Friday, July 11, 2014
Marin K. Levy (Duke) has a new article, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 Yale L. Journal 2386 (2014), a review of the 2012 monograph, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis by William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds.
Richman and Reynolds are well-known and prolific authors on the federal appellate courts and the caseload crisis that dominated the late-twentieth century. As Levy explains:
Over the past thirty years, no one has contributed more to this field than two court scholars together—William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds. Through a series of critical articles, Richman and Reynolds were able to pinpoint the precise effects of the caseload crisis, both on litigants and the system as a whole. Furthermore, they were able to show the interplay of these various effects, providing a holistic account of the problem in a way that no one else had done. Their recent book, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis, stands as a culmination of their earlier work, bringing together vital analysis of the caseload crisis, the ways in which appellate review has suffered as a result of that crisis, and potential solutions. More broadly, Injustice on Appeal stands as one of the most comprehensive and thoughtful accounts of the largest problem facing the federal judiciary today.
For the most part, Levy's review agrees with Richman and Reynolds' evaluation of the recent history, and present problems facing, the federal judiciary. Chief among these problems are the continued high volume of cases in the federal appellate courts and the case management practiced by the federal courts over the last forty years to manage that higher volume. Where Levy parts ways with the book's authors is in the possible solutions to the federal courts' problems. While Richman and Reynolds prescribe large-scale changes, such as enlarging the federal judiciary, and look skeptically on the kinds of internal changes the courts have been doing for decades, Levy views the large-scale changes as unrealistic and smaller process changes as more fruitful.
As I discuss in my recent piece, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of Federal Court Reform, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 47 (2013), the federal courts over the last forty years have adopted many internal reforms to deal with the increase in caseload volume, but they have also left many proposed reforms on the table. Large-scale systemic reforms have been politically unpopular, and smaller scale internal reforms have raised questions about the quality of appellate justice. It is possible that the disagreement between the book's authors and Professor Levy is the difference between a normatively preferable approach, a systemic fix, and a more pragmatic solution, continuing case management reform.
I certainly agree with Levy that the area is ripe for the next wave of scholars, and I would add, reformers, to make a difference in the post-"caseload crisis" era. Richman and Reynold's latest work is a terrific collection and summarization of their extensive research and thoughtful commentary in the area, and Levy's review is a useful focus on solutions and an interesting challenge to the field.
I highly recommend both works to anyone interested in the appellate courts.
Sunday, July 6, 2014
Today's post is a guest piece by Daniel L. Real, a career judicial staff attorney for the Nebraska Court of Appeals since 1995 and a legal research and writing professor at Creighton University since 1999. Dan's prior work is on the issues of appellate practice and judicial independence. He shares his thoughts with us on the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Wheaton College v. Burwell:
There has been plenty of quick commentary on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision from last week in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014). You can form your own opinions on whether the decision was correct, where you stand on the subjects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and religious freedom. I don't have an interest in discussing those specific topics here. Something related, however, did catch my eye this weekend.
I suspect that there will be quite a bit of discussion in the next week or so about the Supreme Court's last-minute ruling on the application for injunction filed by Wheaton College in Wheaton College v. Burwell, but for now there has not been a particularly wide-ranging discussion of it. Perhaps the lateness of the ruling on July 3, coupled with the July 4 holiday, caught some off guard. Nonetheless, it was a noteworthy ruling that is worth looking at and considering.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that certain closely-held corporations could assert the same religious freedoms as individuals and addressed whether certain provisions of the ACA requiring employers to provide health-insurance coverage for specific methods of contraception that violated the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies' owners were in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Court held ACA provisions concerning four specific contraception methods imposed a substantial burden on the religious freedom of the closely-held corporations. Under the RFRA, such a substantial burden would be permissible only if the government could show a compelling state interest and if the government's action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving that compelling interest.
The Court assumed, without specifically deciding, that the government had a compelling interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the particular contraceptive methods. The Court held, however, in a 5-4 decision, that the challenged ACA provisions did not constitute the least restrictive means of serving that interest and held that the ACA provisions violated the RFRA with respect to the closely-held corporations.
In explaining why the ACA provisions did not constitute the least restrictive means, the Court had to make a decision that often faces appellate courts and had to discern how much explanation to provide to support the Court's conclusion. In writing for the majority, Justice Alito noted at least two "less restrictive" ways for the government to achieve its compelling ends. First, the Court noted that "[t]he most straightforward way . . . would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ____, *41 (2014).
After analyzing potential objections to the theoretically viable creation of a new government-funded program to provide the contraceptives, however, the Court concluded that it "need not rely on the option" to conclude that the ACA provisions were not the least restrictive alternative. The Court noted that "[Health and Human Services (HHS)] itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs." Id. at *43. The Court noted that "HHS has already established an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections," wherein the organization can self-certify that it opposes providing insurance coverage for the particular contraceptive services and require the organization’s insurance issuer or third-party administrator to provide coverage for the contraceptive services without any cost-sharing by the objecting organization. Id.
The Court specifically cautioned that it was not deciding whether this option "complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims," but very specifically held that "[a]t a minimum . . . it does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious belief that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion." Id. at *44. In footnote 40, the Court even responded to the dissenting opinion's characterization of the Court as being noncommittal about the viability of this alternative and the Court commented that "[T]he less restrictive approach we describe accommodates the religious beliefs asserted in these cases." Id.
There has been much discussion about the Hobby Lobby decision, its implications, whether it is the start to a "slippery slope," how it might impact the ACA as a whole. But what has potentially gone largely unnoticed to this point is what happened just three days later, when the Court issued its ruling on Wheaton College's application for injunction in Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. ___ (2014).
The "less-restrictive" alternative described by the Court in Hobby Lobby allows groups with a religious objection to the ACA mandates to self-certify a religious objection and pass the obligation to pay for coverage for the contraceptives to the insurer or third-party administrator. To obtain this accommodation, however, groups are required to fill out a federal form to register their objections. As the Washington Post noted in a July 3 article (http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/2014/07/03/622f7b12-02f8-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html?hpid=z1), a number of colleges, including Wheaton, objected to the requirement to complete the form. The colleges alleged that the act of signing the form and authorizing third parties to provide the contraceptive coverage made the colleges complicit in the action of providing the contraceptives and that even that offended the college's religious beliefs.
In its ruling on Wheaton's application for injunction, the Court held that Wheaton need not fill out the previously required form and, instead, need only notify the government "that it meets the requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds." Wheaton v. Burwell, 573 U.S. ___, *2 (2014). The Court noted that "[n]othing . . . precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the Act." Id.
Justice Sotomayor authored a dissent to this ruling, in which Justices Ginsburg and Kagan joined. The dissent noted that earlier in the week the Court had described the very accommodation that Wheaton was challenging as being an alternative that was less-restrictive than the ACA provisions in achieving the government's compelling interests. The dissent characterized the ruling in Wheaton as "evinc[ing] disregard for even the newest of [the] Court's precedents and undermin[ing] confidence in the institution." Id. at *4.
The apparent conflict between what the Court suggested in Hobby Lobby—that the accommodation was a legitimate and permissible means for the government to achieve its compelling interests that demonstrated that the ACA provisions were not the least-restrictive alternative—and what the Court suggested three days later in Wheaton—that the accommodation itself imposes a sufficient burden on religious freedom to merit injunctive relief—has been discussed briefly in a few articles, and they are a good starting point if you're interested in a more thorough look at the Wheaton dissent.
Dahlia Lithwick and Sonja West addressed it for Slate in an article titled, "Quick Change Justice." (http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/07/wheaton_college_injunction_the_supreme_court_just_sneakily_reversed_itself.html). Robert Barnes addressed it for the Washington Post in an article titled, "Supreme Court Sides with Christian College in Birth Control Case." (http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/2014/07/03/622f7b12-02f8-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html?hpid=z1). Adam Liptik addressed it for the New York Times in an article titled, "Birth Control Order Deepens Divide Among Justices." (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/us/politics/supreme-court-order-suspends-contraception-rule-for-christian-college.html?_r=1). And Daniel Fisher addressed it for Forbes in an article titled, “Hobby Lobby Decision Begins to Contort Under its Own Logic.” http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/07/04/hobby-lobby-decision-begins-to-contort-under-its-own-logic/).
While the Hobby Lobby decision will be the subject of much commentary, the very quick development of a potentially contrary ruling of the Court later the same week is somewhat remarkable. As is the lengthy dissent signed by the Court's three female justices on an unsigned order in Wheaton. It's a safe bet that the discussion and debate is only beginning.
Thursday, June 26, 2014
The briefs in this week’s landmark Riley v. California cellphone search decision showcase the choices lawyers must make when framing the issues. They also demonstrate how injecting some factual context into an issue statement can dramatically increase its persuasive value.
In the Riley cert petition, defendant’s counsel chose a classic “whether” statement:
"Whether or under what circumstances the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct a warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual’s cell phone seized from the person at the time of arrest."
It’s a good, clear issue statement that partially meets audience needs by identifying what legal question the Court will resolve if it accepts the case. It’s also the type of issue statement most of us were taught to write in law school (if we were taught), and it is particularly appropriate for issues involving pure questions of law. Like most legal questions, however, the cellphone cases involve mixed questions of law and fact—even just the details about how smartphones work are important facts that played heavily into the reasoning in Riley and Wurie. Looking at the facts in Riley’s cert petition, the events highlighted most prominently in the statement of facts were:
- "The phone was a Samsung Instinct M800 “smartphone” – a touch-screen device designed to compete with Apple’s iPhone, capable of accessing the internet, capturing photos and videos, and storing both voice and text messages, among other functions."
- "First, Officer Dunnigan scrolled through the phone’s contents at the scene. He noticed that some words (apparently in text messages and the phone’s contacts list) normally beginning with the letter 'K' were preceded by the letter 'C.' Officer Dunnigan believed that the 'CK' prefix referred to 'Crip Killers,' a slang term for members of a criminal gang known as the 'Bloods.'"
- "The second search of petitioner’s phone took place hours later at the police station. After conducting an interrogation in which petitioner was nonresponsive, Detective Duane Malinowski, a detective specializing in gang investigations, went through petitioner’s cell phone. The detective searched through “a lot of stuff” on the phone “looking for evidence.” Detective Malinowski found several photographs and videos that suggested petitioner was a member of a gang. Pet. App. 4a, 6a-7a. He also found a photo of petitioner with another person posing in front of a red Oldsmobile that the police suspected had been involved in a prior shooting."
(Emphasis added.) By adding a couple of sentences containing the highlighted information, the need for a warrant becomes plain. For those still skeptical about the power of adding facts to issue statements, I recommend looking at the question presented in the government’s response brief:
"After petitioner’s lawful arrest for possession of loaded firearms, officers twice examined the contents of his cell phone, on his person at the time of his arrest, for evidence linking him to the firearms. The first examination, a cursory one of text entries, occurred at the scene of the arrest; the second, which included viewing photographs and videos, occurred a couple of hours later at the police station. The question presented is: Whether the officers’ searches of the cell phone seized incident to petitioner’s arrest were lawful under the Fourth Amendment."
Notice how the facts frame the issue here: “officers twice examined the contents of his cell phone . . . for evidence linking him to the firearms,” and the first search was “cursory.” It’s clear from Riley’s facts that the officers were searching much more generally—and thoroughly—for evidence of gang activity, not only for evidence related to “the [two] firearms” found in his car. But the Court has to read all the way down to the statement of facts to see that discrepancy.
In a less prominent case with a less pressing social issue, the government might have made a much stronger first impression on the Court, not only in the final decision, but also in whether to accept the case for review in the first place.
Thursday, June 12, 2014
Following the Adam Liptak piece on Professor Richard Lazarus' new study, that I mentioned in my last post, a clever coder has developed a way to monitor, identify, and publicize any changes to U.S. Supreme Cout opinions. David Zvenyach, general counsel to the Council of the District of Columbia, has launched @SCOTUS_servo, to help identify any changes. The Twitter feed reports the result of comparison of the prior verison of court opinions to those now appearing. The code that does this, a crawler, checks every five minutes for a change and makes an automated post to the Twitter account reporting any change that has been made. Zvenyach then makes a manual tweet detailing and highlighting the actual change.
This is a useful service for forcing transparency regardless of how important any individual change might be to the followers of@SCOTUS_servo. More details available at this Gigaom post by Jeff John Roberts.
Tuesday, June 10, 2014
Above The Law just posted Benchslap Of The Day: The D.C. Circuit Calls Out A Top Law School. In a time when lawyers are criticized for being unprofessional, I think it might be time to question whether the benchslap itself is unprofessional. Perhaps there are other more productive ways to ensure professionalism without resorting to the humiliating and demeaning benchslap.
Monday, June 2, 2014
Adam Liptak has a terrific, if deeply disturbing, piece in the New York Times: Final Word on U.S. Law Isn’t: Supreme Court Keeps Editing last week.
The Supreme Court has been quietly revising its decisions years after they were issued, altering the law of the land without public notice. The revisions include “truly substantive changes in factual statements and legal reasoning,” said Richard J. Lazarus, a law professor at Harvard and the author of a new study examining the phenomenon.
The article identifies a handful of cases that received more than typographical or editing changes. While none of the changes located actually reverse the Court's decision, some certainly alter substantive comments of the Court and involve language already under discussion by the bench, bar, and legal academia. These identified changes are almost certainly only the tip of the iceberg. The NYT piece is worth reading, and hopefully Lazarus' study will make some waves.
Wednesday, May 28, 2014
In a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court has just given Freddie Lee Hall another chance to live. With an IQ of 71, Mr. Hall was sentenced to death row in 1978 for the kidnap, beating, rape, and murder of a 21-year-old pregnant newlywed. Shortly after this murder, Mr. Hall and his co-defendant also killed a sheriff’s deputy. In 2002, the Supreme Court held that the execution of individuals with intellectual disabilities violates the protections of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 321 (2002). Based on this decision, Mr. Hall appealed his conviction. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed his conviction holding that Mr. Hall’s 71 IQ was above the threshold mark of 70 and Mr. Hall was therefore not intellectually disabled. Now, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that use of such a rigid measure does not preserve the value of human dignity, and it “creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus [it] is unconstitutional.” Hall v. Florida, 572 U. S. ____ (2014).
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
When I first began blogging, I focused on exploring category construction as a tool of appellate advocacy. Today, I want to talk about the second given: categories imply a world that contains them. It basically boils down to container logic—does the object fit within the parameters defining the category? If so, it belongs, and if not, it obviously does not belong.
The way a category is defined necessarily constructs the boundaries surrounding what belongs. Take for instance the category of planets. When I was growing up, I was taught we had nine planets in our solar system: Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto. Those nine belonged to the “world” of planets. But in 2006, astronomers declared that Pluto is no longer a planet. This change occurred because the category of planets was redefined. Pluto belonged to the world of planets when the definition did not require a planet to dominate the neighborhood around its orbit. Once the category changed to require a planet dominate its neighborhood, Pluto, whose moon is half its size, got nudged out of this world containing planets.
In terms of appellate advocacy, this principle becomes incredibly important, especially in light of the first principle that categories are made and not found. We see attorneys constantly battling over how to define the legal world applicable to a given case, and in judicial opinions we see judges struggle to define a world clearly encompassing the resolution of the case. Take for example a recent Ninth Circuit opinion, United States v. Ezeta. There the defendant successfully moved to dismiss an indictment by claiming that the defendant did not “obtain” federal financial aid as defined by the statute. The defendant claimed that “obtain” as used in the statute meant to exercise dominion and control over the financial aid, and that since the defendant had assisted other students in completing and submitting forms, he had not exercised dominion and control over the funds in violation of the statute.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the category of “obtain” as adopted by the district court defined a world that was far too narrow. In a relatively straightforward statutory analysis, the Ninth Circuit defined a world around the meaning of “obtain” to include procurement on behalf of someone else. In so doing, the Court created a world large enough to encompass the acts committed by Mr. Ezeta, and his case has now been remanded for prosecution in District Court.
As advocates, attorneys must constantly assess the boundaries of the world surrounding legal disputes. This principle that categories imply a world that contains them provides appellate attorneys the creative power to identify existing categories and imagine better ones for solving legal disputes.
Friday, May 23, 2014
Almost a month ago, Legal Ethics Forum mentioned an AP story out of Washington about The Center for Public Integrity's conflict check on the federal appellate courts. CPI examined the last three years of financial disclosure reports of federal appellate judges and the federal appellate cases before each judge. The review found twenty-six cases involving sixteen judges where the a judge had a financial interest in one of the parties or in a law firm appearing before court. Such a small number of cases in the large volume of appeals suggests a reasonably functioning screening system, but even this small number of conflicts calls into question the outcomes in those cases and threatens the public perception of the judiciary as unbiased.
CPI notes that all sixteen judges have now informed the litigants in these cases of the conflict. Litigants whose cases are still pending have some chance at relief, recusal and perhaps a substitute judge added to their panel. Litigants whose cases are closed may have a tougher time of things. Those still in the window for en banc review may seek that rare remedy and getting the Supreme Court to review the cases seems even more remote.
Relatedly, our sister blog, the Civil Procedure and Federal Courts Blog, posted yesterday that the National Law Journal has issued a Special Report on Judicial Transparency and made available in digital format the 2012 disclosure statements of 257 federal appellate judges. Having this data publicly available increases the opportunity for the kind of conflict checking done by CPI as well as allowing for a scholarly or journalistic examination of judges' extra-judicial income. Of course, it also allows for the all-too-human poking our noses into other people's business, should anyone be interested in doing that.
Sunday, May 18, 2014
Friday, May 16, 2014
Last month, I posted a graphic that challenges laypersons to critically assess the social science evidence they cite. As lawyers, we have our own research methods, testing primary sources through syllogistic and analogistic reasoning, among others. Few of us without advanced degrees in other fields apply any of our liberal arts training in scientific methods to our practice.
As appellate lawyers, we are nearly always limited to scientific evidence admitted at trial, but in very special circumstances, we may see an opportunity to use "Brandeis" evidence in socially charged cases. You may be as surprised as I was to learn that even Louis Brandeis himself has been critiqued in recent years over the use of questionable studies in his famous brief from Muller v. Oregon.
In order to use social science research--or any science research--ethically and soundly, lawyers should educate themselves about the scientific method, the various forms of research, and common pitfalls. The same concern applies to appellate advocates who handle cases with a good deal of social or "hard" science evidence introduced at trial. It is all too easy to draw unsupported arguments from research that was not intended to provide conclusive proof. And as the opposing party, even if the trial counsel and experts did not see every chance to expose flaws in the opponent's research-based testimony, appellate counsel may be able to clarify the problems for the higher court.
When examining methodology, it helps to understand the differences between qualitative and quantitative study. Very generally speaking, qualitative research tends to work with smaller samples and to study topics where there is no possible "right" answer due to subjectivity in culture, gender, class, etc. Quantitative research tends to work with much larger sample sizes and with questions that better lend themselves to objective measurement. As you might guess, many studies work with hybrids of the two forms, and each type has several sub-categories of research methods. Finally, before dismissing the use of qualitative research in legal cases, keep in mind that just because a large, statistically valid quantitative study does not exist to support a client's position does not mean that other forms of research are unpersuasive. And conversely, just because qualitative studies deal with objective conclusions and statistical samples does not mean that they do not have a number of pitfalls of their own. Several of them are mentioned in last month's graphic.
Last week I posted about Savannah High School’s moot court reenactment of the Brown v. Board case. After participating in that event as a judge, I became curious about whether other high schools participated in appellate advocacy training. Of course, high school debate and mock trial are pretty common, but I had not yet seen any high school programs that focused on appellate advocacy.
In my research, I came to discover that American University Washington College of Law hosts an annual high school moot court competition. In preparation for competition, high school students study a problem comprised of judicial opinions, the party briefs, case law, and articles. Over the course of two days in the Spring, students present oral arguments on the issues presented by the moot court problem. The competition is open to all students, even those who are home schooled, and there is no requirement of prior experience with moot court or mock trial.
This type of program is positioned to impart a number of skills upon the students. Aside from the obvious ones like poise and public speaking, the studying of cases and defending a position through oral expository argument engages the brain in sophisticated problem-solving thought processes. Furthermore, asking young students to contemplate social justice issues and policy concerns in the context of legal precedent creates opportunities to ignite passion for the law and respect for its power.
I know many attorneys and academics seek opportunities to give back to their communities. Partnering with a high school to train students for appellate advocacy is an excellent way to give back by passing along attorney-specific knowledge to a younger generation.
Monday, May 12, 2014
Last week I blogged about who should teach appellate advocacy. A commenter on the post led me to think a little more about the topic and, more specifically, how we should be teaching appellate advocacy. The commenter referenced his concern regarding new associates who have no knowledge about syllogistic (deductive) reasoning. While this is certainly, or at least should be, a staple of legal education, should we expect appellate advocacy professors to teach this or should this be left to the first year learning extrapolated from legal writing/process classes? While some modicum can certainly be taught in appellate advocacy, I believe the vast majority of teaching relative to this way of thinking and writing should be left with the legal writing curriculum and not the advanced appellate advocacy courses.
On a related note, since appellate advocacy is not a bar course and relieves the professor of the need to teach with an eye towards a future substantive examination, should appellate advocacy professors be more concerned about teaching appellate advocacy skills for law practice readiness or should the teaching be geared towards moot court readiness? Is there really a difference? I am not sure there is a major difference.
While some might posit that moot court is merely a glorified beauty pageant, students do learn valuable skills. They learn about decorum before the bench, effectively dealing with both hostile and docile judges, professionalism in dealing with opposing counsel, and most importantly they gain additional experience writing a brief and arguing on both sides of the issue - a task that prevents getting tunnel vision and keeping an eye towards seeing both the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the issue(s). Yes it is a little odd that moot court neatly provides two issues so that two advocates can argue on each side (I have argued many appeals in the real world and I have never been exposed to a tag-team approach to oral advocacy), but beyond that it seems to me that the learning extrapolated and the similarities between moot court and real appellate advocacy outweighs the differences.
I also believe students are better served being taught from the perspective of advocacy before appellate courts rather than the Supreme Court. After all, many practitioners will eventually argue before either a state or federal appellate court, whereas very few get the glory of arguing before the highest court in their state or this country. Lastly, although it is preferable that professors err on the side of focusing their teaching on getting students prepared for the real-world practice of appellate advocacy, students taught more from a 'lets prepare to win at moot court' angle should not be severely disadvantaged.
What do you think?
In response to a commenter, I am posting a link to Judge Kozinski's article. He does not have a favorable opinion of moot court. For your viewing pleasure or horror (video production value is not one of my strengths), I am also posting a video blog (vlog) I did early last year which, in part, takes issue with Judge Kozinski's view.
Thursday, May 8, 2014
Sometimes I wonder about this question. After all, there seems to be several approaches. While many would agree that primarily doctrinal professor generally are not best suited for the task, either due to a lack of interest or lack of expertise or a combination of both, what about the other camps? Should it be taught by a clinician? An adjunct? A legal writing professor? Which type of professor would be best?
Clinical professors, focus on experiential learning, and appellate advocacy does fit the bill. This is especially true when thinking about preparing students for oral argument. The experience preparing for an presenting an oral argument before a panel of (mock or real) judges is an invaluable academic experience. Clinical professors with legal backgrounds doing appellate advocacy work are assets in this capacity.
But preparing for oral argument is only a portion of the course. In some instances, such as at my law school, the oral argument portion is only 1/3rd of the course, with the other 2/3rds being focused on writing both an appellate and an appellee brief. And best practices for writing briefs falls squarely within the wheelhouse of legal writing professors. Many of the legal writing professors I know also have some law practice experience, but is it plausible to assume they have some experience making oral presentations in court, and especially in appellate courtrooms? These professors are excellent writers, but are they skilled oralists as well? I am sure it is a case-by-case scenario.
And then we have adjunct professors. While in some ways an adjunct seems the perfect fit, in other ways I question it. A lawyer immersed in appellate advocacy would be a wonderful resource for students. Thinking logically, it might be best to learn from someone presently doing the work, from both a brief writing and oral argument capacity. However, as a former adjunct myself, one challenge is always availability for students after class. Law practices are demanding, and appellate advocacy students can be some of the most time-demanding students. A lot of hand-holding takes place when considering individual conferences to discuss drafts submitted for both briefs, meetings to discuss grades on final drafts submitted, and even more meetings and conferences to prepare the students for the nerve-racking oral arguments. Do adjuncts have the time to devote to this? If they do not, the student experience will surely suffer.
Perhaps more importantly, will (or should) adjuncts stay true to the stylistic best practices of briefs? It is easy to learn the shortcuts in brief writing that specific courts and judges will allow once you have been practicing for awhile. It is easy to pass these tricks and tips off to students either consciously or subconsciously. But not knowing whether the student will be practicing in the same jurisdiction upon graduation might hamper the student, because an allowable shortcut in one jurisdiction (i.e. no need for formal a formal introduction during oral argument, or no need to file an appendix or table of authorities outlined which page each case cited appears in the brief), might become a death knell to the brief or oral argument in another.
I see pros and cons to each approach. Inevitably this brings me back to my question: who should teach appellate advocacy?
Tuesday, May 6, 2014
I was recently asked to participate as a judge in a high school “moot trial” competition amongst three of our local high schools. I was intrigued by the notion of a high school “moot trial,” so I of course began asking questions about the event.
It turns out the students had been studying Brown v. Board of Education, and our local Board of Education wanted to host a capstone event to celebrate that study. What they really wanted was to host a debate on the issues in Brown, and I think they really meant moot court, not moot trial. While it was a good idea, the implementation became problematic as the organizers, who were not lawyers, could not understand the full vision or magnitude of the task assigned to the students. After some conversation with me and other professors, however, the vision narrowed to a more manageable scope for the students. In the end, the students basically reconstructed the oral arguments from Brown and delivered them in a moot court style.
I have to admit, I was skeptical going in about the ability of the students to grasp the issues without having had any formal guidance or legal training. The students, however, were nothing short of amazing. Don’t get me wrong—they aren’t ready to argue at the Supreme Court, but these students showed great potential as blossoming appellate advocates. They were poised, confident, thoughtful, and prepared. Until hearing them, I would have thought it unproductive to use Supreme Court precedent in this fashion at the high school level. Surely high schoolers are not open to learning about important historical developments in our law through the reading of the actual cases and briefs, right? Now, though, I see a number of opportunities for awakening social justice issues by engaging in brief studies of major Supreme Court decisions, and I think the context of the cases and briefs is exactly what the students need to stimulate a desire to learn and understand the issues of the day.
Wednesday, April 30, 2014
Oral arguments in Riley v. California and United States v. Wurie have revived the discussion about the future of cellphone searches by law enforcement. Amy Howe over at SCOTUSblog has an excellent plain English summary of the arguments.
In a pair of posts last fall (here and here), I discussed examining the issue with my Advanced Appellate Advocacy class. These cases present a question of when law enforcement may search a cellphone seized at the time of arrest without seeking a warrant. I noted then that one way to conceptualize the debate is to attempt to categorize the cellphone as either an "item associated with the arrestee" (which may be freely searched) or merely an "item within the arrestee's control" (which may be searched only with some justification). The government in these cases, particularly Wurie, seemed to employ a bright-line classification argument. That is, the government proposed that a cellphone in the possession of an arrestee should be classified as an "item immediately associated with the arrestee," similar to a wallet or pager, and, therefore, subject to search without limitation. The litigation history at that time suggested the government pushed hard for this classification with very little attention devoted to a fallback or alternative argument. This was in contrast to the defense approach, again, particularaly in Wurie's appellate briefing, of providing alternative arguments for rejecting cellphone searches.
The recap at SCOTUSblog suggests that the Justices did not seem inclined to credit either party's categorical classification argument. Instead, they seemed to be searching for a logical way to draw a line between a permissible and impermissible search. As Howe explains:
Given the lack of support for either bright-line rule, it comes as no surprise that the Justices spent a good chunk of the two hours today mulling over a possible middle ground. But here too there wasn’t much in the way of consensus, as the Court struggled to find a compromise that would genuinely protect privacy.
While the pull of a strict categorical approach is strong, (it was especially strong for my students as new advocates), judges concerned with practical application and balancing the interests often seek out some middle ground. This is even more true in areas of the law concerned with balancing interests, such as the Fourth Amendment's reasonable search arena. Ultimately, the Court in Riley and Wurie will have to find that consensus position, even if it did not find it among the advocates' arguments yesterday.
Photo Credit: Adrian Clark
Tuesday, April 29, 2014
At the beginning of this month, I blogged about the 5th Circuit's Texas decision - applauded by some as responsibly upholding legislation that supports women's health and criticized by others concerned that it will cause an undue burden on access to abortions and possibly hinder health by causing some women to dangerously take matters into their own hands. Here we are at the end of the month and the 5th Circuit is once again facing the same issue. However, this time it may answer some questions left unanswered in the prior case.
While the prior case upheld the legislation requiring abortion clinics to have admitting privileges at a hospital, it also held that the issue of undue burden was not ripe for consideration; after all, there still exists multiple options for abortions throughout the state. However, the state of Mississippi is down to only one abortion clinic. Surely this fact was discussed during oral arguments yesterday. When you couple the lack of access to clinics, especially if this last clinic is forced to close, with the concern raised in the Texas case that allowing hospitals to have control over providing admitting privileges to abortion clinic practitioners might effectively kill off all abortion clinics, it is clear to see the dilemma. Jackson Women's Health Organization, the clinic in question, has stated that it has requested, and been denied, admitting privileges by thirteen different medical facilities. Similar laws are being pushied in Louisiana, Oklahoma and Alabama, causing at least one media outlet to question if this is the beginning of end of abortion access in the South.
Of note, this is a different three judge panel than the one presiding over the Texas case. I suspect SCOTUS will eventually be weighing in on this debate.
Friday, April 25, 2014
One long-running debate in our field is how much appellate lawyers can use non-record social science evidence in their briefs. While there may be a little wiggle room, it's best to be extremely cautious when testing judges' patience. Poor research can harm an attorney's reputation and also lead to a restriction of that little big of wiggle room we have to help build a stronger case theory through social science "evidence." Appellate attorneys should take care to make sure they are using sound, widely accepted research.
I'll be posting more on this over the next several days, but in the meantime, even if it's been a long time science your last college science class, a great place to get your quick refresher is this handy, full-sheet PDF graphic by Compound Interest.
Hat tip: Lifehacker
A postscript: The blog's been quiet for several days but we are still here. Our host, TypePad, faced several hacker attacks last week. Fortunately, things seem to be humming again.
Tuesday, April 15, 2014
Joan Steinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent School of Law, posted a piece on SSRN: The Puzzling Appeal of Summary Judgment Denials: When are Such Denials Reviewable? Steinman is a co-author of the excellent text, Appellate Courts, Structures, Functions, Processes and Personnel (2d ed. & 2009 Supp.). In this article, she examines the fractured state of the law regarding appeals of summary judgment denials, in particular those appeals brought after a trial and final judgment. She identifies both inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits on the appealability of such denials and some confusion over which types of denials are appealable. She notes that the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in dicta in Jordan v. Ortiz, 131 S.Ct. 884 (2011), but argues that:
the Court’s approach was off-the-cuff, its thought process superficial and in some respects flatly in error, and its dicta seriously misguided, with the result that the intermediate federal courts of appeals were left in a quandary over whether to follow the dicta. An additional layer of splits among the circuits resulted. Few legal scholars have made a foray into this morass.
Steinman wades into the morass and offers observations, criticism, and a proposed approach to summary judgment appeals. This thoughtful piece is recommended to trial and appellate advocates alike.