Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Wednesday, July 12, 2017

Fighting Collusion by Permitting Price Discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena ; Herweg, Fabian are Fighting Collusion by Permitting Price Discrimination.

ABSTRACT: We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash equilibrium are higher if price discrimination is allowed. (ii) Best-response asymmetries so that profits in the static Nash equilibrium are lower if price discrimination is allowed. In both cases, firms' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under uniform pricing.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2017/07/fighting-collusion-by-permitting-price-discrimination.html

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