Sunday, March 26, 2017
Thursday, March 23, 2017
Sunday, March 19, 2017
2/2: "Remuneration in Germany is ... now linked to the sustainable development of the company." 18 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 751 #corpgov— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) March 14, 2017
Thursday, March 16, 2017
A half century ago, corporate legal theory pursued an institutional vision in which corporations and the law that creates them protect people from the ravages of volatile free markets. That vision was challenged on the ground during the 1980s, when corporate legal institutions and market forces came to blows over questions concerning hostile takeovers. By 1990, it seemed like the institutions had won. But a different picture has emerged as the years have gone by. It is now clear that the market side really won the battle of the 1980s, succeeding in entering a wedge between corporate law and social welfare. The distance between the welfarist enterprise of a half century ago and the concerns that motivate today’s corporate legal theory has been widening ever since. This Essay examines the widening gulf. It compares the vision of the corporation and of the role it plays in society that prevailed during the immediate post-war era, before the fulcrum years of the 1980s, with the very different vision we have today, and traces the path we took from there to here. It will close with a brief prediction regarding corporate law’s future.
Sunday, March 12, 2017
shareholder-oriented #corpgov: "social price for..nonoccupational income provision outside of direct state control" 40 Seattle U. L.Rev. 427— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) March 7, 2017
Thursday, March 9, 2017
In 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for the first time sought public comment on whether financial disclosure reform should address indicators of firms’ sustainability risks and practices. Securities disclosure reform now appears poised to take a deregulatory turn, and innovations at the intersection of sustainability and finance appear unlikely in the face of new policy priorities. Whether the SEC should take any steps to improve how sustainability-related information is disclosed to investors is also deeply contested.
This Article argues that the SEC nonetheless faces a sustainability imperative, first to address this issue in the near term as part of its ongoing review of the reporting framework for financial disclosure, and second, to promote disclosure of material sustainability information within financial reports in furtherance of its core statutory mandate. This conclusion rests on evidence that the current state of sustainability disclosure is inadequate for investment analysis and that these deficiencies are largely problems of comparability and quality, which cannot readily be addressed by private ordering, nor by deference to policymaking at the state level. This Article highlights the costs of agency inaction that have been largely ignored in the debate over the future of financial reporting and concludes by weighing potential avenues for disclosure reform and their alternatives.
Sunday, March 5, 2017
Hobby Lobby: "an assault on the..notion of corporate interests separate from the..interests of..immediate owners" 101Minn.L.Rev.963 #corpgov— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) March 5, 2017
Thursday, March 2, 2017
The majority of states have now passed laws prohibiting bad faith assertions of patent infringement. The laws are heralded as a new tool to protect small businesses and consumers from harassment by so-called patent trolls. But state “anti-patent laws” are not a new phenomenon. In the late nineteenth century, many states passed regulations to prevent rampant fraud by patent peddlers who aggressively marketed fake or low value patents to unwitting farmers. However, courts initially held the laws were unconstitutional. Congress, courts reasoned, had power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 to “secure” patent rights. If states could tax patents or alter the terms on which patents were sold and enforced, this risked destroying a federal property right and nullifying an Article I power. In the early twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court finally held that states retained some authority to regulate, and to tax, patent transactions. But the Court made clear that states could never impose an “oppressive or unreasonable” burden on federal rights. The Federal Circuit has completely ignored this preemption law. But it has never been overruled and must be consulted today in assessing the constitutionality of states’ current efforts to combat patent trolls.
Sunday, February 26, 2017
Friday, February 24, 2017
The following comes to us from Professor Stephen Diamond, Santa Clara University School of Law.
The Santa Clara University School of Law, the Leavey School of Business at Santa Clara University, the University of Washington School of Law, the NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, the Rutgers Center for Corporate Law and Governance and the Business and Human Rights Journal announce the Third Business and Human Rights Scholars Conference, to be held September 15-16, 2017 at Santa Clara University in Santa Clara, California. Conference participants will present and discuss scholarship at the intersection of business and human rights issues. Upon request, participants’ papers may be considered for publication in the Business and Human Rights Journal (BHRJ), published by Cambridge University Press.
The Conference is interdisciplinary: scholars from all disciplines are invited to apply, including law, business, human rights, and global affairs. The papers must be unpublished at the time of presentation. Each participant will present his/her own paper and be asked to comment on at least one other paper during the workshop. Participants will be expected to have read other papers and to participate actively in discussion and analysis of the various works in progress.
To apply, please submit an abstract of no more than 250 words to email@example.com with the subject line “Business & Human Rights Conference Proposal.” Please include your name, affiliation, contact information, and curriculum vitae. The deadline for submission is March 15, 2017. We will begin reviewing submissions on a rolling basis on March 1, 2017. Scholars whose submissions are selected for the symposium will be notified no later than April 15, 2017. Final papers will be due August 25, 2017.
Thursday, February 23, 2017
Christopher Bruner has posted Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What Is the 'Progressive' Agenda? on SSRN. You can download the paper here. Here is the abstract:
For as long as corporations have existed, debates have persisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders as a normative matter. This is hardly surprising given the economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and growing "corporate" resources, and it has become commonplace to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly political terms. In particular, on the fundamental normative issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the corporation have long been described as politically right-leaning while stakeholder-oriented conceptions have conversely been described as politically left-leaning. When the frame of reference for this normative debate shifts away from state corporate law, however, a curious reversal occurs. Notably, when the debate shifts to federal political and judicial contexts, one often finds actors associated with the political left championing expansion of shareholders' corporate governance powers, and those associated with the political right advancing more stakeholder-centric conceptions of the corporation.
The aim of this article is to explain this disconnect and explore its implications for the development of U.S. corporate governance, with particular reference to the varied and evolving corporate governance views of the political left - the side of the spectrum where, I argue, the more dramatic and illuminating shifts have occurred over recent decades, and where the state/federal divide is more difficult to explain. A widespread and fundamental reorientation of the Democratic Party toward decidedly centrist national politics fundamentally altered the role of corporate governance and related issues in the project of assembling a competitive coalition capable of appealing to working- and middle-class voters. Grappling with the legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks - as well as the economic and cultural trends - that conditioned and incentivized this shift will prove critical to understanding the state/federal divide regarding what the "progressive" corporate governance agenda ought to be and how the situation might change as the Democratic Party formulates responses to the November 2016 election.
I begin with a brief terminological discussion, examining how various labels associated with the political left tend to be employed in relevant contexts, as well as varying ways of defining the field of "corporate governance" itself. I then provide an overview of "progressive" thinking about corporate governance in the context of state corporate law, contrasting those views with the very different perspectives associated with center-left political actors at the federal level.
Based on this descriptive account, I then examine various legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, as well as important economic and cultural trends, that have played consequential roles in prompting and/or exacerbating the state/federal divide. These include fundamental distinctions between state corporate law and federal securities regulation; the differing postures of lawmakers in Delaware and Washington, DC; the rise of institutional investors; the evolution of organized labor interests; certain unintended consequences of extra-corporate regulation; and the Democratic Party's sharp rightward shift since the late 1980s. The article closes with a brief discussion of the prospects for state/federal convergence, concluding that the U.S. corporate governance system will likely remain theoretically incoherent for the foreseeable future due to the extraordinary range of relevant actors and the fundamentally divergent forces at work in the very different legal and political settings they inhabit.
Sunday, February 19, 2017
"each ontological understanding of the corporation bears..insights about..[corporate] religious freedom" 14 First Amend. L.Rev. 375 #corpgov— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) February 19, 2017
"the feudal understanding of corporations as quasi-sovereigns entitled to something like comity" 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 163 #corpgov— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) February 19, 2017
Thursday, February 16, 2017
Position Opening: Akron School of Law Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law & Technology
The University of Akron's School of Law invites applications and nominations for the position of Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law & Technology, a tenure-track or tenured faculty position, with an anticipated start date of August 2017.
The Director of the Center for Intellectual Property Law and Technology is responsible for developing, articulating, and implementing a long-term vision for the Center that will achieve greater distinction for the University of Akron's School of Law. The Director, in coordination with the Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, is responsible for implementing the IP curriculum within the School of Law. The Director also manages and supervises the law schools' special IP degree and certificate programs, and may help propose and create additional new programs in intellectual property for attorneys and other professionals as appropriate. The Director is responsible for the management and coordination of all law school programming in the area of intellectual property law, including programs for both attorneys and academics.
The Director fosters and advances external relationships, including the law schools' ongoing international relationships with other universities, where those relate to intellectual property and technology. The Director also works with the law schools' Intellectual Property Advisory Council in advancing the intellectual property program. The Director serves as a faculty advisor to the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Association, a law student organization, oversees the advising related to the annual issue of the Akron Law Review devoted to intellectual property law, and also oversees the law schools' participation in intellectual property-related moot court competitions.
As a member of the law school faculty, the Director will engage in relevant scholarship, teach in the area of intellectual property law, and serve on administrative committees.
For complete details and to apply visit: http://www.uakron.edu/jobs Job ID # 10009
Sunday, February 12, 2017
Sunday, February 5, 2017
Sunday, January 29, 2017
Sunday, January 22, 2017
Sunday, January 15, 2017
"worker participation in #corpgov": "the inefficiency argument sits at odds with the historical evidence" 23 Colum. J. Eur. L. 135 (2016)— Stefan Padfield (@ProfPadfield) January 10, 2017
Sunday, January 8, 2017
Sunday, January 1, 2017