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November 12, 2012
Four More Years: What Obama’s Reelection Means for United States Antitrust Policies
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
CPI has assembled a great lineup to discuss Four More Years: What Obama’s Reelection Means for United States Antitrust Policies.
November 12, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Competition, Standards, and Patents
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Per Hellstrom, European Union - Directorate General for Competition and Thomas Kramler, discuss Competition, Standards, and Patents. ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to briefly outline some of the issues raised by the use of standards and patents from an EU competition law perspective, and discuss what lessons market participants and regulators might draw from ongoing disputes.
November 12, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Trust and Deterrence
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Maria Bigoni, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) Chloe Le Coq, SITE-Stockholm School of Economics, and Giancarlo Spagnolo, University of Rome Tor Vergata, EIEF, Stockholm School of Economics (SITE), Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) have a very interesting paper on Trust and Deterrence. Highly recommended.
ABSTRACT: This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. Deterrence appears then mainly driven by 'distrust', the fear of partners deviating and reporting. Absent leniency, the probability of detection and the expected fine matter the most, and low fines are exploited to punish defections. The results appear relevant to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud.
November 12, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
U.S. Competition Policy 2013 and Beyond - A Post-Election Briefing By the American Antitrust Institute
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
November 12, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
What Happens When Local Phone Service is Deregulated?
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Jeffrey A. Eisenach, Navigant Economics LLC, George Mason University School of Law and Kevin W. Caves, Navigant Economics ask What Happens When Local Phone Service is Deregulated?
ABSTRACT: After more than half a century of monopoly and public utility-type regulation of retail telephone rates, the United States embarked on a path of liberalization in the early 1980s. That process is now nearing completion. However, two areas of telephone service largely remain under traditional regulation: rural-area service and “basic” service. Some states, however, have moved toward deregulation in these areas as well. This paper examines the outcomes of those efforts as compared to states that maintain traditional regulation. It finds that in terms of rates and utilization, consumers in deregulated states are at least as well off as consumers in regulated states.
November 12, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
