Friday, December 3, 2010
Professor Brian Havel's contribution to Airline Business's 25th Anniversary issue is available online from the Flight Global website here. In it, Havel discusses why the U.S. "Open Skies" policy is a milestone toward, not the culmination of, authentic international air transport liberalization.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
The fourth installment of the International Aviation Law Institute's "Conversations with Aviation Leaders" Oral History Series--A Conversation with John Byerly--is now online in streaming video here. Prior to his retirement in October 2010, Byerly served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and was the lead U.S. negotiator for the historic 2007 U.S./EU Air Transport Agreement and, more recently, the 2009 U.S./Japan Open Skies Agreement.
Earlier installments in the series, featuring former Civil Aeronautics Board Chairman Alfred Kahn; Professor and former Northwest Airlines Exectuive Michael Levine; and former American Airlines Chairman and CEO Robert Crandall can be accessed here.
Monday, November 29, 2010
Blog readers may be interested in Yannis Karagiannis & Adrienne Heritier's new working paper, The New Institutions of Transatlantic Aviation (IBEI Working Papers 2010/32, Nov. 2010) (available from SSRN here). From the abstract:
This article focuses on the institutions of transatlantic aviation since 1945, and aims at extracting from this historical process topical policy implications. Using the methodology of an analytic narrative, we describe and explain the creation of the international cartel institutions in the 1940s, their operation throughout the 1950s and 60s, their increasing vulnerability in the 1970s, and then the progressive liberalization of the whole system. Our analytic narrative has a natural end, marked by the signing of an Open Skies Agreement between the US and the EU in 2007. We place particular explanatory power on (a) the progressive liberalization of the US domestic market, and (b) the active role of the European Commission in Europe. More specifically, we explain these developments using two frameworks. First, a “political limit pricing” model, which seemed promising, then failed, and then seemed promising again because it failed. Second, a strategic bargaining model inspired by Susanne Schmidt’s analysis of how the European Commission uses the threat of infringement proceedings to force member governments into line and obtain the sole negotiating power in transatlantic aviation.