Thursday, November 28, 2013

The Superrich and the SEC

On Saturday evening I leave for Geneva to attend the United Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights with 1,000 of my closest friends including NGOs, Fortune 250 Companies, government entities, academics and other stakeholders.  I plan to blog from the conference next week.  I am excited about the substance but have been dreading the expense because the last time I was in Switzerland everything from the cab fare to the fondue was obscenely expensive, and I remember thinking that everyone in the country must make a very good living. Apparently, according to the New York Times, the Swiss, whom I thought were superrich, "scorn the Superrich," and last March a two-thirds majority voted to ban bonuses, golden handshakes and to require firms to consult with their shareholders on executive compensation. Nonetheless, last week, 65% of voters rejected a measure to limit executive pay to 12 times the lowest paid employee at their company. According to press reports many Swiss supported the measure in principle but did not agree with the government imposing caps on pay.

Meanwhile stateside, next week the SEC closes its comment period on its own pay ratio proposal under Section 953(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act. Among other things, the SEC rule requires companies to disclose: the median of the annual total compensation of all its employees except the CEO; the annual total compensation of its CEO; and the ratio of the two amounts. It does not specify a methodology for calculation but does require the calculation to include all employees (including full-time, part-time, temporary, seasonal and non-U.S. employees), those employed by the company or any of its subsidiaries, and those employed as of the last day of the company’s prior fiscal year.  A number of bloggers have criticized the rule (see here for example), business groups generally oppose it, and the agency has been flooded with tens of thousands of comment letters already.

The SEC must take some action because Congress has dictated a mandate through Dodd-Frank.  It can’t just listen to the will of the people (many of whom support the rule) like the Swiss government did.  It will be interesting to see what the agency does. After all two of the commissioners voted against the rule, and one has publicly spoken out against it.  But the SEC does have some discretion. The question is how will it exercise that discretion and will the agency once again face litigation as it has with other Dodd-Frank measures where business groups have challenged its actions (proxy access, resource extraction and conflict minerals, for example). More important, will it achieve the right results? Will investors armed with more information change their nonbinding say-on-pay votes or switch out directors who overpay underperforming or unscrupulous executives? If not, then will this be another well-intentioned rule that does nothing to stop the next financial crisis?

Business Associations, Corporate Governance, Corporations, Current Affairs, Ethics, Financial Markets, Marcia Narine Weldon, Securities Regulation | Permalink


I suppose if there was some evidence that excessive CEO pay had anything to do with the financial crisis, then a measure intended to reduce CEO pay might conceivably have something to do with preventing the next financial crisis. Of course, there is no such evidence and no one thinks that this proposed rule has anything at all to do with preventing another crisis. Its sole purpose is to give the labor unions some leverage in negotiating pay packages for their members. Why that would be in the best interests of shareholders beats me.

Posted by: Douglas Levene | Dec 4, 2013 5:33:29 AM

Post a comment