Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Cartel stability and profits under different reactions to entry in markets with growing demand

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joao Correia-da-Silva (CEF.UP e Faculdade de Economia do Porto), Joana Pinho (CEF.UP e Faculdade de Economia do Porto) and Helder Vasconcelos (ANACOM) discuss Cartel stability and profits under different reactions to entry in markets with growing demand.

ABSTRACT: We study sustainability of collusion with optimal penal codes, in markets where demand growth may trigger the entry of a new firm. In contrast with grim trigger strategies, optimal penal codes make collusion easier to sustain before entry than after. We compare different reactions of the incumbents to entry in terms of: sustainability of collusion, incumbent’s profits, entrant’s profits, consumer surplus and social welfare. Surprisingly, the incumbent firms may prefer competition to collusion.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/05/cartel-stability-and-profits-under-different-reactions-to-entry-in-markets-with-growing-demand-.html

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