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August 15, 2006
London's AIM
Entrepreneurs in the United States depend on venture capital for funding the formative years of their operations. The willingness of venture capitalists, angels and venture capital funds, to place funds with portfolio companies depends on predictions of high rates of return for these high risk investments. The most robust of these predictions depend on the anticipated sale of the company within the next seven to ten years to the public, an Initial Public Offering (IPO). Since the number of IPOs has been down for the past several years, venture capital funding has been corresponding flat.
The fundamental reason for the small numbers of IPOs is, of course, the reluctance of public investors to buy IPO stock. The technology bubble burst in 2000 and investors still remember their losses in the IPO industries. But the IPO market would be more active if IPOs were not so expensive. IPOs cost too much to do and, once done, a company has much higher ongoing costs. The higher ongoing costs are a significant bone of contention, particularly with the implementation of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Here I want to focus, however, on the costs of the IPO itself.
In the United States a small company has to pay too much in fees and discounts when it sells its stock to the public. A small company selling fifty-three million dollars of its equity, as measured by the market price at the end of the first day of public trading, can net only forty-five million dollars in cash or less. Moreover, perversely those who charge to do the IPOs, underwriters, are uninterested in the smaller offerings; underwriters do not make enough money on the small offerings to justify their expenditure of time on them. A small company that wants to raise twenty-five million dollars cannot find an underwriter; a fifty million dollar IPO is a practical minimum.
The London Stock Exchange is successfully marketing a low cost public offering process to small companies, entitled the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). AIM caters to companies in the micro to small cap universe, offering access and liquidity comparable to NASDAQ at a lower total cost to the issuer. Small companies can raise capital on the AIM with fees and underwriting charges that are forty percent of those incurred in the United States markets. Under-pricing losses are less as well. The listing process takes only eight to twelve weeks, compared to the six to eight months required in the United States.
The AIM market has limited listing requirements. A listed company must have a “nominated advisor” and declare its working capital. The Nominated Advisor (Nomad) vouches for the company, determining its suitability for AIM, and will do due diligence, but the requirements are less stringent than those for a full listing. The Nomad’s certification provides the substitute for the underwriter’s certification in the United States.
The AIM market is booming. In 2005 AIM had 335 IPOs compared to NASDAQ’s 35. The deal size comparisons are also telling. The average technology IPO deal size on the NASDAQ was $117.5 million, on the AIM it was $18.7 million. The AIM supported the smaller deals. Interestingly, the enterprise value as a multiple of revenue was lower on the NASDAQ 4.7x than on the AIM, at 6.3x. AIM investors were willing to accept more risk. The London market has successfully created a public offering market for small and micro cap companies. To remain competitive, the United States trading markets need to mount a successful competitor to this market.
August 15, 2006 in Securities Markets | Permalink
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Comments
I'm more sanguine about the worthiness of replicating AIM in the United States. For a number of reasons:
1. Risk. These are much riskier companies reflected in the higher risk premium you note. This, combined with minimal disclosure requirements and limited available research makes them ripe for manipulation and investor fraud. Not to mention higher failure naturally. If you want an example of the speculation effect, follow a months worth of trading of the oil, gas and mining stock on the AIM. There have been a number of high-profile frauds and failures on AIM as well. As a result, most UK institutional investors are barred in their investment statements from investment in AIM companies.
2. Liquidity. The AIM has a notorious liquidity problem. The reason why the investment banking fees are low on the front end may be attributable to the equally notorious wide-spreads on the AIM due to the fact there is only one market-maker for each stock (guess who it is?). Adding multiple market-makers may increase ipo costs. This obviously needs more study.
3. Need. In the United States there is a well-developed vc market as well as a credit market (including SBA) where these smaller companies can go to for early-stage capital. This is not the case for the home markets of many AIM listed companies.
4. Culture. The U.K. does not have the stock market investment culture that the U.S. does. While this is very paternal, I suspect that you will have greater interest from the common investor in these stocks in the U.S. than you do in the U.K. Again, when there is the inevitable scandal this is likely to effect more people.
5. Fees. I don't buy it. The investment banks are nothing if not rational. If they really are losing ipo listings that would have gone to America the fees will adjust acordingly. Perhaps this is a regulatory risk issue mitigating towards relaxing standards in the U.S., but I suspect if U.S. companies (more than the one that has already done it) start having sole listings on the AIM or LSE for that matter there will be a corresponding reduction of fees in the U.S.
I agree the AIM is an interesting challenge for the U.S. particularly since about 30 U.S. companies list on it, including, as I mentioned, a recent sole listing. But I view this as more a regulatory arbitrage issue of fpis than anything else. Perhaps it is time for the SEC to return to the thinking of Linda Quinn who knew this and focused on sensibly relaxing regulatory restrictions to encourage these companies to list in the U.S. But relaxing regulation for U.S. companies to spur a micro-cap market may be a basket of worms. It definitely needs more study of the risks versus reward as well as necessity. It may be the case that small cap companies do not have the access to capital they need and a deregulated micro-cap market would therefore be beneficial to the nation on the whole. But, again it needs more thought and (empirical) study.
Posted by: Steven Davidoff | Aug 17, 2006 9:05:10 PM
I'm more sanguine about the worthiness of replicating AIM in the United States. For a number of reasons:
1. Risk. These are much riskier companies reflected in the higher risk premium you note. This, combined with minimal disclosure requirements and limited available research makes them ripe for manipulation and investor fraud. Not to mention higher failure naturally. If you want an example of the speculation effect, follow a months worth of trading of the oil, gas and mining stock on the AIM. There have been a number of high-profile frauds and failures on AIM as well. As a result, most UK institutional investors are barred in their investment statements from investment in AIM companies.
2. Liquidity. The AIM has a notorious liquidity problem. The reason why the investment banking fees are low on the front end may be attributable to the equally notorious wide-spreads on the AIM due to the fact there is only one market-maker for each stock (guess who it is?). Adding multiple market-makers may increase ipo costs. This obviously needs more study.
3. Need. In the United States there is a well-developed vc market as well as a credit market (including SBA) where these smaller companies can go to for early-stage capital. This is not the case for the home markets of many AIM listed companies.
4. Culture. The U.K. does not have the stock market investment culture that the U.S. does. While this is very paternal, I suspect that you will have greater interest from the common investor in these stocks in the U.S. than you do in the U.K. Again, when there is the inevitable scandal this is likely to effect more people.
5. Fees. I don't buy it. The investment banks are nothing if not rational. If they really are losing ipo listings that would have gone to America the fees will adjust acordingly. Perhaps this is a regulatory risk issue mitigating towards relaxing standards in the U.S., but I suspect if U.S. companies (more than the one that has already done it) start having sole listings on the AIM or LSE for that matter there will be a corresponding reduction of fees in the U.S.
I agree the AIM is an interesting challenge for the U.S. particularly since about 30 U.S. companies list on it, including, as I mentioned, a recent sole listing. But I view this as more a regulatory arbitrage issue of fpis than anything else. Perhaps it is time for the SEC to return to the thinking of Linda Quinn who knew this and focused on sensibly relaxing regulatory restrictions to encourage these companies to list in the U.S. But relaxing regulation for U.S. companies to spur a micro-cap market may be a basket of worms. It definitely needs more study of the risks versus reward as well as necessity. It may be the case that small cap companies do not have the access to capital they need and a deregulated micro-cap market would therefore be beneficial to the nation on the whole. But, again it needs more thought and (empirical) study.
Posted by: Steven Davidoff | Aug 17, 2006 9:06:49 PM










