Sunday, July 13, 2014

ICYMI: Tweets From the Week (July 13, 2014) [Hobby Lobby Edition]

July 13, 2014 in Business Associations, Books, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Religion, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 6, 2014

The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Hobby Lobby

Let me start by publicly announcing a forthcoming panel discussion at this year’s AALS Annual Meeting, tentatively titled “The Role of Corporate Personality Theory in Corporate Regulation.” As the organizer of this panel, I am extremely grateful to Stephen Bainbridge, Margaret Blair, Lisa Fairfax, and Elizabeth Pollman for agreeing to participate in what promises to be a thoroughly enjoyable discussion. For those of you who like to plan ahead, the panel is scheduled for Monday, Jan. 5, from 2:10 to 3:10 (part of the Section on Socio-Economics Annual Meeting program).

Given Stephen Bainbridge’s pending participation, I was interested to read a couple of his posts from a few weeks ago wherein he asked (here), “When was the last time anybody said anything new about corporate personhood?” and concluded (here), “I struggle to come up with anything new to say about the issue, when people have been correctly disposing of the legal fiction of corporate personality for at least 126 years!”

While I understand that asserting there is nothing new to say on a topic is not necessarily the same thing as saying it is not worth talking about, I still find myself motivated to explain why I think talking about corporate personality theory continues to constitute valuable scholarly activity (and, yes, I will connect all this to Hobby Lobby).

First of all, some qualifiers: (1) I distinguish corporate personality theory from corporate personhood because a thumbs up on corporate personhood (i.e., acknowledging that corporations can sue and be sued, etc.) still leaves a number of important questions regarding the nature of this “person,” which I believe theories of corporate personality (typically: artificial entity theory, real-entity theory, or aggregate theory) are well-positioned to answer. (2) While theories of corporate governance (typically: shareholder primacy, director primacy, or team-production theory) are distinct from theories of corporate personality, I believe there are at least some legal issues that are profitably analyzed by viewing both sets of theories as constituting a pool from which to choose an answer. With those introductory propositions in place, here are three reasons why I believe corporate personality theory still matters:

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July 6, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Religion, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 1, 2014

Guest Post: Closely Held Means "Controlling Shareholder"?

The following is a contribution from guest blogger Sarah Haan, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Idaho College of Law.

Business law professors no doubt felt relief yesterday when the news media corrected course and stopped distilling Hobby Lobby into a sound bite about “family-owned” corporations.  The three corporations challenging the Affordable Care Act in the case – Conestoga, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel – happen to be family-owned, but the majority opinion, penned by Justice Alito, was careful to articulate its holding as applying to “closely held” corporations, of which family-owned corporations are just a subset.

Commentators (like the Business Law Profs Blog’s Anne Tucker) have noted that the Court’s failure to define what it meant by “closely held” is significant.  By using the ambiguous phrase, and by suggesting that the opposite of a closely held corporation is a “publicly held corporation,” Justice Alito was opening the door to RFRA free exercise claims by a wide range of companies, the vast majority of which will bear no likeness to mom-and-pop businesses.  Generally, a “closely held” corporation is one that has a “small number” of shareholders (ALI Principles of Corporate Governance), or, under an alternate theory, one in which the identity of owners and managers is “substantially identical.”  Importantly, there is no consensus about how many shareholders a “closely held” corporation can have.  Under Delaware law, a statutory “close” corporation (a subset of closely-held corporations) can have as many as 30 shareholders.  Under Maryland law, there is no limit.  “’Closely held’ is not synonymous with ‘small,’” Justice Ginsberg rightly pointed out in her dissent.

But there is more to Justice Alito’s slight-of-hand than the murky distinction between a “closely held” corporation and a “family-owned” one.  The government argued that giving corporations free exercise rights under RFRA will lead to religious battles among shareholders that distract from the economic objectives of the corporation.  In a paragraph that echoed the majority’s discussion of the “mechanisms of corporate democracy” in Citizens United, Justice Alito explained why shareholders’ religious disagreements are little cause for concern:

The owners of closely held corporations may – and sometimes do – disagree about the conduct of business.  And even if RFRA did not exist, the owners of a company might well have a dispute about religion.  For example, some might want a company’s stores to remain open on the Sabbath in order to make more money, and others might want the stores to close for religious reasons.  State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure.  Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes.

In this paragraph, the Court acknowledges that shareholders in a closely held corporation might not have the same religious views, but assumes that such a corporation can still exercise a religion under RFRA.  All shareholders at each of the three corporations in Hobby Lobby held the same set of religious views, but nowhere does the Court suggest that this is a requirement of RFRA personhood. To the contrary, this passage reveals that the Court does not mean to limit corporate religious exercise to only those closely held corporations whose shareholders all agree about religion.  In fact, the Court anticipates that shareholders of companies exercising a religion under RFRA will have religious disputes, and it views the mechanisms of state corporate law as the proper means for sorting out those disagreements.

And here’s the rub:  The most basic principles of state corporate law allow a controlling shareholder to, well, control the corporation.  So what the Court has really decided is that a single controlling shareholder, or a sub-group of shareholders with voting control, can make religious exercise decisions for the corporation, even over the objections of minority shareholders.  Because that is how state corporate law resolves intra-corporate disputes.

In other words, the sincerely-held religious beliefs of a closely held corporation may just be the sincerely-held religious beliefs of its controlling shareholder.

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July 1, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, June 20, 2014

Nussbaum on Liberty of Conscience

In various airports and airplanes over the past few weeks I read University of Chicago professor Martha Nussbaum’s (University of Chicago) book on religious equality in America entitled Liberty of Conscience (2008).  Even though this book predates the Hobby Lobby case, it addresses a number of underlying issues at play in the case. 

Liberty of Conscience

More after the break.

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June 20, 2014 in Books, Constitutional Law, Current Affairs, Haskell Murray, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 12, 2014

The Corporation and Free Speech- Three Views

Greetings from Salvador, Bahia, one of the twelve cities hosting the World Cup. Apologies in advance for any spacing issues. I am typing on an iPad with spotty internet service in Brazil so editing is an issue. The long plane ride gave me some time to reflect on the Law and Society Conference I attended two weeks ago. It was my second time and once again, it didn’t disappoint. I served as the discussant on a panel on Theorizing the Corporation with Elizabeth Pollman, Charlotte Garden and Sarah Haan. All of the papers talked about a right to speak. The common theme was the question of who is speaking, the basis of that right and whose interests are being served by the speech. I found them particularly interesting given my background. Prior to joining academia I was a deputy GC and our PAC and lobbying activities reported to me. Elizabeth Pollman presented "The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional Rights", which she co-authored with Margaret Blair. She started off by providing us with a 200-year history of the corporation which I plan to incorporate in my BA class next fall. Her paper provided a framework for the court to think about corporate rights in a number of ways ending with Constitutional and particularly First Amendment slant. Before a court is going to extend constitutional protections to corporations, she asks judges to consider whether the corporation represents an identifiable group of individuals in the matter at stake or whether the corporation has its own interests distinct from any specific group of individuals. The second threshold question she asks is whether extending the protection to the corporation is necessary or convenient to ensure that the rights of the individuals that the corporation represents are protected. Sarah Haan's paper "Opaque Transparency: Outside Spending and Disclosure by Business Entities" examined corporate and individual rights from another perspective. I was completely surprised to learn that the majority of reported outside spending from the 2012 federal election came from privately-held, not publicly-held companies, including a large number of unincorporated organizations such as LLCs. She noted that more than 40% of spending by privately-held companies was obscured in some way in terms of the source of the funding. I think many of us know about the Koch Brothers, Sheldon Adelson and some wealthy individuals but I hadn't realized how many LLCs and other non-public companies where involved in financing elections. She asked us to think about the value of transparency and disclosure- a common theme from the corporate Law and Society panels and the recent BLPB posts. Specifically, she proposes that privately-held entities should be compelled to reveal the names of the individuals who control them, at least in federal elections. Charlotte Garden's article "Citizens United and the First Amendment of Labor Law" looked at speech rights from the union perspective. She observed that unions have different speech rights than others and posited that the recent McCutcheon case, which looked at the effect of corruption in the political process, might eventually have an effect on future corporate and union campaign finance cases. Next week I will discuss some of the interesting trends that emerged from Emory's Teaching Transactional Law Conference. Now back to celebrating Brazil's first win. Adeus from Bahia.

June 12, 2014 in Conferences, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, LLCs, Marcia L. Narine | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 23, 2014

Racial Identities of Corporations

In March, the Fourth Circuit held in Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Housing Authority, that racial identity can be imputed to a corporation for purposes of standing under Title VI, citing to case precedent from the several circuits allowing 1981 claims to be raised by corporations. 

“[W]e observe that several other federal appellate courts have considered this question, and have declined to bar on prudential grounds race discrimination claims brought by minority-owned corporations that meet constitutional standing requirements.” 

The Fourth Circuit had to deal with the following language in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977): “As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.” In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court however did not need to “decide whether the circumstances of this case would justify departure from that prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the constitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. For we have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his own.” (citations omitted).  The dicta in Arlington Heights was not a barrier to imputing a racial identity to the corporation in the Fourth Circuit case.

In a clear statement, the Fourth Circuit concluded that:

“We agree with the Ninth Circuit that a minority-owned corporation may establish an “imputed racial identity” for purposes of demonstrating standing to bring a claim of race discrimination under federal law. We hold that a corporation that is minority-owned and has been properly certified as such under applicable law can be the direct object of discriminatory action and establish standing to bring an action based on such discrimination.”

Chief Justice Roberts was concerned about the connection of racial identities for corporations and corporate free exercise of religion as raised in the Hobby Lobby and related cases.   Note that fellow BLPB blogger Josh Fershee wrote about the racial identity of a corporation on BLPB here arguing why religious discrimination claims by corporations should be allowed and how the analysis would work.  Professor Bainbridge weighed in on the issue as well.

Here is my best response as to why holding that corporations can have a racial identity is not necessarily fatal to the claim that corporations cannot have a religious identity for purposes of free exercise under the 1st Amendment, and why religious discrimination cases for corporations may also be more difficult than racial discrimination cases.  

Line drawing.  In the Carnell case as well as in others, the corporations at issue had been certified as a minority/women owned business at the state level, which is treated as a form of pre-requisite for such standing to assert a racial discrimination claim.  There is no similar bright line test or religious entity process for a for-profit corporations.  Indeed the very process of such a certification may implicate other 1st Amendment protections for freedom of speech and association.

Third Parties & Equity. Second, imputing the racial identity to the corporation for purposes of a Title VI claim of racial discrimination upholds the minimum anti-discrimination standard against third parties.  So in the race cases, the identity of the owners is imputed to the corporation to prevent third parties from evading a legal standard.  In the corporate free exercise of religion context, the owners are requesting that their individual religious beliefs be imputed to the corporation to allow it to evade compliance with a law.  Anti-discrimination laws are applied generally and don’t allow a person to discriminate whether it is with an individual or through a corporation rather than exempting a corporation from a neutrally-applied, generally applicable law. 

This last points get to the debate, in part, about the relevance of reverse veil piercing (RVP) on which Professor Stephen Bainbridge has advocated as a framework to resolve the mandate issue in Hobby Lobby. The corporate veil is rejected in both CVP and RVP when equity requires and that is usually dependent upon a third party interest that is best protected by rejecting the legal fiction of a separate corporate form.  In the anti-discrimination/racial identity there is an equitable argument that the third party cannot discriminate against the corporation simply because it is owned by minorities.  What is the equitable argument in Hobby Lobby?  The fairness rationale is weakened here, especially in light of the interests of the 13.5K employees receiving health care coverage as a form of compensation for their work for the company.  Instead RVP, it must rest, if at all, on the public policy justification advanced by Professor Bainbridge.   But again, the public policy argument cuts both for and against RVP.  There is a public policy argument in protecting/promoting religious freedom as there is in facilitating access to health care, including forms of health care that Congress has determined to be necessary for women (and families) under the ACA.

 -Anne Tucker

April 23, 2014 in Business Associations, Anne Tucker, Constitutional Law, Corporations, Current Affairs, Joshua P. Fershee | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 30, 2014

The Conglomerate on Hobby Lobby

Our friends at The Conglomerate recently conducted an excellent online symposium on the Hobby Lobby case.

All of the posts have been collected here.

It was refreshing to read such a thoughtful and balanced set of posts.

March 30, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Haskell Murray | Permalink | Comments (0)

How would former Chief Justice Rehnquist have ruled on Hobby Lobby?

In my article, “The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases,” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 831, I criticized the Supreme Court justices for failing to acknowledge the role of competing conceptualizations of the corporation in their corporate political speech cases.  I noted, however, that former Chief Justice Rehnquist was arguably the lone modern justice to deserve at least some praise in this area.

Justice Rehnquist's stand-alone dissent in Bellotti provides arguably the sole example in these opinions of a Justice affirmatively adopting a theory of the corporation for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of corporations--though not via the express adoption of one of the traditionally recognized theories. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist relied on Justice Marshall's Dartmouth College opinion to conclude that: “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very existence.”’ Thus, while it may be true that “a corporation's right of commercial speech . . . might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation[, i]t cannot be so readily concluded that the right of political expression is equally necessary to carry out the functions of a corporation organized for commercial purposes.” I would argue that this is a formulation most aligned with concession theory because not only does Justice Rehnquist rely on Dartmouth College, but he also goes on to say: “I would think that any particular form of organization upon which the State confers special privileges or immunities different from those of natural persons would be subject to like regulation, whether the organization is a labor union, a partnership, a trade association, or a corporation.”  Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court's Campaign Finance Cases, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 831, 853 (2013) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).

While this is only one data point, I think it suggests the former Chief Justice would have been hesitant to grant corporations any form of free exercise rights, since it is difficult to see how free exercise rights are more incidental to a corporation’s existence than political speech rights.  Cf. Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2004) (“With limited qualifications, the Rehnquist Court has abandoned the possibility of constitutionally-required free exercise exemptions.”).

For more on concession theory, I shamelessly suggest my more recent article, “Rehabilitating Concession Theory,” 66 Okla. L. Rev. 327 (2014) (“the reports of concession theory's demise have been greatly exaggerated”).  And if you find that of interest, you can check out my latest SSRN posting, “Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory.”

March 30, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Religion, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 23, 2014

The Weekly BLT for March 23, 2014

I'm trying out a new weekly blog post theme, "The Weekly BLT," wherein I highlight a few interesting business law tweets that I've come across in the past week that have not yet made it to the BLPB.

 

 

March 23, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Financial Markets, LLCs, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, March 9, 2014

“Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory”

I have posted the first rough draft of my latest project, “Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory,” on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This Essay examines three related propositions: (1) Voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) fails to effectively advance the agenda of a meaningful segment of CSR proponents; (2) None of the three dominant corporate governance theories – director primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production theory – support mandatory CSR as a normative matter; and, (3) Corporate personality theory, specifically concession theory, can be a meaningful source of leverage in advancing mandatory CSR in the face of opposition from the three primary corporate governance theories. In examining these propositions, this Essay makes the additional claims that Citizens United: (A) supports the proposition that corporate personality theory matters; (B) undermines one of the key supports of the shareholder wealth maximization norm; and (C) highlights the political nature of this debate.

March 9, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 26, 2014

More or Less?

As previously noted on this blog, 44 law professors filed an amicus brief in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., outlining several corporate law issues in the arts-and-craft store chain’s request for a religious exemption from complying with contraceptive requirements in the Affordable Care Act.  That brief prompted several responses and sparked a corporate law debate, which is being recapped and weighed in on at Business Law Prof Blog (see earlier thoughtful posts: here, here, and here by Stefan Padfield and Haskell Murray).   

So what is at stake in this case? Religious exemptions for corporations. The role of benefit corporations and other hybrid, triple bottom line entities.  The classic entity theory vs. aggregate theory debate of how do we treat the legal fiction of individuals acting through businesses and businesses acting, in part, on behalf of people.  The role and future of Corporate Social Responsibility generally. Corporate personhood.  Corporate constitutional rights. And existential questions like can corporations pray? You know, easy stuff. 

CSR. Our laws set the floor; they establish the minimum that social actors must do and that other members in our society can expect to receive.  Corporate social responsibility asks companies to do more than their minimum legal obligations and to do so for a host of reasons, some of which may be religious.  The owners of Hobby Lobby can elect a corporate board that will authorize the company to donate to religious charities, to reimburse employees for religious expenses, to provide paid leave for a mission trip, or to not operate on Sundays. (Who here hasn’t craved a chicken biscuit on a road trip only to realize that Chick-Fil-A is closed on Sunday? Just us in the south?). Under what I will call the standard state corporate law regime, corporations can take actions like increasing their use of renewable energy sources, implementing diversity programs for women and minorities, refusing to support tobacco products and other actions that are in line with CSR.  Whether for religious or environmental or other conscience-driven reasons, a corporation may take these actions and the directors of the corporation (under whose governance the acts took place) are protected by the business judgment rule in the event that any shareholder challenges the program or expenditure as a form of waste or conflict of interest. 

Benefit Corporations & Hybrid Entities.  For companies incorporated in states with benefit corporate statutes or laws that recognize hybrid entities interested in seeking (but not always maximizing) profits and other goals, there is even greater protection.  These entities contain provisions in their charters identifying their “other” purpose, the shareholders are on notice of the dual pursuit and the corporate actions are protected by statutes recognizing this charter-based exception to profit maximization.  In the event a shareholder sues for waste or conflicts of interest, not only is the business judgment rule available to protect the corporate actors, but the validity of the corporate action is strengthened by the special legislation. [This in no way captures the full scope of benefit corporation and hybrid entity legislation, but this post is about religious exemptions for corporations, so please excuse the over simplification here.]

Hobby Lobby.  The owners of Hobby Lobby are not asking to do more, rather they are asking to do less.  Hobby Lobby want to provide less than the standards established in the Affordable Care Act, and less than their competitors will be required to provide.  Who would complain if Hobby Lobby failed to comply with the ACA?  The employees without access to contraceptive medicine, and the federal government.  This isn’t about the business judgment rule and whether owners, acting through boards of directors, can run companies in line with their view of religious or social or environmental consciousness.  This case asks can the religious beliefs of owners of a corporation entitle that corporation to do less under the law and as compared to their competitors.  On these grounds, deciding against a religious based exemption for Hobby Lobby does no harm to CSR or benefit corporations. 

The Hypothetical.  If the privately held religious belief of owners can change legal obligations for corporate actors, this could pose a threat to the stability, reliability and uniformity of the floor that the law sets. Poking a hole in the floor for religious exemptions based upon the owners’ religious beliefs may seem like a small concession in the Hobby Lobby case.  If religion is a means to opt-out of regulations and requirements, and if doing so could lower costs, shortcut compliance obligations and otherwise provide a competitive edge there will be robust incentives for businesses to claim such an exception in a likely wide array of issues. 

The Horrible.  The sacred ground of religion has long been an unhappy refuge for arguments in support of racial, gender, religious and sexual-orientation discrimination.  Every major social movement that I can think of has met resistance shrouded in religious beliefs.  The right for women to vote (and the continuing progress towards equality), desegregating schools, the Civil Rights Acts, and our most modern example:  gay rights.  Consider the law that the Arizona Legislature passed last week that would exempt businesses refusing to serve same-sex couples from civil liability on the grounds of a religious exemption.  Substantially similar legislation is pending in Georgia.

Religion, if we have it, should call us to do more and to be better.  As individuals, we may disagree about what “more” and “better” means.  I have no doubt that the owners of Hobby Lobby believe that their stance on birth control is consistent with their view of “more” and “better”.  As individuals, they can express that value in many ways.  As owners of a corporation they can express those values by electing directors that will govern the company and possibly pursue corporate donations to abstinence charities, promote natural family planning among employees via posters in the break room, and other avenues.  The individual values of the owners should not be used to excuse the corporation from compliance with the legal standard.  Individual religious views should not lower the minimum standards for corporate actions in this context, or others.

 

 -Anne Tucker

February 26, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Current Affairs, Religion | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, February 23, 2014

The Separation of Church and For-Profit Corporations

My co-blogger Haskell Murray recently posted “Religion, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Hobby Lobby” and asked me to respond, which I am happy to do. I will admit that I am still developing my thoughts on the issues raised by Haskell’s post, so what follows is a bit jumbled but still gives a sense of why I currently oppose for-profit corporations being permitted to evade regulation by pleading religious freedom (if you have not read Haskell’s post, please do so before proceeding):

1. Corporate power threatens democracy. Corporations and other limited liability entities have been controversial since their creation because, among other things, the combination of limited liability, immortality, asset partitioning, etc., makes them incredible wealth and power accumulation devices. Of course, on the one hand, this is precisely why we have them – so that investors are willing to contribute capital they would never contribute if they risked being personally liable as partners, and thus unique economic growth is spurred, a rising tide then lifts all ships, and so on. On the other hand, because of their unique ability to consolidate power, corporations are aptly considered by many to be one of Madison’s feared factions that threaten to undermine the very democracy that supports their creation and growth:

Besides the danger of a direct mixture of religion and civil government, there is an evil which ought to be guarded against in the indefinite accumulation of property from the capacity of holding it in perpetuity by ecclesiastical corporations. The establishment of the chaplainship in Congress is a palpable violation of equal rights as well as of Constitutional principles. The danger of silent accumulations and encroachments by ecclesiastical bodies has not sufficiently engaged attention in the U.S.

[More after the break.]

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February 23, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Financial Markets, Food and Drink, Haskell Murray, Religion, Social Enterprise, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, February 2, 2014

Gedicks & Van Tassell on “RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion"

Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell recently posted “RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion” on SSRN (HT: Robert Esposito).  Here is excerpt of the abstract:

Litigation surrounding use of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to exempt employers from the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate” is moving steadily towards resolution in the U.S. Supreme Court. Both opponents and supporters of the mandate, however, have overlooked the Establishment Clause limits on such exemptions.

The heated religious-liberty rhetoric aimed at the mandate has obscured that RFRA is a “permissive” rather than “mandatory” accommodation of religion — a government concession to religious belief and practice that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause. Permissive accommodations must satisfy Establishment Clause constraints, notably the requirement that the accommodation not impose material burdens on third parties who do not believe or participate in the accommodated practice.

While it is likely that RFRA facially complies with the Establishment Clause, it violates the Clause’s limits on permissive accommodation as applied to the mandate. RFRA exemptions from the mandate would deny the employees of an exempted employer their ACA entitlement to contraceptives without cost-sharing, forcing employees to purchase with their own money contraceptives and related services that would otherwise be available to them at no cost beyond their share of the healthcare insurance premium.

Neither courts nor commentators seem aware that a line of permissive accommodation decisions prohibits shifting of material costs of accommodating anti-contraception beliefs from the employers who hold them to employees who do not. Many of the Court's decisions under the Free Exercise Clause and Title VII also exhibit this concern with cost-shifting accommodations. Yet, one federal appellate court has already mistakenly dismissed this cost-shifting as irrelevant to the permissibility of RFRA exemptions from the mandate.

The impermissibility of cost-shifting under the Establishment Clause is a threshold doctrine whose application is logically prior to all of the RFRA issues on which the courts are now focused: If RFRA exemptions from the mandate violate the Establishment Clause, then that is the end of RFRA exemptions, regardless of whether for-profit corporations are persons exercising religion, the mandate is a substantial burden on employers’ anti- contraception beliefs, or the mandate is not the least restrictive means of protecting a compelling government interest.

February 2, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, February 1, 2014

“To be, or not to be,” is an important question, but so is, “What to be?”

A lot of chatter this week surrounding the submission of an amicus brief filed in the Hobby Lobby case by corporate and criminal law professors in support of petitioners.  In particular, Stephen Bainbridge has written a series of posts critical of the brief:

 

 

I was one of the 44 law professors that signed on to the amicus brief, and I also have a tremendous amount of respect for Prof. Bainbridge, so I’ve been very interested in what he’s had to say.  However, I’m also currently trying to advance my latest writing project (relatedly, on the intersection of corporate governance theories, theories of corporate personality, and corporate social responsibility) to some semblance of completeness that I can submit to journals with a straight face in the next few weeks.  Thus, I am going to pass on addressing Bainbridge’s critiques for now – except for briefly responding to his claim that there is some inconsistency between arguing that the Supreme Court should respect corporate personhood in Hobby Lobby (the brief states: “this legal separateness—sometimes called legal ‘personhood’—has been the very basis of corporate law at least since the 18th Century”) while at the same time bemoaning the application of that corporate personhood in Citizens United (while I won’t speak for my co-signers, I think it is fair to assume many are critics of Citizens United and I personally have expressed my disagreement with the opinion in various places, including here).

By way of background, the three primary theories of corporate personality are aggregate theory, real entity theory, and concession theory (AKA artificial entity theory).  At the risk of over-simplifying, aggregate theory and real entity theory essentially presume corporations stand in the shoes of natural persons (e.g., shareholders in the former case, and the board of directors in the latter), and thus have available to them all the rights of natural persons in resisting government regulation.  Concession theory, on the other hand, views the corporation as fundamentally a state creation, and presumes the state has the right to regulate its creation as it sees fit.  Importantly, concession theory does not preclude granting particular rights of natural persons to corporate entities, and it certainly doesn’t preclude doing so by including “corporation” in the definition of “person” for purposes of a particular rule, regulation, or statute.  It just doesn’t presume that all the rights of natural persons are automatically transferred to corporations upon their creation.

I focus on presumptions, and the concomitant allocation of burdens of proof, because I believe these issues were critical in Citizens United.  The majority presumed that corporations were entitled to the same political free speech rights as natural persons, and placed the burden of proving that this right was subject to limitation on the basis of corporate status alone on the state.  Meanwhile, the dissent argued that the burden was on those claiming free political speech rights for corporations and presumed the legislative determinations regarding the corrupting influence of corporate spending on politics were sufficient to uphold the relevant regulation.  Accordingly, while many commentators disagree as to whether aggregate or real entity theory animated the Citizens United majority, most of those to have considered the issue agree it was one of two (I believe the key line in the opinion is: “[T]he Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity.”).  On the other hand, I believe most – though certainly not all -- of the commentators that have considered the issue appear to agree that concession theory animated the dissent’s position (despite the dissent’s express protestations to the contrary). 

Thus, I believe the better characterization of the relevant issue is not whether corporations are persons (we can all likely agree that corporations are entitled to personhood rights at the very least for a variety of relatively non-controversial purposes), but rather which rights of personhood corporations should be entitled to.  In Hobby Lobby, the issue is not whether corporations should ever be deemed persons under the law, but rather whether corporations should be deemed legal persons that are entitled to rights of religious freedom identical to natural persons and, if so, in what situations and to what extent.  I see no inconsistency in arguing that corporate personhood should not include religious freedom rights co-extensive with natural persons while at the same time arguing that corporate personhood should also not include political free speech rights co-extensive with natural persons.

February 1, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporations, Current Affairs, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 30, 2014

What does a for-profit corporation believe and should it receive a religious exemption?

Professor Caroline Mala Corbin from University of Miami has written an interesting article on the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialites Corp. cases before the Supreme Court. Her abstract is below:

Do for-profit corporations have a right to religious liberty? This question is front and center in two cases before the Supreme Court challenging the Affordable Care Act’s “contraception mandate.” Whether for-profit corporations are entitled to religious exemptions is a question of first impression. Most scholars writing on this issue argue that for-profit corporations do have the right to religious liberty, especially after the Supreme Court recognized that for-profit corporations have the right to free speech in Citizens United. 

This essay argues that for-profit corporations should not – and do not – have religious liberty rights. First, there is no principled basis for granting religious liberty exemptions to for-profit corporations. For-profit corporations do not possess the inherently human characteristics that justify religious exemptions for individuals. For-profit corporations also lack the unique qualities that justify exemptions for churches. Citizens United fails to provide a justification as its protection for corporate speech is based on the rights of audiences and not the rights of corporate speakers. Second, as a matter of current law, neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the Religious Freedom Restoration Act recognizes the religious rights of for-profit corporations. Finally, corporate religious liberty risks trampling on the employment rights and religious liberty of individual employees.

 

 

January 30, 2014 in Business Associations, Constitutional Law, Corporations, Current Affairs, Ethics, Marcia L. Narine, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, January 22, 2014

Anniversary

Today marks the 4 year anniversary of the Citizens United decision and tomorrow marks the 41st anniversary of Roe v. Wade.  Corporations, the First Amendment, and Reproductive choice/freedom may have seemed like odd bed-fellows, but all three issues come together in the upcoming Hobby Lobby case challenging the application of access to birth control required under the health care law to a corporation whose owners oppose the extension on the grounds of religious freedom. 

Consider this a teaser on the issues offered up in the Hobby Lobby case.    Law professors are filing amicus briefs on this case coming down on either side of the issue.  One group arguing that religious views of the owners should not protect the corporation from complying and another arguing that the religious views of the owners can be imputed to the corporation and thus exempt it from compliance.  This is set to be a fantastically interesting issue, and hopefully one that will generate some healthy debate on this blog.  There will be more to come from me on this issue, but for now...consider this a teaser (or a place holder).

And if you crave more substance and internet sleuthing this afternoon, let me refer you to a list of 7 charts that is making its rounds in the blogosphere today. These charts detail the consequences of Citizens United in the last four years.  The results are not surprising and include:increased outside spending, conservative spending outpacing liberal spending 2:1, more political ads and occurring earlier, and decreased disclosures.  You can see the version posted by the Washington Post here.

-Anne Tucker

January 22, 2014 in Business Associations, Anne Tucker, Constitutional Law, Religion | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, January 18, 2014

Huhn on the Implications of Daimler AG for Hobby Lobby

My Akron colleague Will Huhn just posted “2013-2014 Supreme Court Term: Court's Decision in Daimler AG v. Bauman, No. 11-965: Implications for the Birth Control Mandate Cases?” over at his blog wilsonhuhn.com.  Here is a brief excerpt, but you should go read the entire post:

On January 14, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in favor of Daimler AG (the maker of Mercedes-Benz), ruling that the federal courts in California lacked personal jurisdiction over Daimler to adjudicate claims for human rights violations arising in Argentina. The ruling of the Court may have implications for the birth control mandate cases pending before the Court in Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties…. In those cases the owners of two private, for-profit business corporations contend that their individual rights to freedom of religion "pass through" to the corporation -- that the corporations are in effect the "agents" of the principal shareholders, and that this is why the corporations have the right to deny their employees health insurance coverage for birth control. In Daimler the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that MBUSA was the "agent" of Daimler AG, and that the substantial business presence of MBUSA in California could be imputed to Daimler AG. The Supreme Court was not persuaded by this agency analysis…. It would be anomalous for the Court to adhere to corporate identity for purposes of personal jurisdiction and liability for tort, and yet to ignore corporate identity to give effect to the personal religious choices of stockholders.

January 18, 2014 in Business Associations, Agency, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Religion, Stefan J. Padfield | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 16, 2014

1 Report, 4 Issues

(1) Corporate Disclosures, (2) Indirect Advocacy, (3) Climate Change, and (4) Institutional Investors 

The Union of Concerned Scientists, an alliance of more than 400,000 citizens and scientists, released a report today: Tricks of the Trade: How Companies Influence Climate Policy Through Business and Trade Associations.  The report is based on data collected by CDP, an international not-for-profit that “works with investors, companies and governments to drive environmental disclosure”.  CDP administers an annual climate reporting questionnaire to more than 5,000 companies worldwide with the support of various institutional investors (722 institutional investors with over $87 trillion in capital). The 2013 questionnaire asked companies about climate policy influence, including board membership in trade associations, lobbying, and donations to research organizations.

Tricks of the Trade highlights outsourced political influence through the use of trade associations and interest groups that lobby on behalf of their members rather than the members engaging in these activities in their own name.  The report highlights 3 main issues:  (1) lack of transparency, (2) incongruence with the outsourced message among responding companies, and (3) the continued role that the Citizens United decision has on corporate spending and political discourse.

 Transparency:

  • Of the 5,557 companies that received the climate change questionnaire (through either CDP’s request or their voluntary participation), 2,323 responded, and only 1,824 (33 percent) of them replied publicly.
  • Ninety-seven Global 500 companies—the top 500 companies in the world by revenue—including Apple, Amazon, and Facebook, did not participate.  
  • In the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500—a market value index of large U.S. companies—166 companies, including Comcast and the Southern Company, did not participate.

The report highlights that proposed rules before the SEC for corporate political spending disclosures would address some transparency concerns and notes that the SEC has no plans to address this issue in 2014.  This is no small issue considering the number of institutional investors and amount of invested capital ($87 trillion, with a "T"!!) behind this initiatve.  CDP sends its survey to corporations on behalf of the signatory institutional investors who are shareholders.

These shareholder requests for information encourage companies to account for and be transparent about environmental risk. Transparency of this data throughout the global market place ensures the financial community has access to the best available corporate climate change information to help drive investment flows towards a low carbon and more sustainable economy

 Incongruence:

  • Ninety-five companies noted that at least one of their trade groups had a climate policy position that was partially or wholly inconsistent with their own, for a total of 172 such responses across all trade groups.

The 2013 questionnaire, while focused on climate change issues, is relevant to broader questions of corporate political influence and spending, the SEC’s agenda for 2014, and the role of corporate disclosures.   If you are teaching corporations/BA this semester, this 12 page report raises several issues that, in my opinion, would elicit a great classroom discussion when you get to the role and purpose of corporations,  sections on the disclosure regime of our securities markets, and even on shareholder rights to information.

-Anne Tucker

January 16, 2014 in Business Associations, Anne Tucker, Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Financial Markets, Securities Regulation, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, January 9, 2014

Aaron Rodgers, Intel and the “Scarlet Letter” of Dodd-Frank- Part 2

On Tuesday, I attended the oral argument for the National Association of Manufacturers v. SEC—the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals case. Trying to predict what a court will do based on body language and the tone of questioning at oral argument, especially in writing, is foolish and crazy, but I will do so anyway.

I am cautiously optimistic that the appellate court will send the conflict mineral rule back to the SEC to retool based on the three arguments generated the most discussion. First, the judges appeared divided on whether the SEC  had abused its discretion by changing the statutory language requiring issuers to report if minerals “did” originate from the DRC or surrounding companies rather than the current SEC language of “may have” originated. This language would sweep in products in which there is a mere possibility rather than a probability of originating in covered countries. One judge grilled the SEC like I grill my law students about the actual statutory language and legislative intent, while another appeared satisfied with SEC’s explanation that issuers did not have to file if the lack of certainty was due to a small number of responses from suppliers or for lack of information. My prediction- if the SEC loses, they will have to rewrite this section to comport with Congressional intent.

The second main issue concerned the SEC’s failure to apply a de minimis exception to the rule. NAM’s lawyer provided a real-life example of a catalyst used in producing automobiles that sometimes washed away during production but at other times could leave just one part per million of tin in the finished product. Judge Srinivasan pointed out that if the mineral could wash away but the product could still function, then perhaps it wasn’t “necessary” as the law required for reporting. Judge Sentelle raised a concern about “breaking new ground” by requiring the SEC to enact a de minimis exception. The SEC bolstered its argument by indicating that no commentator that had proposed such an exception during the rulemaking process  had provided a workable threshold. My prediction- this is a toss up. This was the SEC’s most successful argument of the day.

Many commenters believed that the third argument—the First Amendment claim-- was spurious and/or a Hail Mary plea when NAM first raised it last year. Yet this argument provided the most interesting discussion of the day, especially since Judge Randolph specifically reminded NAM’s counsel to discuss it and not save it for rebuttal as NAM had planned. NAM argued that by requiring companies to declare on their websites that their products were not “DRC-Conflict Free,” thereby denouncing their own products, this amounted to a “scarlet letter.” NAM conceded that the government could ask for the information and could post it, but maintained that requiring companies to “shame” themselves was unconstitutional. This argument gained traction with both judges Randolph and Sentelle, who called it “compelled speech.” The judges also questioned the SEC on: whether the SEC had ever or should focus its efforts on communications to consumers; how the SEC would enforce the rule, asking whether a group of scientists would do product inspections; how this rule would achieve Congress’ intent of securing the safety of the Congolese people; whether the government could require companies to indicate whether they had used child labor overseas; and whether the intent of the shaming provision was to cause a boycott- bingo! My prediction- the SEC loses on this provision.

If the SEC does have to go back to the drawing board, it will be interesting to see how current Chair Mary Jo White influences the rule given her public statements about the rule being out of the SEC’s purview. I hope that the European Commission, which has done an impact analysis, will pay close attention as they roll out their own conflict minerals legislation to the EU.

Many have asked what I think the government should have done to help the people of Congo. Put simply, the government could and should fund and enforce the DRC Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006, which has over a dozen provisions addressing security sector reform, minerals, infrastructure and other matters that could provide a more holistic solution. Next week, I will blog about other ways that the government could incentivize business to address human rights issues around the world.

January 9, 2014 in Constitutional Law, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Ethics, Financial Markets, Marcia L. Narine, Securities Regulation | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, January 7, 2014

Citizens United 4 Year Anniversary Symposium: February 28, 2014

The following information was shared with me by my friend, Professor Ciara Torres-Spelliscy at Stetson Law.  On February 28, 2014, Stetson Law in Gulfport, FLorida, will host: 

Taking Stock of Citizens United: How the Law Has (and Has Not) Changed Four Years Later.

Panel One: Quantifying the Problem of Money in Politics
Citizens United opened a new avenue for corporations and unions to spend in politics by purchasing political ads. This ability to spend was added to older avenues of political activity such as corporate and union segregated funds (SSFs or PACs), lobbying and direct contributions in certain states. The question of what political spenders get in return for this largess remains an open one.
 
Panel Two: The Risk of Corruption Collides with Free Speech
From a Constitutional law perspective, the courts have long wrestled with the placing political spending into a single paradigm. On one hand, courts have recognized that running for political office is costly and fundraising implicates First Amendment concerns such as the freedom of speech and association. On the other hand, campaign spending can be a corrupting force in the democratic process. Layered on top of this is an impulse by the courts to treat different political spenders in distinct ways: state contractors, corporations, unions, nonprofits, political parties, PACs and individuals may find themselves subject to distinct legal rules in the same election.

Panel Three: Making New Rules that Help Taxpayers, Voters, Investors, Employees and Members
While Citizens United limited the scope of solutions that are available for campaign finance legislation, the decision leaves ample room for a wide range of reforms in the realm of tax law, employment law, corporate law and securities law. And the barriers to reform that Citizens United has constructed has inspired several legal and grassroots groups to work on a Constitutional Amendment to overturn the decision.

Registration is available online.

Before joining the academy, Professor Torres-Spelliscy worked as counsel in the Democracy Program of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.  The symposium line up contains a who's who of corporate political spending and first amendment scholars (include John Coates & Lawrence Lessig from Harvard) and industry experts.  The panels will provide balanced and in-depth discussions of the impact of Citizens United 4 years later.

 -Anne Tucker

January 7, 2014 in Business Associations, Anne Tucker, Constitutional Law, Current Affairs | Permalink | Comments (0)