Tuesday, May 24, 2016

Another Teaching and Life Lesson on the Run: It's Easier at the Top and We Don't Get There Alone

Some time ago, I wrote the post Better Teaching Idea: Try to Notice When the Wind Is at Your Back. That post emerged from some observations while running, and today's post has the same origin.

This month I have been trying to up my miles again for no particular reason. I don't run for races. I run to run. And to feel like I am at least doing something to stay in some semblance of good shape (it's not really working).  I now run 4 miles most days. Maybe a little more or less, but that's the norm this month.  The past two days, I ran from my house, which is at the top of a hill. It is more of a mountain when I am running up it. (I promise, I am getting somewhere with this.)  

I often go down to the rail trail along the river, which is a mostly flat, pretty place to run.  The last two days, I have been running from my house. This means that if I want to get any distance in, I need to go down the mountain.  And, of course, it means I need to get back to the top.  Now, I could stay at the top.  It's relatively flat on our street, and I can run a quarter of a mile down and back and stay at the top of the mountain. That's a lot of down and backs to get in four miles.  No thanks. It's easier, but not much fun. (Note: you can follow along my running escapades on Twitter @jfershee and Nike+.

IMG_8642
The Mon River Trail: A Mostly Flat, Pretty Place to Run

My usual route from my house takes my down the mountain, then back up the mountain, where I turn around and retrace my steps.  That means I am running up the steepest part of the run at mile 3.5.  It's not always my favorite part of the run, even if it is my most triumphant.  As I was slogging my way back up the mountain, my mind wandered and I caught myself thinking again, "It would have been a lot easier to just stay at the top."  And it is. It's true in running, and it's true in most everything else we do.  

IMG_8849
Pace over elevation - slow pace today.

It doesn't matter how you get to the top.  Once you're there, it's easier to stay there than it was to get there.  It may take a lot of work to get to the top. For most people, it does. But someone can just take you to the top, too. Once you're there, it's easier to stay there. And once you leave, it's hard to get back up. 

Knowing all of this is important.  And it is important to remember that not everyone has the same amount to climb to get to the top of whatever it is they are climbing.  I did not come from money, but I had everything I needed.  I am a straight, white male. The data show that starts you ahead of the game.  I went to good public schools.  I went to college. And law school.  This required a lot of work to move ahead, but the opportunity was there for me in a way it isn't for many.

It's easy to start thinking that everyone is starting from the same point.  And it's a lot easier to notice the people who are ahead of you on the way up. It's not that often that we look back, which can skew our perspective in unproductive ways.  

As teachers, it's important to recognize that we can be part of helping our students move up their mountain.  And they may not be starting from the same place we were. They may have further to go. Some may have less.  It's our job to help them get where they want go.  As a corollary, it's also important to remember that just because they might have farther to go, it's not our job to limit the mountains they can climb. To the contrary, it's our job to help them see that the sky truly is the limit. 

That's my take away for the day: as hard as it is to keep climbing to the top, don't ever think you're doing it alone.  Appreciate who helped you. Keep slogging. And when you get to the top, don't forget to see if you can help someone else up.   

May 24, 2016 in Joshua P. Fershee, Law School, Lawyering, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, May 18, 2016

Dear California: LLCs are Not Corporations. Or Are They?

California is the back on my short list for the state's inability to successfully differentiate between corporations and limited liability companies (LLCs).  Last week, an "unpublished/noncitable" decision that was published on Westlaw provided a good example.

The opinion states: 

A corporation—including a limited liability corporation—may be served by effecting service on its agent for service of process. (Code Civ. Proc., § 416.10, subd. (a); see also Corp.Code, § 17701.16, subd. (a) [allowing service on limited liability corporations under Code Civ. Proc., § 413.10 et seq.].)7
*12 One of the ways a limited liability corporation can be served is by substituted service. (1 Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) ¶ 4:172, p. 4–26.) This requires that a copy of the summons and complaint be left at the office of the person to be served (or, in some cases, at the mailing address of the person to be served), in the presence of a person who is apparently in charge, “and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.20, subd. (a).)
City of Fontana v. Bani, LLC, No. E062018, 2016 WL 2864971, at *11-12 (Cal. Ct. App. May 12, 2016).

No, no, no.  First, even in California, an LLC is a "limited liability company." It says so right in the act. Cal. Corp. Code § 17701.01 (West) ("This title may be cited as the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act.").

And, yet, I have to admit, if you note the cite to the LLC act, California lawmakers have made this less clear than in other states. Yes, that's right. In California, the LLC Act is part of the California Corporations Code.  Cal. Corp. Code §§ 17701.16 - 17713.13 (West).  For that matter, so are partnerships, under Title 2.  Sigh.   

Would it be so terrible if the Corporations Code were called what it is: the Business Entities Code? As currently structured, LLCs and partnerships are arguably types of corporations under California law, as the above cases suggests. One could argue the headings don't change the meaning or intent of the laws. See Cal. Corp. Code § 6 (West) ("Title, division, part, chapter, article, and section headings contained herein do not in any manner affect the scope, meaning, or intent of the provisions of this code.").  The problem with that is that the code text says otherwise: "This act shall be known as the Corporations Code." Cal. Corp. Code § 1 (West).  

To reinforce that notion, the Code Commission notes from the 2014 main volume explain: 

This code was listed in the appendices of Code Commission reports showing code classification as the “Corporations, Partnerships, and Associations Code.” The 14 syllables of that title appear to make it impractical, but no shorter phrase indicative of the full subject-scope has been found. Therefore, resort has been had to the rhetorical device of synecdoche, and the entire code designated by the name of longest part.

I admit I had to look up synecdoche to be sure I was on the right track, but the term supports, I think, my point that California is treating LLCs and partnerships as corporations (or some subset thereof).  See, for example, this explanation

Synecdoche is a literary device in which a part of something represents the whole or it may use a whole to represent a part.

Synecdoche may also use larger groups to refer to smaller groups or vice versa. It may also call a thing by the name of the material it is made of or it may refer to a thing in a container or packing by the name of that container or packing.

Still, even if it were accurate to says LLCs and partnerships are "types" of corporations under the California code, one thing is still clear: an LLC is a limited liability company, which is, at a minimum, a specific type of "limited liability corporation." 

I supposed I can see how "14 syllables" might be deemed "impractical," but not at the cost of imprecision.  The "Business Entities" -- or even just "Entities" or "Associations" -- Code would seem like a better, more accurate, option.  

Oh well.  At least the court cited the part of the California code for service of an LLC.  That much, they got right.  

May 18, 2016 in Corporate Personality, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Partnership, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 10, 2016

LLCs Still Aren't Corporations, And At Least Some of Us Seem to Care

I had a plan to write on something else today, but I got a note from Keith Bishop sharing his blog post, which he was right to think I would appreciated.  In his post, Bishop discusses a California case

The LLC May Well Be The Platypus Of Business Organizations

What happens to the attorney-client privilege when a corporation dissolves?  Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim recently answered that question in Virtue Global Holdings Ltd. v. Rearden LLC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53076 (N.D. Cal. April 5, 2016):

When a corporation ceases to exist, “the corporate powers, rights and privileges of the corporation shall cease.” Cal. Corp. Code §1905(b). In that case, no entity holds the attorney-client privilege for Original MO2. City of Rialto, 492 F.Supp.2d at 1197 (“a dissolved corporation is not entitled to assert the attorney-client privilege”).

I am somewhat baffled by the ruling because the entity asserting the privilege in the case was not a corporation at all (Section 1905 is in the General Corporation Law).  The entity attempting to claim the privilege was, according to the information provided in the opinion, indubitably a California limited liability company.  Thus, the court should be citing the California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, not the General Corporation Law.

California, like many others states, seems to make the error relatively often.

Today, though, I will pick on the news.  A Google News search of "limited liability corporation" for the past twenty-four hours provides a few such instances.  (Note for new readers, an LLC is a "limited liability company," not corporation.) 

I'll highlight two.  According to one news outlet, the University of Illinois just extended a $2 million line of credit to an entity do research in Singapore.

To set up shop in another country, the university created a limited liability corporation, Singapore Research LLC. The LLC then established a private entity in Singapore which allows the center to compete legally for government grants.

Oops. Next, another news outlet reports:

A Nevada energy company said it wants to purchase an unfinished nuclear power plant from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and use the site in northeast Alabama to produce electricity with new technology.

Michael Dooley, managing partner of Phoenix Energy of Nevada, told the Associated Press his company wants to use the mothballed Bellefonte Nuclear Plant site as the base for a new, non-nuclear generation method.

. . . 

Phoenix Energy of Nevada describes itself as a privately-held Nevada limited liability corporation, incorporated in October 2010, Kallanish Energy learns.

This time, though, the report is right.  Phoenix Energy of Nevada, LLC (PENV) says on its web page it "is a Veteran owned closely and privately held viable early stage mid-market Nevada State Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) Small Business Company founded and incorporated in October 2010." Nope. It's an LLC.   

I know I complain about this a lot, but there is value in getting it right. Reporters should get it right, and those who own the entity really should get it right.  One of these days some court will find that an LLC didn't follow the corporate formalities required of a "limited liability corporation" and they won't even know to object.  

I concede when one writes things like "company" and "corporation" a lot, a mistake may occur from time to time, especially when the distinction is not, on its face, crucial. My concern is less that people make mistakes. It's more that they don't know they are making one.  That's where I come in.  

On the plus side, I am about halfway through grading my Business Organizations exams, and not one person has called an LLC a corporation. 

May 10, 2016 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, May 4, 2016

Entities Should Ask About Politics and Religion: Round Two

In follow up to my post yesterday, my trusted and valued co-blogger Joan Heminway asked a good question (as usual) based one of my comments.  My response became long enough that I thought it warranted a follow-up post (and it needed formatting).  Joan commented: 

you say: "there should be no problem if, for example, Delaware corporate law did not allow a for-profit entity to exercise religion for the sole sake of religion. I think that is the case right now: that’s not a proper corporate purpose under my read of existing law." Are you implying that a corporate purpose of that kind for a for-profit corporation organized in Delaware would be unlawful? Can you explain?

My response: I am suggesting exactly that, though I concede one might need a complaining shareholder first. My read of eBay, and Chief Justice Strine’s musing on the subject, suggest that an entity that is run for purposes of religion (not shareholder wealth maximization) first and foremost, is an improper use of the Delaware corporate form. (“I simply indicate that the corporate law requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders.”)  Chancellor Chandler explained in eBay:

The corporate form in which craigslist operates, however, is not an appropriate vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment.

I think this definition of philanthropic easily includes religious ends (or should).

Chancellor Chandler continued:

Jim and Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction whereby eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.

I don’t see how this should play any differently if it applied to religion. Consider, for example, this possible spin:

Jane and Carrie opted to form Religion, Inc., as a for-profit Delaware corporation and voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from BigCo as part of a transaction whereby BigCo became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the Religion directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.

Further to the point, Chancellor Chandler added:

I cannot accept as valid . . .  a corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders—no matter whether those stockholders are individuals of modest means or a corporate titan of online commerce.

Thus, a for-profit business can be religious in nature—e.g., make religious books or products or sponsor religious seminars—but as a Delaware corporation, the purpose of the entity must be to “promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”

This is the potential problem with the Hobby Lobby case as to Delaware lawThere, the companies had a lot to lose:

If they and their companies refuse to provide contraceptive coverage, they face severe economic consequences: about $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby, $33 million per year for Conestoga, and $15 million per year for Mardel. And if they drop coverage altogether, they could face penalties of roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby, $1.8 million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel.

These losses were justified in that case as being necessary to exercise religion, and not to further a corporate purpose. Of course, they had to make that claim, because otherwise they couldn’t get the benefit of RFRA, which requires demonstrating “an honest conviction,” which could be problematic if the reason was couched in business terms, and not religious ones. 

Incidentally, I think the business judgment rule should probably protect this decision, anyway, but I don’t know that Delaware law would support that view. In fact, it shouldn't based in recent case law, and I think plainly eBay says no on that one. The Supreme Court says RFRA protects the right to pursue religious ends. It doesn't mean Delaware law does.  (Note: Hobby Lobby is not a Delaware entity, so the rules are admittedly different.) 

Thus, my fix seek to balance these competing possible outcomes. Tell shareholders your plan, and they can’t question it later, even if that plan costs the company $475 million in losses. Where the law has evolved, I don't think it's fair to suggest it was part of the bargain for all companies, thought maybe investors in Hobby Lobby did know.  But it doesn't matter.  I thought craigslist’s long-standing business plan was sufficient notice, too. Chancellor Chandler disagreed.

May 4, 2016 in Corporate Governance, Corporations, Delaware, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Management, Shareholders | Permalink | Comments (10)

Tuesday, May 3, 2016

Entities Should Ask Before Exercising Citizens United and Hobby Lobby Rights

A recent Vanity Fair article discussing Citizens United is making the rounds. (I saw it on Facebook!)  The article notes:  

It had already been established, in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), that anyone has a First Amendment right to spend his or her own money advancing his or her own cause, including a candidacy for political office. Citizens United extended this right to legally created “persons” such as corporations and unions.

I have been giving some more thought to whole “personhood” discussion of late, and my thoughts have taken me back to both Hobby Lobby and Citizens United. What follows is a long blog post that pulls together my thoughts on these two cases in an admittedly not well developed way.  But it's a start (though I really should be grading).  

Continue reading

May 3, 2016 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Legislation, LLCs, Religion, Shareholders, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (9)

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

Top Five Best Beers "Created" By Law

Beer is good.  It's an opinion based on serious research.  A lot of beer laws are not good.  They often restrict beer distribution, limits sales, and generally make it harder for us to access good beverages.  

There have been some benefits of these restrictions.  The main one, probably, is that it provided the storyline for Smokey and The Bandit: 

Big Enos (Pat McCormick) wants to drink Coors at a truck show, but in 1977 it was illegal to sell Coors east of the Mississippi River without a permit. Truck driver Bo "Bandit" Darville (Burt Reynolds) agrees to pick up the beer in Texas and drive it to Georgia within 28 hours. When Bo picks up hitchhiker Carrie (Sally Field), he attracts the attention of Sheriff Buford T. Justice (Jackie Gleason). Angry that Carrie will not marry his son, Justice embarks on a high-speed chase after Bandit.

(Note that IMDB's description -- "The Bandit is hired on to run a tractor trailer full of beer over county lines in hot pursuit by a pesky sheriff." -- seems to have confused the film with the Dukes of Hazzard.  Crossing state, not county, lines was the issue and Rosco P. Coltrane was not part of the Bandit films.  I digress.)  

In my home state of West Virginia, getting craft beer, until 2009, was hard. Beer with more than 6% ABV could not be sold in the state. All beer in the state is "non-intoxicating beer" but the definition was raised from 6% so that it now includes (and allows) all malt-based beverages between 0.5% and 12% ABV.  

Continue reading

April 26, 2016 in Comparative Law, Entrepreneurship, Joshua P. Fershee, Law and Economics, Legislation, Licensing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

Veil Piercing or Alter Ego Doctrine in a Criminal Suit? No Thanks.

A recent Illinois case uniquely applied the alter ego doctrine in the context of a criminal case.  See People v. Abrams, 47 N.E.3d 295, ¶¶ 57-61, 399 Ill. Dec. 790 (2015) ( slip op. PDF here ).  In my view, not quite right, either.

In the case, the defendant (Abrams) stole $1.87 million from the victim (Lev), which led to a restitution order for that amount and a twelve-year prison sentence for Abrams.  The conviction was for a Class 1 felony, for the the theft of property exceeding $500,000.  Id.¶ 23 (citing 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/16-1(a(2) (West 2012)).  The statute provides, "Theft of property exceeding $500,000 and not exceeding $1,000,000 in value is a Class 1 non-probationable felony." 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/16-1(b)(6.2). 

On appeal, the defendant argued the indictment was wrong in that it stated the money was stolen from Lev, when most of the money actually belonged to Lev's company, The Fred Lev Company (presumably a corporation, but that is not stated expressly).   Abrams claimed: 

the State did not prove he obtained “unauthorized control” of more than $500,000 of Lev’s property. Abrams recognizes the evidence presented at trial established that over $1.8 million was taken. Abrams contests the finding that the entire amount was taken from Lev and not The Fred Lev Company. 

Abrams, 47 N.E.3d 295 ¶ 57.  The court countered: "This is a distinction without a difference. Two separate doctrines of law guide our decision." Id. Although I think the court is probably right on the outcome, one of the rationales is wrongly explained.

The court's first assertion is as follows: 

First, the alter ego doctrine of corporate law was developed for and has been traditionally used by third persons injured due to their reliance on the existence of a distinct corporate entity. In re Rehabilitation of Centaur Insurance Co., 158 Ill. 2d 166, 173 (1994). “The doctrine fastens liability on the individual or entity that uses a corporation merely as an instrumentality to conduct that person’s or entity’s business.” Peetoom v. Swanson, 334 Ill. App. 3d 523, 527 (2002). In the context of “piercing the corporate veil,” an alter ego analysis starts with examining the factors which reveal how the corporation operates and the particular party’s relationship to that operation. A.G. Cullen Construction, Inc. v. Burnham Partners, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 122538, ¶ 43. Generally, did the corporation function simply as a facade for the dominant shareholder? Id. Here, without question, the corporate entity, The Fred Lev Company, served as the alter ego or business conduit of Lev, and Abrams’ own testimony confirmed it. 

Id.¶ 58. This is an overreach, as far as I am concerned, and I don't like the ease with which the court uses veil piercing without a detailed analysis. I believe that veil piercing, if it is to be used, should have some consistency, though I know that's now how it tends to work (i.e., without consistency).  Here, would the court have pierced the veil if this were a creditor bringing suit directly against Lev because his corporation couldn't satisfy a judgment? I think it would be wrong to do so on similar facts, so I think it is careless to apply the alter ego doctrine in this manner here.  

The court continues:

Second, the indictments sufficiently apprised Abrams of the charges against him. See People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 219-20 (2005) (any variance was neither material nor prejudicial to defendant). We do not believe that the defendant was in any way prejudiced by the indictments at issue. 

Id.¶ 59. I totally and completely buy this.  And, in addition, the court noted:

Even more convincing is that in opening statements to the jury, defense counsel told the jury that the checking accounts “were not used solely for [Lev’s and Abrams’] corporate work. They didn’t separate the corporation from their personal lives and personal expenses. *** They were using everything that went into that corporate account and writing checks on it for their own personal private, for their own person use. There was a commingling.” Additionally, defense counsel referred to “Fred Lev and Company” as being both Abrams and Lev. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the company was “a small-time operation” with “one corporate book” that both Lev and Abrams used as “their own personal piggybank.” 

Id.¶ 60.  In the trial, it was determined that the statutory felony monetary amount threshold was met.  And the defendant admitted that he considered the funds to be Lev's and that he (the defendant) disregarded the entity.  I see no notice problem as to the defendant, and I have no concern that a jury couldn't understand whether the theft occurred in the amount claimed. I can see an argument, perhaps, that the prosecution should still get it right as to whom the money actually belonged, but it seems to me correct to say the crime was properly analyzed and assessed as to the criminal elements, so the claim is harmless error in this instance. Lev would have been the one to assert the claim for the Company, so it is hard to see how Abrams was harmed. 

I will maintain, though, that the veil piercing rationale is unnecessary and overstated. (I might be comfortable if they used the analogy to explain harmless error, but the way it was done is too much for me.)  Furthermore, as to the judgment for restitution to Lev, it is wrong. That money (or some portion of it) belongs to The Fred Lev Company.  Suppose there are creditors out there who have gone unpaid.  Or they are unpaid down the road.  At a minimum, the funds stolen from the company should go back through the company so it could be clear what funds were there and should have been available. Thus, as to the charges, I think the court probably got it right.  But as to respecting the entity (and protecting creditors now, and in the future), this could have been handled better. 

H/T Prof. Gary Rosin

April 19, 2016 in Business Associations, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Business Judgment Rule Protected?

Short post today:  I spent Business Organizations today whining that Benefit Corporations dilute the business judgment rule for regular corporations.  I do this, in part, because I hate it, but I also do it because students can see (I think) how the concept of the business judgment rule works in practice. 

I left class to find that Coca-Cola is providing paid leave for new fathers, not just new mothers.  I fully support this, and think it is both wise and moral.  The report notes: 

Coke said one motivation is to help it recruit and retain millennials.

This makes total sense to me. And I think it good business.  But I still hope the reason to say this is that it is (in the Board's judgment) good business, and not because the board thinks they otherwise need to justify such a decision. 

April 12, 2016 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Law and Economics | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, April 5, 2016

Six Years and $20B Later: Revisiting BP and the Role of Government

AP reported yesterday:

NEW ORLEANS (AP) — A federal judge in New Orleans granted final approval Monday to an estimated $20 billion settlement over the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, resolving years of litigation over the worst offshore spill in the nation's history.

The settlement, first announced in July, includes $5.5 billion in civil Clean Water Act penalties and billions more to cover environmental damage and other claims by the five Gulf states and local governments. The money is to be paid out over roughly 16 years. The U.S. Justice Department has estimated that the settlement will cost the oil giant as much as $20.8 billion, the largest environmental settlement in U.S. history as well as the largest-ever civil settlement with a single entity.

The settlement with the government (private claims remain) reminds me of a post I made almost six years ago, where I argued that it was not the federal government's job to avoid the harm of such an oil spill, and it was neither advisable nor reasonable to expect that the government could handle such an event.  I explained my thinking

Just imagine what would have happened six months [before the oil spill] if the President had suggested a new agency that would be trained and funded to clean up disasters like this, granted the authority to take over an oil well at the first sign of trouble, and this agency would be funded by a large tax on oil companies. You can be sure that the response would have been that the government shouldn’t be in this business because the oil companies are better trained, better prepared, and better able to respond to such problems. I guarantee it.

Yes, perhaps the federal government could have been swifter than it has been, especially with regard to protecting the coast. However, in this situation, President Obama’s primary mistake was likely listening to BP when they said they could, and would, handle the problem. I find it curious that many of the same people who often argue that government should stay out of the way of big businesses now want to lay blame at the feet of a president who did just that.

In this political era where candidates suggest that the government should be in business of building big walls (funded, and perhaps also built, by other governments) and free college tuition, I think it's worth taking another close look at what we really should expect of government.  (For the record, of the two ideas proposed above, I hate the first idea, and I am skeptical of the second. I appreciate the sentiment behind the free college tuition idea, but highly question the wisdom or feasibility in practice, even if I would prefer that someone else pay my law school loans.) 

The reality is that, where we allow highly specialized industrial activity, we cannot ensure there will be no harm.  We can try create protections, and we can enact penalties for failures to follow the rules and remediate harm. This is not to say everything was done correctly leading up to the Deepwater Horizon spill.  There were significant regulatory failures to accompany BP's failures. But when we look for solutions, we still need to be realistic about what role the government can and should take. About one thing I am confident: it is still not a good use of government funding to put a fleet of government-funded, oil-well plugging submarines at the ready. 

April 5, 2016 in Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee, Legislation, Shareholders | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Wyoming Cleans Up Veil Piercing in LLC Act

Wyoming has added two new sections to its Code Section 17-29-304, which is related to veil piercing of a Wyoming LLC.  The additions are a response of a court decision from last year, Green Hunter Energy, Inc. v. Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc., No. S-14-0036, 2014 WL 5794332 (Wyoming Nov. 7, 2014), which is summarized nicely here. The first added section provides:
(c) for purposes of imposing liability on any member or manager of a limited liability company for the debts, obligations or other liabilities of the company, a court shall consider only the following factors no one (1) of which, except fraud, is sufficient to impose liability:
 
(i)         Fraud;
(ii)        Inadequate capitalization;
(iii)       Failure to observe company formalities as required by law; and
(iv)       Intermingling of assets, business operations and finances of the company and the members to such an extent that there is no distinction between them. 
Although some might view this as a significant change to the veil piercing of a Wyoming LLC, this largely confirms and clarifies the law prior to GreenHunter.  The rule from that case was set forth as follows: 
The veil of a limited liability company may be pierced under exceptional circumstances when: (1) the limited liability company is not only owned, influenced and governed by its members, but the required separateness has ceased to exist due to misuse of the limited liability company; and (2) the facts are such that an adherence to the fiction of its separate existence would, under the particular circumstances, lead to injustice, fundamental unfairness, or inequity.
GreenHunter Energy, Inc. v. W. Ecosystems Tech., Inc., 2014 WY 144, ¶ 27, 337 P.3d 454, 462 (Wyo. 2014).
 
The GreenHunter court provided the above rule, then stated that several factors could be considered in assessing whether both prongs of the test were met.  These factors included fraud, inadequate capitalization, and intermingling of assets.  "No single category, except fraud, alone justifies a decision to disregard the veil of limited liability; rather, there must be some combination of them, and of course an injustice or unfairness must always be proven." GreenHunter Energy, 2014 WY 144, ¶ 34, 337 P.3d at 464.  
 
This amendment, in fact, adds another factor courts can consider in LLC veil piercing: "Failure to observe company formalities as required by law." As such, this law clarifies the state LLC law, which is an improvement over the prior iteration, in my view. I do have a concern that some courts might miss that the need for "company formalities" as a potential factor for veil piercing is limited only to the formalities that are "required by law," which also means very few such formalities. "Company formalities" are not "corporate formalities," and I hope courts remember this. 
 
In addition, the Wyoming legislature added:   
(d)  In any analysis conducted under subsection (c) of this section, a court shall not consider factors intrinsic to the character and operation of a limited liability company, whether a single or multiple member limited liability company.  Factors intrinsic to the character and operation of a limited liability company include but are not limited to:
 
(i)         The ability to elect treatment as a disregarded or pass-through entity for tax purposes; 
(ii)        Flexible operation or organization including the failure to observe any particular formality relating to the exercise of the company’s powers or management of its activities;
(iii)       The exercise of ownership, influence and governance by a member or manager;
(iv)       The protection of members’ and managers’ personal assets from the obligations and acts of the limited liability company.
This section is, to me, spot on.  GreenHunter did not disabuse the notion of using tax classification as a factor in veil piercing analysis, and that was wrong.  Tax status is irrelevant to limited liability (a general partnership is a pass-through entity) and using any factors of an LLC acting like an LLC is inherently flawed. 
 
Overall, if the state is going to allow veil piercing of LLCs, then I support a more clear statute. This is an improvement over the original statute, which did not include veil piercing, but Wyoming courts allowed it anyway. Still, the better read on GreenHunter, is not really veil piercing, it would have been some version of enterprise liability, though I know some people think it has to be veil piercing when the entities in questions are vertically related, and reserve enterprise liability for horizontal relationships.  I don't agree, but that's for another post. 
 

March 29, 2016 in Joshua P. Fershee, Legislation, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, March 22, 2016

Top Five LLC Mistakes of March

March has provided a slate of mistakes as to entity form, focusing (as it almost always does) on limited liability companies (LLCs) and various outlets calling such entities "corporations."  These are not in any particular order, but lists are neat. Enjoy! 

(1 ) Politifact Checks Trump Facts, Forgets to Check Entity Law Facts

In an article on Politifact.com, Donald Trump incorrectly says Virginia winery is the largest on East Coast, which determines that Trump's claims about the size of a winery that his son runs to be false and notes some statements are incorrect. Ironically, the article also claims: 

A legal disclaimer on the winery website says the GOP presidential candidate doesn’t own the winery. The venture is a limited liability corporation, and its owners are not a matter of public record.

Wrong. The winery site says, "Trump Winery is a registered trade name of Eric Trump Wine Manufacturing LLC, which is not owned, managed or affiliated with Donald J. Trump, The Trump Organization or any of their affiliates."  An LLC is still not a corporation. 

(2) Big Bang Theory: Big Brains Don't Know Entity Law

I don't watch the Big Bang Theory, but my colleague at Valparaiso University, Professor Rebecca J. Huss, is a reader of this blog who also cares about precise language with regard to LLCs alerted me to this one.  The story line of the March 10 show (the show can be found here) related to a the creation of a partnership agreement for some of the characters. One thing that is realistic is that the folks think it's a good idea to form an entity and draft contract language without a lawyer.  One character says he has some concerns about the partnership, and another replies with this "joke": "Are you suggesting a limited liability corporation, because I did not LLC that coming." (The offending segment is roughly 14 minutes into the show.) (This was also covered at Kentucky Business Entity Law Blog, here, which noted, "Ughhhh.   LLC ≠ limited liability corporation.  Rather, LLC = limited liability company.") 

(3) Ghost LLCs Masquerading as Corporations

The Washington Post last week ran a story, How ‘ghost corporations’ are funding the 2016 election. The article discusses how entities can be used to shield those backing political candidates. The article states: 

Advocates for stronger campaign-finance enforcement fear there will be even more pop-up limited liability corporations (LLCs) funneling money into independent groups, making it difficult to discern the identities of wealthy players seeking to influence this year’s presidential and congressional contests.

. . . .

Many corporate givers this cycle are well-established hedge funds, energy companies and real estate firms. But a significant share of the money is coming from newly formed LLCs with cryptic names that offer few clues about their backers.

That LLC definition is wrong, and LLC giving is not "corporate" giving. Perhaps political funding via opaque entities is a problem, but we should try to get our entities right.  There may be problems (and solutions) unique to one entity form or another, so this could be more than semantic.  

 

(4) Pass-Through Tax Law Isn't Really About Corporations (mostly)

The Topeka Capital-Journal Editorial Board wrote on March 20: LLC loophole needs plugging: Even some small business owners think the tax exemption should be eliminated.  The editorial is related to a 2012 Kansas law, HB 2117, which eliminated taxes on pass-though entities like LLCs, S corps, partnerships, farms, and sole proprietorships. (So, I admit, S corps are corporation, but they are essentially partnerships for federal tax purposes.)  Even though I agree with some their concerns, the board makes a couple mistakes here when they assert that the bill "was simply an unconditional gift from the state for anyone who has created an entity called a limited liability corporation (LLC)."

First, it assumes that just LLCs get the benefit, which is not true. All pass-though entities benefit.  Second, of course, the "limited liability corporation" is a corporation, not an LLC, and the corporation (other than one chosen to be an S corp) does not get the benefit of the law.  

(5) Court Gets Entity Right, Regulations Not Quite

I'm not one to leave the courts out of this.  Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., of the United States District Court, Northern Illinois has an incredible resume.  A member of Phi Beta Kappa and a Rhodes Scholar, his credentials are impressive.  In a recent decision, though, his opinion refers to a defendant LLC correctly, but then goes on to say that Treasury Regulations are silent on treatment of "limited liability corporations." Alas, that's not accurate.  Here's the passage: 

It is undisputed that, as of the date of Anderson Bros.' withdrawal from the fund, Anderson Bros. (an Illinois corporation) was 100% owned by Anderson. Anderson therefore had a “controlling interest” in Anderson Bros. 29 U.S.C. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2)(A). At the same time, Defendant (an Illinois limited liability company) was also solely owned by Anderson. Section 1.414(c)-2 of the Treasury Regulations does not address specifically the treatment of limited liability corporations, and the Board does not address this issue in its brief. According to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), “an LLC with only one member is treated as an entity disregarded as separate from its owner for income tax purposes * * *, unless it files Form 8832 and affirmatively elects to be treated as a corporation.” IRS, Single Member Limited Liability Companies, https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Single-Member-Limited-Liability-Companies (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).

Bd. of Trustees of the Auto. Mechanics' Local No. 701 Union & Inustry Pension Fund v. 6516 Ogden Ave., LLC, No. 14-CV-3531, 2016 WL 1043422, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 2016) (emphasis added).

 

March 22, 2016 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Partnership, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, March 15, 2016

Why Not Have Freedom of Strategic Contracting in LLC Formation?

In my Energy Business: Law & Strategy course, I use Larry A. DiMatteo's article, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 727 (2010).  I have been using the article in the class since 2012 (this is the third time I have taught it), and I think it does a great job of providing a theoretical backdrop for practical application.  I teach the article in combination with a one-sided proposed Memorandum of Understanding to help students think about the contracting process and and the long-term implications of what might seem like a small-scale negotiation. I highly recommend the piece.  

In reading the article this time around, though, I was struck by how differently the piece treats limited liability companies (LLCs) and corporations and the way concerns about opportunistic behavior are raised in the context of the latter.   In one portion of the article, DiMatteo notes: 

Corporate strategy that fails to take account of the strategic use of law is likely to waste opportunities for competitive advantages. A corporate legal strategy can be used to gain competitive advantages both internally and externally.

I wholeheartedly agree, and this is part of the reason I teach my course.  Although I don't think this is true of just "corporate" strategy, because the same applies to other entities, such as educational institutions, environmental organizations, LLCs, and even governments.  Regular readers will not be surprised that I would choose to start the sentence "entity strategy" instead of "corporate strategy, " but his point is still well taken.  

Later in the piece, Prof. DiMatteo takes the following position with regard to LLCs: 

The freedom of contract paradigm that underlies LLCs allows for broad flexibility in strategically drafting the operating agreement. I will make a distinction here between proper and improper strategic drafting, because a distinction based on legality is insufficient. That is, improper terms may be perfectly legal under some states’ LLC statutes. The argument here is that the freedom of contract construct can lead to contractual abuse, albeit a legally sanctioned abuse. For example, a combination of clauses could be inserted into the operating agreement that strips nonmanager members of all power and protections, such as removal of fiduciary duties relating to the managing member, an indemnification clause to protect the managing member from liability for malfeasance, and a clause providing that the nonmember managers have no right to withdraw or to seek dissolution. These types of provisions may be legal under some statutory schemes, but strict enforcement of these clauses by the managing member would be abusive.

I fail to see why strategic use of law in this context is more problematic than the strategic use of law in other contexts. I do understand and validate concerns about on-going expectations of fiduciary protections related to entities, and that is why, as I have suggested previously, that the lack of fiduciary duties and post-formation changes to fiduciary duties (especially loyalty) should include disclosure and perhaps other structural protections.  (I am less concerned about those forming the entity agreeing to limit or eliminate fiduciary duties because they are agreeing to the option at formation when they can object or walk away.) Still, I don't see any reason that freedom of contract in LLCs is fundamentally different from freedom of contract in any other setting, at least as along as you account for a potential knowledge gap about fiduciary duties. In contrast, I liked how Larry Ribstein framed the question of possible promoter liability for LLCs in New York, where he argued that one could make a complaint that "alleged a misrepresentation which would be actionable without implying a fiduciary duty."

I do agree with Prof. DiMatteo when he says, "In the end, contracts can be a strategic tool in obtaining a competitive advantage, or they can be a tool to support collaboration by minimizing the opportunities for advantage taking." Freedom of contract in LLC formation embraces both of these concepts, too.  I just think that those forming the entity should be the ones to determine which path they will take.  

March 15, 2016 in Corporations, Delaware, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Partnership, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, March 9, 2016

Five "Best" Songs About Business (Law Edition)

It has been a crazy busy couple of weeks, and one thing I rely on the keep sane (or sane-ish) is music. This morning I was listening to the most recent Public Enemy album, Man Plans God Laughs, which includes a song called "Corplantationopoly."  (The album is solid, and while it will never top Nation of Millions or Fear of a Black Planet, Chuck D is still powerful to hear.)  This got me to thinking about songs that reference business as part of their lyrics and/or theme.

With the availability of the internet, of course several such lists have already been compiled. Here is a sampling:

March 9, 2016 in Joshua P. Fershee, Law School, Lawyering, Music | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, March 2, 2016

A Modern Business Tragedy: Chesapeake Energy and Aubrey McClendon

I have long followed the trials and tribulations of Chesapeake Energy and founder Aubrey McClendon, and I had been planning to write about yesterday's indictment of McClendon for bid rigging in a couple weeks, after I gathered more information.  About an hour ago, though, reports broke that former Chesapeake CEO Aubrey McClendon died today.  According to CNBC:

Aubrey McClendon, a founder and former chief executive of Chesapeake Energy, died in a single-car crash Wednesday at age 56, a day after he was charged with conspiring to rig bids for oil and natural gas leases.

McClendon crashed into an embankment while traveling at a "high rate of speed" in Oklahoma City just after 9 a.m. Wednesday morning, said Capt. Paco Balderrama of the Oklahoma City Police Department. Flames engulfed McClendon's vehicle "immediately," and it was burnt so badly that police could not tell if he was wearing a seatbelt, he said.

Before going any further, my thoughts go out to his friends and family.  Regardless of how anything else comes together, their loss is real, and I feel badly for them.  

In years past, I have questioned how Chesapeake conducted some of their business, including their use of entities and their leasing practices in Michigan and whether loan practices McClendon used personally were at odds with his fiduciary duties to Chesapeake.  This round of bid rigging allegations were new to me (a Michigan case settled last year), and I was researching this set of allegations to see what I thought about this case.  I remain curious whether it was a case of "singling him out" unfairly, as he claimed, or were there some strong evidence of more.  

And even if he were being singled out, was it because the practice didn't occur or is it just how everyone did business?  That question remains an open one, even if the case against McClendon is now closed.  I hope to learn more in the coming weeks.   

As to the impact on his former company, CNBC notes
Chesapeake said Tuesday that it did not expect to face criminal prosecution or fines related to McClendon's charges. The company's stock, which was already substantially higher Wednesday, briefly added to gains following news of McClendon's death.
That's a cold reminder that the market (and the news coverage of the market) moves on quickly.  It's good that life continues on, of course, but sometimes reminders of that are still striking.  

March 2, 2016 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Litigation, White Collar Crime | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 25, 2016

On Describing The Limited Liability Partnership . . . .

Our Kentucky "brother," Tom Rutledge, sent me a link to a super blog post yesterday on Mortgage Grader Inc. v. Ward & Olivo, a limited liability partnership case currently before the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Tom's focus in his post was the limited liability aspect of the case, which is fascinating--and more than a bit unsettling for those practicing in jurisdictions like New Jersey and Kentucky that require law firms organizing limited liability partnerships to maintain malpractice insurance.  The question before the court: whether, in the absence of an express provision in the partnership statute, the failure of a law firm organized as a limited liability partnership to maintain required malpractice insurance results in the loss of the partnership's limited liability status.  The trial court ruled that the lapse of malpractice insurance caused a loss of limited liability status; the appeals court reversed.

But Tom also mentions another aspect of the case in his post that I want to call out here.  Specifically, he notes references in the appellate court opinion to the conversion of a partnership to a limited liability partnership.  Here's what he says on that point:

One potentially disturbing aspect of the language used by the Court of Appeals and in the oral argument is the notion that the loss of LLP status and the treatment of the firm as a general partnership is some sort of conversion. But it isn’t. An LLP is a general partnership that has elected into a special status – it is still a general partnership but for the rule of partner limited liability. . . .

This comment reminded me of co-blogger Josh Fershee's super-helpful obsession (maybe too strong a word?) with "limited liability corporation" as an incorrect judicial (and other) descriptor of the limited liability company business form.  (See, e.g., his December 2015 post here.)  And far be it from me to disagree with either of these guys in making their respective points about these labeling inaccuracies!  

As a separate point, I want to call out the fact that this area of partnership law can be important both for bar examinations (thinking of all those folks suffering through that test this week . . .) and IRL.  In fact, I was asked a question recently about the Tennessee provision on limited liability elections by a BARBRI student.  (Little-known fact: I teach the Tennessee BARBRI segments on agency, unincorporated entities, and personal property.)  The student's question did not inappropriately refer to a conversion of a partnership into a limited liability partnership, but it did point out several differences in Tennessee law in this area that I want to mention.

Continue reading

February 25, 2016 in Business Associations, Joan Heminway, Joshua P. Fershee, Partnership, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, February 19, 2016

Comin' Back Atcha, Josh, on Partnerships and the Requirement of a Contract

I love your most recent post, Josh, and have been truly enjoying the ensuing commentary/conversation. I took on the “is it a contract?” issue in the LLC context because of questions similar to those raised in your post and in the comments it generated. I admit that the partnership issue on which you posted has fascinated me for quite some time. (I first encountered it when I undertook to teach Business Associations almost 16 years ago . . . .)

I have to push back on your analysis a bit, however.  In particular, here’s the part of your post with which I have some trouble:

There must be an agreement to associate for a purpose. To me, that requires consideration and assent.  If one has associated sufficiently under the law to make one both a partner and an agent of another (and thus liable for the partner), I don’t see how there is a lack of sufficient consideration or assent to form a contract.

Why does an association for a purpose require an agreement? To "associate" is to combine, connect, or link. The concept of an association builds from that: "connection or combination" or "an organization of people with a common purpose and having a formal structure."  It is clear in the comments to the RUPA that the drafters use "associate" and "association" in these common forms. In fact, the drafters refer to various forms of association created under other statutes, including “corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability companies.” See RUPA Section 202, cmt 2.  

It is the association--of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit--that creates an agency relationship and third-party liability for the obligations of the firm (unless the parties separately agree to those matters--which they may do independently or coincident with the formation of a partnership).  Those parts of the relationship are attributes of a partnership--aspects of the relationship that flow from the legal conclusion that a partnership has been formed. In other words, because of the formation of a partnership, the partners are agents of the partnership and are liable for partnership obligations.

Even assuming an agreement, however, it certainly is true that not every agreement is a contract.  Offer, acceptance, and (as you note) consideration would be required at common law to form a contract.  (Mohsen adds value to that analysis as well in his comment, even if he refers to the partnership agreement as opposed to partnership formation.)  Partners may and do, in fact, contract with each other under that legal meaning.  But I am not confident that a contract is required.  

Tell me what I am missing in all this . . . .

Parenthetically, I will note that I am extending my work on LLC operating agreements as contracts (referenced favorably at the outset in your post, for which I thank you) in future work, and I will be presenting the preliminary ideas on that at KCON XI next weekend in San Antonio.  It will be interesting to share some of these ideas with folks for whom contracts is their primary area of legal inquiry.  And since my associate dean is making noises about me teaching contracts sometime soon, I'd best get myself up to speed with the experts in any case . . . .

 

February 19, 2016 in Business Associations, Joan Heminway, Joshua P. Fershee, Partnership | Permalink | Comments (10)

Tuesday, February 16, 2016

The Contrarian Contractarian: Every Partnership is Formed by Contract

My co-blogger Joan Heminway a short while back wrote a great article, The Ties That Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding Commitments, 68 SMU L. Rev. 811 (2015). (symposium issue)

I often (and perhaps even usually) agree with Joan on issues of law and life, but there’s a spot in Joan’s article with which I disagree.  Joan says:

Although partnership law varies from state to state, as a general matter, partners are not expressly required to contract to form a partnership,88 and a partnership agreement is not defined in a manner that mandates adherence to the common law elements of a contract.89

  1. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, a partnership exists when two or more persons associate as co-owners to carry on a business for profit. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(6), 202(a) (1997).
  2. See, e.g., Sewing v. Bowman, 371 S.W.3d 321, 332 (Tex. App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act provides the following definition for a partnership agreement: “the agreement, whether written, oral, or implied, among the partners concerning the partnership, including amendments to the partnership agreement.” REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(7).

Joan has case law support, so at least in some jurisdictions, she’s right (as usual), but I think the opinion she relied on got it wrong.  That is, I disagree with the idea that "partners are not expressly required to contract to form a partnership” because I think the partnership definition — see footnote 88 above — satisfies (and must satisfy) the requisites for a contract. Unlike an LLC, partnerships can be formed by mere agreement of the parties, which is an agreement I think must rise to the level of a contract.

Partnership law is such that "the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership.”  § 202. Formation of Partnership., Unif. Partnership Act 1997 § 202. There must be an agreement to associate for a purpose. To me, that requires consideration and assent.  If one has associated sufficiently under the law to make one both a partner and an agent of another (and thus liable for the partner), I don’t see how there is a lack of sufficient consideration or assent to form a contract.  

Another Texas case, which the Sewing court decided not to apply, provided:

Clearly, an offer and its acceptance in strict compliance with the offer's terms are essential to the creation of a binding contract. American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 131 Tex. 457, 114 S.W.2d 1161, 1164 (1938); Smith v. Renz, 840 S.W.2d 702, 704 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). However, even if an offer and acceptance are not recorded on paper, dealings between parties may result in an implied contract where the facts show that the minds of the parties met on the terms of the contract without any legally expressed agreement. Smith, 840 S.W.2d at 704; City of Houston v. First City, 827 S.W.2d 462, 473 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied). Accordingly, the parties' conduct may convey an objective assent to the terms of an agreement, and whether their conduct evidences their agreement is a question to be resolved by the finder of fact. Estate of Townes v. Townes, 867 S.W.2d 414, 419 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, writ denied). If the finder of fact determines that one party reasonably drew the inference of a promise from the other party's conduct, then that promise will be given effect in law. E–Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hale, 883 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994, writ denied).

Ishin Speed Sport, Inc. v. Rutherford, 933 S.W.2d 343, 348 (Tex. App. 1996)

I see the formation of a partnership—the agreement to carry on a business as co-owners for profit—to be a higher level agreement than a contract (i.e., contract plus), not less than a contract.  We view partnership as a more significant connection between parties than an agency relationship, which does not require consideration. How would it be possible for me to agree with another person to carry on a business as a co-owner seeking profit, without meeting the minimal requirements contract formation? I simply can’t see it.  Once a court finds there is a partnership, the agreement that satisfied the partnership threshold carried reciprocal obligations that I must have agreed to, even if I did not knowingly agree at the time to all the obligations that then occur by operation of law because I made the agreement.  

A partnership is more than just a contract, and I might even be willing to concede that some of the obligations of a partnership under partnership law are outside or independent of contract law. But to me, if there is a partnership, somewhere, there is an underlying contract.  Thus, the question is not whether there is a contract where there is a partnership.  The question is what is the scope of the contract?

February 16, 2016 in Joshua P. Fershee, Partnership | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, February 9, 2016

Legislated Discrimination Is Terrible for Business

My home state in West Virginia is struggling.  The economy is struggling because two of the state's main industries -- coal and natural gas -- are facing falling production (coal) and low prices (gas). Severance taxes for the state account for approximately 13% of the budget, and both are down dramatically. Tax revenues for the state were down $9.8 million in January from the prior year and came up $11.5 million short of estimates.  For the year-to-date, the state collected $2.29 billion, which is $169.5 million below estimates. Oddly enough, state sales and income taxes for January both exceeded estimates, but not enough to offset other stagnation in the state.  

The state has long been known as a coal state, and that industry has dominated the legal and political landscape.  West Virginia has been criticized for having a legal system that is "anti-business," with the United States Chamber of Commerce finding stating that West Virginia is the 50th ranked state in terms of the fairness of its litigation. (See PDF here.) CNBC (with input from the National Association of Manufacturers) also ranked West Virginia last in terms of business competitiveness, so the starting point is not good.  

Now, the West Virginia legislature is considering the state's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which many (including me) see as about legalizing specific forms of discrimination, and not promoting or supporting religion.  And some religious groups agree.  As the Catholic Committee of Appalachia’s West Virginia Chapter explains: 

We appreciate the background of 1993 federal act with the same name, and the history leading up to it, with its pertinence to protecting Native American sacred lands and religious practices from governmental infringement. With the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that RFRA would only be applicable to federal actions, we can recognize, also, the value of an argument for versions of a law to be passed at the local level. However, the primary motivation behind West Virginia’s bill #4012, and others like it, seems not to be the protection of legitimate religious exercises, but securing the ability of religious groups to discriminate against marginalized populations on the basis of religious convictions.

Just as important for purposes of this post, many West Virginia businesses oppose the bill.  Local Embassy Suites and Marriott hotels representatives spoke out against the bill, and the Charleston (WV) Regional Chamber of Commerce and Generation West Virginia, along with several city mayors, have opposed the bill, as well.  They have good reason.  When the state of Indiana passed a similar bill, Indianapolis promptly lost as many as twelve conventions and estimates around $60 million.  Ouch. As one mayor said, West Virginia legislators need to "Get out of the way." 

Morgantown, home to my institution, was the state’s second city to pass an LGBT non-discrimination ordinance in February 2014. West Virginia University’s faculty senate also unanimously yesterday approved a resolution condemning the bill. And there was a chance to make clear the intent of the bill was not intended to be used as a way to discriminate against someone based sexual orientation through a proposed amendment making that clear. Unfortunately, the amendment was deemed “not germane.”

Beyond coal, natural gas, chemicals, and timber, tourism is one of our state's main industries. It's also a great one. From whitewater rafting to skiing to hiking, the state is a great place for outdoor activities.  Craft breweries and a few great local restaurants are helping make the state a destination.  Unfortunately, the debate about this bill, especially in the wake of the backlash in Indiana, is hurting the state's ability to make build up it's tourism industry by making many people feel unwelcome.  

It's really too bad as a local restaurant, Atomic Grill, made international news for how they responded to comments about their waitresses and has been lauded for their response to other intolerance in their restaurant.  

I don't like this bill because, to me, it's either a tautology or an attempt to discriminate through legislation.  But beyond that, it's stupid, terrible way to promote business in the state.  We spend enough time trying to get people to come visit -- and when people do, they almost always like it. It really is a great place in so many ways.  At a time when the entire state is looking at 4% budget cuts across the board -- when we need to be building bridges to broader audiences -- the state's legislature is screwing around with bills that have zero economic upside and reinforce stereotypes about the people of our state.   

Being pro-business means being pro-consumer, which really means being pro-people.  This bill is none of those.  We need to do better, and it's disappointing our time and our money are being wasted like this.  

February 9, 2016 in Current Affairs, Jobs, Joshua P. Fershee, Law and Economics, Religion | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, February 2, 2016

Embracing Freedom of Contract in the LLC: Linking the Lack of Duty of Loyalty to a Duty of Disclosure

I have been giving a lot of thought to the idea of waiving the duty of loyalty in LLCs in Delaware.  The more I think about it, the more I am okay with the concept of allowing members of an LLC to decide to do away with the duty of loyalty when they form the entity.  Delaware, of course, retains the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in any contract, and I think parties to a contract should be able to decide the terms of their deal.  

Still, I am sympathetic to those who are concerned about eliminating the duty of loyalty because it does seem rather awful, and yet, I am also a proponent of freedom of contract.  How to reconcile these things?  Well, I am now of the mind that perhaps we need to bring a partnership principle to LLCs to help.  In partnerships, the default rule is that changes to the partnership agreement or acts outside the ordinary course of business require a unanimous vote. See UPA § 18(h) & RUPA § 401(j).  I think changes to the duty of loyalty should have the same requirement, and perhaps that even the rule should be mandatory, not just default.  

At formation, then, those creating an LLC would be allowed to do whatever they want to set their fiduciary duties, up to and including eliminating the consequences for breaches of the duty of loyalty.  This is part of the bargain, and any member who does not agree to the terms need not become a member.  Any member who joins the LLC after formation is then on notice (perhaps even with an affirmative disclosure requirement) that the duty of loyalty has been modified or eliminated.  This is not especially concerning to me. 

What would concern me more is a change in the duty of loyalty after one becomes a member.  That is, if the majority of LLC members could later change the loyalty provision, then that seems problematic to me, as fiduciary duties are not just to protect the majority.  As such, it seems to me more proper that changes to the duty of loyalty, when a member does not have any say in that change, is what should be restricted. Like in changing a partnership agreement, if everyone agrees, then there is not a problem.  And if you accept the provision when you join, it is not a problem.  But you shouldn't have a fiduciary duty removed or modified after the fact without your consent.  

Because the duty of loyalty is a fixture that most people expect, I do see value in requiring (at least for some time) that there be clear disclosure of the applicable to duties to potential LLC members.  But at least for the moment, I am feeling the freedom of contract option on the duty of loyalty is quite reasonable.  

February 2, 2016 in Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, January 26, 2016

The Stock Market and Oil: What's in a Correlation?

The Wall Street Journal yesterday reported that oil and stocks are working together closer than they have in twenty-six years.

Oil and stock markets have moved in lockstep this year, a rare coupling that highlights fears about global economic growth.

As oil prices tumbled early in 2016, global equities recorded one of their worst-ever starts for a new year. On Monday, oil and stocks were lower again. The S&P 500 index was down 0.7% in midday New York trading, and Brent crude futures, the global benchmark, were down $1.37 a barrel, or 4.3%, to $30.81. That followed a joint rebound on Friday.

The correlation between the price of Brent and the S&P 500 stock index is at levels not seen in the past 26 years. January isn’t over yet, but over the past 20 trading days—an average month—the correlation is 0.97, higher than any calendar month since 1990 . . . .

And today, stocks rebounded with the 3.4% increased in the price of oil to $31.38 a barrel. And yeah, that's still low.   

The correlation may not be a strong as reports indicate, though.  Some reports suggest that the correlation is not nearly as close as it seems. As this analysis explains, "[e]ven if correlations between assets are trending higher that doesn’t mean that the outcomes have to be even remotely similar. While stocks are down around 8% this year, oil has fallen nearly 20%." 

There is some indication that oil and stocks now tend to correlate, even though for a long time, stocks and commodities seemed to operate independently. According to this 2012 study,

The changes in commodity price correlation and volatility have profound implications for a wide range of issues, from commodity producers’ hedging strategies and speculators’ investment strategies to many countries’ energy and food policies. We expect these effects to persist so long as index investment strategies remain popular among investors. 

It's hard to predict what this correlation can mean, or whether one is driving the other.  Certainly a spike in oil supply demand could cause an increase in oil prices, and that demand would like help support the stock market.  But oil prices could stay low, and we could still see the market go up if other indicators make investors happy.  

One correlation that it seems you can always count on: low oil prices means more car and truck sales.  And by that, it usually means SUV and truck sales.  

Sales of trucks and sport utility vehicles are rapidly outpacing sales of all other vehicle types in the U.S. as consumers ditch four-door sedans and flock to a seemingly endless selection of small, midsize and gargantuan SUVs. According to 2015 sales data released by the world’s top automakers on Tuesday, trucks and SUV sales dominated last year.

We'll see how long it lasts. As they say, the cure for low prices is low prices, and the cure for high prices is high prices.  For now oil and gas are low -- the market will fix that one way or another soon enough.   

 

January 26, 2016 in Joshua P. Fershee, Law and Economics | Permalink | Comments (0)