Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, March 15, 2013

Exclusionary pricing in a two-sided platform : some insights from the industrial organization theory in the Google case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Estelle Malavolti and Toulouse School of Economics /ENAC-LEEA and Frederic Marty, OFCE-Sciences-Po describe Exclusionary pricing in a two-sided platform : some insights from the industrial organization theory in the Google case.

ABSTRACT: Firms operating in two-sided markets have to integrate in their optimal pricing structure the existence of indirect externalities across groups of consumers. Beyond direct externalities (network effects), such markets are characterized by the increasing value of the platform for the users on one side with the number on the other side. As for Internet search platforms such as Google, their value for advertisers depends on the number of users and especially of precisely targeted ones. As a consequence, the optimal price structure in a two-sided market cannot be symmetrical. In other words, the price structure is not neutral and has to take into account such linkages between these two groups of users. From an economic point of view, it may make sense to impose no charge for the group that generates the most valuable externalities. With antitrust inquiries, such specificity imposes to consider simultaneously both sides of the markets. Otherwise, the risk of false negative decisions may arise. On one side the pricing strategy might be interpreted as a predatory practice and on the other side as an exploitative abuse. As the number and the loyalty of users on one side is an essential input to competition between platforms on the other side, it might be rational to subsidize them by acquiring exclusive rights on some valuable contents and to implement bundling and tying strategies. The main risk lies in some market foreclosure. The market might evolve towards vertically integrated ecosystems, e.g. a silos model of competition. Furthermore, competition authorities have to define a sound economics-based theory of harm to disentangle practices that reduce consumer welfare (by increasing switching costs) from ones that might be finally welfare-enhancing. The issue of remedies arises inexorably from this point. Our paper sheds light on these industrial economics and competition law issues.

Download Marty

March 15, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Mind the Gap: Economic Costs and Innovation Perils in the Space between Patent and Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

George Addy, Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP and Erika Douglas, Davies Ward Phillips and Vineberg LLP ask readers to Mind the Gap: Economic Costs and Innovation Perils in the Space between Patent and Competition Law.

ABSTRACT: This article considers a gap between patent law and competition law that is being profitably exploited by "patent trolls", firms whose business is the acquisition and assertion of patents against parties who are already using the patented technology. First, we frame the discussion by considering the interaction of competition law and patent law and how the interaction can, in theory, impact innovation. Then we look at the example of patent trolls and how they are taking advantage of an absence of competition or patent law enforcement: what they are, the reasons for their recent emergence and the main arguments in defence of patent trolling. Next, we examine the economic cost and harm to innovation caused by patent trolls as they relate to wider issues in competition and patent law and policy, including asymmetry of litigation risk, the hold-up problem and the growing valuation of patents based on the right to exclude rather than the economic value of the underlying invention. Finally, we survey the efforts to stem patent abuse, including patent trolling, through market, judicial, legislative and regulatory means. Regardless of the source of the solution, be it patent or competition, law or policy, patent trolling highlights a clear need for reform to achieve the innovation goals of both the competition and patent regimes. Law makers, enforcement agencies, regulators and the courts need to bridge the ever-widening gap.

March 15, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Impact of Liberalization on the Production of Electricity in Japan

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Miyuki Taniguchi (Graduate School of Economics, Keio University) summarizes The Impact of Liberalization on the Production of Electricity in Japan.

ABSTRACT: This study aims to measure the impact of liberalization on the efficiency of electricity production in Japan, and to examine whether or not economies of scope exist between electricity generation and transmission. Since 1995, liberalization of the electricity market in Japan has been phased in and regulations on entry have been relaxed three times. One motivation for these regulatory changes has been to improve the efficiency of electricity production by introducing competition. Using a panel data set on the nine main power companies in Japan over the period 1970-2010, fixed-effects and stochastic frontier estimates of the cost function are obtained and compared. Estimates of the cost function show that liberalization has improved cost efficiency. Economies of scope are found to exist for all firms.

March 15, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Intermodal competition on some routes in transportation networks: The case of inter urban buses and railways

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Marc Bataille (Monopolkommission) and Alexander Steinmetz (Monopolkommission) explore Intermodal competition on some routes in transportation networks: The case of inter urban buses and railways.

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes the effect of inter urban buses competing on a few routes against trains within an established railway network. In line with expectations, we show that this can lead to unprofitable train service on these routes. However, within an established railway network with every track being pro table, competition on just some tracks can result in a collapse of the entire network. External e ects of individual routes on the railway network are fundamental for the profitability of the network. Hence, weakening these network effects might be crucial. As a result, efficient intermodal competition on some routes might cause the abandoning of other routes that are not facing any competition. This effect has to be taken into account by political actors when liberalization of inter urban bus travel is considered.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Eric Bond (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) and Kamal Saggi (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University) analyze Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented foreign products.

ABSTRACT: Motivated by existing multilateral rules regarding intellectual property, we develop a North-South model to highlight the dual roles price controls and compulsory licensing play in determining Southern access to a patented Northern product. The Northern patent-holder chooses whether and how to work its patent in the South (either via entry or voluntarily licensing) while the South determines the price control and whether to issue a compulsory license. The threat of compulsory licensing benefits the South and also increases global welfare when the North-South technology gap is significant. The price control and compulsory licensing are complementary instruments from the Southern perspective.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Gill (Oxford) and John Thanassoulis (Oxford) analyze Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we study price competition between firms when some consumers attempt tobargain while others buy at the public list or posted prices. Even though bargainers succeed innegotiating discounts off the list prices, their presence dampens competitive pressure in the marketby reducing the incentive to undercut a rival's list price, thus raising all prices and increasingprofits. Welfare falls because of the uncertainty in the bargaining process, which generates somemisallocation of products to consumers. We also find that the bargainers facilitate collusion byreducing the market share that can be gained from a deviation.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Call for Papers: Sixth Annual Searle Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy, Friday, September 20, 2013-Saturday, September 21, 2013

Posed by D. Daniel Sokol

Call for Papers: Sixth Annual Searle Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy. Friday, September 20, 2013-Saturday, September 21, 2013

Submission Deadline: May 13, 2013

The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth is issuing a call for original research papers to be presented at the Sixth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy at Northwestern University School of Law. This year's conference will run from approximately 9:00 AM on Friday, September 20, 2013 to 12:30 PM on Saturday, September 21, 2013. The conference is co-sponsored by the Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern University.

The goal of this conference is to provide a forum where leading scholars from across the country can gather together with Northwestern's own distinguished faculty to present and discuss high quality research relevant to antitrust economics and competition policy. Both theoretical and empirical submissions are welcome. Papers in industrial organization or applied microeconomic theory that address issues relevant to antitrust policy are welcome even if they do not directly focus on particular antitrust policy issues or institutions.

TOPICS: While papers on all topics are welcome, we especially encourage submissions related to the following topic areas:

- open vs. closed platforms

- standard essential patents

- vertical contracting and vertical integration

- cloud computing

- antitrust and copyright

FURTHER DETAILS: We hope to involve leading thinkers from the government, non-profit, and private sector, as well as leading academics from economics departments, business schools, law schools and public policy schools. While most of the conference will be devoted to presentation and discussion of original academic research, we also expect to schedule a small number of panels on important current topics or policy issues.

Paper authors will receive an honorarium of $1,000.00 to cover transportation expenses; if more than one author presents at the symposium, the honorarium will be divided equally between the presenters. Government employees and non-US residents may be reimbursed for reasonable travel expenses up to the honorarium amount. Authors and discussants are expected to attend and participate for the full duration of the symposium. Also, the Searle Center will make hotel reservations and pay for rooms for Thursday, September 19th and Friday, September 20th, 2013. The conference will also include a dinner reception and Keynote Dinner Address (speaker TBA) on Friday evening, presenters should plan to attend.

Papers prepared for the Sixth Annual Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy will be permanently hosted on the Searle Center website as part of our Working Papers Series: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter

Authors will be free to publish their work in other venues (with appropriate acknowledgement of the Searle Center).

RESEARCH PROPOSALS: SUBMISSION, REVIEW PROCEDURE AND TIMELINE: Research Proposals should include an abstract (300 words maximum) and c.v.

Proposal Submission Deadline: Research Proposals should be submitted to [email protected] by May 13, 2013.

Notification Deadline: Research Proposals will be reviewed by a committee. Authors will be notified of the committee's decisions by June 10, 2013.

Discussion Draft Deadline: Authors should plan to submit a paper suitable for distribution to discussants and other conference participants no later than September 4, 2013.

Potential Discussants or panel members should send a message indicating their interest to [email protected]

ABOUT THE SEARLE CENTER: The Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth at Northwestern University School of Law was established in 2006 to research how government regulation and interpretation of laws and regulations by the courts affect business and economic growth. Information on the Searle Center's activities may be found at: http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the internet driving competition or market monopolization?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff (Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics, Heinrich-Heine-University of Dusseldorf) ask Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the internet driving competition or market monopolization?

ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the general characteristics of online markets from a competition theory perspective and the implications for competition policy. Three important Internet markets are analyzed in more detail: search engines, online auction platforms, and social networks. Given the high level of market concentration and the development of competition over time, we use our theoretical insights to examine whether leading Internet platforms have non-temporary market power. Based on this analysis we answer the question whether any specific market regulation beyond general competition law rules is warranted in these three online markets.

March 14, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, March 13, 2013

Bricks, Beer and Shoes: Indirect Purchaser Standing in the European Union and the United States

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Andrea Hamilton, McDermott, Will and Emery and David Henry, McDermott, Will and Emery summarize Bricks, Beer and Shoes: Indirect Purchaser Standing in the European Union and the United States.

ABSTRACT: Mature antitrust regimes typically prioritize two main enforcement goals: deterrence and compensation of those injured by anti-competitive conduct. The simultaneous pursuit of these goals, however, creates difficulties for policymakers and enforcers that seek to strike a balance between public and private enforcement. Public enforcement is seen as the optimal means for achieving deterrence, through the imposition of high fines and (in some jurisdictions) individual sanctions. On the other hand, public enforcement in its current form does little to compensate businesses and individuals that incur injury as a result of anti-competitive conduct. Antitrust regulators on both sides of the Atlantic generally agree that private enforcement is the mechanism best placed to pursue the compensation objective. This short paper, therefore, seeks to explore the issue of indirect purchaser standing to pursue private damages actions and to contribute to the current discussion by comparing the treatment of indirect purchasers in the United States and European Union.

March 13, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

AT&T AND T-MOBILE: ECONOMIES AS AN ANTITRUST DEFENSE APPLIED

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Russell Pittman (DOJ) and Yan Li have written AT&T AND T-MOBILE: ECONOMIES AS AN ANTITRUST DEFENSE APPLIED.

ABSTRACT: From the beginning, the debate on the likely results of the proposed acquisition of T-Mobile USA by AT&T focused more on the claims of the parties that “immense” merger efficiencies would overwhelm any apparent losses of competition than on the presence or absence of those losses, and the factors that might affect them, such as market definition. The merging companies based their “economic model” of the merger on estimates of efficiencies derived from AT&T's “engineering model,” without addressing the credibility of the results of the latter in the context of the economics literature on the telecommunications sector. This article argues that the economics literature on economies of scale (especially) and economies of density in mobile telephony and elsewhere suggests caution in expecting such massive cost reductions from increasing the size of an already very large firm. It closes with an argument for the application of this perspective, where appropriate, in future discussions of merger efficiencies.

March 13, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

THE USE OF PROPORTIONAL MARKET SHARES AS ESTIMATES OF DIVERSION RATIOS IN MERGER ANALYSIS

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Andrew P. Vassallo, Criteroan Economics explores THE USE OF PROPORTIONAL MARKET SHARES AS ESTIMATES OF DIVERSION RATIOS IN MERGER ANALYSIS.

ABSTRACT: In this article, I employ a linear differentiated demand model to demonstrate the risks associated with using market shares as a proxy for diversion ratios when calculating the unilateral effects of a merger. In particular, when pro-rata market shares are not adjusted for recapture rates, the estimated diversion ratios are significantly higher than the true diversion ratios. As a result, the estimated unilateral effects price increase is much higher than the actual unilateral effects price increase. Even when recapture rates are introduced, problems arise with nested demand structures and inaccurate market definition. In each case, the use of market share based estimates of diversion ratios can both underestimate and overestimate the actual diversion ratio. This result calls into question the usefulness of proportional market shares as a proxy for actual diversion ratios.

March 13, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST: NOT READY FOR THE MAIN STAGE

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Roger Van den Bergh (University of Rotterdam) argues BEHAVIORAL ANTITRUST: NOT READY FOR THE MAIN STAGE.

ABSTRACT: Antitrust law is firmly grounded in rational choice theory. The behavioral antitrust literature introduces irrationality into the analysis of the reasons and effects of firms' behavior. Behavioral scholars claim that several antitrust issues may be better understood by taking account of heuristics and cognitive biases in the firms' decision making processes. Generally, by arguing that welfare losses may be caused by irrational behavior of firms, the behavioral antitrust literature tends towards more interventionism. This article questions the view that irrationality of firms would be a better assumption for explaining and predicting market behavior and designing competition rules. Moreover, the usefulness of a behavioral approach is restricted by the ambiguous results of the theoretical analysis. Rather than adopting an anti-Chicago profile, behavioral scholars should explore potential synergies with the mainstream Post-Chicago literature. Information economics, the theory of the firm and game theory have created scope for bounded rationality and information problems in the analysis of firms and markets. Behavioral antitrust can enrich but may not replace mainstream antitrust economics. Currently, behavioral antitrust certainly does not require a change of the competition rules or antitrust methodology. Behavioral antitrust is a side act and not (yet) ready for the main stage.

March 13, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

COMPETITION AND THE RAILROADS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Gunter Knieps offers COMPETITION AND THE RAILROADS: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE.

ABSTRACT: The reform of European railroads is a time-consuming process strongly characterized by its path-dependency. First, a short outline of the historical roots of the controversial debates on the role of the state and the markets, and the organization of competition in European railroad industries is provided. Second, the opening of the market for train services in the context of the liberalization of European transport markets since 1985 is characterized and the regulatory preconditions for competition on the tracks are presented. Third, the evolution of track access regulation in Europe during the last decades is analyzed, differentiating between the period of negotiated third-party access after 1991, the introduction of ex ante regulation by the first railroad infrastructure package in 2001, and the danger of over-regulation posed by the recent Draft Directive of July 2012, establishing a single European railway area. Fourth, the role of competition on the markets for rail services and the reform process of interoperability requirements are considered. Finally, competition on the markets for rail services and public subsidies for rail infrastructures as well as subsidies for train services are evaluated.

March 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Do expert agencies outperform generalist judges? Some preliminary evidence from the Federal Trade Commission

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joshua D. Wright (FTC) and Angela M. Diveley (Freshfields) ask Do expert agencies outperform generalist judges? Some preliminary evidence from the Federal Trade Commission.

ABSTRACT: In the context of US antitrust law, many commentators have recently called for an expansion of the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC’s) adjudicatory decision-making authority pursuant to Section 5 of the FTC Act, increased rulemaking, and carving out exceptions for the agency from increased burdens of production facing private plaintiffs. These claims are often expressly grounded in the assertion that expert agencies generate higher quality decisions than federal district court judges. We call this assertion the expertise hypothesis and attempt to test it. The relevant question is whether the expert inputs available to generalist federal district court judges translate to higher quality outputs and better performance than the Commission produces in its role as an adjudicatory decision-maker. While many appear to assume agencies have courts beat on this margin, to our knowledge, this oft-cited reason to increase the discretion of agencies and the deference afforded them by reviewing courts is void of empirical support. Contrary to the expertise hypothesis, we find evidence suggesting the Commission does not perform as well as generalist judges in its adjudicatory antitrust decision-making role. Furthermore, while the available evidence is more limited, there is no clear evidence the Commission adds significant incremental value to the administrative law judge decisions it reviews. In light of these findings, we conclude there is little empirical basis for the various proposals to expand agency authority and deference to agency decisions. More generally, our results highlight the need for research on the relationship between institutional design and agency expertise in the antitrust context.

March 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Chairs of the AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation 1980-Present

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Chairs of the AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation 1980-Present

D. Daniel Sokol, University of Florida, Chair Elect 2014

Darren D. Bush, University of Houston Law Center, 2013

Michael A. Carrier, Rutgers School of Law-Camden

Bruce H. Kobayashi, George Mason University, 2011

Robin C. Feldman, University of California, Hastings, 2010

Marina L. Lao, Seton Hall University, 2009

Salil Kumar Mehra, Temple University 2008

Christopher R. Leslie, New York University 2007

Mark A. Lemley, Stanford Law School 2006

Keith Norman Hylton, Boston University 2005

Barbara Ann White, University of Baltimore 2004

Jonathan B. Baker, American 2003

Susan Beth Farmer, Pennsylvania State 2002

Spencer Weber Waller, Loyola – Chicago 2001

Jean Wegman Burns, Brigham Young 2000

Andrew I. Gavil, Howard University 1999

Peter C. Carstensen, Wisconsin 1998

William E. Kovacic, George Mason 1997

Robert H. Lande, Baltimore 1996

William Hepburn Page, Mississippi College 1995

Stephen Calkins, Wayne State 1994

Stephen Calkins, Wayne State 1993

E. Thomas Sullivan, Arizona 1992

E. Thomas Sullivan, Arizona 1991

Herbert Hovenkamp, Iowa 1990

Herbert Hovenkamp, Iowa 1989

Joseph P. Bauer, Notre Dame 1988

Joseph P. Bauer, Notre Dame 1987

George A. Hay, Cornell 1986

George A. Hay, Cornell 1985

Robert Pitofsky, Georgetown 1984

Robert Pitofsky, Georgetown 1983

Eleanor M. Fox, New York University 1982

Eleanor M. Fox, New York University 1981

Lawrence A. Sullivan, California-Berkeley 1980

March 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

For those of you who read the blog and are AALS members (note: you need to teach at AALS member and affiliated schools), please consider joining the AALS Section on Antitrust and Economic Regulation (no charge to join).

1.            Go the AALS website www.aals.org
2.            In the “spotlight” column on the right
Click >> Faculty: Join an AALS Section
3.            AALS Section sign-up uses a standard
shopping cart process:  select section, add it to cart, check
out.
4.            You must log in to check out. If you don’t
have your password click “Forgot account info”.
5.            There is no fee for faculty or
professional staff at AALS member and fee paid schools to sign up for AALS
Regular or Associate Membership in a Section except for the AALS Section on
Clinical Legal Education, which charges $15 for dues.

March 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Models for Merging the US Antitrust Agencies

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

William Blumenthal (Clifford Chance) offers Models for Merging the US Antitrust Agencies.

ABSTRACT: Responsibility for federal antitrust enforcement in the US is shared between the Federal Trade Commission and the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division. Numerous commentaries have identified pros and cons of dual enforcement, and some commentaries have advocated the merger of the antitrust operations of the two agencies into a single unit. Without taking a position on the advisability of such a merger, this article identifies several alternative models by which a merger might be achieved, and it discusses factors that warrant consideration in choosing among the models. The choice of institutional design turns largely on three overarching questions, each of which has subparts: (i) through what structure should enforcement and policy decisions be made, (ii) what should be the scope of the agency's authority, and (iii) what set of missions should be co-housed in the agency?

March 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Justifying criminal sanctions for cartel conduct: a hard case

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Caron Beaton-Wells (University of Melbourne) and Christine Parker (Monash University) argue Justifying criminal sanctions for cartel conduct: a hard case.

ABSTRACT: Competition authorities increasingly favour criminal sanctions for ‘hard core’ cartel conduct. However, the empirical case for criminalization is thin. This article reports on ‘first of its kind’ empirical research that interrogates the key justifications offered by enforcers in support of criminal cartel law enforcement. Based on an Australian case-study, but with implications for other jurisdictions, the research findings raise serious questions about claims regarding the deterrence impact of criminal sanctions and the inherent criminality of cartel conduct. The implications for the criminalization ‘movement’ are far-reaching. Specific implications for the advocacy and outreach strategies of competition authorities are discussed, with particular emphasis on how such strategies should be formulated so as to maximize their value, not just in securing deterrence, but ultimately in building compliance.

March 12, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, March 11, 2013

Dealing with India's New Antitrust Laws: Practical Tips

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

See here for a program on April 9 in Washington, DC on Dealing with India's New Antitrust Laws: Practical Tips cosponsored by Nathan Associates, Kaitan & Co. and the US-India Business Counsel.

 

March 11, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Cartel class actions and immunity programmes

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Edward M. Iacobucci (University of Toronto) has written on Cartel class actions and immunity programmes.

ABSTRACT: The existence of class actions within a jurisdiction’s competition law regime has significant implications for other legal and enforcement issues. This article focuses on the interaction between class actions for damages and immunity programmes pursuant to which cartel whistle-blowers may escape criminal punishment, but may remain vulnerable to class actions. The article challenges a simplistic conclusion that class actions undermine the incentives to report a cartel pursuant to an immunity programme. The threat of independent detection of the cartel, and a corresponding obligation to pay damages in any event, at least mitigates the potentially negative effect of class actions on immunity programmes. Moreover, other considerations, for example, the fact that class actions may increase the probability of the cartel’s detection, suggest that class actions for damages may make immunity programmes more effective. If positive but lowered penalties are optimal for whistle-blowers, class actions also allow competition agencies to provide a bright-line, and thus more credible, commitment to zero public punishment for whistle-blowers, while maintaining a positive penalty overall because of private actions for damages. In light of this analysis, the article considers the question of standing of indirect purchasers to sue for damages from a cartel. There are competing considerations: indirect standing may mitigate concerns about reluctant direct purchaser plaintiffs, and about foreign cartels, but may increase concerns about attorney agency problems.

March 11, 2013 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)