Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, June 11, 2013

Rebels without a clue? Experimental evidence on partial cartels

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Georg Clemens - Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) and Holger A. Rau - Dusseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ask Rebels without a clue? Experimental evidence on partial cartels.

ABSTRACT: This paper provides experimental evidence on the formation of partial cartels with endogenous coordination. Firms face a coordination challenge when a partial cartel is to be formed as every firm is better off if it is not inside the cartel but is a free-riding outsider. We introduce a three-stage mechanism with communication which facilitates the formation of a cartel and respectively allows the formation of a partial cartel. All-inclusive cartels are always formed. We find that partial cartels are frequently rejected out-of-equillibrium if moutside firms profit excessively from the formation of the cartel.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/06/rebels-without-a-clue-experimental-evidence-on-partial-cartels.html

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