Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, June 18, 2013

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES: AN ITALIAN ANTITRUST DILEMMA

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Valeria Falce (European University of Rome) discusses INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES: AN ITALIAN ANTITRUST DILEMMA.

ABSTRACT: The detrimental effects deriving from the widespread diffusion of interlocking directorates in the financial sector have been recently addressed by the Italian legislator. The new regulation, prohibiting personal links as such, swings between two focal points: the first is aimed at promoting a competitive marketplace, and the second one at fostering a more ethical environment based on diligence, correctness, and fairness. Both extremes perform a very precious function, balancing the undesirable consequences coming from the sole application of the other. In order to maximize the benefits of the new regulation, reducing its downsides, some amendments are suggested. As a result of their introduction, neutral social networks will be recognized and preserved, whereas those that represent the “superficial layer” of a broader pathological functioning of specific financial markets will be detected and appropriately eliminated.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/06/posted-by-d-daniel-sokol-valeria-falce-european-university-of-rome-discusses-interlocking-directorates-an-italian-antit.html

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