Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Thursday, July 18, 2013

Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Duarte Brito, New University of Lisbon, Ricardo Ribeiro, Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) and Helder Vasconcelos Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) are Quantifying the Coordinated Effects of Partial Horizontal Acquisitions.

ABSTRACT: The growth of private-equity investment strategies in which firms often hold partial ownership interests in competing firms has led competition agencies to take an increased interest in assessing the competitive effects of partial horizontal acquisitions. We propose a methodology to evaluate the coordinated effects of such acquisitions on differentiated products industries. The acquisitions may be direct and indirect, and may or not correspond to control. The methodology, that nests full mergers, evaluates the impact on the range of discount factors for which coordination can be sustained. We provide an empirical application to several acquisitions in the wet shaving industry.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/07/quantifying-the-coordinated-effects-of-partial-horizontal-acquisitions.html

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