Thursday, March 20, 2014

Some light reading just in time for proxy season

It’s proxy season and the Conference Board has released a series of reports on investor engagement and corporate governance. In “The Conference Board Governance Center White Paper: What is the Optimal Balance in the Relative Roles of Management, Directors, and Investors in the Governance of Public Corporations?” the authors provide a 76-page overview of the evolution of US corporate governance, describing key trends and issues.

The report begins by discussing the history of the allocation of roles and responsibilities for governance of public companies. If I thought my law students would read it, I would assign this section to them.  The second part of the paper addresses the legal, social and market trends that have influenced the historical allocation of rights. Specifically, it reviews:

a) the increasing influence of institutional investors resulting from the concentration of ownership in institutional investment, changes in voting rules and practices and more assertive shareholder activism;

b) shifting conceptions about the purpose of the corporation and the duty to maximize corporate value, with a strong emphasis on shareholder wealth maximization;

c) decreased public trust of business leaders following the corporate scandals of 2001-2002 and 2007-2008;

d) federal regulation intended to enhance the influence of shareholders and increase board and management accountability;

e) continuing related to executive compensation and incentives; and

f) the growth of proxy advisory firms in the shareholder voting process. 

Some interesting statistics:

a) in 2013, 25% of all shareholder proposals were sponsored by two individuals and their family members and family trusts;

b) from 2006-2013, 33% of shareholder proposals submitted to Fortune 250 companies were sponsored by investors affiliated with labor; 26% by corporate gadflies; 25% by religious, social impact and public policy organizations; and 15% by other individual investors;

c) 241 activist campaigns were launched in 2012 up from 187 in 2009;

d) 69% of proxy contests against the management of Russell 3000 companies during the 2013 proxy season were launched by activist hedge funds; and

e) one third of the activist hedge fund contests sought full control of the board.

The third part of the report briefly summarizes but does not provide any conclusions about the work of Professors Bainbridge, Stout, Anabtawi, Bebchuk, Laverty, and others. It considers the following questions (but does not answer them):

a) Do federal mandates undermine the benefits of a historically state-driven corporate law?

b) Are further changes to board processes and composition desirable?

c) Should shareholders assume a more active role in corporate governance?

d) Do proxy advisory firms replace, rather than augment, the shareholder voice, and should the proxy advisory industry be subject to greater regulation and oversight?

e) Can changes to voting mechanisms improve the effectiveness of corporate governance?

f) Is short-termism a cause of concern, and is so, what are its causes and remedies?

g) What new challenges are presented by vote decoupling, high-speed trading, and hyper portfolio diversification?

In next week’s post I will discuss the “Guidelines for Engagement” and the “Recommendations of the Task Force on Corporate/Investor Engagement.” In the meantime, I highly recommend downloading these complimentary reports.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/03/some-light-reading-just-in-time-for-proxy-season.html

Business Associations, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Financial Markets, Marcia L. Narine, Securities Regulation, Teaching | Permalink

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