Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Summer "Work" Reading: Straight Man, by Richard Russo

A friend who is a member of a university faculty (non-law) some years ago recommended that I read Straight Man, by Richard Russo. I am forever thankful.  The book is a novel set in a small town in Pennsylvania and follows the trials and tribulations of an English-department faculty member at a college besieged by budget challenges, a dysfunctional department, and his own lack of motivation.   

The book is funny -- sometimes laugh-out-loud funny -- and for anyone on a faculty, I am willing to wager that, despite occasional absurdity, this faculty will feel like it could be yours.  The main character is sympathetic, to a point, but he is also part of the problem.  It is a fast read, and it's one I come back to every couple years.  Perhaps it is just a guilty pleasure, but the universality of the characters and the bit of hope that emerges are things I find to be comforting in some way. It may be that the book serves as a reminder that we're not alone in our craziness.  Everyone who has taught for a while knows a Hank, a Finny, a Gracie DuBois, Jacob Rose, a Billy Quigley.  

The book also a good reminder of traps we, as faculty (and administrators), can fall into, and hopefully, help us avoid them. If you need a break from research and heavy reading, I highly recommend you put this in the rotation. 

Here's the Amazon.com Review: 

First Jane Smiley came out of the comedy closet with Moo, a campus satire par excellence, and now Richard Russo has gotten in on the groves-of-academe game. Straight Man is hilarious sport, with a serious side. William Henry Devereaux Jr., is almost 50 and stuck forever as chair of English at West Central Pennsylvania University. It is April and fear of layoffs--even among the tenured--has reached mock-epic proportions; Hank has yet to receive his department budget and finds himself increasingly offering comments such as "Always understate necrophilia" to his writing students. Then there are his possible prostate problems and the prospect of his father's arrival. Devereaux Sr., "then and now, an academic opportunist," has always been a high-profile professor and a low-profile parent.

Though Hank tries to apply William of Occam's rational approach (choose simplicity) to each increasingly absurd situation, and even has a dog named after the philosopher, he does seem to cause most of his own enormous difficulties. Not least when he grabs a goose and threatens to off a duck (sic) a day until he gets his budget. The fact that he is also wearing a fake nose and glasses and doing so in front of a TV camera complicates matters even further. Hank tries to explain to one class that comedy and tragedy don't go together, but finds the argument "runs contrary to their experience. Indeed it may run contrary to my own." It runs decidedly against Richard Russo's approach in Straight Man, and the result is a hilarious and touching novel.

June 20, 2017 in Books, Joshua P. Fershee, Law School, Social Enterprise, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 13, 2017

My Favorite Business Law Cases, Round 1: Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien (Del. 1971)

I am such a fan of Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,  280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971), that I use the case in both Business Organizations and in Energy Law. The case does a great job of giving a basic overview of parent-subsidiary relationships, some of the basic fiduciary duties owed in such contexts, and it sets up the discussion of why companies use subsidiaries in the first place. 

On fiduciary duties and when the intrinsic (entire) fairness test applies: 

A parent does indeed owe a fiduciary duty to its subsidiary when there are parent-subsidiary dealings. However, this alone will not evoke the intrinsic fairness standard. This standard will be applied only when the fiduciary duty is accompanied by self-dealing — the situation when a parent is on both sides of a transaction with its subsidiary. Self-dealing occurs when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary

On what test to apply to parent-subsidiary dividends: 

We do not accept the argument that the intrinsic fairness test can never be applied to a dividend declaration by a dominated board, although a dividend declaration by a dominated board will not inevitably demand the application of the intrinsic fairness standard. Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 41 Del.Ch. 177, 190 A.2d 749 (Del.Supr. 1963). If such a dividend is in essence self-dealing by the parent, then the intrinsic fairness standard is the proper standard. For example, suppose a parent dominates a subsidiary and its board of directors. The subsidiary has outstanding two classes of stock, X and Y. Class X is owned by the parent and Class Y is owned by minority stockholders of the subsidiary. If the subsidiary, at the direction of the parent, declares a dividend on its Class X stock only, this might well be self-dealing by the parent. It would be receiving something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of and detrimental to its minority stockholders. This self-dealing, coupled with the parent's fiduciary duty, would make intrinsic fairness the proper standard by which to evaluate the dividend payments.

. . . . The dividends resulted in great sums of money being transferred from Sinven to Sinclair. However, a proportionate share of this money was received by the minority shareholders of Sinven. Sinclair received nothing from Sinven to the exclusion of its [722] minority stockholders. As such, these dividends were not self-dealing. We hold therefore that the Chancellor erred in applying the intrinsic fairness test as to these dividend payments. The business judgment standard should have been applied. 

On whether shareholder of one subsidiary should be allowed to participate in ventures pursued by other subsidiaries: 

The plaintiff proved no business opportunities which came to Sinven independently and which Sinclair either took to itself or denied to Sinven. As a matter of fact, with two minor exceptions which resulted in losses, all of Sinven's operations have been conducted in Venezuela, and Sinclair had a policy of exploiting its oil properties located in different countries by subsidiaries located in the particular countries.

It makes sense for companies, often, to use subsidiaries to keep certain businesses well organized and to protect assets for shareholder.  That is, I might only want to invest in a subsidiary doing business in Mexico because I trust that the assets there are secure.  I may not want to participate in work in Venezuela, which I might deemed riskier.  And it's not just shareholders who might feel that way.  Creditors, too, may view such investments very differently and may only be willing to participate in ventures where the risks can be more easily assessed. 

June 13, 2017 in Case Law, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Lawyering, Management, Venture Capital | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, June 6, 2017

GM Votes Show Value of Shareholder Proposals as a Process for Accountability

More than two years ago, I posted Shareholder Activists Can Add Value and Still Be Wrongwhere I explained my view on shareholder proposals: 

I have no problem with shareholders seeking to impose their will on the board of the companies in which they hold stock.  I don't see activist shareholder as an inherently bad thing.  I do, however, think  it's bad when boards succumb to the whims of activist shareholders just to make the problem go away.  Boards are well served to review serious requests of all shareholders, but the board should be deciding how best to direct the company. It's why we call them directors.    

Today, the Detroit Free Press reported that shareholders of automaker GM soundly defeated a proposal from billionaire investor David Einhorn that would have installed an alternate slate of board nominees and created two classes of stock.  (All the proposals are available here.) Shareholders who voted were against the proposals by more than 91%.  GM's board, in materials signed by Mary Barra, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer and Theodore Solso, Independent Lead Director, launched an aggressive campaign to maintain the existing board (PDF here) and the split shares proposal (PDF here).  GM argued in the board maintenance piece: 

Greenlight’s Dividend Shares proposal has the potential to disrupt our progress and undermine our performance. In our view, a vote for any of the Greenlight candidates would represent an endorsement of that high-risk proposal to the detriment of your GM investment.

Another shareholder proposal asking the board to separate the board chair and CEO positions was reported by the newspaper as follows: "A separate shareholder proposal that would have forced GM to separate the role of independent board chairman and CEO was defeated by shareholders." Not sure. Though the proposal was defeated, it's worth noting that the proposal would not have "forced" anything.  The proposal was an "advisory shareholder proposal" requesting the separation of the functions.  No mandate here, because such decisions must be made by the board, not the shareholders.  The proposal stated: 

Shareholders request our Board of Directors to adopt as policy, and amend our governing documents as necessary, to require the Chair of the Board of Directors, whenever possible, to be an independent member of the Board. The Board would have the discretion to phase in this policy for the next CEO transition, implemented so it did not violate any existing agreement. If the Board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, the Board shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of the policy within a reasonable amount of time. Compliance with this policy is waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair. This proposal requests that all the necessary steps be taken to accomplish the above.

GM argued against this proposal because the "policy advocated by this proposal would take away the Board’s discretion to evaluate and change its leadership structure." Also not true.  It the proposal were mandatory, then this would be true, but as a request, it cannot and could not take away anything.  If the shareholders made such a request and the board declined to follow that request, there might be repercussions for doing so,  but the proposal would have kept in place the "Board’s discretion to evaluate and change its leadership structure."  

These proposals appear to have been properly brought, properly considered, and properly rejected.  As I suggested in 2015, shareholder activists can help improve long-term value, even when following the activists' proposals would not.  That is just as true today and these proposals may well prime the pumpTM for future board or shareholder actions.  That is, GM has conceded that its stock is undervalued and that change is needed.  GM argues those changes are underway, and for now, most voting shareholder agree.  But we'll see how this looks if the stock price has not noticeably improved next year.  An alternative path forward on some key issues has been shared, and that puts pressure on this board to deliver.  They can do it their own way, but they are on notice that there are alternatives.  An shareholders now know that, too.

This knowledge underscores the value of shareholder proposals as a process.  They can and should create accountability, and that is a good thing. I agree with GM that the board should keep control of how it structures the GM leadership team.  But I agree with the shareholders that if this board doesn't perform, it may well be time for a change.  

June 6, 2017 in Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Financial Markets, Joshua P. Fershee, Management, Securities Regulation, Shareholders | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 30, 2017

LLCs Are Not Corporations: "Corporate" Disclosure Edition

Regular readers know that I monitor courts and other legal outlets for improper references to LLCs as "limited liability corporations" when the writer means "limited liability companies." I get a Westlaw update every day. Really. Every day. So while it may seem that I write about examples a lot, I tend to think I am showing great restraint.  

At times, this is just a semantic issue, or at least a more amorphous "how one thinks about entities" issue.  Usually, at a minimum such cases can cause confusion about entity type and what laws apply, which may eventually lead courts to an improper analysis and application of the wrong laws.  It certainly leads some lawyers to incorrectly characterize their clients and their cases.  

For example, a recent case from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington gets the law right, but still creates some potential confusion. Consider this excerpt: 

Cash & Carry asserts that the court's jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship. (Not. at 2.) For purposes of assessing diversity, the court must consider the domicile of all members of a limited liability company. Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members are citizens.”); see also Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 101(e). Plaintiff Deborah Markham alleges that she is a Washington resident. (Compl. (Dkt. # 2) ¶ 1.2.) However, neither the complaint nor the notice of removal identifies Cash & Carry's members or the domicile of those members. (See id. ¶ 1.3 (alleging that Cash & Carry is “a limited liability corporation formed under the laws of the State of Washington”); Not. at 2.)
DEBORAH MARKHAM, Plaintiff, v. CASH & CARRY STORES, LLC, et al., Defendants., No. C17-0746JLR, 2017 WL 2241136, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2017) (emphasis added).  It'd have been great for the court to note that Cash & Carry's claim it was "a limited liability corporation" was incorrect.  Instead, the court then stated, "Furthermore, Cash & Carry's corporate disclosure statement fails to establish Cash & Carry's domicile. (CDS (Dkt. # 4).)" Id. As an LLC, Cash & Carry isn't "corporate," but because of the local rules for the Western District of Washington, it does have an obligation to make a "corporate disclosure." See U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules W.D. Wash., Civ LR 7.1.
 
Rule 7.1. Disclosure Statement

(a) Who Must File; Contents. A nongovernmental corporate party must file 2 copies of a disclosure statement that:

(1) identifies any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning 10% or more of its stock; or

(2) states that there is no such corporation.

(b) Time to File; Supplemental Filing. A party must:

(1) file the disclosure statement with its first appearance, pleading, petition, motion, response, or other request addressed to the court; and

(2) promptly file a supplemental statement if any required information changes.

However, in Washington, the Local Rule 7.1 adds to the requirements of the federal "disclosure statement":

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

(a) Who Must File; Copies

Any nongovernmental party, other than an individual or sole proprietorship, must file a corporate disclosure statement identifying:

  1. any parent corporation and any publicly held corporation owning more than 10% of its stock;

  2. any member or owner in a joint venture or limited liability corporation (LLC);

  3. all partners in a partnership or limited liability partnership (LLP); or

  4. any corporate member, if the party is any other unincorporated association

If there is no parent, shareholder, member, or partner to list in response to items (1) through (4), a corporate disclosure statement must still be filed stating that no such entity exists.

In this instance, the Local Rule changes the disclosure to "corporate disclosure," when it would appear this is really an "ownership" or "financial interest" disclosure.  (And, while I am being picky, isn't it odd to have a subpart "a," when there is not subpart "b?" I suspect this subpart notation is to track subpart a of Federal Rule 7.1, but it still looks odd to me.)  
 
This is not the first time a local rule has created some potential trouble with regard to Federal Rule 7.1.  Back in January of this year I posted Oops: Oregon District Court Rule For LLCs that are Defined as Corporations, which discussed some different concerns for the Oregon District Court's expansion of Rule 7.1. I will note that the LLC reference in the Oregon District Court Local Rule remains incorrect
 
I am prepared for the "no harm, no foul" comment. And maybe that's right. But it still seems like courts (and lawyers) should be able to get this right more often. 

May 30, 2017 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Lawyering, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

Just Because You Can, Doesn't Mean You Should, Detroit Lions Edition

Last weekend, retired NFL receiver Calvin Johnson made news when he revealed that he was not pleased with the Detroit Lions and how they handled his retirement. Johnson is apparently frustrated that the Lions required him to pay back about 10% of the  unearned $3.2 million remaining on his $16 million signing bonus from his 2012 contract. This is apparently a thing for the Lions, who sought all of the unearned signing bonus money remaining on Barry Sanders' contract when he abruptly retired in 1999.

This is in contrast to Tony Romo's retirement, in which the Dallas Cowboys released him, making the $5 million remaining on the signing bonus Romo's.  Cowboys owner Jerry Jones said he was following the “Do Right Rule” when he allowed the team to release him.  The Seattle Seahawks made a similar decision with Marshawn Lynch.  

Some have argued that Johnson is being "pettier" than the Lions in this spat.  Mike Florio, a sports writer and graduate of WVU College of Law, where I teach, argued that "while Johnson has every right to be miffed at the Lions, Johnson also should be miffed at himself. Or at whoever advised him to retire instead of biding his time until the Lions would have released him." Florio correctly notes that Johnson had a big cap number likely to come due had he not retired or accepted a restructured deal, so he was coming from a position of power in negotiating, which would have likely forced the Lions to cut him. Still, that doesn't mean Johnson is wrong to be frustrated.  

Perhaps Johnson didn't ever want to be cut in his career, even at that point in his carerr. Maybe he just wanted to retire.  The Lions were worried, perhaps about "precedent" that other players could use to walk away without paying back the bonus, though there is already such precedent out there, as discussed above, and the Lions have non-binding precedent already in the Barry Sanders case, where an arbitrator said Sanders had to pay back some of his signing bonus.  Beyond that, the response to most players would simply be, "I know we didn't ask Calvin Johnson for any money back. You're not Calvin Johnson." 

It is  true that the Lions could seek money from Johnson, and that Johnson almost certainly, from a legal sense, owed the money.  But having a legal right to something doesn't always mean it is a good idea.  And that is important for lawyers to remember.  The question I would have asked the Lions front office is this: "Is it really worth $320,000 when it is possible that one of your greatest players will feel disrespected by the process? Especially when you already created a rift with one of you other greatest players fifteen years ago?"  

Maybe it was asked, and the answer was yes, but I just don't see the upside.  My guess is that the Lions asked for a lot more and the two sides negotiated to this figure.  But that process, not the payment, is likely what irked Johnson.  Why does it matter? Because it tells future people the team wants, especially coaches and free agents, how the Lions do business.  And when choosing between two similar offers, that could very well lead one to choose the other team.  

I often use these kinds of issues facing a business when teaching the importance of the business judgment rule and allowing a board of directors not to pursue claims it can win (as long as there is no fraud or self dealing).  Sometimes, it is better for the entity to let a claim go than to extend a bad story or scare off potential talent.  Back in 2007, for example, Billy Donovan was hired to leave his head coaching job at the University of  Florida to lead the NBA's Orlando Magic.  Just days later, Donovan decided he did not want to leave Florida, and asked the Magic to let him return to the college game. The Magic decided to let him do so without any financial penalty, though they did ask him to agree not to coach in the NBA for five years.

Why let Donovan back out and return to Florida without a payment?  For one, the Magic needed to hire a new coach, and you want to send a message that you are a good employer.  Second, Donovan was beloved in Florida. He had won two NCAA championships in a key market for the team.  Don't irritate your prime audience is always a good bit of advice.  There was little upside to being difficult. The team was almost certainly irritated, but there is little value in letting that lead to bad publicity and unnecessary public spats. This principle extends well beyond the sports realm, but it is especially important in any area where employers fight for talent, which is common in the sports and entertainment areas. 

In assessing the legal (and business) options for the Calvin Johnson situation, good lawyering requires a recognition that key issues were likely related to perception and respect, not money.  As such, the fact that there was an argument about repayment at all was the issue that made Johnson frustrated (and now could have repercussions in the future free agent market).  It is certainly possible the Lions assessed this risk and decided it was worth it.  I disagree that it was worth it, but that would be a reasonable decision.  (As a life-long Lions fan, I will need more evidence the problem was properly assessed, though I do hold out hope for the new front office.) 

Such decisions, if made simply on the legal merits (e.g., Would I win in court?), run the risk of what Jeff Lipshaw calls "pure lawyering," which is essentially legal reasoning without context or assessment of non-legal impacts or opportunities. As Lipshaw explains in the preface to his book, Beyond Legal Reasoning, A Critique of Pure Lawyering

Legal reasoning is merely one way of creating meaning out of circumstances in the real world. In its pure form, it does nothing more than convert a real-world narrative to a set of legal conclusions that have no necessary connection either to truth or morality.

Or the ability to recruit free agents.  

May 23, 2017 in ADR, Compensation, Contracts, Corporate Personality, Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee, Lawyering, Sports | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

What is Loyalty?

This past week was a big one for loyalty stories.  First, we have the New York Times reporting that President Trump asked former FBI director James Comey for his pledge of loyalty, to which Comey apparently promised "honesty."  (The White House disputes this report.) 

Then, we have a high school quarterback in Illinois being forced to decommit from the University of Wisconsin's, apparently because he tweeted that the University of Georgia had offered him a scholarship.  The student called Wisconsin Coach Budmayr, telling him he had the offer and said he was "still 100% committed to the Badgers." The next day Budmayr apparently told him that he was no longer a good fit for Wisconsin and that he should keep looking.  The reason: lack of loyalty.  

Obviously, I only have the facts as they have been portrayed in these articles, and there are two sides to every story.  Nonetheless, these anecdotes got me to thinking about loyalty and how people tend to perceive the concept. 

To some, loyalty means fidelity.  This can be in the physical or emotional sense, as in the marriage context.  Some view extend it to ideological loyalty.  And to some, it means undying, uncompromising agreement and support.  It is this last idea that troubles me, because often it means that the loyalty is misguided. 

Merriam-Webster dictionary defines loyal as follows:

1. unswerving in allegiance: such a

a :  faithful in allegiance to one's lawful sovereign or government were loyal to the king    

b:  faithful to a private person to whom faithfulness is due a loyal husband

 c :  faithful to a cause, ideal, custom, institution, or product a loyal churchgoer

2. showing loyalty a loyal friend

3. obsolete :  lawful, legitimate

The Trump-Comey scenario is clearly type 1(a), but I think the same is true of the Badger football situation. The concept of requiring absolute loyalty to the cause as a prerequisite for being part of the team.  

The problem, of course, is what it means to be faithful and to whom.  In the Comey situation, Comey's loyalty is to the FBI, the country, and the truth, not the person in the White House. Trump has sort of acknowledged this, although it is not clear what the president had in mind if he really did ask Comey for such a pledge.  But it is clear that if Comey were to have pledged loyalty to the president, he would clearly have created the risk of compromising his loyalty to the country and the truth.  

For football, this is harder to define.  Is it to the team?  To the coach? To the other players?  To the program?  Everything? 

Blind allegiance is rarely a good thing, and can often lead to bad outcomes.  In the Badger football case, it seems the coach was either (a) looking to get out of the commitment and took an excuse, (b) really believes assurances from one of his commits are hollow, or (c) wanted to send a message about allegiance.  It is entirely possible it was some combination of the three. 

When it comes to the high school player, I can imagine a scenario where the player was excited to be pursued, and he was showing off a little.  Hard to blame a kid for that, frankly.  Despite assurances to the contrary, the Badger coach wanted none of it.  His team, his call, but I don't like it. 

In my view, loyalty runs two ways.  And loyalty should have room for misunderstandings, at a minimum, if not mistakes. Even it it doesn't, in the case of college player and college coach, the coach is the grown up.  He or she should act like it.  That means, if you have a real problem with the player, state it. And if you really don't want them any more, say it.  I have no idea what the coach said, and in fairness to him, he may be the one taking the high road here by not airing issues publicly. 

I can't say these stories raise any clear answers for me.  But they do raise questions about loyalty, and what it means.  I think that's worth thinking about, especially for lawyers and future lawyers. Both of these stories make me uncomfortable. It's worth it to me to think about why and what that means. And I think we should all spend a little time thinking about it. 

May 16, 2017 in Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee, Lawyering, Philosophy | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 9, 2017

Leadership: If Done Right, More Women Can Mean Less Incompetence

Back in 2013, Tomas Chamorro-Premuzic wrote Why Do So Many Incompetent Men Become Leaders? on the Harvard Business Law Review site.  He argues,

the main reason for the uneven management sex ratio is our inability to discern between confidence and competence. That is, because we (people in general) commonly misinterpret displays of confidence as a sign of competence, we are fooled into believing that men are better leaders than women. In other words, when it comes to leadership, the only advantage that men have over women (e.g., from Argentina to Norway and the USA to Japan) is the fact that manifestations of hubris — often masked as charisma or charm — are commonly mistaken for leadership potential, and that these occur much more frequently in men than in women.

He further notes that the qualities that the same traits that often lead to a male manager to get hired (i.e., be perceived as a leader) are the characteristics that get in the way of being an effective and successful leader.  ( "[L]eaderless groups have a natural tendency to elect self-centered, overconfident and narcissistic individuals as leaders, and that these personality characteristics are not equally common in men and women.")  Thus, because we mistake confidence for competence, we pass up a lot of good people (and hire the wrong people).  These mistakes apply to both men and women, but Chamorro-Premuzic notes that (by nature and/or nurture) women are less likely to have those traits.  

He concludes 

there is no denying that women’s path to leadership positions is paved with many barriers including a very thick glass ceiling. But a much bigger problem is the lack of career obstacles for incompetent men, and the fact that we tend to equate leadership with the very psychological features that make the average man a more inept leader than the average woman. The result is a pathological system that rewards men for their incompetence while punishing women for their competence, to everybody’s detriment.

This is true, but I would also note that it's also likely that the women who get hired because of the traditional traits he describes are also less likely to be successful. Most leaders, he notes fail, whether in politics or business: "Good leadership has always been the exception, not the norm." 

This suggests that people doing the hiring (or voting) would be well served to change their criteria for assessing talent and quality, at least in some ways. We simply can't keep using the same inputs and be surprised we keep getting the same outputs.    If we change our inputs, there is a good chance that we will have a greater diversity of leaders (particularly increasing the numbers of women) and may, in fact, choose more successful leaders. It seems to me worth a try. 

May 9, 2017 in Jobs, Joshua P. Fershee | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, May 2, 2017

Fake News! Trump's LLCs Are Not Corporations

It's exam-grading time, so my focus is largely on that.  I did do my usual peruse of the news, though, and I found a whole host of news outlets discussing President Trump's tax plan, which proposes to lower income tax rates on pass-through entities.  As one of the pieces explains

Pass-through income, for those of you who aren’t tax nerds, is business income that’s reported on a personal return. It comes from partnerships, limited-liability corporations and other closely held businesses, including Trump’s own family real estate operation.

First of all, knowing about pass-through income does not make you a tax nerd. I don't think. 

Beyond that, though, limited liability corporations are not a thing.  And, limited liability companies (LLCs) are generally chosen for pass-though tax status, but they don't have to be. They can chose to be taxed as C corporations at the federal level, if they wish.  Furthermore, partnerships, such as MLPs, and LLCs don't have to be closely held. They can be publicly traded.  

Multiple outlets got on the incorrect"limited-liability corporations" bandwagon. Even Barron's! Oh, well.. For now, I guess I will just continue to note that LLCs are still limited liability companies.  

Happy grading to those in the same boat, and good thoughts to the students taking our exams.  We really do want you to succeed, so please, show us what you know. 

 

May 2, 2017 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Partnership | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, April 26, 2017

What Is Ideological Diversity in the Legal Academy?

More than a few legal blogs and scholars have taken note of a recent paper by Adam Bonica (Stanford University), Adam S. Chilton (University of Chicago), Kyle Rozema (Northwestern University) and Maya Sen (Harvard University), “The Legal Academy’s Ideological Uniformity.”  The paper finds that those in the legal academy are more liberal than those in legal profession generally.  Anecdotally, I have to say I am not surprised. 

The abstract of the piece is as follows:

We find that approximately 15% of law professors are conservative and that only approximately one out of every twenty law schools have more conservative law professors than liberal ones. In addition, we find that these patterns vary, with higher-ranked schools having an even smaller presence of conservative law professors. We then compare the ideological balance of the legal academy to that of the legal profession. Compared to the 15% of law professors that are conservative, 35% of lawyers overall are conservative. Law professors are more liberal than graduates of top 14 law schools, lawyers working at the largest law firms, former federal law clerks, and federal judges. Although we find that professors are more liberal than the alumni at all but a handful of law schools, there is a strong relationship between the ideologies of professors from a law school and the ideologies of alumni from that school. However, this relationship is weaker for schools with more conservative alumni.

Jonathan Adler recently discussed the paper in a piece for The Volokh Conspiracy How ‘ideologically uniform’ is the legal academy? Adler notes, that the paper's "findings are based upon an examination of reported political donations. While this is an admittedly imperfect measure of ideology, it does allow for comparisons across population groups." I agree on both counts.   

I am particularly interested in (and a bit skeptical of) the use of political donations as the proxy for ideology.  I understand why the authors used that proxy: the information is available and it does, as Adler says, provide for comparisons.  My skepticism is not about their process or choice, but merely about whether it tells us very much about legal ideology. I think it tells us primarily about political party. And even there, in a primarily two-party system, it only tells us about preferences between those two parties, and if the data is primarily presidential, about those two specific candidates. 

My point is that legal ideology is often different that political party choice. When choosing between two parties, we all have priorities of our views, too. For example, I am a far bigger believer in the ability of markets to solve problems than many of my colleagues.  I am more skeptical of government intervention and increased regulation than many of my colleagues. But because of a few priorities that tip my balancing test, I would almost certainly come out "liberal" in using my modest contributions to political parties as the assessment of my ideology.  

In assessing legal ideology, though, I would argue diversity comes more from how we view the law than particular candidates or certain social issues. Obviously, it is much harder to assess that, but I think it should matter when considering how law schools teach.  

Some legal programs (like SEALS) have been seeking diversity of viewpoints, along with other measures of diversity, for panel and discussions groups. This is a good thing. It's not always easy to assess, though. Maybe we should just ask. Here's how I'd assess my own legal ideology: When it comes to economic regulation, my thinking is much more in line with former law professor and SEC Commissioner Troy A. Paredes than I am with, say, Elizabeth Warren. When it comes to business entities law, I am far more Bainbridge than Bebchuck.  For environmental law, more Huffman or Adler than Parenteau. Of course, I have at various times agreed and disagreed with them all.  

I, like many others, am very skeptical of an ideological litmus test or quota system. And yet I also think there is value in embracing different perspectives and viewpoints.  Ultimately, I don't care how someone votes when I assess whether they are a good legal scholar, a good colleague, and a good teacher. I do care that they value diversity of all kinds (including ideological), and I care that they believe in encouraging and faciltitating productive discourse. There is little value in lockstep thinking in any arena, and that is particularly true in legal education. I'm glad this discussion is part of how we consider moving forward in legal education.  

April 26, 2017 in Corporate Governance, Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee, Law and Economics, Law School, Lawyering, Research/Scholarhip, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 11, 2017

Why Do So Many People Assume States Can Disregard Series LLCs?

The Uniform Law Commission is in the process of considering the Limited Liability Company Protected Series Act (f/k/a Series of Unincorporated Business Entities Act), and the final reading is schedule to take place in July 2017.  (Draft is here.) I have been discussing the challenges of Series LLCs with a variety of folks, and it strikes me that a consistent theme about the Series LLC is a concern about asset protection between each LLC in there Series. That is, there is concern that some courts may disregard the separateness of each LLC in the Series and treat the entire Series as a single entity.  I share this concern, but it strikes me that it is a rather outlandish concern that a court would do so without some significant level of fraud or other injustice to warrant whatever the state version of veil piercing would mandate. 

One source goes so far as to state: 

Case law has not been developed on Series LLCs yet, and there is much fear in the professional world that the assets may not be as protected as when the entity is formed. What is clear is that the “corporate formalities” must be carefully followed, such that:

  1. Separate books and records should be maintained for each series;

  2. Creditors need to be made specifically aware of the separate existence of each series; and

  3. The assets of each must be unambiguously identified as belonging to that series.

I don't consider these corporate formalities as at all, given that we're talking about an LLC, but it's true that any Series LLC would be well served to follow the entity formalities we'd expect of any entity seeking to protect limited liability.  Perhaps because the Series LLC as an entity is new, there is a need for heightened vigilance, but I am of the mind these kinds of measures are proper for all entities, if one wants to reduce the likelihood of veil piercing, enterprise liability, or other agency/guarantor concerns.  

Another source warns of the risks of the Series LLC:

The biggest problem with series LLCs is that many states (including California) don’t have series legislation and may choose to ignore the laws of the state where the series was created. That’s because you’re subject to their rules when doing business in their state. The example of the attitude of the California Franchise Tax Board applies to fees, but liability protection is also an issue. Since series LLCs are so new they’ve never been tested by courts, even in the states that permit them. That means there’s no guarantee that limited liability protection will be extended to each series until every state rules on the subject. It’s hard to see how a court would choose to grant this kind of protection inside one entity, and only time will tell if courts will do this. But do you want this type of uncertainty when you are trying to protect your assets?

Again, perhaps valid, but the idea that a state would simply ignore a properly created entity formed in another state is an outrageous proposition, in my mind.  If a state sees fit to define an entity, and such an entity is properly formed, that should be sufficient to follow the entity rules.  That might be different if a state were to write a law that specifically disallows certain kinds of entity structures. (I'd likely have a problem with that, too, but on the merits of such a law.)  And some laws clearly change the analysis, like bankruptcy. But to simply disregard another state's entity structure if the business is properly operating? That's not right.  

Anyway, I agree with those who are cautious about the relative limited liability protections of the Series LLC, especially outside of the eight(?) states that have such laws (Delaware, Nevada, Illinois, Iowa, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas and Utah). But I do find it disturbing that so many people are comfortable with the idea that courts would (and perhaps should) be so inherently skeptical of a structure chosen by a state legislature that the court would disregard the concept completely.  I am all for requiring entities to be clear which entity is to bound (and I think those doing business with those entities should seek guarantees, co-signers, or other assurances where they want them).  Courts allowing plaintiffs to expand limited liability beyond a Series entity to include other entities, based only on the use of the Series structure, is different. Like haphazard veil piercing, such decisions run the risk of incentivizing careless or ambiguous drafting and give creditors a chance to pursue a windfall in the form of an un-negotiated guarantee. 

As I often remind my students, to argue against the concept of limited liability is a very different thing than arguing that the current law allows one to disregard an entity in a particular circumstance. One asks, "What should be?,"  while the other asks, "What is?"  And to dislike the idea of a Series LLC is very different than suggesting a Series LLC law is invalid.  There, the former says what the law should be,"  while the latter says that what is, is not.  

 

April 11, 2017 in Corporations, Delaware, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs, Unincorporated Entities | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, April 4, 2017

Equal Pay Day Applied to M & A

The Washington Post reports

Back in 2015, Salesforce CEO Marc Benioff admitted something many CEOs wouldn't: The company had found a pay gap between the men and women who worked for the cloud computing giant, and it was spending $3 million to fix it. Now after acquisitions and rampant growth at the company brought in 7,000 new employees in the past year, he's doing it again, announcing Tuesday that the company has spent another $3 million to adjust for a pay gap that affects 11 percent of its more than 25,000 employees.

In an interview with The Washington Post, Benioff said he believed the re-opened gap was largely because of the company's acquisitive streak -- it bought 14 companies in its last fiscal year, the largest in its history. When companies acquire others, Benioff said, "you buy their pay practices, and this pay practice -- of, basically, gender discrimination -- is quite dramatic through our industry and other industries," he said.

If one cares about equal pay, and I think people should (beyond just today), one needs to account for it in the purchase price of another entity.  This is a great reminder about the due diligence process. We need to think about all the things that matter to our clients (and ask them what those things are). The cost of implementing those things that matter, in addition to all the traditional things we worry about in an acquisition, should be accounted for if we want to maximize benefit for clients.   

April 4, 2017 in Compensation, Corporations, Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

NFL's Business Judgment Rules: Will Raiders' Move To Vegas Harm the League?

The Oakland/Los Angeles/Oakland Raiders are soon to become the Las Vegas Raiders. This has fans in an uproar, with some saying the move is like losing "family."  Moves of sports teams are rarely well received in the place the team leaves, and this move is no different.  

Teams move for a variety of reasons, though the primary reason comes down to money.  And there's nothing wrong with that.  Although it is a loss for long-time fans, the team will get new fans in the locations (if history is any indication), and it's certainly the right of the business owners to decide what is best for their business.  In the judgment of Raiders' ownership, it's time for Vegas Baby.  

The structure of the NFL is such that team owners need approval of the league to make such a move, which makes sense because a sports league is necessarily dependent on other teams.  As such, the teams have created some obligations to one another and agreed to give up some level of control for the good of the league.  All but one team voted to support the move to Vegas (the Miami Dolphins dissented), giving the Raiders 31 votes, when they only needed 24.  Thus, it means the other league owners (sans the Dolphins' owners) thought the move was in their best interest, too. 

This makes three recently announced NFL team moves. In addition to the Raiders, the former St. Louis Rams returned to Los Angeles, and the former San Diego Chargers are now a second L.A.-based team. This means the super majority of NFL owners feel all of these moves are in the best interest of the league, or are at least neutral to the moves.  This makes some sense, as there had been relative stability for the league teams, with the last move before these three taking place in 1997, when the Houston Oilers left for Tennessee (Memphis temporarily, then Nashville in 1999). 

Moving forward, though, how much will fans take?  If several more teams make a move in the next few years, will it upset fans to the point that they stop watching? Hard to say, but the league will be able to put a stop to it if they are concerned.  There are a number of older stadiums in the league, so there may be more moves to come. There will almost certainly be threats to move, even if teams end up staying put.

If teams keep moving, it's possible the league could be hurt, but that would require the NFL fans in the old league cities to stop watching the NFL. That could happen, but it seems unlikely.  Either way, it probably won't be a move that tells us the league is being harmed.  Instead, it will probably be when teams without a lease don't get a lucrative offer to move another city.  

March 28, 2017 in Contracts, CSR, Joshua P. Fershee, Sports | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Abolishing Veil Piercing Is for Legislatures, Not Courts

I write often about how courts often incorrectly treat LLCs as corporations.  Last week, I reported on a case about a court that misstated, in my view, the state of the law regarding LLCs and veil piercing.  When I do so, I often get comments about how veil piercing should go away. Prof. Bainbridge replies similarly here

I am on record as being open to the elimination of veil piercing (I am actually, at least in theory, working on an article tentatively called Abolishing Veil Piercing Without Abolishing Equity), and I am especially open to the idea of abolishing veil piercing with regard to contract-based claims.  (Texas largely does this by requiring "actual fraud" for cases arising out of contract. For a great explanation of Texas law on the subject, please see Elizabeth Miller's detailed description here.)

Several courts over the years, most notably the Wyoming court in Flahive, have extended the concept of veil piercing to LLCs, even where a statute did not explicitly provide the concept of veil piercing. Although I think these courts got it wrong, now that concept of veil piercing is well established for corporations and LLCs in virtually all (if not all) U.S. jurisdictions, I think any rollback must properly be done by statute. 

In the past, I have been critical of courts like the one in Flahive, because I agree with Prof. Bainbridge and others who argue that veil piercing, when not expressly stated, may well have not been intended.  Minnesota, for example, has at least made the concept clear. Minnesota LLC law provides: 

322B.303 PERSONAL LIABILITY OF MEMBERS AS MEMBERS.

Subdivision 1. Limited liability rule. 

Subject to subdivision 2, a member, governor, manager, or other agent of a limited liability company is not, merely on account of this status, personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities, or obligations of the limited liability company.

Subd. 2. Piercing the veil.

The case law that states the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited liability companies.  . . . .

Like most states, Minnesota courts are willing to pierce the corporate veil where (1) an entity ignores corporate formalities and serves as the alter ego of a shareholder and (2) enforcing the liability limitations of the corporate form leads to injustice or is fundamentally unfair. I have often used this example of how a state should, if they want to have LLC veil piercing, proceed. That is, although I would not advocate for doing so, if a state is going to have veil piercing of LLCs, it should be expressly stated. The statute may be flawed in concept, but that's a call for the legislature.  

The Minnesota statute is well crafted to achieve its apparent goals, in that it makes clear that one can, in fact, be "personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities, or obligations of the limited liability company" merely on account of being a member of an LLC.  That is, the general rule is that members are not liable for the LLC's debts, but where an LLC veil is pierced, all members become personally liable for the debts, regardless of the their actions.  In Minnesota, this includes "corporate formalities" as a factor for corporate veil piercing and thus it applies to LLCs, even though LLCs have few, if any, statutory formalities (and many states disclaim formalities as an obligation to maintain limited liability for an LLC).  

This seems wrong to me, especially the part about making those who did not participate in the bad behavior potentially liable and adding a corporate-formalities requirement to an entity that is not supposed to have them.  As Prof. Bainbridge argues in Abolishing Veil Piercing,  "Abolishing veil piercing would refocus judicial analysis on the appropriate question-did the defendant-shareholder do anything for which he or she should be held directly liable."  I agree.  

Still, because veil-piercing of entities is well-settled law, I don't think judges have latitude to eliminate it. Judges must focus on proper limitations and clarity of the law that is still subject to interpretation (or plainly inconsistent with the law), where possible.  At this point, abolishing veil piercing must be done by statute. Maybe some bold legislators will heed the call.

March 21, 2017 in Corporate Personality, Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 14, 2017

Perpetuating the Hot Mess of LLC Veil Piercing Law

A new case, out just yesterday from the Southern District of Ohio, makes a mess of LLC veil piercing law. It appears that the legal basis put forth by the court in granting a motion to dismiss a veil piercing claim was probably right, but the statement of veil piercing law was not quite there.  

The case is ACKISON SURVEYING, LLC, Plaintiff, v. FOCUS FIBER SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Defendants., No. 2:15-CV-2044, 2017 WL 958620, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2017).  Here are the parties: the defendant is FTE Networks, Inc. (FTE), which filed a motion to dismiss claiming a failure to state a claim. FTE is the parent company of another defendant, Focus Fiber Solutions, LLC (Focus). The plaintiff, Ackison Surveying, LLC (Ackison) filed  a number of claims against Focus, added an alter ego/veil piercing claim against FTE. Thus, Ackison is, among other things, seeking to pierce the veil of an LLC (Focus). Focus appears to be a Pennsylvania LLC, based on a search here.

Pennsylvania law provides the liability cannot be imposed on a member of an LLC for failing to observe formalities. The law states: 

The failure of a limited liability partnership, limited partnership, limited liability limited partnership, electing partnership or limited liability company to observe formalities relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its activities and affairs is not a ground for imposing liability on a partner, member or manager of the entity for a debt, obligation or other liability of the entity.
15 Pa. Stat. and Consol. Stat. § 8106 (2017). 
 
However, the S.D. Ohio court states that a threshold question of whether an LLC's veil can be pierced includes an assessment of the following factors: 
(1) grossly inadequate capitalization,
(2) failure to observe corporate formalities,
(3) insolvency of the debtor corporation at the time the debt is incurred,
(4) [the parent] holding [itself] out as personally liable for certain corporate obligations,
(5) diversion of funds or other property of the company property [ ],
(6) absence of corporate records, and (7) the fact that the corporation was a mere facade for the operations of the [parent company].
ACKISON SURVEYING, LLC, Plaintiff, v. FOCUS FIBER SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al., Defendants., No. 2:15-CV-2044, 2017 WL 958620, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2017) (alterations in original). 
 
The opinion ultimately find that the complaint made only legal conclusions and failed to provide any facts to support the allegations of the LLC as an alter ego of its parent corporation, and further determined that a proposed amended claim was equally lacking.  As such, the court dismissed FTE from the case.  This conclusion appears correct, but it still suggests that, in another case, one could support a veil piercing claim against an LLC by showing that the LLC's "failure to observe corporate formalities," formalities it may have no legal obligation to follow.  
 
This remains my crusade. When courts get cases like this, they should (at a minimum) provide a clear veil piercing law for LLCs that accounts for the differences between LLCs and corporations.  I keep saying it, again and again, and I will keep beating the drum. If state law allows for LLC veil piercing, then fine, but get the law right. LLCs and corporations provide limited liability for their residual interest holders, but they are not the same entity. You Can’t Pierce the Corporate Veil of an LLC Because It Doesn't Have One, but the LLC does have a limited liability veil.  In cases such as these, courts should take the time make the law clearer so that future courts can stop applying the incorrect standards.  And lawyers bringing such cases could help, too, by framing their claims and responses appropriately.  Please.  

March 14, 2017 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, Litigation, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, February 28, 2017

A Few Irritating Things

I don't know if it's the time of year or if I am just a little off, but I am generally grumpy today. So, I am going to vent a bit.  

First, a regular irritation that is no shock to regular readers is the "limited liability corporation." I probably should have stopped the Westlaw alert for that terms, which comes through nearly every single day with multiple cases and news items.  A new case from the U.S. District Court in Kansas, Pipeline Prods., Inc. v. Horsepower Entm't, No. CV 15-4890-KHV, 2017 WL 698504, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2017), is typical.  The court states: 

Pipeline Productions, Inc. is a Kansas corporation with its principal place of business in Lawrence, Kansas. Backwood Enterprises, LLC is an Arkansas limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Lawrence, Kansas. . . . 

The Madison Companies, LLC is a Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in Greenwood Village, Colorado. Horsepower Entertainment, a Delaware limited liability company, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Madison with its principal place of business in Greenwood Village, Colorado.

Irritation 1: Arkansas does not have an entity called a "limited liability corporation." Arkansas, as is typical, has a corporation entity and a limited liability company entity.  They are different.  The fact that the court gets the entity right for the two Delaware LLCs suggests to me that the filings from Backwood Enterprises, LLC, is the likely source of the language.  Still, courts should be getting this right.  (It won't shock me if my obsession with this is irritating more than one reader. C'est la vie.) 

Irritation 2: The case also references a "wholly-owned subsidiary."  This is a common reference, but "wholly owned" does not need a hyphen when used a compound adjective.  This source cites the one I tend to follow, from my public relations days: 

When a compound modifier–two or more words that express a single concept–precedes a noun, use hyphens to link all the words in the compound except the adverb very and all adverbs that end in -ly. —AP Stylebook, 2013 edition. Boldface added.

Spot on.  The site also provides a good hint:

*Warning: Not every word that ends in -ly is an adverb. Watch out for nouns like family and supply, and adjectives like only. For example, “family-oriented websites”; supply-side economics”; “only-begotten son.”

Since Americans (in particular) love threes, I will follow the Rule of 3s, and add one more. 

Irritation 3: The word "articulate."  Yeah, this is kind of random, but I am done with that word. I cannot come up with a time when another word won't serve as a good substitute, and the loaded way in which the term has evolved means it should be skipped.  See, e.g., here.  This article provides more good background and quotes Condoleezza Rice's former communications counselor, Anna Perez: 

The word perfectly conveys, to quote George Bush, the soft bigotry of low expectations. It literally comes down to that. When people say it, what they are really saying is that someone is articulate ... for a black person.

Before anyone wants to get mad at me for being too "PC," calm down.  I am not saying you can't say it. I am saying you will irritate me if you do.  And if you say it to or about an African-American person, you probably are showing the bias Ms. Perez described. And, yeah, I have heard it said about and to African-Americans in my presence, and it's usually pretty clear the bias is there.  It's an irritation to me, and it's demeaning, even though I think it is, from time to time, well intentioned, if ignorant.  Time to move forward.  What was once "progressive thinking" is not anymore.  Try to catch up if you're really trying to be nice.

I know, everyone has things that irritate them.  It's good to vent now and again. No person attacks or freak outs. Just a good, old-fashioned vent.  Happy Mardi Gras.  

 

February 28, 2017 in Corporations, Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, February 21, 2017

Finally -- Moot Court Meets Transactional Law

Later this week, I will be on the road to Los Angeles to take one of our teams to a LawMeet Transactional competition.  The competition is described as follows: 

The National Transactional LawMeet is the premier “moot court” experience for students interested in a transactional practice. The National Transactional LawMeet is a part of the LawMeet family of live, interactive, educational competitions designed to give law students a hands-on experience in developing and honing transactional lawyering skills.

I worked with a team last year that made it to the finals in New York City (their work and talent got them there, to be clear), and it was a great experience. They did the regional on their own last year, so I am hoping I don't get in their way this time around.  

I have worked with moot court teams for years, including taking teams to the Evans Moot Court Competition at the University of Wisconsin Law School and the Mardi Gras Moot Court Competition at Tulane Law School, and they were good experiences, I think, for the students. And I have helped with our West Virginia University College of LawNational Energy & Sustainability Moot Court Competition, which I think is both unique and well done (I am not unbiased, I admit, but I am confident I am right.)

Still, it was great to go to a transactional competition. The LawMeet competition was impressive. It's hard to isolate a deal simulation, but the organizers did well. And after their negotiation sessions, the students got reviewed by some incredibly talented people. One of the reviewers was a very big deal M&A partner at a very big deal New York firm. And he was kind, thoughtful, while providing an incisive critique. I disagreed with him on one tactic (I kept my mouth shut), because I was exposed to a different viewpoint for a very big deal partner at a very big deal New York firm some years ago.  It wasn't a big point, but it was actually great opportunity to talk about philosophy and tactics with my students (later) using a deal setting as the basis for discussion.  

Anyway, I am happy this opportunity is out there for students aren't seeking to litigate, but want to go live (or close to it).  Go Business Law!  

February 21, 2017 in Joshua P. Fershee, Law School, M&A, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, February 14, 2017

Business Law on Valentine's Day

I hope this Valentine's Day is a good one for you, dear readers.  Mine started with a random (minor) dog bite on my morning run, followed by some time with some very nice health care professionals and quite a few less pleasant needles. 

A friend alerted me to the law-related Twitter hashtag #AppellateValentines. Some of them are quite funny.  See, e.g.,

There is also a #BusinessValentines hashtag, which is less creative, but has its moments.  Of course, there was no #BusinessLawValentines, but there should be and there is now. I went first. Join in, if you're so inclined.  

And, of course, I could not resist:

February 14, 2017 in Corporations, Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee, Partnership, Unincorporated Entities, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, February 7, 2017

5% Women in Charge is a Record? Wow.

According to CNN/Money, 2016 was a record year for women.  The report

America hit a milestone in 2016: The most female CEOs ever. There are now 27 women at the helm of S&P 500 companies. 

 The good news is it's a new record for women in business, according to S&P Global Market Intelligence. It's also 22% more -- a big jump -- from last year, when only 22 women led S&P 500 companies. 
Wow.  It's not shocking that women are trailing, but the numbers are still pretty surprising to me. That's a lot of unrealized talent.  
 
I have had the opportunity to work for two women who were deans of my law schools, and that, too, is pretty uncommon, though far more so than the numbers at Fortune 500 companies.  Women make up about 34% of faculty and 30% of law deans (or did as of 2015). That's noticeably better, but it remains clear we have work to do.
 
And that's really all I have to offer right now. We need to do better in how we assess talent and ability.  Because the numbers suggest we're missing out.  
 
 
 

February 7, 2017 in Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, January 31, 2017

Note to the White House: More Energy Supply Drives Down Prices

Energy and business are closely related, and the former often has a direct impact on latter.  At Whitehouse.gov, the President has posted his energy plan, making the following assertions: 

Sound energy policy begins with the recognition that we have vast untapped domestic energy reserves right here in America. The Trump Administration will embrace the shale oil and gas revolution to bring jobs and prosperity to millions of Americans. We must take advantage of the estimated $50 trillion in untapped shale, oil, and natural gas reserves, especially those on federal lands that the American people own. We will use the revenues from energy production to rebuild our roads, schools, bridges and public infrastructure. Less expensive energy will be a big boost to American agriculture, as well.

It is certainly true that we "have vast untapped domestic energy reserves right here in America." It has brought some wealth and prosperity to the nation, and low oil prices because the country "embrace[d] the shale oil and gas revolution to bring jobs and prosperity to millions of Americans." However, low oil and gas prices (which largely remain) have slowed that growth and expansion because shale oil and gas exploration and production was wildly successful. 

The President says, "We must take advantage of the estimated $50 trillion in untapped shale, oil, and natural gas reserves, especially those on federal lands that the American people own."  But it's not clear how that's helpful. That is, selling our (the American people's) assets when the market is at or near record lows doesn't seem like very good asset management.  

The plan is to "use the revenues from energy production to rebuild our roads, schools, bridges and public infrastructure."  I am very fond of all of these things, though I am skeptical that the federal government should take a leading role in all of them. I am open to the discussion.  But, if we're selling our assets at pennies on the dollar of historic value, I am particularly skeptical of the benefits. 

"Less expensive energy will be a big boost to American agriculture, as well." Low energy costs do help agriculture. That is certainly true.  But notice that making energy even less expensive means we get less for our assets, and we're dumping more cheap energy into a market where private businesses in the oil and gas sector are already having a hard time.  

Facilitating a boom from cheap energy means investing in new jobs to use the energy, not just getting more of the energy.  Plants that use our cheaper fuels to make and build new products could help, but it's never easy.  High energy prices can stifle an economy, but low ones rarely spur growth.  About a year ago, an Economist article from January 2016 remains accurate, as it explained that sudden and major price increases can slow an economy rapidly, as we saw in Arab oil embargo of 1973. However, "when the price slumps because of a glut, as in 1986, it has done the world a power of good. The rule of thumb is that a 10% fall in oil prices boosts growth by 0.1-0.5 percentage points."  

The article further explains: 

Cheap oil also hurts demand in more important ways. When crude was over $100 a barrel it made sense to spend on exploration in out-of-the-way provinces, such as the Arctic, west Africa and deep below the saline rock off the coast of Brazil. As prices have tumbled, so has investment. Projects worth $380 billion have been put on hold. In America spending on fixed assets in the oil industry has fallen by half from its peak. The poison has spread: the purchasing managers’ index for December, of 48.2, registered an accelerating contraction across the whole of American manufacturing. In Brazil the harm to Petrobras, the national oil company, from the oil price has been exacerbated by a corruption scandal that has paralysed the highest echelons of government.

I am all for a new energy plan to help the economy grow, and I support continued energy exploration and production as long as it is done wisely, which I firmly believe can be done.  But adding new competitors (by allowing more exploration on federal lands) simply won't help (and it really won't help increase coal jobs). More supply is not the answer in an already oversupplied market.  And the current proposal is just giving away assets we will want down the road. 

January 31, 2017 in Current Affairs, Entrepreneurship, Financial Markets, Joshua P. Fershee, Law and Economics | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, January 24, 2017

Alaska LLC Veil Piercing at Crossroads: A Chance to Get it Right

Friend and co-blogger Marcia Narine Weldon sent me a news article from Alaska discussing a "piercing of the corporate veil" claim for an LLC.  

The City and Borough of Juneau demolished the Gastineau Apartments and is trying to get hold members of Gastineau Apartments LLC, apparent owners of the building liable for the $1.4 million demolition costs. Demolition cost more than the land is worth, so the suit is seeking to have the owners of the LLC, Camilla and James Barrett, pay the bill because they missed deadlines to repair or demolish the property.

 

The article reports:

At issue before Juneau Superior Court Judge Philip Pallenberg is the legal concept of “piercing the corporate veil.” It would allow legal action against the Barretts, who controlled Gastineau Apartments LLC.

Defense Attorney Robert Spitzfaden had argued that the Barretts should remain shielded from liability. But the judge noted that the defendants had allowed their limited liability corporation to be dissolved after missing filing deadlines with the state.

“It’s clear that the Barretts were not always clear to observe the formal legal requirements of their LLC,” Judge Pallenberg said from the bench.

A quick review of Alaska LLC law did not make clear to me that LLCs in the state have formal requirements that would be implicated in this case.  If the main reason that the LLC did not pay the bills was a mere lack of money, there is no reason to pierce the veil. It's just a failed venture.  Sure, the Barretts should have gone followed the appropriate processes, but it cannot be that the fact that the Barretts "allowed their limited liability corporation [author's note: it's an LLC] to be dissolved after missing filing deadlines with the state" is sufficient to support veil piercing."  

Imagine the same scenario, but the building had value. Would missing deadlines and allowing the land owned by LLC to be automatically transferred to the Barretts?  Even if there were other creditors?  I think not.  

Perhaps there is more to this case than the article reveals, but this looks a lot like a lack of entity funds is the only issue, and a lack of funds (on its own) should not be sufficient for veil piercing, especially in a property case where the property can be forfeited.  If the city or state wants to make a law making individuals liable, then fine, but this looks like a bad case for veil piercing and a possible summary judgment case. I look forward to seeing if Alaska analyzes this one right at trial.  

January 24, 2017 in Corporations, Joshua P. Fershee, LLCs | Permalink | Comments (5)