Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Wednesday, September 14, 2016

EU Competition Law An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases - 5th edition

EU Competition Law An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases - 5th edition

EU Competition Law

An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases

By: Ariel Ezrachi
Media of EU Competition Law
Published: 08-09-2016
Format: Paperback
Edition: 5th
Extent: 768
ISBN: 9781509909834
Imprint: Hart Publishing
Dimensions: 246 x 189 mm
RRP: £40.00
  • See more at: http://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/eu-competition-law-9781509909834/#sthash.Gq8uoVyc.dpuf

About EU Competition Law This book is designed as a working tool for the study and practice of European competition law. It is an enlarged and updated fifth edition of the highly practical guide to the leading cases of European competition law.This fifth edition focuses on Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU and the European Merger Regulation. In addition it explores the public and private enforcement of competition law, the intersection between intellectual property rights and competition law, the application of competition law to state action and state aid laws.Each chapter begins with an introduction which outlines the relevant laws, regulations and guidelines for each of the topics, setting the analytical foundations for the case entries. Within this framework, cases are reviewed in summary form, accompanied by analysis and commentary.Praise for the book'This book should be in the library of every competition law practitioner and academic. The summary of cases is first class. But what makes it really stand out is the quality of the commentary and the selection of the material which includes not only the most important European judgements and decisions but also some of the leading cases from the US and European Member States.'Ali Nikpay, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP'The study of EU Competition law requires the analysis and understanding of a number of increasingly complex European Commission and European Court decisions. Through the provision of case summaries, excerpts from the important passages and concise commentary linking these decisions to other key case law and Commission documents, this unique and impressive book, now in its fifth edition, provides the student and practitioner of EU competition law with an extremely clear and useful introduction to these leading decisions.'Dr Kathryn McMahon, Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Warwick - See more at: http://www.bloomsburyprofessional.com/uk/eu-competition-law-9781509909834/#sthash.Gq8uoVyc.dpuf

September 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Pricing Patterns over Product Life-Cycle and Quality Growth at Product Turnover: Empirical Evidence from Japan

Nobuhiro Abe (Bank of Japan) ; Yojiro Ito (Bank of Japan) ; Ko Munakata (Bank of Japan) ; Shinsuke Ohyama (Bank of Japan) ; and Kimiaki Shinozaki (Bank of Japan) explore Pricing Patterns over Product Life-Cycle and Quality Growth at Product Turnover: Empirical Evidence from Japan.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines pricing patterns over the product life-cycle and quality growth at the time of product turnover regarding a wide range of durable consumer goods sold in Japan. Applying hedonic regressions with time dummies to large granular data sets obtained from Kakaku.com, the most popular price comparison website in Japan, we find out that sellers tend to raise product prices more than those justified by quality improvements to ensure the profitability at product turnover. A glance at the pricing patterns reveals that the prices of new products decrease gradually with the elapse of time, however, the pace of falling in prices varies considerably among commodities. The quality improvement ratio, which measures the contribution of quality growth to the price difference between matched pair of a new product and an old one by commodities, exhibits a unimodal distribution slightly fat-tailed to the right. The mode value of the distribution is about 0.5! -0.6 for home electrical appliances and about 0.6-0.7 for digital consumer electronics. Those results provide an empirical support to the existing quality adjustment method in the field of the price index, so-called 50% rule, which has been implemented by some statistical agencies. Our findings bring significant implications for improving quality adjustment methods under uncertainty of quality evaluation and lead to the better understanding of the firms' price setting behavior.

September 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

New Firms and Post-Entry Performance: The Role of Innovation

Colombelli, Alessandra ; Krafft, Jackie ; Vivarelli, Marco (University of Turin) study New Firms and Post-Entry Performance: The Role of Innovation.

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the reasons why entry per se is not necessarily good and the evidence showing that innovative startups survive longer than their non-innovative counterparts. In this framework, our own empirical analysis shows that greater survival is achieved when startups engage successfully in both product innovation and process innovation, with a key role of the latter. Moreover, this study goes beyond a purely microeconomic perspective and discusses the key role of the environment within which innovative entries occur. What shown and discussed in this contribution strongly supports the proposal that the creation and survival of innovative start-ups should become one qualifying point of the economic policy agenda.

September 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs

Ismail Saglam theorizes about Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Gradstein (1995), or first monopolized and then regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Baron and Myerson (1982). We show that the answer to this question depends on the number of the oligopolistic firms and the size of their fixed costs, as well as on the weight of the producer welfare in the social objective function.

September 14, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 13, 2016

Entry under an information-gathering monopoly

Alex Barrachina (Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain) has written on Entry under an information-gathering monopoly.

ABSTRACT: The effects of information-gathering activities on a basic entry model with asymmetric information are analyzed. In the basic entry game, an incumbent monopoly faces potential entry by one firm without knowing with certainty whether this potential entrant is weak or strong. If the entrant decides to enter, the monopoly must compete with him and decide whether to accommodate or to fight. To include information-gathering activities, it is considered that the monopoly has access to an Intelligence System (IS) of a certain precision (exogenous and common knowledge) that generates a noisy signal about the entrant's type. When the monopoly believes that the entrant is weak, the probability of market entry increases only for the relatively inaccurate precision of the IS and decreases for relatively accurate precision. If the monopoly is not sure about the entrant’s level of strength or considers him to be strong, the information-gathering activities either have no effect on market entry or decrease the probability of entry. Not only do these results suggest that to inform the entrant credibly about information-gathering activities can be considered as a monopoly’s entry deterrence strategy, but they also provide give an idea about when to allow or not allow monopoly’s information-gathering activities.

September 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion

Sara Biancini, University of Cergy-Pontoise - THEMA and David Ettinger, CNRS, National Center for Scientific Research, France - CERAS examine Vertical Integration and Downstream Collusion.

ABSTRACT:  We investigate the effect of a vertical merger on downstream firms’ ability to collude in a repeated game framework. We show that a vertical merger has two main effects. On the one hand, it increases the total collusive profits, increasing the stakes of collusion. On the other hand, it creates an asymmetry between the integrated firm and the unintegrated competitors. The integrated firm, accessing the input at marginal cost, faces higher profits in the deviation phase and in the non cooperative equilibrium, which potentially harms collusion. As we show, the optimal collusive profit-sharing agreement takes care of the increased incentive to deviate of the integrated firm, while optimal punishment erases the difficulty related to the asymmetries in the non cooperative state. As a result, vertical integration generally favors collusion.

September 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason University School of Law, on the Proposed Revisions to the Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council on Determining the Illegal Gains Generated from Monopoly Conduct and on Sett

Bruce H. Kobayashi, George Mason University - School of Law, Koren W. Wong-Ervin, George Mason University School of Law - Global Antitrust Institute, Joshua D. Wright, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, and Douglas H. Ginsburg, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University offer Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, George Mason University School of Law, on the Proposed Revisions to the Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council on Determining the Illegal Gains Generated from Monopoly Conduct and on Setting Fines.

Abstract: We respectfully recommend that the Draft Guidelines be revised to limit the application of disgorgement (or the confiscating of illegal gain) and punitive fines to matters in which: (1) the antitrust violation is clear (i.e., if measured at the time the conduct is undertaken, and based on existing laws, rules, and regulations, a reasonable party should expect that the conduct at issue would likely be found to be illegal) and without any plausible efficiency justifications; (2) it is feasible to articulate and calculate the harm caused by the violation; (3) the measure of harm calculated is the basis for any fines or penalties imposed; and (4) there are no alternative remedies that would adequately deter future violations of the law.  In the alternative, and at the very least, we strongly urge the NDRC to expand the circumstances under which the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Agencies (AMEAs) will not seek punitive sanctions such as disgorgement or fines to include two conduct categories that are widely recognized as having efficiency justifications: unilateral conduct such as refusals to deal and discriminatory dealing and vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing, tying and bundling, and resale price maintenance.

We also urge the NDRC to clarify how the total penalty, including disgorgement and fines, relate to the specific harm at issue and the theoretical optimal penalty.  As explained below, the economic analysis determines the total optimal penalties, which includes any disgorgement and fines.  When fines are calculated consistent with the optimal penalty framework, disgorgement should be a component of the total fine as opposed to an additional penalty on top of an optimal fine.  If disgorgement is an additional penalty, then any fines should be reduced relative to the optimal penalty.

Lastly, we respectfully recommend that the AMEAs rely on economic analysis to determine the harm caused by any violation.  When using proxies for the harm caused by the violation, such as using the illegal gains from the violations as the basis for fines or disgorgement, such calculations should be limited to those costs and revenues that are directly attributable to a clear violation.  This should be done in order to ensure that the resulting fines or disgorgement track the harms caused by the violation.  To that end, we recommend that the Draft Guidelines explicitly state that the AMEAs will use economic analysis to determine the but-for world, and will rely wherever possible on relevant market data.  When the calculation of illegal gain is unclear due to a lack of relevant information, we strongly recommend that the AMEAs refrain from seeking disgorgement.   

September 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Online services and the analysis of competitive merger effects in privacy protections and other quality dimensions

Keith Waehrer, Bates White has written on Online services and the analysis of competitive merger effects in privacy protections and other quality dimensions.

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a model of competition in privacy and/or quality offered to consumers in two-sided online markets in which revenue is derived from advertising. I review a number of the previously reported barriers to including a loss of competition over privacy provisions in antitrust analyses. A standard method for analyzing the effects of mergers on prices can be applied to the effects of mergers on non-price competition, such as competition in the level of privacy or quality offered to consumers. The model and results provide tools that competition authorities can use to improve the analysis of the effects of mergers on the consumer side in such two-sided online markets, hopefully leading to a more complete analysis of the effects on competition for consumers and better enforcement decisions. The technique can also be adapted for use in analyzing quality competition in other contexts.

September 13, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 12, 2016

Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License Frand-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level

Koren W. Wong-Ervin, George Mason & Jorge Padilla, Compass Lexecon address Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License Frand-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level.

Abstract: Competition agencies around the globe have recently initiated investigations involving a standard-essential patent (SEP) holder’s refusal to license patents at the component level, such as the chipset, that it has committed to license on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms.  While much has been written about FRAND-assured SEPs, the literature to date focuses largely on the appropriateness of seeking and obtaining injunctive relief on such patents or on the appropriate royalty rate and the meaning of “fair and reasonable” (FR), and has largely ignored the “nondiscriminatory” (ND) prong of FRAND.  This paper analyzes the common-industry practice of licensing on a portfolio basis at the end-user device level and whether a refusal to license at all levels of the production chain may constitute an antitrust violation, concluding that: (1) whether the “ND” prong of FRAND requires licensing at the component level is a fact-specific inquiry that depends upon the specific standard-development organization’s (SDO’s) Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Policy at issue; and (2) regardless, evasion of a FRAND assurance alone does not constitute an antitrust violation.  In addition, while U.S. antitrust agency practice and law highly disfavor imposing antitrust liability for refusals to license, such liability (including in Europe and elsewhere) would at the very least require a showing of anticompetitive harm such as foreclosure. 

Through a simple model, we show that due to the FRAND commitment and because most FRAND-assured SEP holders do not assert their patents at the component level, there is likely no foreclosure or exclusionary conduct or otherwise harm to competition.  Our model features two SEP holders, one of which is vertically integrated with a component manufacturer, and a competing non-integrated component manufacturer.  By refusing to license at the component level, the vertically integrated SEP holder de facto bundles its component (the bundled product) with its SEP portfolio (the bundling product).  We show that this bundling strategy will not lead to the foreclosure of the component market if (i) the vertically integrated SEP holder does not assert its patents at the component level, and (ii) it licenses its SEP portfolio to end-devise manufacturers on FRAND terms irrespective of whether they source components from its own subsidiary or from the non-integrated rival.  Intuitively, when (i) and (ii) hold, the bundle offered by the vertically integrated SEP holder can be replicated competitively by end-device manufacturers by mixing and matching the component sold by the non-integrated component supplier and the patent portfolio of the integrated SEP holder.  Finally, we note that there are a number of legitimate business reasons for the common industry practice of licensing at the end-user device level, including avoiding patent exhaustion, reducing administrative costs, and ease of monitoring or verifying the number of units sold.  These efficiency reasons motivate the decision of both vertically integrated and, tellingly, non-integrated SEP holders to license at the end-user device level only.

September 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

What Drives Price Dispersion and Market Fragmentation across U.S. Stock Exchanges?

Yong Chao, University of Louisville - College of Business - Department of Economics, Chen Yao, University of Warwick, and Mao Ye, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign ask What Drives Price Dispersion and Market Fragmentation across U.S. Stock Exchanges?

ABSTRACT: We propose a theoretical model to explain two salient features of the U.S. stock exchange industry: (i) sizable dispersion and frequent changes in stock exchange fees; and (ii) the proliferation of stock exchanges offering identical transaction services, highlighting the role of discrete pricing. Exchange operators in the United States compete for order flow by setting “make” fees for limit orders (“makers”) and “take” fees for market orders (“takers”). When traders can quote continuous prices, the manner in which operators divide the total fee between makers and takers is irrelevant because traders can choose prices that perfectly counteract any fee division. If such is the case, order flow consolidates on the exchange with the lowest total fee. The one-cent minimum tick size imposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 612(c) of Regulation National Market Systems for traders prevents perfect neutralization and eliminates mutually agreeable trades at price levels within a tick. These frictions (i) create both scope and incentive for an operator to establish multiple exchanges that differ in fee structure in order to engage in second-degree price discrimination; and (ii) lead to mixed-strategy equilibria with positive profits for competing operators, rather than to zero-fee, zero-profit Bertrand equilibrium. Policy proposals that require exchanges to charge one side only or to divide the total fee equally between the two sides would lead to zero make and take fees, but the welfare effects of these two proposals are mixed under tick size constraints.

 

 

September 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Price Elasticities of Pharmaceuticals in a Value-Based-Formulary Setting

Kai Yeung; Anirban Basu; Ryan N. Hansen; Sean D. Sullivan explore Price Elasticities of Pharmaceuticals in a Value-Based-Formulary Setting.

ABSTRACT:  Ever since the seminal RAND Health insurance experiment (HIE) was conducted, most health care services, including pharmaceuticals, are deemed to be price inelastic with price elasticities of demand (PED) close to -0.20. However, most studies of PED exploit natural experiments that change demand prices for multiple components of health care. Consequently, these experiments usually do not produce estimates for the true own-price elasticities of demand but rather composite own-price elasticities that are driven by concomitant price changes to their substitutes and complements. Hence, an estimate of price elasticity is expected to vary based on the setting in which it was estimated, and likely not be applicable to other settings. In this work, exploiting a natural experiment of exogenous policy implementation of a value-based formulary (VBF) that was designed based on drug-specific incremental cost-effectiveness ratios, we estimate price elasticities of pharm! aceuticals within a VBF design, formally accounting for the nature of composite elasticities that such a setting would generate. We also calculate welfare effects of such a policy using a consumer surplus approach. We show theoretically that VBF designs can increase dispersion of price elasticities of demand among pharmaceutical products compared to their true own-price elasticities and affect their magnitude based on direction of price change. Aligning these PEDs with value VBF is also likely to produce positive welfare effects. We estimate an overall PED for pharmaceuticals to be -0.16, close to the estimate of RAND HIE. However, we see substantial dispersion of PED across the VBF tiers ranging from -0.09 to -0.87 with trends aligned with the levels of value as reflected by the cost-effectiveness ratio (p

September 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers

Elena Carletti, Steven Ongena, Jan-Peter Siedlarek, and Giancarlo Spagnolo analyze The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers.

ABSTRACT:  We find that stricter merger control legislation increases abnormal announcement returns of targets in bank mergers by 7 percentage points. Analyzing potential explanations for this result, we document an increase in the pre-merger profitability of targets, a decrease in the size of acquirers, and a decreasing share of transactions in which banks are acquired by other banks. Other merger properties, including the size and risk profile of targets, the geographic overlap of merging banks, and the stock market response of rivals appear unaffected. The evidence suggests that the strengthening of merger control leads to more efficient and more competitive transactions.

September 12, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 11, 2016

Ninth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy Friday, September 16-Saturday, September 17, 2016

Ninth Annual Searle Center Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy

Friday, September 16-Saturday, September 17, 2016

Agenda

Papers

Property Rules vs Liability Rules for Patent Infringement
Carl Shapiro, Walter A. Haas School of Business and Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley

A Unifying Analytical Framework for Loyalty Rebates (with Zachary Abrahamson)
Fiona Scott Morton, Yale University School of Management

Exit, Tweets, and Loyalty (with Avi Goldfarb and Mara Lederman)
Joshua Gans, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto

Vertical MFNs and the Credit Card No-Surcharge Rule
Dennis Carlton, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Ralph Winter, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia

Ownership Concentration and Strategic Supply Reduction (with Ulrich Doraszelski, Katja Seim and Peichun Wang)
Michael Sinkinson, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania

Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patents:  Voting Power vs Market Power
Daniel F. Spulber, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

Maintaining Privacy in Cartels (with Takuo Sugaya)
Alexander G. Wolitzky, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Economics

The Tragedy of the Last Mile: Congestion Externalities in Broadband Networks (with Jacob Malone and Aviv Nevo)
Jonathan W. Williams, Department of Economics, University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill

 

September 11, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

ICN Chief/Senior Economists Workshop - September 12-13, 2016

Our friends at the UBC Sauder School of Business are co-hosting a great event in Vancouver.

 

ICN Chief/Senior Economists Workshop

University of British Columbia

Robson Square Campus

Rooms C150/C180

Vancouver, Canada

 

September 12-13, 2016

Program

 

Sunday, September 11

 

7:00 p.m.:     Welcome reception –

                     Four Seasons Hotel (Chartwell, Main Lobby Level)

 

Monday, September 12

8:00 to 8:30 a.m.:     Continental breakfast on site

8:30 to 8:45 a.m.:    Welcome Remarks

                                  John Pecman, Commissioner of Competition, Canadian

                                  Competition Bureau

 

8:45 to 9:00 a.m.:       Introductions and review of workshop objectives

9:00 to 12:00 noon (break at 10:20):   Session 1

Topic:  Unilateral Effects Analysis:  Experiences using Different Methods

Session Leader:  Professor Aviv Nevo, University of Pennsylvania

Opening presentation:   40 minutes

Case 1 Presentation (France:  Eshien Chong):  40 minutes

Break

Case 2 Presentation (Chile:  Maria de la Luz Domper and Gastón Palmucci):  40 minutes  

Group Discussion:  40 minutes

 

12:00 noon to 1:30 p.m.: 

                     Working Lunch: Roof, Fairmont Hotel Vancouver

Discussion Topic:   Economists in Competition Authorities:  Organization, hiring, training and retention 

Discussion Moderator:  Martine Dagenais, Canadian Competition Bureau

 

 

1:30 to 4:30 p.m. (break at 2:50):  Session 2

Topic:  Vertical Restraints in Digital Markets

Session Leader:  Professor Fiona Scott Morton, Yale University

Opening presentation:   40 minutes

Case 3 Presentation (Germany:  Arno Rasek):  40 minutes

Break

Case 4 Presentation (Australia:  Graeme Woodbridge):  40 minutes

Group Discussion:  40 minutes

 

6:30 p.m.:  Workshop Dinner – Teahouse in Stanley Park

                    Bus pick-up at Four Seasons Hotel

                                                             

Tuesday, September 13

8:00 to 9:00 a.m.:     Continental breakfast on site

9:00 to 12:00 noon (break at 10:20):   Session 3

 

Topic:  Screening for Cartels

Session Leader:  Professor Joseph Harrington, University of Pennsylvania

Opening presentation:   40 minutes

Case 5 Presentation (South Africa:  Liberty Mncube):  40 minutes

Break

Case 6 Presentation (Belgium:  Alexis Walckiers):  40 minutes        

Group Discussion:  40 minutes

 

 

12:00 noon to 1:30 p.m.: 

              Working Lunch:  Roof, Fairmont Hotel Vancouver

Discussion Topic:   Economists in the ICN:  Increasing engagement and influence

Discussion Moderators:  Nigel Caesar, Canadian Competition Bureau; Renée Duplantis, Brattle Group; and Tom Ross, University of British Columbia

 

 

1:30 to 4:30 p.m. (break at 2:50):  Session 4

Topic:  Merger Remedies

Session Leader:  Professor John Kwoka, Northeastern University

Opening presentation:   40 minutes

Case 7 Presentation (European Commission:  Giulio Federico):  40 minutes

Break

Case 8 Presentation (Singapore:  Hi-Lin Tan):  40 minutes   

Group Discussion:  40 minutes

 

4:30 p.m. (approx.):  Workshop Close

 

 

6:00 p.m.:  Optional Dinner – location TBD

 

September 11, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 9, 2016

Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs

Ismail Saglam (Department of Economics, Ipek University) examines Regulation versus Regulated Monopolization of a Cournot Oligopoly with Unknown Costs.

ABSTRACT:  This paper studies whether a Cournot oligopoly with unknown costs should be left unregulated, or regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Gradstein (1995), or first monopolized and then regulated according to the optimal mechanism of Baron and Myerson (1982). We show that the answer to this question depends on the number o the oligopolistic firms and the size of their fixed costs, as well as on the weight of the producer welfare in the social objective function.

September 9, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Leveraging Dominance with Credible Bundling

Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon, and Domenico Menicucci are Leveraging Dominance with Credible Bundling.

ABSTRACT: We contribute to the leverage theory of tying by studying bundling of a dominant firm instead of a monopolist. We show that, when one firm has symmetric dominance across all markets, bundling has a positive demand size effect on the dominant firm but affects both firms similarly through the demand elasticity effect. The demand size affect is hump-shaped in dominance level whereas the demand elasticity affect is increasing and negative (positive) for low (high) dominance levels. This makes bundling credible for sufficiently strong dominance. In the case of asymmetric dominance levels, we identify three different circumstances in which a firm can credibly leverage its dominance in some (tying) markets to foreclose a dominant rival in other (tied) markets. Our findings provide a justification for the use of contractual bundling for foreclosure.

September 9, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Competition Policy and Incentives for Innovation

Shastitko. Andrey (Lomonossov Moscow State University, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) ; Komkova, Anastasia Andreevna (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) ; Kurdin, Alexander (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow State University, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) ; Shastitko, Anastasia (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) examine Competition Policy and Incentives for Innovation.

ABSTRACT:  The work is dedicated to the identification and study of the relationship between the intensity of competition, market structures, competition policy and innovation activity. Critical analysis of foreign research shows that a universal solution, this problem has not, and the effects of competition policy on innovation in practice depends on a number of specific national and sectoral factors. Impact of innovation activity in respect of competition policy instruments is comprehensive, taking into account their impact on several aspects of the activities of businesses and entrepreneurs' expectations, as well as the availability of related markets. The paper evaluates the effects of the complex. Built in the theoretical model shows that the "inhospitable" attitude antitrust authorities to potentially anti-competitive actions of enterprises can be deterrent to innovative activity, but the rejection of antitrust measures may be harmful to consumers. The best op! tion of competition policy seems favorable attitude towards business initiatives in the case of a likely increase their innovation potential with the simultaneous implementation of compensatory measures or protective active competition policy.

September 9, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 8, 2016

2016 Symposium on Reconciling Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care, September 20, 2016

2016 Symposium on Reconciling Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care, September 20, 2016 

2016 Symposium on Reconciling Competition and Consumer Protection in Health Care

 
 
Format:
In-Person
 
Location:
Loyola Univ Chicago School of Law
25 E Pearson St Office 1236 Chicago, IL 60611-2046
 
Date:
September 20, 2016
 
Time:
9:00 AM - 2:30 PM CT
 
 
Credits:
3.75 General CLE Credit Hours
 
Sponsor(s):
Co-Sponsor(s):
 

 

September 8, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence

Carsten J. Crede (University of East Anglia) and Liang Lu (University of East Anglia) study The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence.

ABSTRACT: This study experimentally investigates the impact of antitrust enforcement on cartel price decisions when fines and detection probabilities depend on them. We impose expected punishments that create two payoff–equivalent collusive price equilibria, of which one features a lower riskiness of collusion. Subjects are found to behave strategically in that they choose the equilibrium with a lower riskiness of collusion. This suggests that competition authorities can exploit the effects of such endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty between cartelists, i.e. a priori uncertainty about the actions of the other cartel members, to lower cartel prices. However, frequency deterrence might be reduced such that the overall welfare effects may be ambiguous.

September 8, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)

Cross-ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy

Angel Luis Lopez and Xavier Vives examine Cross-ownership, R&D Spillovers, and Antitrust Policy.

ABSTRACT: This paper considers cost-reducing R&D investment with spillovers in a Cournot oligopoly with minority shareholdings. We find that, with high market concentration and sufficiently convex demand, there is no scope for cross-ownership to improve welfare regardless of spillover levels. Otherwise, there is scope for cross-ownership provided that spillovers are sufficiently large. The socially optimal degree of cross-ownership increases with the number of firms, with the elasticity of demand and of the innovation function, and with the extent of spillover effects. In terms of consumer surplus standard, the scope for cross-ownership is greatly reduced even under low market concentration.

September 8, 2016 | Permalink | Comments (0)