Tuesday, January 21, 2014
Svetlana Avdasheva (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Institute for Industrial and Market Studies) and Polina Kryuchkova (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, Laboratory of Competition and Antimonopoly Policy) explore LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN RUSSIA.
ABSTRACT: Law enforcement by regulatory authorities on complaints may replicate not only advantages but also disadvantages of both public and private enforcement. In Russian antitrust enforcement there are strong incentives to open investigations on almost every complaint. The increasing number of complaints and investigations decreases both the resources available per investigation and the standards of proof. It also distorts the structure of enforcement, increases the probability of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals, and lowers deterrence. Statistics of antitrust enforcement in the Russian Federation, including Russian regions, highlight the importance of complaints for making decisions on whether to open investigations and the positive dependence of convictions on the number of investigations.