Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, January 28, 2013

The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

James McAndrews (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) and Zhu Wang (Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond) describe The economics of two-sided payment card markets: pricing, adoption and usage.

ABSTRACT: This paper provides a new theory for two-sided payment card markets. Adopting payment cards requires consumers and merchants to pay a fixed cost, but yields a lower marginal cost of making payments. Analyzing adoption and usage externalities among heterogeneous consumers and merchants, our theory derives the equilibrium card adoption and usage pattern consistent with empirical evidence. Our analysis also helps explain the card pricing puzzles, particularly the high and rising merchant (interchange) fees. Based on the theoretical framework, we discuss socially desirable payment card fees as well as the interchange fee cap regulation.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2013/01/the-economics-of-two-sided-payment-card-markets-pricing-adoption-and-usage-.html

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