Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, November 16, 2012

Competition in Information Technologies: Standards-Essential Patents, Non-Practicing Entities and FRAND Bidding

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herbert J. Hovenkamp, University of Iowa - College of Law, discusses Competition in Information Technologies: Standards-Essential Patents, Non-Practicing Entities and FRAND Bidding.

ABSTRACT: Standard Setting is omnipresent in networked information technologies. Virtually every cellular phone, computer, digital camera or similar device contains technologies governed by a collaboratively developed standard. If these technologies are to perform competitively, the processes by which standards are developed and implemented must be competitive. In this case attaining competitive results requires a mixture of antitrust and non-antitrust legal tools.

FRAND refers to a firm’s ex ante commitment to make its technology available at a “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalty.” The FRAND commitment results from bidding to have one’s own technology selected as a standard. Typically the FRAND commitment is not a promise to charge any particular price, but only a price that meets FRAND expectations. This permits members of a standard setting organization (SSO) to focus on technical issues and worry about the price later. Two important questions that a FRAND commitment typically leaves open is the royalty base and the royalty rate. A strong case can be made that the base should be the smallest saleable unit containing the patented technology. While that base is not entirely free from problems, it does provide a more-or-less common currency. The FRAND obligation that the rate be nondiscriminatory typically, but not always, provides a set of yardsticks for measuring the rate.

The non-practicing entity (NPE) that voluntarily declines to participate in an SSO process should generally be held to the FRAND royalty as its measure of its damages, even though its particular patents are not FRAND-encumbered. In this case a “reasonable” royalty is the royalty that the patent holder would have obtained in the competitive market in which it might have participated. The case for limiting NPE damages in this way is strongest when the NPE had actual or objectively reasonable knowledge of the SSO process but declined to participate. The case is weakest when the SSO’s processes were not well communicated to outsiders or the NPE in question was not permitted to participate.

FRAND commitments should “run with the patent,” in the sense that owners of FRAND-encumbered patents should not be able to free them simply by assigning the patents to someone else. One fundamental principle of property law is that a property owner cannot transfer away a larger interest than it owns. The entire FRAND commitment process would be worthless if patent holders were able to evade it by the simple device of assigning encumbered patents in order to remove the encumbrance.

The question of injunctive relief is only a little more complex. A FRAND commitment is on its face an offer to license to all who employ that patent in their standards-compatible product. True, the precise royalty terms are typically not specified in advance, but that entails that the FRAND royalty will be determined by reference to common indicia such as rates paid for similar technologies in the same or perhaps another situation. Further, the FRAND commitment effectively turns the royalty issues into a breach of contract claim rather than a litigated royalty claim. Permitting the owner of a FRAND-encumbered patent to have an injunction against someone willing to pay FRAND royalties is tantamount to making the patent holder the dictator of the royalties, which once again is the same thing as no FRAND commitment at all.

November 16, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Federico Ciliberto, University of Virginia - Department of Economics, Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) asks Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry.

ABSTRACT: We show that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion in the US airline industry using two complementary approaches. First, we show that the more extensive is the overlap in the markets that the two firms serve, i) the more firms internalize the effect of their pricing decisions on the profit of their competitors by reducing the discrepancy in their prices, and ii) the greater the rigidity of prices over time.

Next, we develop a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. We find i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on collusive behavior and equilibrium fares; iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; iv) assuming that firms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs.

November 16, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Diminishing Enforcement: Negative Effects for Deterrence of Mistaken Settlements and Misguided Competition Promotion and Advocacy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Francisco Marcos, Instituto de Empresa Business School addresses Diminishing Enforcement: Negative Effects for Deterrence of Mistaken Settlements and Misguided Competition Promotion and Advocacy.

ABSTRACT: Competition policy is conceived to preserve and promote free market competition. It is fleshed out through a mix of tools that are used to further consumer welfare by preserving and promoting the efficient functioning of markets. Courts, administrative authorities and governments play different roles in the execution of competition policy. However, relatively recent developments have increased the number of tools in the shed of competition law enforcement.

This paper criticizes certain uses, mistaken or misguided, of settlements, advocacy and promotion by competition authorities. These are two very different settings in which the deterrent feature of competition authorities’ enforcement actions may suffer a deathly blow. If wrongly used, both may endanger the deterrent principle upon which competition law is built. The basic point of departure is that the new tools might be diminishing the effectiveness of ‘regular’ competition law enforcement — which shall not be left in the shed to rust.

November 16, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, November 15, 2012

Why an Antitrust Lawyer Cares About Patent Reform

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

David Balto explains Why an Antitrust Lawyer Cares About Patent Reform.

November 15, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Seminar on Competition Law - Brasilia December 6, 2012

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Seminar on Competition Law - Brasilia December 6, 2012. See the link.

Download Brazil conference

November 15, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Darius Lakdawalla (USC) and Tomas Philipson (Chicago) ask Does Intellectual Property Restrict Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets. I have known Darius since he was 19 and I was 18. He was smart then too.

ABSTRACT: Standard analysis of intellectual property focuses on the balance between incentives for research and the welfare costs of restraining output through monopoly pricing. We present evidence from the pharmaceutical industry that output often fails to rise after patent expirations. Patents restrict output by allowing monopoly pricing but may also boost output and welfare by improving incentives for marketing, a form of nonprice competition. We analyze how nonprice factors such as marketing mitigate and even offset the costs of monopoly associated with intellectual property. Empirical analysis of pharmaceutical patents suggests that, in the short run, patent expirations reduce output and consumer welfare by decreasing marketing. In the long run, patent expirations benefit consumers, but by 30 percent less than would be implied by the reduction in price alone. Focusing only on the pricing issues of intellectual property may lead to incomplete or even inaccurate conclusions for welfare.

November 15, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Competitive Impact of Hypermarket Retailers on Gasoline Prices

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Paul R. Zimmerman (FTC) has a really interesting article on The Competitive Impact of Hypermarket Retailers on Gasoline Prices.

ABSTRACT: Hypermarkets are large retail suppliers of general merchandise or grocery items that also sell gasoline, often at very low margins. This paper estimates the impact of hypermarkets on average state-level retail gasoline prices and margins. The empirical results indicate an economically and statistically significant price-decreasing effect of increased hypermarket competition. The estimations also suggest that refiners lower the delivered wholesale prices charged to their affiliated lessee-dealer and open-dealer stations in response to increased hypermarket competition, which in turn translates to lower retail (street) prices. The adoption of sales-below-cost laws may lessen the price-reducing effects from hypermarket competition.

November 15, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Relieving Banks from Toxic or Impaired Assets: The EU State Aid Policy Framework

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yassine Boudghene (DG Comp) and Stan Maes (Leiden) discuss Relieving Banks from Toxic or Impaired Assets: The EU State Aid Policy Framework.

ABSTRACT: The financial crisis has demonstrated that banks may end up holding toxic or impaired assets that harm their perceived solvency and liquidity. To address that difficulty, the European Commission has issued policy guidelines defining to what extent such banks can be relieved from impaired assets under the rules on State aids. An important question in that regard is the assessment of whether any assistance from governments may distort competition between financial institutions.

November 15, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Patrice Bougette, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis - Law, Economics, and Management Research Group (GREDEG CNRS), LAMETA CNRS and Frederic M. Marty, Research Group on Law, Economics and Management (UMR CNRS 7321 GREDEG) analyze What Remedies for Abuses of Dominant Positions? An Economic Analysis of the EC's Decisions.

ABSTRACT: Among other factors, one can assess the efficacy of a competition authority by its ability to choose and implement its remedies. Up until now, a dense economic literature has emerged on retrospective merger studies to measure the efficacy of merger control. Yet, little attention has been given to remedies in the other major pillar of competition policy, i.e. abuses of dominant position. In this paper, we try to fill the gap by first highlighting what is at stake and second analyse the most emblematic cases. We focus on the European Commission, while U.S. cases serve us as benchmark.

November 15, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

Shelanski presents Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet at Heath Memorial Lecture - University of Florida - 10 a.m., Friday, Nov. 16

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Howard Shelanski (Georgetown Law/FTC) is giving this year's Heath Memorial lecture at the University of Florida Levin College of Law 10 a.m., Friday, Nov. 16.

[Join us to rebuild a domestic violence survivor's life]


Georgetown Law Professor Howard Shelanski

Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the Internet

10 a.m., Friday, Nov. 16
Martin H. Levin Advocacy Center courtroom

Professor Howard Shelanski has been on leave from Georgetown to serve as director of the Bureau of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission since July 2012.

The Heath Memorial Lecture Series is made possible by a gift from Inez Heath, Ph.D., widow of Bayard "Wick" Heath. Before his death in 2008, Heath was the senior competition consultant with Info Tech, a Gainesville firm specializing in statistical and econometric consulting, expert witness testimony and antitrust law.


November 14, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ajay Bhaskarabhatla, Erasmus University Rotterdam and Enrico Pennings, Erasmus University Rotterdam examine Defensive Disclosure under Antitrust Enforcement.

ABSTRACT: We formulate a simple model of optimal defensive disclosure by a dominant firm facing uncertain antitrust enforcement and test its implications using unique data on defensive disclosures and patents by IBM. Our results indicate that stronger antitrust enforcement leads to more defensive disclosure, that quality inventions are also disclosed defensively, and that defensive disclosure served as an alternative, but less successful, mechanism to patenting at IBM in appropriating returns from R&D. We extend our analysis to two other exceptionally large firms with defensive-disclosure activity, AT&T and Xerox, and show that their patenting propensity declined under increased antitrust enforcement relative to other firms in the industry. Overall, we show how these firms used defensive disclosure as a strategy to balance the benefits of patenting with the costs of uncertain antitrust enforcement.

November 14, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Herb Hovenkamp (Iowa) offers his thoughts on Implementing Antitrust's Welfare Goals.

ABSTRACT: United States antitrust policy is said to promote some version of economic welfare. Antitrust promotes allocative efficiency by ensuring that markets are as competitive as they can practicably be, and that firms do not face unreasonable roadblocks to attaining productive efficiency, which refers to both cost minimization and innovation. One important welfare debate is whether antitrust should adopt a “consumer welfare” principle rather than a more general “total welfare” principle.

The simple version of the consumer welfare test is not a balancing test. If consumers are harmed by reduced output or higher prices resulting from the exercise of market power, then this fact trumps any offsetting gains to producers. In this sense the consumer welfare test is easier to administer on a case by case basis than general welfare tests that may have to trade consumer losses and producer gains against each other.

The volume and complexity of the academic debate on the general welfare vs. consumer welfare question creates an impression of policy significance that is completely belied by the case law. Few if any decisions have turned on the difference. In fact, antitrust policy generally applies both tests in the following sense. First, the economic analysis from the dominant Harvard and Chicago schools of antitrust is consistently concerned with general welfare. Second, however, if the evidence in a particular case indicates that a challenged practice facilitates the exercise of market power, resulting in output that is actually lower and prices that are actually higher, then tribunals uniformly condemn the restraint without regard to offsetting efficiencies. Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a single appellate decision that made a fact finding that a challenged practice resulted in lower market wide output and higher prices, but that also went on to approve the restraint because proven efficiencies exceeded consumer losses. In sum, courts invariably apply a consumer welfare test.

In the paradigm cases that are commonly used as illustrations in this debate, all consumers either gain or lose from a practice. Often things are not that simple. Many practices affect different consumers in different ways, making the computation of net effects very difficult. Among such practices are (1) variable proportion ties; (2) ties that result in interproduct price discrimination; (3) tying and bundled discounts of imperfect complements; (4) vertical restraints and other practices used to facilitate third degree price discrimination; and (5) resale price maintenance which causes nominally higher prices but produces services that are more valuable to some customers than to others.

When a practice causes both consumer harm and consumer benefit but net effects are unknown, producer gains may become more relevant, particularly if they result from significant production efficiencies.

November 14, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers within International Cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990-2009

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

John K. Ashton, Bangor Business School & Andrew D. Pressey, Birmingham Business School ask Who Manages Cartels? The Role of Sales and Marketing Managers within International Cartels: Evidence from the European Union 1990-2009

ABSTRACT: Although the study of international cartels has a considerable lineage our understanding of their organization, operation and management remains limited. This study attends to this omission through examining the role of marketing and sales managers within international cartels using a content analysis of 56 major international price-fixing cartels over two decades (1990-2009). It is reported that marketing and sales managers are demonstrably involved in many international cartels (42.9% of all cartel cases), albeit often accompanied by more senior managers from other firm functions. Marketing and sales managers appear most frequently within worldwide and manufacturing industry cartels and where market allocation and customer-sharing practices occur. In light of these findings it is important to reassess both managerial attitudes towards inter-firm collaborations and enhance the position of antitrust concerns within business school syllabi. Key words:

November 14, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

How Important is the Distinction in Article 101 TFEU between Agreements that Restrict Competition by Object and Those that Restrict by Effect?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Beata Kozubovska, Motieka & Audzevicius PLP, Vilnius University asks How Important is the Distinction in Article 101 TFEU between Agreements that Restrict Competition by Object and Those that Restrict by Effect? - Should the Distinction be Abolished, with the Result that the European Commission (or a National Competition Authority) Should Have to Prove Appreciable Anti-Competitive Effects in All Cases in Which a Violation of Article 101 is Alleged?

ABSTRACT: The paper discusses how important is the distinction in Article 101 TFEU between agreements that restrict competition by object and those that restrict by effect. Along the same line of thought it argues whether the distinction should be abolished, with the result that the European Commission (or a national competition authority) should have to prove appreciable anti-competitive effects in all cases in which a violation of Article 101 is alleged.

November 14, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Is Competition Always Good?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Maurice Stucke (Tennessee) asks Is Competition Always Good?

ABSTRACT: Competition is the backbone of U.S. economic policy. The U.S. Supreme Court observed, “The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition.” Competition advocacy is also thriving internationally. Promoting competition is broadly accepted as the best available tool for promoting consumer well-being. Competition officials, who regularly try to protect the public from anticompetitive special interest legislation, are justifiably jaded about complaints of excess competition. Although the economic crisis has prompted some policymakers to reconsider basic assumptions, the virtues of competition are not among them.

Nonetheless to effectively advocate competition, officials must understand when competition itself is the problem's cause, not its cure. Market competition, while harming some participants, often benefits society. But does competition always benefit society? This is antitrust’s blind spot. After outlining the virtues of competition, and discussing some well-accepted exceptions to competition law, this Article addresses four scenarios where competition yields a suboptimal result.

November 13, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Use and Abuse of Competition Law in Pursuit of the Single Market - Has Competition Law Served as Regulation Subject to a Quasi Industrial Policy Agenda?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Christian Bergqvist, University of Copenhagen/Falculty of Law asks Use and Abuse of Competition Law in Pursuit of the Single Market - Has Competition Law Served as Regulation Subject to a Quasi Industrial Policy Agenda?

ABSTRACT: The call for an enhanced role for industrial policy considerations has traditionally been relegated to the darkest corner of the competition law universe with limited support. In accordance with this the presumption has been that no such considerations have influenced the Commission's enforcement priorities. However, the reality tends, as often is the case, to be more complicated. In pursuit of the Single Market, competition law has occasionally served a regulatory role that comes with a flavour of industrial policy. Hence, it would be too simplistic to exclude industrial policy considerations as an objective advanced under competition law if a broader definition is applied.

November 13, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Present and Future of Behavioural Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

 

The Notre Dame Research Program on Law and Market Behavior with the UCL Centre for Law, Economics and Society invites you to
The Present and Future of Behavioural Antitrust
 
on Thursday 6 December 2012
from 3pm - 6.30pm, followed by a drinks reception
Speakers:
The Hon Mr Justice Barling (President, Competition Appeal Tribunal)
Dr Amelia Fletcher (OFT)
Dr Andrea Coscelli (OFCOM)
Dr Cristina Caffarra (CRA)
Dr Peter Davies (Compass Lexecon)
Paolo Siciliani (Chief Economist, BBC Trust)
Prof. Christopher Leslie (University of California at Irvine School of Law)
Prof. Maurice Stucke (University of Tennessee)
John Kirkpatrick (UK Competition Commission)
Prof. Avishalom Tor (Notre Dame Law School)
Dr Ioannis Lianos (UCL)
About the event:
Behavioural antitrust—the application to antitrust analysis of empirical evidence of common deviations of human behavior from strict rationality—is increasingly popular and hotly debated by competition law scholars and the enforcement agencies in the U.K, the EU more generally, and the U.S. alike. This timely conference will bring together leading experts in the field to examine the state-of-the-art of the behavioral approach to competition law and policy and to consider its future potential and limitations as an antitrust methodology.
Booking Website: 
http://behavioural-antitrust.eventbrite.co.uk/

November 13, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Peter P. Swire, Ohio State University (OSU) - Michael E. Moritz College of Law and Yianni Lagos, mention Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust and Privacy Critique.

ABSTRACT: In its draft Data Protection Regulation, the European Union has announced a major new economic and human right – the right to data portability ('RDP'). The basic idea of the RDP is that an individual would be able to transfer his or her material from one information service to another, without hindrance. For instance, consumers would have a legal right to get an immediate and full download of their data held by a social network such as Facebook, a cloud provider, or a smartphone app. <p> Although the idea of data portability is appealing, the RDP as defined in Article 18 of the draft Regulation is unprecedented and problematic. Part I explains Article 18, whose text appears to require software and online service providers to create what we call an 'Export-Import Module,' or software code that exports data seamlessly from the first service to the second service. The requirements would apply globally, for any entity that sells to an E.U. resident.

Part II critiques the RDP in light of the teachings of E.U. competition and U.S. antitrust law. Competition law has long addressed the problems of lock-in and high switching costs that form a chief justification for the RDP. The RDP, however, applies to small enterprises, where there is essentially no risk of lock-in. In contrast to competition law, the RDP applies to all online services even where there is no market power and no barrier to  entry. Article 18 more generally is in conflict with the rules in competition law about exclusionary conduct – it creates a per se prohibition where competition law would apply a rule of reason approach. Competition law would consider the many efficiencies that result from a service provider deciding which functions and formats to include in its products, which undergo rapid innovation.


Part III shows that Article 18 also suffers serious difficulties as a matter of privacy or data protection law. Proponents have claimed the RDP is a new fundamental human right, aiding the individual’s
autonomy for online activities. No jurisdiction has experimented with anything resembling the proposed Article 18, however, casting serious doubt on its status as a new human right. Among other difficulties, Article 18 poses serious risks to a long-established E.U. fundamental right of data protection, the right to security of a person’s data. Previous access requests by individuals were
limited in scope and format. By contrast, when an individual’s lifetime of data must be exported 'without hindrance,' then one moment of identity fraud can turn into a lifetime breach of personal data. Part IV shows that Article 18 goes far beyond previous legal rules that specifically address
interoperability.

In conclusion, the novel RDP is justified by the supposed benefits to consumers. As drafted, however, the RDP likely reduces consumer welfare, as articulated after long experience in competition law. It
also creates risks to privacy that are not addressed in the current text. The RDP deserves far more scrutiny before becoming a mandate that applies globally to software and online services.

November 13, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Forward Integration and Market Entry – Evidence from Natural Gas Markets for Household Customers in Germany

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Vigen Nikogosian and Jurgen Weigand, Wissenschaftliche Hochschule fuer Unternehmensfuehrung (WHU) Koblenz address Forward Integration and Market Entry – Evidence from Natural Gas Markets for Household Customers in German.

ABSTRACT: Due to potential abuse of the market power at wholesale and retail market level for natural gas the Federal Cartel Office in Germany prohibited further forward integration of gas importing firms with retail incumbents from 2005/2006 to 2010. The Authority argued that the very few dominant gas importing companies, which also own and operate the gas pipelines, could have an incentive to foreclose existing competitors or prevent potential market entry. However, two of the importing companies remained extensively forward integrated. To analyze possible forward integration issues empirically we employ cross sectional data (for September 2009) for about 500 submarkets for household customers in Germany. These submarkets have different vertical ownership structures. Our data set contains information on ownership and market entry. By applying a market entry model, which is based on the framework introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we do not find clear evidence that market entry is restricted by forward integration of gas importers and retail incumbents.

November 13, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, November 12, 2012

Market Definition - Still Needed after All These Years

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Malcolm B. Coate, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Jeffrey H. Fischer, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) argue Market Definition - Still Needed after All These Years.

ABSTRACT: The 2010 Merger Guidelines appear to elevate game theoretic models of competitive concerns to the primary concern of merger policy, while reducing the importance of market definition. Although situations in which this change makes some sense exist, we observe that, as a practical matter, market definition is still required. Some basic understanding of the market’s contours is necessary to aid the decision maker in the choice among the relevant competitive effects models. Simply assuming that a theoretical analysis is correct is not scientific. Proponents of the view that markets are unnecessary, rely on game-theoretic models that implicitly presume a particular competitive dynamic. Yet to displace the standard model of competitive analysis, a game theoretic model of competition requires both parameterization (estimation of the relevant coefficients) and testing of the implications of the model. Once the game theoretic model is tested, it becomes just one more Chicago-based analysis of the likely effects of a merger. Thus, theoretical considerations alone cannot eliminate the desirability of defining an antitrust market. Our review of the empirical data from Federal Trade Commission (FTC) merger investigations substantiates the potential for different market modeling structures to be applied to evaluate competition. Support for three different modeling structures (homogeneous product, static differentiation, and dynamic differentiation) is found in both a review of the court records and the FTC case studies. Choice among the modeling structures is best made on a case-by-case basis.

November 12, 2012 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)