Wednesday, September 17, 2014

BP Counsel Fiddles With Line Spacing in Federal Filing

This is the kind of basic advocacy blunder that is hard to believe, but it's being reported that BP's counsel fiddled with the formatting to file an over-length brief without permission.While this happened in federal district court, it's a fundamental advocacy issue worth reporting here. In a filing related to the Deepwater Horizon oil rig spill in 2010, BP's counsel tried to slip one past Eastern District of Louisiana Judge Carl Barbier. He was not fooled or amused.

After noting that it had already allowed BP to file a brief ten pages longer than the usual twenty-five-page limit, the Court explained:

"BP’s counsel filed a brief that, at first blush, appeared just within the 35-page limit. A closer study reveals that BP’s counsel abused the page limit by reducing the line spacing to slightly less than double-spaced. As a result, BP exceeded the (already enlarged) page limit by roughly 6 pages. The Court should not have to waste its time policing such simple rules—particularly in a case as massive and complex as this. Counsel are expected to follow the Court’s orders both in letter and in spirit. The Court should not have to resort to imposing character limits, etc., to ensure compliance. Counsel’s tactic would not be appropriate for a college term paper. It certainly is not appropriate here. Any future briefs using similar tactics will be struck."

Judge Barbier was far more generous than I would have been. Still, even without a harsh penalty, this will make good material for my appellate advcocacy class lesson on ethos in a few weeks. For a company that wants to be viewed as one that follows the rules and cares about details, this kind of angle-shooting by its counsel seems counter-productive.

A former clerk for Judge Barbier, Alabama Law Professor Montré Carodine, reads between the lines to suggest: "The subtext seems to be Judge Barbier saying, 'Look, every time I give you an inch you take a mile, and I'm tired of it,'" (as quoted in the NPR piece on the matter). I'm not sure what evidence exists to show repeated offenses, but fiddling with the formatting after being allowed to increase your brief by 40% does seem to be the kind of presumptious greed Carodine's idiom suggests. 

I wonder how often this occurs. Does it slip past judges with any frequency? Is there any creditable explanation for changing the formating? Any one want to defend the practice?

 

Hat tip to reader Maryanne Heidemann

September 17, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, Law School, Legal Ethics, Legal Profession, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, September 6, 2014

Tenth Circuit orders exhaustion of remedies in Muskogee (Creek) Tribal Court

6274849487_d891da93b3_mAppellate practitioners know the more common exhaustion and abstention doctrines, such as exhaustion of administrative remedies. Few are aware, however, that similar concepts operate between federal and tribal courts and even between state and tribal courts, and that they can arise out of comity, court rule, or other sources, depending on the jurisdiction. Ignorance of those concepts can sometimes lead to inadvertent or even open disregard for tribal judicial systems.

Turtle talk reports this week on a current example from the Tenth Circuit, which deferred to the Muskogee Tribal Court when litigants in an election dispute tried to jump ship to federal court. See the post regarding Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham on Turtle Talk.

Image: bradleypjohnson, cc by 2.0 license

 

September 6, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, State Appeals Courts, Tribal Law and Appeals | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 3, 2014

Judges Reading Appellate Materials on Electronic Devices

There is an interesting post today at Legal Research & Writing Pro Blog about how judges read appellate materials in the ever-expanding age of electronic resources. As the post notes, as federal courts and an increasing number of state courts have moved to electronic filing, judges have also moved toward reading materials, including briefs, on electronic devices such as laptops and iPads.

The post notes that changes in how judges are reading briefs -- from paper to electronic -- comes with a potential for real differences in impact.  There are studies suggesting that readers tend to skim electronic materials more than they do paper materials, but also that active engagement with the electronic material can substantially improve comprehension.

As the post suggests, there are also some potential new advantages to the prevalence of electronic resources in appellate practice.  Citations can be hyperlinked to research sources so that judges can quickly and effectively jump right to the authority; similarly, annotations to the appellate record can be hyperlinked to the relevant part of the record in jurisdictions that have invested in the necessary software. An April post on Cite Blog included thoughts about those kinds of hyperlinks.

A couple of years ago I presented at a symposium at Washburn Law School where there was a presentation from an attorney who did a great deal of practice in various federal courts across the country.  He talked about embedding digital information in briefs, including hyperlinks to video excerpts from video depositions, hyperlinks to exhibits, etc., in addition to the more conventional hyperlinks that could appear to authorities.  It certainly seems that the continuing development of digital practice would point to a future with vast opportunity to connect the appellate materials in profound ways.

For some additional thoughts, see a post from back in January over at Volokh Conspiracy, with additional discussion in the comments.

Thoughts?  Is the increased use of digital resources by courts impacting the way you present arguments in your appellate briefs?  Have you seen this as a good development, or one with significant pitfalls?  And is legal education keeping up with these kinds of trends?  Share your thoughts in the comments!

September 3, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, State Appeals Courts, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, August 24, 2014

Goldstein's Latest Amicus Brief

Last week, Tony Mauro had an article in the National Law Journal discussing the latest amicus brief filed by Goldstein & Russell's Thomas Goldstein.

As Mauro pointed out, what makes this particular amicus brief potentially noteworthy is not any particular argument it advances on behalf of either party in the case, nor is it the underlying issues of the case itself.  What makes this particular amicus brief potentially noteworthy is that it may be the first amicus brief ever submitted to the Supreme Court by a law firm on behalf of no client and in support of neither side. Instead, Goldstein authored and submitted the brief to test the waters concerning the utility of the bar providing assistance to the Court in unconventional ways, rather than simply as an advocate for a particular party or outcome in the case.

The case, M&G Polymers USA v. Tackett, involves health-care coverage for retirees and whether such coverage continues indefinitely when the underlying collective bargaining agreement governing the benefits is silent on the issue. In his amicus brief, Goldstein sought to provide the Court with data that he believed might not be presented by the parties or more traditional amici, including the results of a survey he conducted of collective bargaining agreements and different provisions reviewed by lower courts in similar cases.

Mauro quoted Goldstein as stating that "he didn't 'attempt to give the court any advice at all. It's just a bunch of data. I don't care who wins this case.'" Goldstein indicated that he felt the data he was providing might not be fully presented by the parties or more traditional amici with an interest in having the Court resolve the case one way or the other, but the data could be very useful to the Court in providing a workable rule.

Amicus Curiae is Latin for "friend of the court." The term has come to reflect briefs filed by a person or group who is not a party to the lawsuit, but has a strong interest in the resolution of the controversy presented by the case. As Goldstein noted in Mauro's article, however, sometimes amici are not truly acting as a friend of the court and, instead, "[t]hey have an ax to grind, a dog in the fight." Goldstein highlighted the uniqueness of his amicus brief in this case in the brief's opening paragraph, where he called it a "rare true 'amicus' brief" that was submitted "with no agenda or desire to direct the outcome of the case."

This caught my eye this weekend as I was preparing to teach a new batch of 2L students about appellate practice and advocacy at Creighton School of Law.   In my view, to be a successful appellate advocate it is crucial to always keep in mind that your primary goal is to help the court find a way to rule in favor of your client. That overarching focus underlies the importance of thorough research, of thoughtful organization, of painstaking editing, and, really, all aspects of presenting the appellate brief and argument.  If you can present the court with a well-thought "map" of exactly how the court could rule in your favor and explain its reasoning in a subsequent opinion, supported by authority and sound analysis, you are in a far better position than if you are simply urging an outcome that the court might find worthwhile but difficult or impossible to support in an opinion.

Amicus briefs can often serve those same purposes and assist the court.  As Goldstein noted, however, most amicus briefs may be submitted as "friends of the court" and provide assistance, but ultimately are assisting the court to rule a particular way. What makes this brief by Goldstein unusual is that it may truly provide meaningful assistance to the Court in a broader sense and without an eye to helping either side succeed.

It will be worth watching to see how the Court treats this kind of brief and, then, watching to see whether anyone else jumps on the bandwagon to author similar briefs in the future.  As Mauro's article noted, there may not be a clammoring of already busy attorneys to sit down and author briefs just to help the Court and not to further the interests of an actual client.

Links:

Goldstein's Amicus Brief in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett. Hat Tip to Howard Bashman at How Appealing who reported the Mauro article last week. Tony Mauro's National Law Journal article, also available via Google News.

August 24, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Current Affairs, Federal Appeals Courts, Law School, Legal Profession, Legal Writing, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 21, 2014

Bashman Post on Word Limit Reduction Proposal

Howard Bashman has a new post on How Appealing examining the new proposal to reduce the word limit for principal briefs in the U.S. Courts of Appeals. The proposal is to reduce the current 14,000 word limit to 12,500. Allegedly, the current 14,000 word limit was based on a misunderstanding about how many words fit on a printed page.

Is this a beneficial reduction that will promote concision and clarity? Or another limitation on the role of advocacy before the courts of appeals?

The preliminary draft of proposed changes and call for comments is available here, and Howard invites comments, pro or con, through his site. This seems to me to be yet another procedural reform that streamlines, and arguably reduces, appellate advocacy and judicial consideration. I welcome your thoughts on the issue as I consider whether to comment.

August 21, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, August 15, 2014

August 2014 Working Paper Round Up

A trio of cases were posted recently as working papers on SSRN dealing with various issues related to the operation of the U.S Court of Appeals:

The most recent is Andrew Hewitt Smith's The Effect of Ideology and Proportionality of the U.S. Courts of Appeals on the Likelihood of Supreme Court Reversal (August 3, 2014) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475631. Abstract:

Although much work has been done on the interaction between the United States Courts of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, few studies have examined how the ideological compatibility of the lower court and the proportion of cases heard from a federal circuit court affects the likelihood of the Supreme Court reversing that circuit. Using data from the Roberts Court (2005-2011), I examine whether greater levels of ideological disagreement and the proportion of appeals from a circuit that are granted certiorari affect the likelihood of Supreme Court reversal. I conclude that the proportion of cases reviewed by the Court does not significantly increase the likelihood of reversal, but greater ideological distance between the lower court and the Supreme Court significantly increases the likelihood of reversal.

Smith, a PhD candidate at the University of Tennessee, tests the interesting hypothesis of whether ideological  distance between the appellate judges and Supreme Court judges affects the rate of reversal. The data-driven analysis turns on existing, and controversial, measures of judicial ideology, and reveals some interesting results. Examining decisions of the Roberts Court (which has seen a shifting membership throughout its six terms) does limit the results somewhat, but the results confirm earlier analyses and suggest further analysis of other panels of the Court may prove useful.

Second, Jeremy D. Horowitz's posted an analysis based on an interesting and under-used source, dissents from denial of rehearings: Split Circuits: Analyzing Polarization on the U.S. Courts of Appeals Using Dissent from Denial of Rehearing En Banc Coalition Data (July 21, 2014) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2469237. Abstract:

Are the federal courts of appeals polarizing along with the rest of the government and American society more generally? This paper explores that question by exploiting a novel source of data: dissents from denial of rehearing en banc (DDRs). A DDR is a published opinion, often attracting concurrences from other judges, in which a judge criticizes her court for choosing not to rehear a case -- one the initial circuit panel ostensibly decided wrongly. DDRs have no precedential effect but offer a judge the opportunity to publicize her disagreement with the court’s result. As such, they are a pure expression of judicial preference. Using an original dataset of information collected from nearly 1,300 DDRs published between 1943 and 2012, I evaluate the ideological nature of DDR usage focusing specifically on two aspects of DDRs: the colleagues a judge joins with, and the panel authors she mobilizes against. I use these measures to examine the different patterns among the circuits, among different presidential cohorts, and in different decades to show trends in circuit court polarization and to explore the connection between polarization in the judiciary and in the elected branches. The paper finds that although the circuits vary widely in the way they use DDRs, a substantial number of them do so in a polarized fashion. Evaluating judicial cohort behavior over time indicates that the nominating presidents -- more than the increasingly polarized environment in the Senate and the general public’s own tendency toward ideological division -- are the primary force driving judicial polarization.

Another graduate student working paper, this time from University of California at San Diego, the article makes a compelling case for the revelatory power of DDRs. It is limited, as all work in this area, by challenge of establishing judicial political ideology for individual judges. That said, it takes the commonly accepted judicial ideology measurement and applies it sensibly. It builds on Horowitz's earlier work, Not Taking "No" for an Answer, 102 Georgetown Law Journal 59 (2013), which also looks at the utility and meaning of DDRs.

Finally, Mark A. Lemley and Shawn P. Miller have posted If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em? How Sitting by Designation Affects Judicial Behavior (June 12, 2014) as part of the Stanford Public Law Working Paper series. It's available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2449349 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2449349 . Abstract:

Judges, lawyers, and scholars have long decried the high reversal rate district judges face in patent cases. Many have suggested greater district court specialization as a solution, and Congress in 2011 enacted legislation to promote such specialization. In this paper, we investigate the impact of a novel measure of experience – whether a district court judge has sat by designation on a Federal Circuit panel in a patent claim construction appeal – on the likelihood a district judge’s subsequent claim constructions are reversed. Before sitting by designation, judges who later do so actually have a slightly higher claim construction reversal rate than judges who never do so. After sitting by designation, the reversal rate of district court judges on subsequent claim construction appeals decreases by 50 percent. This decrease is not fully explained by other measures of experience, including the number of prior patent cases or years on the bench. Nor is it fully explained by the timing of the appeal, the particular district court judge or various other characteristics of the patents, the parties and the litigation. Our results suggest a simple way to reduce the reversal rate in patent and perhaps other sorts of cases. However, our evidence suggests this increased agreement is due to increased Federal Circuit trust in the decisions of individual judges who have sat by designation and not increased district judge understanding of claim construction.

This article makes a significant claim that the lower court judge's rate of reversal drops due to greater trust of the appellate panels rather than the lower court judge's better understanding of claim construction. Whether this greater trust is a legitimate or illegitimate reason to affirm a lower court's decision is certainly an interesting question.

August 15, 2014 in Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 1, 2014

Anderson on Amicus Curiae

Helen A. Anderson at University of Washington Law has a new article on SSRN: Frenemies of the Court: The Many Faces of Amicus Curiae. Given the rise in the number of amicus briefs, the phenomenon seems ripe for closer scrutiny. Anderson does just that by breaking up the singular concept of an amicus curiae brief into types that can be examined separately.

The abstract:

Amicus curiae occupy a unique place in the courts: non-parties who are nevertheless advocates, who are not bound by rules of standing and justiciability, and who can present the court with new information and arguments. Amicus participation has increased dramatically in recent years, and threatens to alter the adversarial process. Yet scholars and courts treat amicus curiae as a single category, not fully recognizing that this friendly term actually covers several very different types, ranging from court appointed advocates of a particular position, to friends of a party (sometimes paid by the party), to persons or groups who just missed qualifying as interveners.

To understand the reality of amicus practice, this article develops a taxonomy of amicus based on the relationship to the court and the parties. The article supports this taxonomy with a look at the history of amicus, and a survey of the rules and judicial attitudes in different jurisdictions. I also explore the persistence of a myth that amicus should be “disinterested,” a myth that has led to confused reasoning about the proper role of amicus.

The modern increase in friend of a party amicus has taken us far from the origins of amicus as one with special expertise or knowledge relevant to the litigation. The article concludes that the Supreme Court’s open-door amicus policy should not be mindlessly copied by our other courts. Friend of a party briefs by ambitious law reform and business advocates may exert great influence, particularly on elected courts. The growth in amicus briefs can lead to distorted views of appellate decision-making, so that a court’s work is seen more like legislation and amicus briefs more like lobbying. To preserve the usefulness of the amicus institution, courts should exercise their gatekeeping authority.

What do you think? Is the increasing amicus briefing giving appellate courts a more legislative, lobbying-susceptible character?

August 1, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, State Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 11, 2014

Marin K. Levy: Judging Justice on Appeal

Marin K. Levy (Duke) has a new article, Judging Justice on Appeal, 123 Yale L. Journal 2386 (2014), a review of the 2012 monograph, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis by William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds.

Richman and Reynolds are well-known and prolific authors on the federal appellate courts and the caseload crisis that dominated the late-twentieth century. As Levy explains:

Over the past thirty years, no one has contributed more to this field than two court scholars together—William M. Richman and William L. Reynolds. Through a series of critical articles, Richman and Reynolds were able to pinpoint the precise effects of the caseload crisis, both on litigants and the system as a whole. Furthermore, they were able to show the interplay of these various effects, providing a holistic account of the problem in a way that no one else had done. Their recent book, Injustice on Appeal: The United States Courts of Appeals in Crisis, stands as a culmination of their earlier work, bringing together vital analysis of the caseload crisis, the ways in which appellate review has suffered as a result of that crisis, and potential solutions. More broadly, Injustice on Appeal stands as one of the most comprehensive and thoughtful accounts of the largest problem facing the federal judiciary today.

For the most part, Levy's review agrees with Richman and Reynolds' evaluation of the recent history, and present problems facing, the federal judiciary. Chief among these problems are the continued high volume of cases in the federal appellate courts and the case management practiced by the federal courts over the last forty years to manage that higher volume. Where Levy parts ways with the book's authors is in the possible solutions to the federal courts' problems.  While Richman and Reynolds prescribe large-scale changes, such as enlarging the federal judiciary, and look skeptically on the kinds of internal changes the courts have been doing for decades, Levy views the large-scale changes as unrealistic and smaller process changes as more fruitful. 

As I discuss in my recent piece, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of Federal Court Reform, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 47 (2013), the federal courts over the last forty years have adopted many internal reforms to deal with the increase in caseload volume, but they have also left many proposed reforms on the table. Large-scale systemic reforms have been politically unpopular, and smaller scale internal reforms have raised questions about the quality of appellate justice. It is possible that the disagreement between the book's authors and Professor Levy is the difference between a normatively preferable approach, a systemic fix, and a more pragmatic solution, continuing case management reform.

I certainly agree with Levy that the area is ripe for the next wave of scholars, and I would add, reformers, to make a difference in the post-"caseload crisis" era. Richman and Reynold's latest work is a terrific collection and summarization of their extensive research and thoughtful commentary in the area, and Levy's review is a useful focus on solutions and an interesting challenge to the field.

I highly recommend both works to anyone interested in the appellate courts.

July 11, 2014 in Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 2, 2014

More Than Words

Adam Liptak has a terrific, if deeply disturbing, piece in the New York Times: Final Word on U.S. Law Isn’t: Supreme Court Keeps Editing last week. 800px-Pink_Pearl_eraser

The lede:

The Supreme Court has been quietly revising its decisions years after they were issued, altering the law of the land without public notice. The revisions include “truly substantive changes in factual statements and legal reasoning,” said Richard J. Lazarus, a law professor at Harvard and the author of a new study examining the phenomenon.

The article identifies a handful of cases that received more than typographical or editing changes. While none of the changes located actually reverse the Court's decision, some certainly alter substantive comments of the Court and involve language already under discussion by the bench, bar, and legal academia. These identified changes are almost certainly only the tip of the iceberg. The NYT piece is worth reading, and hopefully Lazarus' study will make some waves.

 

June 2, 2014 in Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Appellate Procedure, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Citing To State Reporters

Over at the Legal Skills Prof Blog, there is a post about Pennsylvania no longer requiring cites to state reporters.  Check out the post, as it should be of interest to readers of this blog.

May 18, 2014 in Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Procedure, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 15, 2014

Steinman on Appellate Review of Summary Judgment Denials

Joan Steinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent School of Law, posted a piece on SSRN: The Puzzling Appeal of Summary Judgment Denials: When are Such Denials Reviewable? Steinman is a co-author of the excellent text, Appellate Courts, Structures, Functions, Processes and Personnel (2d ed. & 2009 Supp.). In this article, she examines the fractured state of the law regarding appeals of summary judgment denials, in particular those appeals brought after a trial and final judgment. She identifies both inter-circuit and intra-circuit splits on the appealability of such denials and some confusion over which types of denials are appealable. She notes that the U.S. Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in dicta in Jordan v. Ortiz, 131 S.Ct. 884 (2011), but argues that:

the Court’s approach was off-the-cuff, its thought process superficial and in some respects flatly in error, and its dicta seriously misguided, with the result that the intermediate federal courts of appeals were left in a quandary over whether to follow the dicta. An additional layer of splits among the circuits resulted. Few legal scholars have made a foray into this morass.

Steinman wades into the morass and offers observations, criticism, and a proposed approach to summary judgment appeals. This thoughtful piece is recommended to trial and appellate advocates alike.

April 15, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, United States Supreme Court | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 13, 2014

Advice To Advocates From The Bench

As a follow-up to yesterday's post, another presenter at the Black Lung CLE was Judge William S. Colwell, a lifetime appointed federal Associate Chief Judge with the U.S. Department of Labor.  Judge Colwell shared the following advice to advocates:

  • Read and "follow" all court orders
  • Comply with evidence deadlines and resolve issues with other party
  • When submitting a large amount of records, paginate and identify the relevant portions
  • Briefs should cite to specific document(s) and page(s)
  • Be careful not to focus too much on the law to the detriment of specific fact analysis
  • Better briefs identify critical evidence and distinguish contrary evidence
  • Deal with unfavorable evidence; this is your chance to shape the case
  • Use pinpoint cites
  • Don't wait until the last minute to file motions or present surprise issues
  • Don't present issues if you lack the evidence to support them
  • If it is an elements test, have proof available for "all" elements
  • Don't put cases in briefs that have been overruled
  • Avoid multiple continuance requests
  • Avoid requests for post-hearing submissions if possible, as it shows lack of preparation
  • Don't over-paper the case

While I am sure most of you are aware of these tidbits for effective advocacy, a friendly reminder is always helpful!

April 13, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 31, 2014

CATEGORIES 201: Categories are Made, Not Found

This post is the second in the series on Categories that I began late in February.  Today we begin with the first premise: categories are made, not found.  As lawyers, we often take for granted the applicability of pre-existing categories of law.  The doctrine of stare decisis has a stronghold on our legal thought processes.  History teaches us, however, that the law has the ability to evolve and redefine over time.  This phenomenon has been described by Anthony Amsterdam and Jerome Bruner in their book, Minding the Law.  They observe that “category systems derive from canonical general theories of the world and template narratives about life; when these theories or narratives are contorted too much or too obviously, when they come to be seen as endangered, we have culture wars and fierce debates about paradigm shifts…” 

Over the last few years, the Supreme Court has been engaged in just this sort of fierce debate over Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Historically, the Fourth Amendment has been categorized as a privacy interest, which the Court defined in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  In 2012, however, the Court articulated a new category of Fourth Amendment protection related to property interests.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  Since then, the Court has been unable to reach strong consensus on its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as marked by cases such as Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013), Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2012), and Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1 (2012), among others.  This new category has prompted a fruit-basket turnover in terms of the alliances amongst the members of the Court, and resolution of Fourth Amendment cases is more unpredictable than ever.  Brooks Holland, Associate Professor of Law at the Gonzaga University School of Law, provides a concise analysis of the competing jurisprudential categories that have emerged since the Jones decision in his review of The Fourth Amendment in the October 2012 Term

The recent evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence proves that the Court is willing to redefine categories of law, even well-established ones.  This evolution does not necessarily occur sua sponte, though.  Appellate advocates participate in the creation of new categories by breaking down existing barriers and reconstructing new ones.  Consider how each case begins with a given set of facts and law.  Within those facts and law, the advocate has the power to tap into pre-existing categories or create new ones.  If a pre-existing category supports the desired result, exploiting that category and relying heavily on principles of stare decisis would be beneficial to the advocate and would perpetuate the existing category.  By the same token, when the law or facts are not easily categorized in existing frameworks, or the existing framework demands a negative result, the advocate must deconstruct and redefine the boundaries in a way that is acceptable to the reader. 

These paradigm shifts, of course, take time.  Recall, that “category systems derive from canonical general theories of the world and template narratives about life.”  (Minding the Law)  Thus, to achieve success an advocate should attempt redefine the law by connecting new categories to life narratives that are already familiar to the reader, just as Justice Scalia in Jones was able to recategorize Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in terms of property doctrine that the Court already understood.

March 31, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Procedure, Rhetoric | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, February 15, 2014

Yes, The Appendix Matters!

I am sure many advocates will agree that after spending countless hours hashing out arguments in a 20-30 page brief, followed by the painstaking task of crafting an accurate table of authorities, not to mention putting together a clear, concise and persuasive table of contents, the last thing one wants to spend a vast amount of time on is the appendices.  In fact, this section is typically an afterthought.  After adding the opinion below and the relevant statutes, many advocates stop there (dare I say some even neglect to do the before-mentioned necessities?!).  A recent decision should have all appellate advocates reconsidering the attention paid to the appendix section and the relevant FRAP and Circuit rules.  

As a nice addition to Professor Burch's post on 7th Circuit Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook has also openly expressed his frustration about counsel.  In the case of United States v. Johnson, decided February 6, 2014, Judge Easterbrook's opinion dedicated approximately four (4) pages towards analyzing and deciding the appeal, followed by almost an equivalent amount of pages blasting Johnson's counsel for his failure to follow Circuit Rule 30(a), 30(b)(1), and 30(d).

Circuit Rule 30 deals with the appendices.  

30(a) provides that:

a) Contents. The appellant shall submit, bound with the main brief, an appendix containing             the judgment or order under review and any opinion, memorandum of decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law, or oral statement of reasons delivered by the trial court or administrative agency upon the rendering of that judgment, decree, or order. 

30(b)(1) provides that:

b) Additional Contents. The appellant shall also include in an appendix:

(1) Copies of any other opinions, orders, or oral rulings in the case that address the issues sought to be raised. If the appellant's brief challenges any oral ruling, the portion of the transcript containing the judge's rationale for that ruling must be included in the appendix.

30(d) provides that:

(d) Statement that All Required Materials are in Appendix. The appendix to each appellant's brief shall contain a statement that all of the materials required by parts (a) and (b) of this rule are included. If there are no materials within the scope of parts (a) and (b) of this rule, counsel shall so certify.

Judge Easterbrook took counsel to task on these rules.  Specifically, he indicated that counsel violated 30(a) and 30(b)(1) by failing to file the transcript of the trial judge's decision on the motion germane to the appeal.  Counsel's contention that this oversight was due to being recently retained counsel was found unpersuasive because the transcript could have been supplemented in the Reply Brief if not ready when the initial brief was filed.  When counsel certified, pursuant to Rule 30(d), that the brief contained all of the required parts pursuant to 30(a) and (b) mandates, he subsequently violated that rule as well.  

It is the violation of 30(d) that seems to bring the most harsh words from Judge Easterbrook.  Because the Judge deemed counsel to be knowledgeable about the omission of the critical transcript, he not only sanctioned counsel $2,000 for the violation, but also left him with some strong words to consider:

"Brindley may not have set out to develop a reputation as a lawyer whose word cannot be trusted, but he has acquired it.  This opinion serves as a public rebuke and as a warning that any further deceit will lead to an order requiring Brindley to show cause why he should not be suspended or disbarred."

OUCH!

February 15, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, Legal Writing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 13, 2014

Stein on Improving Oral Arguments Through Tentative Opinions

Just over a year ago, Steve Wisotsky and I published an article documenting, and to be frank, bemoaning, the decline of oral argument in the federal courts of appeals. The Decline of Oral Argument in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 119 (2012). Oral argument is just one of a number casualties of the caseload crunch of the 1970s and 80s. Oral argument has gone from being routinely granted and thirty minutes per side to rarely granted and often fifteen minutes or fewer per side. This dramatic reduction coincides with an increase in early tracking of cases into those that receive more appellate process and those that recieve less. The decline oral argument also coincides with a significant decline in reversal rates across all categories of federal appeals. Sacrificing oral argument on the altar of efficiency both reveals and causes a significant diminishment of appellate values. Or so Steve and I argue.

So it was with great interest that I read Joshua Stein's article, Tentative Oral Opinions: Improving Oral Argument Without Spending a Dime, 14 J. App. Prac. & Process 159 (2013), in which he offers an idea for improving the quality of oral arguments. The abstract:

This article explores use of the tentative opinion, two types of which were pioneered by California appellate courts. In 1990, the Second Division of California’s Fourth District Court of Appeal (which sits in Riverside) began disseminating written draft opinions in advance of oral argument. The measure received acclaim from appellate advocates, but did not beget imitation by other courts. In late 2011, however, an appellate court in Los Angeles (the Eighth Division of the Second District) began issuing tentative opinions orally at the beginning of argument. This approach, referred to here as the “oral tentative,” represents an attractive alternative to the written version, which has failed to catch on in other courts.

I was only passingly familiar with this practice, so it was interesting to read about its use in two districts within the California appellate system. I'm not persuaded that it could, or should, be adopted more widely, though. Issuing a tentative opinion a week or so before the oral argument offers advocates the opportunity to tailor their oral arguments to the judge's concerns at cost of requiring courts to review the case in advance and write a tentative opinion. I understand how this benefits the advocate, and perhaps improves the quality of the oral argument, but it does so by shifting the cost of assessing the most important and persuasive arguments to the courts.

An oral tentative opinion, offered immediately prior to the argument, comes too late to offer advocates an ability to focus their oral arguments. I fail to see how a tentative opinion offered in the moments prior to the argument offers any significant advantage over a judge asking questions or even offering such opinions during argument. The only one that comes to mind is that the oral tentative time doesn't come out of the advocates' very limited oral argument time. 

I come away thinking that these practices are a result of the California system's requirement that  appeals be resolved within ninety days of submission. This "ninety-day rule" forces judges to issue opinions close on the heels of oral argument. Because the system forces judges to prepare a nearly final draft prior to the oral argument, there is little additional cost to distributing that in some form to the advocates. But for any system without such a built-in requirement, I'm skeptical of its utility or desirability. Still, I recommend Stein's article and invite your opinions on the practice.

February 13, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Federal Appeals Courts, Oral Argument, State Appeals Courts | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Is It Apropos To Respectfully Request?

I have heard plenty of dialogue about whether or not attorneys should "respectfully request" that the court rule in a specific fashion.  Likewise, I have also heard plenty of debate about whether or not attorneys should "respectfully disagree" with the judges during oral argument.  It seems that adding the word "respectfully" is an unnecessary guise for professionalism and politeness, and merely eliminating that words does not diminish the respect the advocate has for the court.  

Regardless of what we think about attorney usage of the "respectful request", have you ever heard a court "respectfully request that an appeal be denied"?  Over at Volokh Conspiracy, he discusses how this is a growing trend in Pennsylvania.  Apparently, in situations where the losing party is likely to appeal the trial court's decision, the court includes a statement at the end of its opinion asking the appellate court to either affirm the order of the trial court or deny the appeal.  

Interesting concept.  I wonder whether it actually impacts the decision of the appellate court or if it is viewed as a formulaic statement that is ultimately ignored.  I'd love to hear from a PA attorney or judge familiar with this practice.  I encourage you to check out the post over at Volokh.

February 6, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, February 3, 2014

Torres on Link Rot in the Texas Appeals Courts

Is link rot destroying stare decisis as we know it? That's a great question. If appellate courts are citing to internet sources and those sources are disappearing (link rot), often within just a few years, that does seem to pose a problem for future litigants and courts in determining the basis for the earlier courts' decision.

Arturo Torres, Associate Dean for Library and Information Technology and Professor of Law at the Texas Tech University School of Law, tackled this issue in: Is Link Rot Destroying Stare Decisis as We Know It? The Internet-Citation Practice of the Texas Appellate Courts, 13 J. App. Prac. & Process 269 (2012). The abstract:

In 1995 the first Internet-based citation was used in a federal court opinion. In 1996, a state appellate court followed suit; one month later, a member of the United States Supreme Court cited to the Internet; finally, in 1998 a Texas appellate court cited to the Internet in one of its opinions. In less than twenty years, it has become common to find appellate courts citing to Internet-based resources in opinions. Because of the current extent of Internet-citation practice varies by courts across jurisdictions, this paper will examine the Internet-citation practice of the Texas Appellate courts since 1998. Specifically, this study surveys the 1998 to 2011 published opinions of the Texas appellate courts and describes their Internet-citation practice.

While it appeared in the Journal's Fall 2012 issue, it just popped up on SSRN last month, which makes it current enough to discuss I suppose. The article does a careful and detailed empirical analysis of Texas Supreme and intermediate appellate courts' use of internet citations, citations to publicly available URLs, by court and overall. It then follows up on the internet citations used in these opinions and determines that, of internet citations used in the period between 1998 and 2011, nearly 40% of them no longer function. Table 10 on page 294 documents the link rot year over year, with citations in the late 90s and and early 2000s being mostly non-functional. In addition to documenting the link rot, the article also parses the data in a couple other interesting ways, showing us which courts are more likely to use internet citations and which domains (such as .com, .gov, etc.) are most cited.

In my estimation, the article doesn't really answer whether this admittedly frequent link rot does destroy stare decisis. To answer this question would require examining how the citations were being used and whether their absence affects our ability to understand and apply the cases. The answer may well be "yes," and its a problem that should be addressed regardless, but it may well be that a qualitative analysis of internet citation use proves the loss of these links to be insignificant. For example, if the appellate court gives the substance drawn from the source before citing it, it may often be the court's own adoption or application that matters, and not the availablility of the underlying source. For this or other reasons, link rot may have only a de minimis affect on stare decisis.

Finally, the author's data sorting methodology strikes me as a bit ironic, although this might just be my sensitivity to the issue of unpublished opinions in appellate courts. But given this article's concern with stare decisis, and its conclusion that link rot a priori erodes stare decisis, I was surprised that it completely omits unpublished decisions from the data set. It would seem to me that wholesale elimination of entire appellate opinions (especially in the large volume designated as unpublished) represents a more blatant affront to stare decisis.

 

February 3, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Court Reform, Appellate Procedure, State Appeals Courts, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, February 2, 2014

AAA Adds Appellate Process

In the category of "not quite new" news, the American Arbitration Association amended its rules effective November 1, 2013.  While a number of rules were amended (as discussed more thoroughly at ADR Prof Blog), a significant rule addition of interest to appellate practitioners is the inclusion of an appeals process.  This is significant because opponents of arbitration have long argued that arbitration has a much greater likelihood than traditional court litigation to end up with unjust conclusions.  This concern is premised on the possibility that arbitrators, some being non-lawyers, may not properly construe the law - resulting in inconsistent and perhaps inconceivable outcomes.  When you couple this concern with a strict standard of review on appeal, it is understandable why some people shy away from arbitration.  

As it stands without consideration of the AAA rule change

When a party appeals an arbitral award, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) section 10 dictates the very limited areas where vacatur is permissible.  These primarily include:

(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;

(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them;

(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or

(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
 
Some courts have construed this to create a "manifest disregard of the law" standard.  This standard greatly reduces the chances of reversal on appeal.  The Supreme Court in Hall Street Associates also held that parties cannot by contract expand the scope of appellate court review.  Therefore, parties agreeing to arbitrate disputes are stuck with the language articulated in the FAA.  While this limited standard of review can be seen as good for expediency in bringing an end to the dispute (timely dispute resolution is a major reason why people choose ADR), it certainly can be painful for the disputant on the wrong end of the decision and facing the daunting prospect of a reversal on appeal.
 
Changes made to the AAA process
 
The changes made by AAA now allow the parties to select an appellate review process within the scope of their arbitral contract, therefore not implicating how a court will later review the arbitral decision.  The rules permit Appeal Tribunal review of errors of law deemed material and/or prejudicial, as well as clearly erroneous factual determinations.  Parties selecting this process can file an appeal within 30 days of the arbitrator's award, and it is "possible" that the process, including the time allotted for briefing, will not exceed 3 months.    The appellant's brief is filed 21 days after the Notice of Appeal is filed, and appellee's brief is due 21 days thereafter.  A Reply Brief can be filed within 7 days.  No more than a 7-day extension of time to file a brief will be granted.  The parties can request oral argument.  Once the last brief is submitted, or oral argument is concluded, the Appeal Tribunal will render a decision within 30 days.  The arbitrator's award will not be considered final, for the purposes of any later court action to modify, enforce or vacate it, until after the appellate process is complete.  
 
These changes are good for the arbitration process.  It allows parties to expand the scope of review within the arbitration process itself, and to essentially get two bites at the appellate apple.  The one negative is that it expands the time spent on the dispute, but this is not really problematic since the parties agreed in advance to allow for this additional appellate process.  One important limitation to note is that these rules do not apply to businesses utilizing standard, non-negotiable consumer arbitration contracts.  
 
 

 

February 2, 2014 in Appellate Advocacy, Appellate Justice, Appellate Practice, Appellate Procedure, Arbitration | Permalink | Comments (0)