Wednesday, July 27, 2016
Just in case you haven't gotten the message yet: Delaware law means fiduciary duty freedom of contract for alternative entities. In May 2016, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld a waiver of fiduciary duties in a master limited partnership. In Employees Retirement System of the City of St. Louis v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc., Vice Chancellor Glasscock upheld challenges to an interested transaction (sale of a pipeline asset to an affiliated entity) that was reviewed, according to the partnership agreement, by a special committee and found to be fair and reasonable. The waiver has been described as "ironclad" to give you a sense of how straight forward this decision was. No close call here.
Vice Chancellor Glasscock's letter opinion starts:
Delaware alternative entity law is explicitly contractual;1 it allows parties to eschew a corporate-style suite of fiduciary duties and rights, and instead to provide for modified versions of such duties and rights—or none at all—by contract. This custom approach can be value enhancing, but only if the parties are held to their bargain. Where equity holders in such entities have provided for such a custom menu of rights and duties by unambiguous contract language, that language must control judicial review of entity transactions, subject only to the cautious application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Such is the case in the instant matter, which involves a master limited partnership (“MLP”) created with interested transactions involving the general partner as part of its business model.....
The Defendants point out that the [transaction] was approved by a special committee (the “Conflicts Committee”), which approval, in accordance with the partnership agreement, creates a conclusive presumption that the transaction is fair and reasonable to the Partnership. I find that the Conflicts Committee’s approval, in these circumstances, precludes judicial scrutiny of the substance of the transaction and grant the Defendants’ Motion.
Importantly, the contractual safe harbor for interested transactions established a process which, if followed, created a fair and reasonable transaction outside of judicial scrutiny and without recourse by the other partners. The court found that the partnership agreement precluded a good faith analysis of the Conflicts Committee's review and limited the court's review purely to matters of process.
The relevant portions of the Special Approval provision, importantly, are silent as to good faith.....According to the contractual language, the Special Approval of a duly constituted and fully informed Conflicts Committee is conclusive evidence that such transaction is fair and reasonable, and such approval is, therefore, preclusive of further judicial review. The Plaintiff does not allege that the Conflicts Committee was not duly constituted—that is, directors who are neither security holders nor employees or officers of the General Partner or its affiliates. Nor does the Plaintiff allege that the Conflicts Committee was not fully informed. Thus, the approval here is conclusive that the [transaction] is “fair and reasonable” to TCP. According to the explicit language of the LPA, when a conflicted transaction is deemed “fair and reasonable” by the terms of the agreement, such conflicted transaction is incapable of breaching the LPA.
Get the message? LOUD and CLEAR!
The opinion contains more analysis and excerpts of the relevant portions of partnership agreement. Look for an excerpt on this case in my ChartaCourse (electronic platform) Business Organizations casebook.
Wednesday, July 20, 2016
Last week on the blog I featured the smart book Empire of the Fund by sharing excerpts from a conversation with author, Professor William Birdthistle. In discussing the book, he shared with me some insights on writing a book: its process, genesis and use in the classroom. I am fascinated by other's people writing process in the continual effort to improve my own.
writing a book...
[W]riting a book was more of a challenge than I expected, even though I told myself it was simply a collection of law review articles. It turns out that the blinking cursor on an empty screen is more taunting when you're obliged to fill hundreds of pages. Brief stints of productivity need to be repeated again and again and, until it all exists, nothing really exists. I developed a convoluted system of drafting notes, then sitting down with a research assistant to record a chat about those notes, then working that recording into an outline. That process still left me with plenty of writing to do, but I found it much easier to expand, polish, and revise those outlines than to fight the demon blank page.
Talking through your ideas forces you to synthesize the materials. It also retains the humanity behind the arguments. This method makes a lot of sense when you read Professor Birdthistle's book because it feels like he is talking to you— just in a way that is smarter, better organized and more pithy than most of us can muster in the average conversation. His book doesn't read like the belabored, bloated, and laborious sections that all too often find their way in law review articles (my own included).
genesis for the book...
The contents, to a large extent, have actually come from the classroom -- as these materials serve as the syllabus for a seminar I've taught for a few years. The seminar, called Investment Funds, is almost always popular: in a go-go market, all the students want to hear about private equity and hedge funds; then in downturns, I get a sober audience of students who want to know more about their 401(k)s.
application to broader classes...
I often work this material in to my BusOrg and SecReg classes too: so, I emphasize the role of funds on topics like corporate purpose (does charitable giving look different if the corporate funds might otherwise go to 401(k) holders), proxy contests (in which mutual funds are major institutional investors but often conspicuously absent from these fights), shorting (where the securities are often borrowed from mutual funds and ETFs), and behavioral versus neoclassical theory (quoting heavily from a wonderful disagreement between Judges Easterbrook and Posner in Jones v. Harris before it went to the Supreme Court).
Since almost all students will soon be figuring out their own 401(k) and mutual fund investments, I've found that it's easy to make business issues far more salient to their lives. Even to the saints who'll soon have a 403(b).
the role of behavioral work...
Finally, I highlight Professor Birdthistle's observations about changes to the corporate law landscape made space for a book like his to contribute, in a serious way, to the academic and popular debate about the efficacy of the mutual fund market.
I've been struck by the change in our intellectual and academic disposition towards investing problems. I've been in the academy for a decade now and, when I began, the rational investor model was so thoroughgoing that it was difficult to discuss problems of individual investing. Many conversations -- and job talks -- required a first-principles exegesis about how this market might possibly be anything other than highly efficient. But a tide of behavioral work in recent years has helped explain why investors might struggle, and a good deal of empirical work has concretely shown how they struggle. So conversations today focus more upon solutions rather than on whether there is even a problem.
To this last point, I wonder what ideas and principles, which seem untouchable today, will give way to the next generation's breakthrough. I think is a particularly heartening message for young scholars--not all of the work has been done! Keep at it! And it is an important message for folks who aren't writing in the mainstream. For folks who are passionate about their work, but feeling like their ideas aren't garnering the right cache with the right audiences. This is where you persevere so long as the work is thorough and well researched. Maybe you and your work are contributing to an important intellectual advancement. You could be changing the tides in ways that in presently imperceptible, but significant nonetheless. So as the August submission deadline looms and the summer hours threaten to languish, press on!
Because this post is a compilation of quotes, I now turn to Garrison Keeler to close:
Be well, do good work, and keep in touch.
*Query: Are the best motivational speeches are the ones you write for yourself?
Wednesday, July 13, 2016
Professor William Birdthistle at Chicago-Kent College of Law is publishing his new book, Empire of the Fund with Oxford University Press. A brief introductory video for the book (available here) demonstrates both Professor Birdthistle’s charming accent and talent for video productions (this is obviously not his first video rodeo). Professor Birdthistle has generously provided our readers with a window into the book’s thesis and highlights some of its lessons. I’ll run a second feature next week focusing on the process of writing a book—an aspiration/current project for many of us.
Empire of the Fund is segmented into four digestible parts: anatomy of a fund describing the history and function of mutual funds, diseases & disorders addressing fees, trading practices and disclosures, alternative remedies introducing readers to ETFs, target date funds and other savings vehicles, and cures where Birdthistle highlights his proposals. For the discussion of the Jones v. Harris case alone, I think I will assign this book to my corporate law seminar class for our “book club”. As other reviewers have noted, the book is funny and highly readable, especially as it sneaks in financial literacy. And now, from Professor Birdthistle:
Things that the audience might learn:
The SEC does practically zero enforcement on fees. [pp. 215-216] Even though every expert understands the importance of fees on mutual fund investing, the SEC has brought just one or only two cases in its entire history against advisors charging excessive fees. Section 36(b) gives the SEC and private plaintiffs a cause of action, but the SEC has basically ignored it; even prompting Justice Scalia to ask why during oral arguments in Jones v. Harris? Private plaintiffs, on the other hand, bring cases against the wrong defendants (big funds with deep pockets but relatively reasonable fees). So I urge the SEC to bring one of these cases to police the outer bounds of stratospheric fund fees.
The only justification for 12b-1 fees has been debunked. [pp. 81-83] Most investors don't know much about 12b-1 fees and are surprised by the notion that they should be paying to advertise funds in which they already invest to future possible investors. The industry's response is that spending 12b-1 fees will bring in more investors and thus lead to greater savings for all investors via economies of scale. The SEC's own financial economist, however, studied these claims and found (surprisingly unequivocally for a government official) that, yes, 12b-1 fees certainly are effective at bringing in new investment but, no, funds do not then pass along any savings to the funds' investors. I sketch this out in a dialogue on page 81 between a pair of imaginary nightclub denizens.
Target-date funds are more dangerous than most people realize. [pp. 172-174] Target-date funds are embraced by many as a panacea to our investing problem and have been extremely successful as such. But I point out some serious drawbacks with them. First, they are in large part an end-of-days solution in which we essentially give up on trying to educate investors and encourage them simply to set and forget their investments; that's a path to lowering financial literacy, not raising it (which may be a particularly acute issue if my second objection materializes). Second, TDFs rely entirely on the assumption that the bond market is the safety to which all investors should move as they age; but if we're heading for a historic bear market on bonds (as several intelligent and serious analysts have posited), we'll be in very large danger with a somnolent investing population
Wednesday, June 29, 2016
Former Delaware Chancellor William (Bill) Chandler and Elizabeth Hecker, a fellow lawyer at Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati presented on benefit corporations and Delaware law at the Berle VIII conference. I cannot fully communicate how exciting it was to hear a distillation of Delaware law generally and several opinions specifically from a judge involved in the cases. In short: it was thrilling.
Former Chancellor Chandler discussed the Delaware case law interpretation of shareholder value and its place in analyzing corporate transactions. While these aren't words that he used, I have been thinking a lot about this tension as a question of complimenting or competing. The simple message was that the "inc." behind corporate names means something. But the question, is what does that mean? It signals, among other things, that a Delaware court will invalidate a board of directors' other serving actions only if they are in conflict with shareholder value, but never when it is complimentary. And there is a expanding appreciation of when "other interests" are seen as complimentary to, and not in competition with, shareholder value maximization.
Former Chancellor Chandler reminded us that shareholder value can include long term interests as the Delaware Chancery Court concluded in February 2011 in the Airgas case where Delaware upheld a board's defensive actions taken, in part, on the belief that the offer didn't include the full long-term value. The Airgas opinion is available here. The original $5.9B bid for Airgas, which the BOD said, despite an informed shareholder vote in its favor, didn't capture the full value of the company. The market validated Airgas' board's position and the Delaware court's adoption of that view. Airgas completed its merger with Air Liquide in May, 2016 for $10.3B.
Monday, June 27, 2016
I am still at Berle VIII with Haskell Murray and Anne Tucker. One more day of my June Scholarship and Teaching Tour to go--and I have a final presentation to do. Then, back to Knoxville to stay until late in July. Whew!
As you may recall or know, my Berle appearance this week follows closely on the heels of a talk on the same work (on corporate purpose and litigation risk in publicly held U.S. benefit corporations) that I made at last week's 2016 National Business Law Scholars conference. While I am thinking about this conference, please join me in saving the date for the next one: the 2017 National Business Law Scholars conference. Next year's conference will be held June 8-9 at The University of Utah S. J. Quinney College of Law, with Jeff Schwartz hosting. I will post more information and the call for papers, etc. once I have it.
June 27, 2016 in Anne Tucker, Business Associations, Conferences, Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Corporate Personality, Corporations, CSR, Haskell Murray, Joan Heminway, Research/Scholarhip, Teaching | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, June 22, 2016
Today is the rare day where I feel like a professor. Dressed in jeans and drinking coffee in my office, I have been reading Colin Mayer's book Firm Commitment in advance of the Berle VIII Symposium in Seattle next week (you can also see Haskell's post & Joan's post about Berle). That's not a typo, my agenda for the day is reading. And not for a paper or to prep for class, I am just reading a book--cover to cover. I can hardly contain my joy at this.
I have been struck by the elegantly simple idea that corporations' true benefit is to advance (and therefore) balance commitment and control. I have long viewed the corporate binary as between accountability and control. Under my framework the two are necessary to balance and contribute to the checks and balances within the corporate power puzzle of making the managers, who control the corporation, accountable to the shareholders. Colin Mayer posits that the one directional accountability of the corporation to shareholders without reciprocity of commitment from the shareholders to the corporation is a corrosive element in corporate design.
"The most significant source of failure is the therefore that we have created a system of shareholder value driven companies who detrimental effects regulation is supposed to but fails to correct, and in response we week greater regulation as the only instrument that we believe can address the problem. We are therefore entering a cycle of the pursuit of ever-narrower shareholder interests moderated by steadily more intrusive but ineffective regulation."
In developing the notions of commitment and control, I have found the following passages particularly thought-provoking:
"The financial structure of the corporation is of critical importance...The commitment of owners derives from the capital that is employed in the corporation. What is held within it is fundamentally different from what remains outside as the private property of its owners. What is distributed to owners as dividends is no longer available as protection against adverse financial conditions and what is provided in the form of debt from banks and bondholders as against equity form shareholders is secure only as long as the corporation has the means with which to service it."
"While incentives and control are centre stage in conventional economics, commitment is not. Enhancing choice, competition, and liquidity is the economist's prescription for improving social welfare, and legal contracts, competition policy and regulation are their basic toolkit for achieving it. Eliminate restrictions on consumers' freedom to choose, firms' ability to compete, and financial markets' provision of liquidity and we can all move closer to economic nirvana. Of course, economics recognizes the problems of time inconsistency in us doing today what yesterday we promised we would not conceive of doing today; of reputations in us continuing to do today what we promised to do yesterday for fear of not being able to do it tomorrow, and of capital and collateral in making it expensive for us to deviate from what we said yesterday we would do today and tomorrow. But these are anomalies. Economics does not recognize the fundamental role of commitment in all aspects of our commercial as well as our social lives and the way in which institutions contribute to the creation and preservation of commitment. It does not appreciate the full manner in which choice, competition and liquidity undermine commitment or the fact that institutions are not simply mechanisms for reducing costs of transaction, but on the contrary means to establish and enhance commitment at the expense of choice, competition, and liquidity. Commitment is the subject of soft sentimental sociologists, not of realistic rational economists. The sociologists' are the words of Shakespeare's 'Love all, trust few. Do wrong to none', the economists' those of Lenin: 'Trust is good, control is better.'"
Monday, June 20, 2016
Having helped a few Tennessee bar applicants get straight on their knowledge of agency, unincorporated business associations, and personal property law last Friday at my BARBRI lecture (such a nice group present at the taping to keep me company!), it's now time for me to wrap up my June Scholarship and Teaching Tour with a twofer--a week of travel to two of my favorite U.S. cities: Chicago, for the National Business Law Scholars Conference and Seattle for Berle VIII. At both events, I will present my draft paper (still in process today, unfortunately) on publicly held benefit corporations, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations. Here's the bird's-eye view from the introduction:
Benefit corporations—corporations organized for the express purpose of realizing both financial wealth for shareholders and articulated social or environmental benefits—have taken the United States by storm. With Maryland passing the first benefit corporation statute in 2010, legislative growth of the form has been rapid. Currently, 31 states have passed benefit corporation statutes.
The proliferation of benefit corporation statutes and B Corp certifications can largely be attributed to the active promotional work of B Lab Company, a nonprofit corporation organized in 2006 under Pennsylvania law that supports social enterprise (“B Lab”). B Lab works with individuals and interest groups to generate attention to social enterprise generally and awareness of and support for the benefit corporation form and B Corp certification (a social enterprise seal of approval, of sorts) specifically. B Lab also supplies model benefit corporation legislation, social enterprise standards that may meet the requirements of benefit corporation statutes in various states, and other services to social enterprises.
Benefit corporation statutes have not, by and large, been the entity law Field of Dreams. Despite the legislative popularity of the benefit corporation form, there have not been as many benefit corporation incorporations as one might expect. In the first four years of benefit corporation authority, for example, Maryland reported the existence of fewer than 40 benefit corporations in total. Tennessee’s benefit corporation statute came into effect in January 2016, and as of May 2, 2016, Secretary of State filings evidence the organization of 26 for-profit benefit corporations. However, a review of these filings suggests that well more than half were erroneously organized as benefit corporations. Colorado, another recent adopter of the benefit corporation, does appear to have a large number of filings (90 in total as of June 12, 2016 based on the list of Colorado benefit corporations on the B Lab website). However, as with Tennessee, a number of these listed corporations appear to be erroneously classified. These anecdotal offerings indicate that published lists of benefit corporations—even those constructed from state filings—over-count the number of benefit corporations significantly.
Research for this article identified no publicly held U.S. benefit corporations. For these purposes (and as referenced throughout this article), the term “publicly held” in reference to a corporation is defined to mean a corporation (a) with a class of equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (“1934 Act”), or (b) otherwise required to file periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission under Section 13 of the 1934 Act. Yet, benefit corporations may be subsidiaries of publicly held corporations (as Ben & Jerry's Homemade Inc., New Chapter Inc., and Plum, PBC have demonstrated), and corporations certified as B Corps have begun to enter the ranks of publicly held corporations (perhaps Etsy, Inc. being the most well known to date). It likely is only a matter of time before we will see the advent of publicly held U.S. benefit corporations.
With the likely prospect of publicly held U.S. benefit corporations in mind, this article engages in a thought experiment. Specifically, this article views the publicly held U.S. benefit corporation from the perspective of litigation risk. It first situates, in Part I, the U.S. benefit corporation in its structural and governance context as an incorporated business association. Corporate purpose and the attendant managerial authority and fiduciary duties are the key points of reference. Then, in Part II, the article seeks to identify the unique litigation risks associated with publicly held corporations with the structural and governance attributes of a benefit corporation. These include both state and federal causes of action. The reflections in Part III draw conclusions from the synthesis of the observations made in Parts I and II. The closing thoughts in Part III are intended to be of use to policy makers, academic observers, and advisers of corporations, among others.
As Haskell mentioned in an earlier post, he and Anne and I will be together at the Berle VIII event. What a great way to end my June tour--with my friends and colleagues from the Business Law Prof Blog! I look forward to it.
Thursday, June 16, 2016
8th Annual Berle Symposium - Benefit Corporations and the Firm Commitment Universe - June 27-28, 2016 - Seattle, WA
Three Business Law Prof Blog editors (myself included) are presenting at the upcoming Berle Symposium on June 27-28 in Seattle.
Colin Mayer (Oxford) is the keynote speaker, and I look forward to hearing him present again. I blogged on his book Firm Commitment after I heard him speak at Vanderbilt a few of years ago. The presenters also include former Chancellor Bill Chandler of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Given that Chancellor Chandler's eBay v. Newmark decision is heavily cited in the benefit corporation debates, it will be quite valuable to have him among the contributors. The author of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, Bill Clark, will also be presenting; I have been at a number of conferences with Bill Clark and always appreciate his thoughts from the front lines. Finally, the list is packed with professors I know and admire, or have read their work and am looking forward to meeting.
More information about the conference is available here.
June 16, 2016 in Anne Tucker, Business Associations, Conferences, Corporate Governance, Corporations, CSR, Delaware, Financial Markets, Haskell Murray, Joan Heminway, Law School, Social Enterprise | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, June 15, 2016
Starting 2 weeks ago at Law & Society, I began participating in a series of conversations that can be boiled down to this: Artificial Intelligence and the Law. Even the ABA is on to this story, which means it has reached a peak saturation point. Exciting, scary, confusing, skeptical and a variety of other reactions have been thrown into the conversations across the legal studies gamut from algorithms in parole & criminal sentencing to its use to generate social credit scores (thank you Nizan Packin for opening my eyes to this application). In another LSA shout out, I want to highlight to forthcoming scholarship of Ben Edwards at Barry College where he criticizes the conflicts of interest in investment advise channels. One possible work around he explores is relying on robo-advisors: In the few years since I have looked at digital investment advise, the field has changed, matured, grown! So much so that FINRA has issued a report on digital investment advise, and is unsurprisingly skeptical of the technology application that poses a significant threat to its members (new release synopsis available here). For the uninitiated, check out this run down of popular robo-advisors and Forbes article. Skepticism about the sustainability of low-fee model can be found here; and optimism about its ability to change the world can be found here.
A robo-advisor (robo-adviser) is an online wealth management service that provides automated, algorithm-based portfolio management advice without the use of human financial planners. Robo-advisors (or robo-advisers) use the same software as traditional advisors, but usually only offer portfolio management and do not get involved in more personal aspects of wealth management, such as taxes and retirement or estate planning.
Thursday, June 9, 2016
Keep reading only if you have 3 minutes that you don't care about being productive or relating to business law, at least not directly.
The Federal Election Committee issued a proposed draft of an advisory opinion on a question brought by Huckabee for President, Inc.--the committee responsible for the 2016 presidential campaign of former Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee. The Committee wanted to know if it can use part of a legal defense fund to pay a settlement. The FEC says yes. This isn't an election law blog, so I won't go into the details. The litigation arose over the campaign's use of the song "Eye of the Tiger". The FEC, feeling quite cheeky writes the following:
The complaint, seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleged that 21 the Committee had violated federal copyright law by playing the song “Eye of the Tiger” at a campaign event on September 8, 2015. The Committee, rising up to the challenge of its rival, incurred attorneys’ fees and other expenses in defending itself in that litigation. After briefly relishing the thrill of the fight, the parties settled the lawsuit for an undisclosed amount.
Has the political circus of the 2016 election warped the sense of decorum at the FEC or should we all want to be friends with the lawyers there? I can't decide. But I do know that you should (a) click on the link to the song, and (b) jam away in your office for the next 4 minutes.
You are welcome.
Wednesday, June 8, 2016
If you've been slamming away on a writing deadline then perhaps you've missed the opportunity (like me) to dive into the recent Chancery Court of Delaware Dell appraisal rights opinion (downloadable here). Have no fear, your summary is here.
Vice Chancellor Laster valued Dell’s common stock at $17.62 per share, reflecting a 28% premium above the $13.75 merger price that was paid to Dell shareholders in October 2014 in a going private transaction lead by company-founder Michael Dell. Dell's going private transaction was opposed by Carl Icahn and this juicy, contentious transaction has its own required reading list. When conceding defeat, Carl Icahn sent the following letter to Dell Shareholders:
New York, New York, September 9, 2013
Dear Fellow Dell Inc. Stockholders:
I continue to believe that the price being paid by Michael Dell/Silver Lake to purchase our company greatly undervalues it, among other things, because:
1. Dell is paying a price approximately 70% below its ten-year high of $42.38; and
2. The bid freezes stockholders out of any possibility of realizing Dell’s great potential.
Fast forward nearly 3 years later and it seems Vice Chancellor Laster agrees. VC Laster reached his undervaluation decision despite no finding of significant fault with the company’s directors' conduct or a competing bidder. Instead, VC Laster focused on the fall in the company’s stock price, and a failure to determine the intrinsic value of Dell before negotiating the buyout. The business press and law blogs have exploded with articles, a few of which are highlighted below:
- For a good summary of the ruling see this succinct Delaware Chancery Court blog post and Andrew Ross Sorkin's NY Times article.
- For a good discussion of how appraisal remedies were applied in Dell, see Steven Davidoff Solomon's NY Times article here.
- For a discussion of the increase in shareholder appraisal actions and contributing factors (arbitrage) and the future of appraisal rights, see this ABA article.
Wednesday, June 1, 2016
Readers attending Law & Society in New Orleans at the end of the week should make a note of the following corporate and securities law panels taking place on Friday, June 3rd and Saturday, June 4th.
FRIDAY, JUNE 3
2:45 PM - 4:30 PM
1146—Panel Session—Financial Market Regulation
Room: Salon C, NOLA Marriott
4:45 PM - 6:30 PM
1147—Panel Session—Rulemaking, National and International
Room: Salon C, NOLA Marriott
SATURDAY, JUNE 4
8:15 AM - 10:00 AM
1150—Panel Session—Investors, Consumers, and the Public Interest
Room: Salon C, NOLA Marriott
2:45 PM - 4:30 PM
1152—Panel Session—Corporate Governance and Value
Room: Salon C, NOLA Marriott
2:45 PM - 4:30 PM
2895—Roundtable—Corporate Diversity: Comparative and Critical Perspectives
Room: Galerie 5, NOLA Marriott
4:45 PM - 6:30 PM
1154—Panel Session—Addressing Agency Costs and Corporate Wrongdoing
Room: Salon C, NOLA Marriott
*updated June 1st at 4:20 to include 2 additional panels submitted by a reader (Shlomit Azgad-Tromer)
Thursday June 2nd : Power Business and Legal Practice, 12:45- 2:30 PM
Friday June 3rd : Stakeholders and the Corporation, 4:45-6:30 PM
Wednesday, May 25, 2016
Last week the SEC announced insider trading charges against former-Dean Foods Company board member Thomas C. Davis and professional sports gambler, William “Billy” Walters of Las Vegas. Involved in the case is professional golfer, Phil Mickelson, named as a relief defendant in the case. Davis owed money to Walters and began passing along confidential information first about Dean Foods, and later about Darden Restaurants. Walters passed along his insider knowledge of Dean Foods to Mickelson, who also owed Walters money.
For those unfamiliar,
"the SEC may seek disgorgement from “nominal” or “relief” defendants who are not themselves accused of wrongdoing in a securities enforcement action where those persons or entities (1) have received ill-gotten funds, and (2) do not have a legitimate claim to those funds." S.E.C. v. DCI Telecommunications, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 495, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The SEC issued a statement on Friday detailing the alleged wrong doing by all parties and announcing that "Mickelson will repay the money he made from his trading in Dean Foods because he should not be allowed to profit from Walters’s illegal conduct.”
As most insider trading cases are, the facts are fascinating. This would make a great exam hypo, and I am flagging it for my casebook section on insider trading.
Tuesday, May 17, 2016
Breaking academic news:
Elsevier, a world-leading provider of scientific, technical and medical information products and services, announced today the acquisition of the Social Science Research Network (SSRN)....SSRN will be further developed alongside Mendeley, a London-based free reference manager and scholarly collaboration network owned by Elsevier....
Elsevier provides web-based, digital solutions - among themScienceDirect, Scopus, Elsevier Research Intelligence and ClinicalKey - and publishes over 2,500 journals, including The Lancet and Cell, and more than 33,000 book titles, including a number of iconic reference works. Elsevier is part of RELX Group, a world-leading provider of information and analytics for professional and business customers across industries. http://www.elsevier.com
What does this change mean for publishing authors and researchers? Content will remain free to post and download. Elsevier acquired Mendeley in 2013 creating controversy over Mendeley's continued "trustworthiness" as a part of a for-profit enterprise. Since the acquisition, Mendeley doubled its subscribers from 2.5 to 5 million. Elsevier's interest in SSRN, a profitable site for over 13 years, is primarily in its potential for generating user data and analytics. Integrating SSRN and Mendeley services is predicted to strengthen
"connections between SSRN author pages and Mendeley professional profiles, and workflow connections that allow Mendeley collaborative groups to submit papers for distribution and perhaps eventually review and publication. There will also be other opportunities to strengthen SSRN for its authors, with plans to link preprints on SSRN with Scopus, bringing analytics about article “performance” to SSRN authors, and to bring improved links between working papers and preprints with their eventual published versions."
Would it be too much to hope for a cosmetic overhaul of the website too?
The acquisition raises some interesting questions for those in academics whose scholarly productivity, national reputation and other outputs are increasingly measured with data points provided from sites like SSRN. Changes to the substance of the website may change how those metrics are generated and what they mean. The creation of new metrics available to authors (and schools) may provide for more reportable data points for our annual faculty reports with the questions remaining how useful are those metrics and what do they tell us about the value of ideas?
Tuesday, May 10, 2016
At the 2017 AALS annual meeting, January 3-7 in San Francisco, the AALS Sections on Agency, Partnerships LLCs, and Unincorporated Associations & Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law will hold a joint session on LLCs, New Charitable Forms, and the Rise of Philanthrocapitalism.
In December 2015, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Dr. Priscilla Chan, pledged their personal fortune—then valued at $45 billion—to the Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI), a philanthropic effort aimed at “advancing human potential and promoting equality.” But instead of organizing CZI using a traditional charitable structure, the couple organized CZI as a for-profit Delaware LLC. CZI is perhaps the most notable example, but not the only example, of Silicon Valley billionaires exploiting the LLC form to advance philanthropic efforts. But are LLCs and other for-profit business structures compatible with philanthropy? What are the tax, governance, and other policy implications of this new tool of philanthrocapitalism? What happens when LLCs, rather than traditional charitable forms, are used for “philanthropic” purposes?
From the heart of Silicon Valley, the AALS Section on Agency, Partnerships LLCs, and Unincorporated Associations and Section on Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law will host a joint program tackling these timely issues. In addition to featuring invited speakers, we seek speakers (and papers) selected from this call.
Any full-time faculty of an AALS member or fee-paid school who has written an unpublished paper, is working on a paper, or who is interested in writing a paper in this area is invited to submit a 1- or 2-page proposal by June 1, 2016. The Executive Committees of the Sections will review all submissions and select two papers by July 1, 2016. If selected, a very polished draft must be submitted by November 30, 2016. All submissions and inquiries should be directed to the Chairs of the Sections at the email addresses below:
University of Oregon School of Law
Garry W. Jenkins
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs
John C. Elam/Vorys Sater Professor of Law
Moritz College of Law,State University
Friday, May 6, 2016
With this post I warmly welcome John Linarelli to the Business Law Professor Blog as a guest blogger for the month of May. Professor Linarelli, Chair in Commercial Law at Durham Law School, has crossed the Atlantic and different disciplines throughout his career. His research engages with issues of inequality, specifically focusing on economic and commercial issues. Recent scholarly publications include his forthcoming co-authored book, to be published with Oxford University Press, Beyond Global Capitalism: Reclaiming the Future of International Law and his 2015 article Concept and Contract in the Future of International Law, 67 Rut. U. L. Rev. 61. Interested readers can view Professor Linarelli’s full academic bio and his SSRN page for more information. Look for new BLPB content from Professor Linarelli later this month.
Understanding that American academics and practicing lawyers may be unfamiliar with Durham University, Professor Linarelli provided us with an overview. He writes a helpful introduction and provides a charming view into some different academic traditions:
Durham Law School usually ranks as one of the top 5 law schools in the UK. In the UK-wide Research Excellence Framework (REF) exercise in 2014, of which all university participate, we ranked third. Our students are incredible and a good number go off to the big City of London law firms upon completion of their practice qualifications. Lord Justice Hughes on the UK Supreme Court is an alum. We also run several LLM programmes, including in Corporate Law, International Trade and Commercial Law, European Trade and Commercial Law, and International Law and Governance.
Wednesday, May 4, 2016
Last week, Hamdi Ulukaya, founder and CEO of Chobani, announced a 10% company stock grant to all company employees. Chobani joined the ranks of high profile stock grants including Whole Foods, Starbucks, Apple and Twitter. Stock grants, while more common in tech industries, are a part of hybrid corporate law-employment law conversation on shared ownership. Employee ownership in companies can occur in several different forms such as ERISA-governed benefit plans where the company stock issued or bought as a part of a retirement saving plan. Alternatively, a stock grant may be structured as a bonus plan, a standard compensation, or a vesting employee benefit eligible after threshold years and types of service. All of these plans fall under the rubric of shared ownership. In 2015, the National Center for Employee Benefits estimated that over 9000 companies participated in some form of shared ownership.
In a similar vein, actors in the hit (and record-breaking with 16 Tony Nominations) musical Hamilton have entered into a profit-sharing agreement with producers. The deal is different for these actors, but the sentiment is the same in sharing profits, aligning interests, and promoting employee loyalty.
Shared ownership plans, especially the ERISA-governed ones can have specific tax and financing benefits for companies. Creating a shared ownership plan, however is often focused on creating certain firm-specific benefits such as recruiting and retaining talent, and improving firm performance by aligning interests between employees and the company. The recruitment and retention aspect can be especially valuable to start-up firms that struggle to compete with mature firms on salary and reputation. Empirical studies have found improved workplace performance, on average, for firms with shared capitalism plans, with positive effects observed most strongly when combined with policies such as low supervision, decision-making participation, and competitive pay.
I note these stories with particular interest for several reasons. The first is that I am routinely embarrassed by how little play I give employees in my corporation class . I seem all too happy to ignore this very important piece of the corporate power puzzle, engine for the machine, etc., etc. Second, I have been looking at shared ownership in the context of a recent research project, so look for more on that topic in a separate post once the project progresses. Third, my sense is that social enterprise movement will bring with it greater demands for shared ownership as a means to address social factors such as retirement security, employee autonomy and wage inequality. Look for more of these stories in the headlines and an emphasis on it in scholarship.
Tuesday, May 3, 2016
Submissions: manuscripts or abstracts must be submitted electronically to Professor Michelle Harner, Chair-Elect of the Section on Business Associations, at email@example.com August 24, 2016.
The AALS Section on Business Associations and the AALS Section on Comparative Law are pleased to announce a Call for Papers for a joint program to be held on January 5, 2017, at the AALS 2017 Annual Meeting in San Francisco. The topic of the program is “Business Law in the Global Gig Economy: Legal Theory, Doctrine, and Innovations in the Context of Startups, Scaleups, and Unicorns.”
Startups and entrepreneurs have long played an important role in the U.S. economy. From Henry Ford to Mark Zuckerberg, entrepreneurs have revolutionized the ways in which their customers receive products and services. As Phil Libin, CEO of Evernote, has explained, “There’s lots of bad reasons to start a company. But there’s only one good, legitimate reason, and I think you know what it is: it’s to change the world.”
That philosophy continues today as entrepreneurs disrupt markets and challenge business and legal norms. Traditional notions of the firm, fiduciary duties, contractual bargains, and optimal capital structures may not aptly fit entrepreneurial approaches. Indeed, entrepreneurs’ business models, financing needs, and operational objectives require lawyers and scholars to rethink governance, capital structures, and regulatory schemes that may limit or impede further innovation, both nationally and transnationally.
Wednesday, April 27, 2016
The shimmering mirage of summer has cast its spell on me, which means I am laboring under the delusion that I will have so much more time to do the thinking, learning, and writing that I want to be doing. My work is increasingly dependent upon statistical evaluations that others do, and occasionally involves my own work in the area. Several years ago I attended an empirical workshop for law professors at USC (something like this) taught by Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin that was an instrumental introduction and my only formal foundation in the area. I have the bug and want to learn more! But I don't know the best way to go about it-- piecemeal or full immersion--or even what all is available. I compiled my research below and share the list for interested readers. Comments encouraged by anyone who wants to share their experience with a listed option, general advice, or add to this meager list.
Empirical Skills Resources:
Introduction/Immersion Workshops like:
- George Mason’s empirical workshop
- Duke/Northwestern’s causal inference workshop
- SELS pre-conference empirical training
- Estimate--Michigan State’s summer econometrics workshop
- ICPSR summer offerings –
Free electronic courses:
Recomended text books/books
Epstein/Martin Introduction to Empirical Research
Enroll in a course at your university (audit or pursue another degree) such as basic statistics or an Econometrics course.
Friday, April 22, 2016
The Fulbright Scholar Program offers teaching, research or combined teaching and research awards in over 125 countries for the 2017-2018 academic year. Opportunities are available for college and university faculty and administrators, as well as for legal professionals and independent scholars.
This year, the Fulbright Scholar Program is offering over 90 awards in the field of Law. Exciting opportunities are available in many countries, including but not limited to:
- Brazil: Fulbright Distinguished Chair in International Relations
- Canada: Research Chairs in Governance
- Ghana: Law
- Japan: Study of the United StatesPublish
- Jordan: Public Policy and International Relations
- Kazakhstan: All Disciplines (Law is a preferred discipline)
- Macedonia: Rule of Law, Judiciary Reform and Civil Society
- Norway: International Courts and Tribunals
- Russia: Distinguished Chair in Sustainable Development
- Sweden: Fulbright-Lund University Chair in Public International Law
We recently hosted a webinar on Fulbright opportunities in law. Staff provided an overview of awards open to academics and professionals, and a 2015-16 Fulbright alumnus spoke about his experiences and answered questions. Please follow this link to listen to the recording.
For further awards in the field of Law, please visit our new Opportunities in Law webpage. There you will find award highlights and examples of successful projects in the discipline.
For eligibility factors, detailed application guidelines and review criteria, please follow this link. Interested scholars may also wish to join My Fulbright, a resource center for applicants interested in the program.
Applicants must be U.S. citizens and the current competition will close on August 1, 2016.