January 9, 2013
The Anti-Competitive Effects of Minority Stake Acquisitions
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Amrita Nain, University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business and Yan Wang, McGill University - Faculty of Management discuss The Anti-Competitive Effects of Minority Stake Acquisitions.
ABSTRACT: We show that partial equity ownership of rival firms is driven by competitive considerations and has significant anticompetitive effects. Firms in competitive industries are more likely to acquire a minority stake in a rival firm’s equity. Moreover, minority sake acquisitions are followed by higher output prices and higher price-cost margins, particularly in industries with high barriers to entry. The increase in prices and profit margins is larger when the acquirer and target have a larger market share and when the percentage of shares acquired is higher. Our results suggest that passive investments in rival firms deserve antitrust scrutiny.
January 9, 2013 | Permalink
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference The Anti-Competitive Effects of Minority Stake Acquisitions: