Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, April 30, 2013

On Vertical Market Structure and Buyer Countervailing Power

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Xu-liang WU, Center for Industrial and Business Organization,DUFE,China provides thoughts On Vertical Market Structure and Buyer Countervailing Power.

ABSTRACT: The paper redefines different types of vertical market structure, such as double monopoly, bilateral monopoly, and two-sided monopoly. The core issue can be stated as follows: When there is bilateral monopoly, what are the differences between two-sided monopoly and one-sided monopoly as far as welfare consequences of retailers’ rising buyer power are concerned. The results show that in tow-sided monopoly situation, from consumer welfare perspective, the results of vertical integration are better than the results of vertical separation, whereas in one-sided monopoly situation, the results of vertical separation are better than the results of vertical integration, so the vertical market structure of one-sided monopoly or one-sided competition effectively overcomes double marginalization problem, to counter the forces at this time the buyer countervailing power hypothesis is somewhat reasonable. Taking Inter-period factor into account, this conclusion is even more credible.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/04/on-vertical-market-structure-and-buyer-countervailing-power.html

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Comments

Dear Professor Sokol, the article it's not available in SSRN, where can I find it.

Best regards,

Posted by: Soledad Rique | May 9, 2013 9:15:12 AM

Thank you

Posted by: Soledad Rique | May 9, 2013 9:16:45 AM

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