Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, July 26, 2013

Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Giacomo Calzolari, University of Bologna and Vincenzo Denicolo, University of Bologna analyze Exclusive Contracts and Market Dominance.

ABSTRACT: We develop a theory of exclusive dealing that rehabilitates pre-Chicago-school analyses. Our theory rests on two realistic assumptions: that firms are imperfectly informed about demand, and that a dominant firm has a competitive advantage over its rivals. Under those assumptions, exclusive contracts tend to be pro-competitive when the dominant firm's competitive advantage is small, but are anti-competitive when it is more pronounced. In this latter case, the dominant firm uses exclusivity clauses as a means to increase its market share and profit, without necessarily driving its rivals out of the market, or impeding their entry. We discuss the implications of these results for competition policy.

July 26, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Asia Competition Association 2013 Annual Conference, September 6, 2013, Seoul, Korea

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Asia Competition Association
2013 Annual Conference

 


          -
Date:
  September 6, 2013
          -
Venue:
Schubert Hall, 31st Floor, Hotel President

          -
Program

Time 

Category 

Details 

09:00 – 09:30

Registration

09:30 – 09:45

Opening Remarks

• Hoil YOON, Chairman, Asia Competition
Association; Chairman,
Yoon & Yang LLC

• Shiying XU,
Vice-Chairman, Asia Competition Association; Professor, East China University of
Political Science and Law

• Kimitoshi YABUKI, Vice-Chairman, Asia
Competition Association;
Yabuki Law Offices

09:45 – 10:05

Keynote Speech

Keynote Speech
Dae-lae NOH, Chairman, Korea Fair
Trade Commission


Major recent developments and
prospects of competition policies
and enforcement in Korea

10:10 – 12:10

Session 1:
Enforcers
Roundtable

Recent developments and prospects of
competition policies and
enforcement in East Asia


Co-Moderators:

Ohseung KWON, Professor, Seoul National University Law School,

Korea

• Akinori UESUGI, Consultant, Freshfields Bruckhaus
Deringer

• Xiaoye WANG, Professor of Law, Hunan University and Chinese

Academy of Social Sciences

Speakers:
• Joong-weon JEONG,
Commissioner, Korea Fair Trade Commission

• Ming SHANG, Director
General, MOFCOM (Invited)

• Qing LI, Deputy Director General, NDRC
(Invited)

• Ye LIU, Deputy Director General, SAIC (Invited)


Toshiyuki NAMBU, Deputy Secretary-General for International
Affairs, Japan
Fair Trade Commission

12:10 – 13:30

Lunch

13:30 – 15:00

Session 2
Trends in
Cartel
Regulation

Economic evidence for proving cartels;
leniency; and regulation of
international cartels


Co-Moderators:

Chul-kyu KANG, President, Woosuk University, Korea

• Kimitoshi YABUKI,
Attorney, Yabuki Law Offices

Speakers:
• Yanbo JIANG, Dean, Law
School of Jiangxi University of Finance
and Economics

• Jae Young
KIM, Attorney, Yoon & Yang LLC

• Gary SPRATLING, Attorney, Gibson
Dunn & Crutcher LLP

• Toshiaki TADA, Attorney, Hibiya Sogo Law
Office

15:00 – 15:10

Coffee Break

15:10 – 16:20

Session 3
Recent Developments
in
Merger Regulation
from an Economic
Perspective

Regulation of international mergers
using economic analysis


Co-Moderators:
• Kei AMEMIYA, Attorney, Morrison
Foerster

• Jianmin DAI, Attorney, Dacheng Law
firm

Speakers:
• Keita ITO, Chief Investigator, Merger and
Acquisition Division of the
Japan Fair Trade Commission

• Yangsoo JIN,
Advisor, Kim & Chang

• Zhong LIN, Attorney, Shanghai Ying Ming Law
Firm
[A person from Japan]
[A possible speaker from an international
company]

16:20 – 16:40

Coffee Break

16:40 – 18:30

Session 4
Abuse of Dominance
in
a Global Context

Global trends in competition regulation
of standard essential
patents, rebates, and so on


Co-Moderators:

Ji-sang CHANG, Professor, Kyungpook National University, Korea

• Shiying
XU, Vice-Chairman, Asia Competition Association; Professor, East China
University of Political Science and Law

Speakers:
• Gee-Hong
KIM, Attorney, Jipyong Jisung

• Makoto KURITA, Professor, Chiba
University

• Greg S. SLATER, Director of Trade and Competition Policy,
Intel Corporation

• Jian WANG, Professor, Law School of Zhejiang Polytech
University

• Seong Un YUN, Attorney, Bae, Kim & Lee LLC
[A
possible speaker from an international company]

18:30 – 18:45

Closing Remarks

• Xiaoye WANG, Professor of Law, Hunan
University and Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences

• Kiljun PARK,
Professor, Yonsei University

• Toshifumi HIENUKI, Hokkai-Gakuen
University

18:30 ~

Dinner
Keynote
Speech

Keynote Speech
Justice Inbok LEE, Supreme Court of
Korea

The role of the courts in development of
antitrust law in Korea
- Judicial review of KFTC decisions and recent
developments in
antitrust damages litigation in Korea [Tentative
topic]


Adress


Schubert Hall, 31st Floor, Hotel President, 16, Euljiro, Jung-Gu,
Seoul Korea 100-191



July 26, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Should Competition Policy in Banking be Amended During Crises? Lessons from the EU

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Iftekhar Hasan Fordham University; Bank of Finland and Matej Marinc University of Ljubljana - Faculty of Economics; University of Amsterdam ask Should Competition Policy in Banking be Amended During Crises? Lessons from the EU.

ABSTRACT: This article investigates the nexus of competition and stability in European banking. It analyzes the European legal framework for competition policy in banking and several cases that pertain to anti-cartel policy, merger policy, and state-aid control. It discusses whether and how competition policy should be amended in order to preserve the stability of the banking system during crises. The article argues for increased cooperation between prudential regulators and competition authorities, as well as an enhanced framework for bank regulation, supervision, and resolution that could mitigate the need to change competition policy in crisis times.​

July 26, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

WHAT IS THE PRICE OF PAY-TO-DELAY DEALS?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Farasat A.S. Bokhari, School of Economics and Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia asks WHAT IS THE PRICE OF PAY-TO-DELAY DEALS?

ABSTRACT: When a branded drug manufacturer makes a payment to a potential entrant to delay generic entry, it raises anticompetitive concerns. In this article, I highlight one such deal in a subsegment of drugs used to treat attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)—mixed amphetamine salts (MAS)—and compute market equilibrium prices under three counterfactuals. In the first case, equilibrium prices are computed as if all MAS drugs were produced by a single profit-maximizing firm, while in the latter two counterfactuals, I compute equilibrium prices as if either an immediate-release generic or an extended-release branded drug were not available in the market. The simulations show that the average percentage increase in drug prices is 4 to 4.5 times larger in the latter two cases (when one of the drugs is not available in the market) compared with a simple joint profit maximization of the same products. In this respect, the challenges by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to the so called “pay-to-delay” deals and the recent legislations introduced into the Congress to ban such deals are justified.

July 26, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, July 25, 2013

New Perspectives on Misuse of Market Power: How Should the Effects-Based Approach Complement the Existing Normative Solution?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Erdem Buyuksagis, University of Fribourg offers New Perspectives on Misuse of Market Power: How Should the Effects-Based Approach Complement the Existing Normative Solution?

ABSTRACT: This article delivers an analysis of the EU Commission’s new competition policy regime, with specific consideration given to abuse of dominant position cases. Given that the new regime based on the effects-based approach makes provision for a shift from the protection of competition towards the protection of consumers, the article forecasts its eventual implementation into European national laws (e.g. Swiss law) as well as its eventual outcome on consumer welfare. It concludes by highlighting the need for the new regime to be complemented by structural and procedural mechanisms in order to contribute to a more efficient competition law enforcement.

July 25, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Economic Consequences and Constitutionality of Administrative Monetary Penalties for Abuse of Dominance

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Grant Bishop, University of Toronto - Faculty of Law discusses The Economic Consequences and Constitutionality of Administrative Monetary Penalties for Abuse of Dominance.

ABSTRACT: The 2009 amendments to the Competition Act introduced administrative monetary penalties ("AMPs") for a finding of abuse of dominant position of up to $10 million for the first order, and a $15 million for each subsequent order. The quantum of such an AMP is to be determined according to a list of "aggravating or mitigating factors,” including gross revenue and profits affected by the practice, the party's financial position, the history of compliance with the Act and "any other relevant factor."

The author argues that this provision is both inefficient and potentially unconstitutional (following from the Supreme Court of Canada's holding in Wigglesworth), because, 1) the Act does not explicitly constrain the AMP quantum to a level that internalizes the economic impacts of the anti-competitive conduct; and, 2) some of the aggravating factors lack a coherent connection to the economic impact of anti-competitive conduct.

The author concludes that the Commissioner should clarify the circumstances under which AMPs for abuse of dominance will be sought. AMPs should be calibrated to market impacts based on evidence of estimated deadweight loss and economic profits, in order to ensure that AMPs remain purely deterrent and do not reach a denunciatory magnitude.

July 25, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Balancing 'Incentive to Innovate' and 'Protection of Competition': An African Perspective on IPRS and Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Mor Bakhoum, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law is Balancing 'Incentive to Innovate' and 'Protection of Competition': An African Perspective on IPRS and Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the interface(s) between IP and Competition Law from a Sub-Saharan Africa perspective. It analyzes the essential facility doctrine raised in the Glaxo Smith Kline case which was settled by the South African Competition Commission against the backdrop of the EU line of case law. This contribution “reopens” the settled case and provides some insights on the legal challenges (and economic implications) that the case would have raised if it had followed the Magill approach with the new product rule for which there is a consumer demand.

The EU line of case law seems to emphasize more the need to promote innovation as evidenced by the “innovation surplus” requirement. However, for countries that are importers of technology where local innovation is limited or nonexistent, the “innovation surplus requirement” would be difficult to meet. Access to existing technology or to patented products would therefore be limited.

From a consumer-interest perspective of a developing or technology-importing country, access to technology, in some cases, is more relevant than innovation in the first place.

In addition to the discussion pertaining to “innovation” and “access”, the paper takes a transversal approach and shed light on the treatment of IP related issues in selected Sub-Saharan African countries competition laws. Suggestions as to how to foster competition law enforcement in IP related restrictions of competition are put forward in the concluding remarks.

July 25, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Federal League Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League et al.

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Roger Ian Abrams, Northeastern University - School of Law has posted Federal League Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League et al.

ABSTRACT: In Federal League Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League (1922), the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Major League Baseball did not affect interstate commerce, an astounding decision even at the time. As a result, the restrictive baseball reserve system, which bound a ballplayer to his club for his entire work life at salary unilaterally determined by his employer, was held not cognizable under the federal antitrust laws. This chapter explains the origins of the decision in the economic battle between Organized Baseball and the rival Federal League and the arguments made by the parties in their briefs submitted to the Court. It then explores Justice Holmes’ decision which continues to remain the law, but only in the business of baseball.

July 25, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, July 24, 2013

As efficient competitor test in exclusionary prices strategies: Does really Post-Danmark pave the way towards a more economic approach?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Frederic Marty (CNRS), Universite de Nice Sophia-Antipolis and Sciences Po asks As efficient competitor test in exclusionary prices strategies: Does really Post-Danmark pave the way towards a more economic approach?

July 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

James C. Cooper, George Mason University School of Law - Law & Economics Center explores Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and Subjectivity.

ABSTRACT: Privacy has begun to creep into antitrust discussions. In some ways, this should not be surprising. Some of the largest and most ubiquitous companies, like Google and Facebook, give away their services in return for consumer data. If information about ourselves really is the price we pay for content, why shouldn’t antitrust limit companies’ ability to collect and analyze consumer data? Although this logic has some facial appeal, this paper identifies three major concerns with the inclusion of privacy in antitrust analysis. The first concern is conceptual. The analogy between privacy and quality begins to break down once we recognize that unlike selecting lower quality levels to enjoy lower costs, firms invest in collecting and analyzing data to improve content and to enhance matching between sellers and consumers, who have heterogeneous tastes for privacy. Second, an antitrust rule that limits firms’ ability to collect and analyze consumer data is likely to raise some First Amendment concerns. Third, allowing antitrust enforcers to consider privacy would inject an undesirable level of subjectivity into antitrust enforcement decisions, which is likely to attract socially wasteful rent seeking expenditures and to deter beneficial data collection efforts.

July 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Pay for delay: Now it's Congress' turn to come to bat

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Balto has an op-ed on Pay for delay: Now it's Congress' turn to come to bat.

July 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

COMESA Competition Law—A New Regional Merger Regime for Eastern and Southern Africa

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Desmond Rudman and Robert Wilson (Webber Wentzel) discuss COMESA Competition Law—A New Regional Merger Regime for Eastern and Southern Africa.

ABSTRACT: On 14 January 2013, a new regional competition law regime came into operation across the 19 African countries that constitute COMESA. Under that regime, mergers are notifiable where either or both the ‘acquiring firm’ and the ‘target firm’ operate in two or more COMESA Member States. A large notification fee of up to COM$500,000 (US$500,000) is payable to the COMESA Competition Commission (CCC). It is not clear whether the new regime constitutes a one-stop-shop, or if parallel national notification of mergers that have a regional dimension is required.

July 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: Current Status and Challenges

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Flavio Laina and Elina Laurinen (DG Comp) describe The EU Cartel Settlement Procedure: Current Status and Challenges.

ABSTRACT: Since 2008, six cartel settlements have been concluded successfully. In one additional case, discussions have discontinued due to lack of progress and the Commission has reverted to the standard procedure. A new wave of cases is currently being dealt with under that procedure. Lessons are being drawn from these experiences and discussions are currently underway to further streamline the process.

July 24, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, July 23, 2013

The Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings: Faster, Higher, Harsher

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Eric Barbier de La Serre and Eileen Lagathu (Jones Day) describe The Law on Fines Imposed in EU Competition Proceedings: Faster, Higher, Harsher.

ABSTRACT: Although in 2012 the Commission adopted few decisions imposing fines, in TV and computer monitor tubes it imposed a record aggregate fine of €1.47 billion and granted a record reduction of the fine for inability to pay.

The General Court has delivered important judgments on the ne bis in idem principle, partial immunity, recidivism, and inability to pay, as well as the calculation of fines for obstruction, non-compliance with a decision finding an infringement, and gun jumping.

The EU Courts have become increasingly harsh with offenders, and less inclined to exercise their theoretically broad powers of review on fines.

July 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

From the Prosecution of Infringements to a Systematic Analysis of Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Alexis Walckiers (Belgian Competition Authority) describes the shift From the Prosecution of Infringements to a Systematic Analysis of Markets.

ABSTRACT: The benefits of well-functioning markets are well-known, and widely accepted. Such benefits are not theoretical, they are established on undisputable evidence. With competition, prices go down1 and quality goes up.

In that context, the overarching objective to be pursued by competition authorities is to contribute to the better functioning of markets. This cannot be limited to the prosecution of competition law infringements, which can only address a subset of market failures. Depending on sectors, competition enforcement can be complemented by sector regulation, consumer policy and advocacy to foster a more competition-friendly legal environment.

Designing a roadmap to improve market outcome may require significant resources to undertake a detailed analysis of markets—an analysis that would seek to describe economic drivers of the sector as well as the dynamics of consumer and firm behaviour in the market.

July 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition and Competition Law in Japan: Between Scepticism and Embrace

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Simon Vande Walle, University of Tokyo - Graduate Schools for Law and Politics has written on Competition and Competition Law in Japan: Between Scepticism and Embrace.

ABSTRACT: Japan’s engagement with international models of competition law has been decidedly ambiguous and counter-cyclical with its economic performance. During times of prolonged economic growth, Japan’s attitude to Western styles of competition regulation has been predominantly skeptical, if not hostile. By contrast, during times of economic stagnation, it has been much more positive.

The first part of this chapter charts the ebb and flow of competition law in Japan. In the 1950s and 1960s, competition law conflicted with Japan’s industrial policy and enforcement became anemic. There was a revival in the 1970s, when the oil crisis wreaked havoc on the Japanese economy, but momentum was lost again in the 1980s. Finally, in the 1990s and 2000s, competition law gained increasing acceptance among policymakers seeking ways to revive a stagnating economy.

The second part of this chapter explores the link between competition law and Japan’s specific form of capitalism. It argues that competition law can best be characterized as a legal irritant, rather than as a legal transplant that is either fully accepted or rejected. Indeed, the introduction of competition law in Japan triggered a process of mutual irritation between the law and Japan's economic system. This process led to a double transformation: on the one hand, competition law was changed, interpreted and enforced in ways to make it more compatible with Japan’s capitalism. At the same time, competition law triggered change in Japan's economic and social order. This process of mutual irritation is still continuing and suggests that competition law in Japan will continue to evolve, in parallel with Japan's capitalist system itself and conditioned by the performance of that system, along a trajectory distinct from that of the West.

July 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Vertical Control and Price Cycles in Gasoline Retailing

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

O. Foros, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics and Frode Steen, Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics address Vertical Control and Price Cycles in Gasoline Retailing.

ABSTRACT: We examine Norwegian gasoline pump prices using daily station‐specific observations from 2003 to 2006. The four big gasoline companies use a vertical restraint that is adopted industry‐wide (labeled price support). This moves price control from the hands of independent retailers into the hands of the headquarters. Retail gasoline prices follow a fixed weekly pattern, where we observe de facto simultaneous decision‐making by the headquarters (without knowledge of their rivals’ prices) when every Monday around noon they decide to increase pump prices to the same level. The price level on Mondays corresponds to the recommended prices published by the headquarters of the gasoline companies.

July 23, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, July 22, 2013

Effects of Transport Regulation on the Oil Market: Does Market Power Matter?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Snorre Kverndokk, Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research and Knut Einar Rosendahl, Norwegian University of Life Sciences (UMB) - Department of Economics and Resource Management; Statistics Norway - Research Department ask Effects of Transport Regulation on the Oil Market: Does Market Power Matter?

ABSTRACT: Instruments used to regulate the consumption of oil in the transport sector include fuel taxes, biofuel requirements, and fuel‐efficiency standards. However, the effects that these have on oil consumption and price vary. If market power is present in the oil market, the directions of change in consumption and price might contrast with those in a competitive market. As a result, the market structure affects not only the effectiveness of the policy instruments used to reduce oil consumption, but also the terms of trade and carbon leakage. In particular, reduced oil consumption, as a result of increased fuel‐efficiency standards, will unambiguously increase the price of oil under a monopoly.

July 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

To Merge or to License: Implications of Information Sharing for Optimal Merger Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Shiou Shieh, National Taipei University - Department of Economics, Chi-Fei Huang, National Taipei University, and Hsiao-Chi Chen, National Taipei University - Department of Economics discuss To Merge or to License: Implications of Information Sharing for Optimal Merger Policy.

ABSTRACT: We investigate the antitrust authority's optimal merger policy in a duopoly model with cost asymmetry and asymmetric information regarding uncertain demand. Technology can be transferred either through a merger or a license, while market information is shared only through a merger. We show that the optimal merger policy differs under Cournot and Bertrand competition. If firms compete in Bertrand fashion, then mergers should never be allowed. If firms compete in Cournot fashion, then mergers are permitted if market volatility is high or if volatility is in the intermediate range and the size of innovations is large enough.

July 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Fordham 40th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy: Thursday, September 26 & Friday, September 27, 2013

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Dates for the 40th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy:
Thursday, September 26 & Friday, September 27, 2013

The conference will be held at McNally Amphitheater, Fordham Law School, located at 140 West 62nd Street, New York, NY.

Each year, a full two-day program focuses on a wide range of issues related to antitrust policy and enforcement. Leaders in the field, representing competition authorities, the judiciary, private practice and the academia, regularly contribute to the success of the conference as speakers and
discussants.

The conference attracts close to 400 participants, including competition authorities from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin/South America and North America, as well as practitioners and academics.


CORPORATE SPONSORSHIPS
are available. Please contact Alice Wong aalwong@law.fordham.edu

THURSDAY SEPTEMBER 26

8:30am
Breakfast & Registration

9:00am
Introduction and Welcome
   Barry E. Hawk, Fordham Law School

Competitor Agreements under  U.S. Antitrust Law
  
William J. Baer, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division

Competitor Agreements under  EU Competition Law
  
Alexander Italianer, Director General, DG for Competition, EU Commission

Discussion
   A. Paul  Victor, Winston & Strawn,  Presider
   Deborah Garza, Covington & Burling
   Mario Siragusa, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

Break

Competitor Agreements under Brazilian Antitrust Law
  
Vinicius Marques de Carvalho, President, Council for Economic Defence (CADE)

Competitor Agreements under EU Member State Laws
   Bruno Lasserre, President, Autorite de la concurrence

Discussion
   A. Paul Victor, Winston & Strawn, Presider
   Gabriel Dias, Magalhaes, Nery & Dias
   Mario Siragusa, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton

12:45pm
Lunch

2:00pm
Mergers
   James Keyte, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom, Adjunct Professor, Fordham Law School, Presider
   Johannes Luebking, DG for Competition, EU Commission
  
Andreas Mundt, President, Bundeskartellamt
   Aviv Nevo, Chief Economist, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice
   Jorge Padilla, Compass Lexecon
   Joshua Wright, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission

6:00pm
Cocktail reception

------------------------------------------------------------

FRIDAY
SEPTEMBER 27

8:30am
Breakfast & Registration

9:00am
Future of Unilateral Conduct Enforcement and Policy --- An
EU Perspective
   Joaquin Almunia, EU Commissioner for Competition

Future of Unilateral Conduct Enforcement and Policy --- A U.S.
Perspective
   Edith Ramirez, Chair, Federal Trade Commission

Discussion
   William Kovacic, George Washington University School of Law, Presider
   Luc Gyselen, Arnold & Porter

Break

Future of Unilateral Conduct Enforcement and Policy --- A Polish
Perspective
   Malgorzata Krasnodebska-Tomkiel

Future of Unilateral Conduct Enforcement and Policy --- A Mexican
Perspective
   Eduardo Perez Motta, President, Mexican Competition Commission

Discussion
   William Kovacic, George Washington University School of Law, Presider
   Jaroslaw Sroczynski, Markiewicz & Sroczynski

12:45pm
Lunch

2:00pm
Antitrust and the Courts
   Frederic Jenny, Co- Director of the European Center for Law and Economics, ESSEC Business School, Presider  

  Gerald Barling, President, UK Competition Appeal Court
  Judge Ricardo Villas Boas Cueva, Brazilian Supreme Court
  Dennis Davis, South Africa Competition Appeal Court
  Vaughn Walker, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (ret.) 
  Nils Wahl, EU Court of Justice

6:00
End

July 22, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)