Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Monday, June 11, 2018

Strategic Effects of Investment and Private Information: The Incumbent’s Curse

Luigi Brighi and Marcello D'Amato offer Strategic Effects of Investment and Private Information: The Incumbent’s Curse.

ABSTRACT: We study a two-period entry model where the incumbent, privately informed about his cost of production, makes a long run investment choice along with a pricing decision. Investment is costreducing and its effects are assumed to differ across incumbent’s types, as a result investment plays a double role as a commitment variable and, along with price, as a signal. We ask whether and how investment decisions allow the incumbent to limit entry into the market. We find that the incumbent will never undertake strategic investment to deter profitable entry, because when incumbent’s costs are private information the signaling role of investment cancels out its value of commitment.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2018/06/strategic-effects-of-investment-and-private-information-the-incumbents-curse.html

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