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January 7, 2013
Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Kai Huschelrath, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Ulrich Laitenberger, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) - Industrial Economics and International Management Research and Florian Smuda, Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) analyze Cartel Enforcement in the European Union: Determinants of the Duration of Investigations.
ABSTRACT: We provide an empirical assessment of EC cartel enforcement decisions between 2000 and 2011. Following an initial characterisation of our dataset, we especially investigate the determinants of the duration of cartel investigations. We are able to identify several key drivers of investigation length such as the Commission’s speed of cartel detection, the type of cartel agreement, the affected industry or the existence of a chief witness.
January 7, 2013 | Permalink
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