Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

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University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, January 6, 2014

Strategic Entry Deterrence by Limiting Qualities Under Minimum Quality Standards

Sangā€Ho Lee, Chonnam National University and Ram Kumar Phuyal, Tribhuvan University discuss Strategic Entry Deterrence by Limiting Qualities Under Minimum Quality Standards.

ABSTRACT: We consider a minimum quality standard (MQS) regulation under a vertically differentiated duopoly model where an incumbent may deter entry by limiting qualities, and explicity examine the strategic interaction between entry cost and a limit quality. We show that MQS will increase social welfare in most cases by reducing the incentive of the incumbent to limit quality, but it might render industry entry unprofitable for the entrant, which could induce predation to deter entry.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2014/01/strategic-entry-deterrence-by-limiting-qualities-under-minimum-quality-standards.html

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