Saturday, September 25, 2010
Back to blogging on substantive stuff after a long hiatus, and you might think that today's topic is not exactly one to quicken the heartbeat. But in fact there is some interesting stuff here, so bear with me.
The rules, entitled "Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Disputes Involving Foreign-Invested Enterprises (I)" (关于审理外商投资企业纠纷案件若干问题的规定（一）) (the "Provisions"), took effect on Aug. 16, 2010. (News report here.) If word count alone is any indication, it seems that the main sources of controversy in FIEs are (a) agreements to transfer equity that the transferor fails to carry out, and (b) hidden investors who use a nominee as a puppet, where the puppet then starts to have a mind of his own.
In general, the thrust of these rules is to give more strength to the substance of contractual agreements among parties where previously the agreement might have been invalidated on some technicality. This is mostly good news, I think, with one possible exception I'll discuss below.
First, the less interesting (to me) stuff, then the really interesting thing at the end.
- Strengthening of unapproved contracts
Chinese law has always had the problem of how much force to give to contracts that must by law be approved to be effective (for example, all contracts for the formation of a foreign-invested enterprise such as a joint venture) but haven't yet been approved. So what if the contract calls for one party to use its best efforts to get the contract approved? By its very nature, the obligation is meaningful only prior to approval, so if the contract has no force prior to approval, the obligation is meaningless. The Provisions say that obligations of this kind are binding even before approval.
- Greater enforceability of equity transfer agreements
The transfer of equity in FIEs requires the approval of the other parties. What if they don't give it? One solution is to try to put it in the original FIE agreement: if one investor wants to transfer its stake to a subsidiary, for example, the other investor agrees in the FIE agreement to permit it. But when the time comes, the other investor may refuse to consent. This isn't a problem in the US - after all, equity views as done that which ought to be done. But it's been a problem in China. The Provisions say that the transfer will be allowed if there is evidence that the other stockholders consented. Maybe a prior consent in the FIE agreement - an agreement to agree, so to speak - would count.
- Greater enforceability of unregistered stock pledges
Art. 13 seems to be an effort to make unregistered pledges of stock more enforceable. But the way you make a pledge enforceable is to make foreclosure (transfer to the lender) possible. The Provisions say pledges of stock are valid even absent approval from the approval agency (remember, transfers of interest in FIEs require government approval). But how can the pledge really be valid, if to be valid means to allow a transfer, and transfer is supposed to require government approval and consent from the other stockholders? I'm not sure what this ultimately means.
- Greater power to the puppet-master
It seems that investors in FIEs frequently like to hide their identity and to invest through a nominee. Sometimes this is to avoid the effect of regulations that don't allow them to invest, and sometimes there may be some purely business reason. But sometimes the nominee gets a mind of his own and doesn't do what he's supposed to do. This can be awkward, because if there's an agreement it will often be unlawful. The Provisions give greater power to the hidden investor to protect his interests when the nominee starts getting ideas of his own. I'm not sure if this is all to the good; if as a policy matter we want an investor's identity to be a matter of public record, then we have to have some serious disincentives for evasion. And one disincentive is to give people less confidence that their hidden investment deal will be protected by courts if a problem crops up.
- Invalidation of duly approved FIE contracts
OK, here's the part I found most interesting. The Provisions state: "When in the course of adjudicating a case, a court discovers that an FIE contract approved by an FIE approval organ is invalid under the provisions of law or administrative regulations, it should deem the contract invalid." (人民法院在审理案件中，发现经外商投资企业审批机关批准的外商投资企业合同具有法律、行政法规规定的无效情形的，应当认定合同无效) Here, "law" means a norm passed by the National People's Congress (NPC) or its Standing Committee; "administrative regulation" means a norm passed by the State Council (as opposed, for example, to a ministry). This provision is very interesting and quite important because it touches on a prominent feature of the Chinese legal system: the tendency of lower-level bodies to issue rules and engage in practices that openly and directly violate higher-level norms in a way that is not allowed under the Constitution, the Law on Legislation, or just general principles of the Chinese legal system, but is nevertheless tolerated.
This is a bit of a hobby-horse of mine, and I have lots of examples. Here's just one: In 2004, the Beijing Municipal Government decided that it would allow Sino-foreign joint ventures in Zhongguancun in which the Chinese investor was a natural person. (News report here.) Fine, but the Equity Joint Venture Law passed by the NPC says that the Chinese party must be a corporate entity, not a natural person, and it is crystal-clear under Chinese that the Beijing Municipal Government cannot override the National People's Congress. (The government official cited in the report fully acknowledges the legal problems.) Therefore, we are getting precisely the situation envisaged by the rules: the Beijing government will approve a JV contract involving a Chinese natural person, but that contract "is invalid under the provisions of law". It should therefore be ruled invalid by any court hearing a dispute involving it. Will this happen? I guess we'll just have to wait and see.
Apologies for typos and infelicities. It's late and writing this took longer than I anticipated.
Thursday, September 2, 2010
Just noticed this on Xu Zhiyong's blog:
On Aug. 21, 2010, in the afternoon, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau decided to dismiss the case of suspected tax evasion against Gongmeng Company [i.e., Xu's organization, known in English as the Open Constitution Initiative] on the grounds that Gongmeng Company had paid the fine. The PSB returned the company account books as well as other confiscated materials. At the same time, the release on bail of Zhuang Lu and Xu Zhiyong was dissolved [i.e., they are free unconditionally and not just out awaiting trial].
To date, the court has not accepted Gongmeng Company's case over its disputed legal status. But whatever Gongmeng Company's legal status, we citizens will continue just as before to promote the establishment and growth of civil society.
Thanks to everyone for your constant concern and support! This is our incentive to keep going. No matter what problems we encounter, we will stubbornly maintain our ideal of a good society.
Background for those who don't know: Here's a news story from the L.A. Times about the case, which began last summer.