Discretion in Appellate Jurisdiction to SSRN.

In Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., the Supreme Court appeared to endorse a balancing approach to federal appellate jurisdiction, whereby courts could weigh the costs and benefits of an interlocutory appeal in any case. But the Court soon disavowed the balancing approach and today eschews case-by-case determinations of appellate jurisdiction. The common perception, then, is that Gillespie and the balancing approach are dead. But the balancing approach persists in the Courts of Appeals. In a variety of contexts, these courts have relied on the balancing approach to hear appeals. They’ve constructed doctrines based on the balancing approach. And they engage in case-by-case balancing in determining their jurisdiction. Contrary to popular belief, the balancing approach is alive and well in the Courts of Appeals.

The balancing approach’s persistence — seemingly in direct defiance of the Supreme Court’s mandate — suggests that appellate judges cannot resist wielding some discretion when defining their jurisdiction. This allure of discretion poses a challenge to the primary goal of the literature on interlocutory appeals: reform. If reform is to happen, it will likely take the form of categorical rules. But if what the balancing approach’s persistence suggests is true — if appellate judges cannot completely forego using discretion in defining their jurisdiction — that threatens to undermine the certainty, predictability, and ease of application of any rules that reform might develop. I thus propose a largely novel approach to interlocutory appeal reform: a combination of categorical rules and a discretionary catchall.

 

March 18, 2016 in Recent Scholarship | Permalink | Comments (0)